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Abstract
THE POLITICS OF MEMORIALIZATION:
CREATING A HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM IN NEW YORK CITY
by
Rochelle G. Saidel
Sponsor:
Reader:

Professor Asher Arian
Professor Marshall Berman

This study of how government intervention affects the
implementation of a project of an interest group analyzes the
political processes of the 45 year impasse in completing a
major Holocaust memorial in New York City.

Using as a case

study the 1981-1991 effort to create such a project,

the

study develops a new concept for analyzing long-term publicprivate projects.

This study develops and uses a so-called

Mutagon to analyze the complicated and changing political
coalition that has endeavored

for ten years

to create a

Holocaust museum.
The Mutagon concept augments existing interest group
theories,

(e.g.,

iron triangle and issue network theory)

which do not adequately account for: changes in political
coalitions during long-term projects,' the possibility of an
interest group having to deal with both a governor and a
mayor; the conflicts of interest when elected officials are
part of the interest group.
The

Mutagon

concept

is

summarized

as

follows:

Government policy for a long-term city-state public-private

project emerges from a changing polygon consisting of the
interest

group,

mayor,

governor,

and

other

officials.

Although the Mutagon is working for closure, it may instead
create an impasse because of:

1. changes within this polygon

that occur over time (e.g., when a player enters or exits);
2.

the top-heavy

structure of a political

sometimes has two heads;

alliance that

and 3. the complex relationship

among the players.
Using the Mutagon,
literature

on

the study also builds on existing

citizen participation,

agenda

setting,

and

political symbolism, by demonstrating how changes over time
in a political alliance must be taken into account.

The

study traces the history and pre-history of the New York City
project,

including failed attempts since 1946 to create a

major Holocaust memorial, and the emergence of the Holocaust
as a "hot" agenda item for President Jimmy Carter and then
for Mayor
changing

Edward
stages

I.

Koch.

The

in the Mutagon

study also
coalition,

analyzes

the

including

the

sharing of power between Koch and Governor Mario Cuomo, and
how

these

changes

have

affected

the

prospects

for

implementation and the projected museum's image and way of
remembering.
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PREFACE

When I chose as the subject of this dissertation the
case study of the effort to create a major Holocaust memorial
museum in New York City, I did so with deep personal interest
in the

subject

and with

successful project.

the

expectation

of

analyzing

a

I chose the topic because I have had a

lifelong commitment to Judaism, and specifically, since 1977,
to studying and writing about the aftermath of the Holocaust.
My interest in the Holocaust solidified in 1977, when I
attended one of the first Nazi war criminal hearings in the
United States and spoke with survivors who were witnesses.
This led to my writing many articles and a book on this
specific

aspect

of

the

Holocaust..

As

part

of

my

responsibility on the staff of Senator Manfred Ohrenstein
from 1981 until 1989, I organized a permanent exhibit in the
New York State Museum in Albany which detailed the odyssey of
Holocaust refugees who were interned in Oswego, New York, and
kept

him

abreast

of

the

progress

on

the

New

York

City

Holocaust museum project.
I thus began following the project closely almost from
its initiation by Mayor Koch in 1981.

At that early date,

and even in 1988-1989 when I chose the project as a case
study for my dissertation,
success.

it seemed destined for ultimate

However, the intricacies of the political coalition

behind the museum, the changes in this coalition over time,

ix

and other circumstances have created problems that as yet
have prevented the museum from becoming a reality.
effort

to

understand

problematic,

why

I developed

this

and

project

coined

the

has
concept

In an

been

so

of

the

and

its

Mutagon.
Studying

and

writing

about

the

Holocaust

memorialization can be depressing because of the subject
matter.

A study of the successful creation of a Holocaust

museum, with its evocation of the history being recreated,
would be heartbreaking enough.

Because I cannot write about

a successful conclusion and because the path to the creation
of this museum has been so torturous, it has been even more
difficult to deal with.
There have been efforts to create a major Holocaust
memorial in New York City since 1946, and all of them have
failed.

It is ironic that this city with its huge Jewish

population, which was the first Jewish community to attempt
to create a major memorial in the United States, still does
not have one.

It is my personal hope that this project will

succeed, and that in the not too distant future the victims
of the Holocaust will be suitably remembered in New York
City.
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INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1:

A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW

"There's no monument in New York....
In the dark silent night
They throng without lament,
Wreathe New York's expanse
Of steel and concrete;
Carry water, sand, cement
To build a monument
For themselves-The s i x
million..."
Wolf Pasmanik1

This study of how government intervention affects the
implementation of a project of an ethnic interest group in
the United States will analyze the political processes of the
45 year impasse in completing a major Holocaust memorial in
New York City.

Using as a case study the 1981-1991 effort to

create such a project, the study will develop a new concept
for analyzing long-term public-private projects.
these ten years,

(During

the New York City project was first the

Mayor's Holocaust Memorial Task Force— 1981-1982, then the
New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission— 1982 through
1985, then the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission— from
early 1986 on.
memorial
account:

began

Earlier attempts to create a major Holocaust
in

1946.)

The

new

concept

takes

into

1) . the shifts in political alliances that occur

over time; and

2) . the top-heavy structure of a public-

1"There Is No Monument in New York", translated from the
Yiddish by Samuel Kreiter, World Union Press, mimeographed
release, New York, 1964? (undated), used with permission of
WUP editor David Horowitz.

private

project

that

involves

both

city

and

state

and

State

governments.
The

ways

in

which

the

New

York

City

governments intervened— from the genesis of the idea for the
latest memorial museum project in 1981 and throughout the
implementation
intricate

stage— are

interplay

government.

The

extremely

of various

question

of

complex,

organs

of

whether

with

an

City and State

the

Commission

is

private, State- and City-connected, or both, is also complex.
This

study

will

examine

how

government

intervention

has

changed over ten years, and how these changes have affected
the structure of the combined interest group and government
influences that are creating the project.

IRON TRIANGLE AND ISSUE NETWORK THEORIES
The

literature

government

alliances

on
is

the

structure

limited,

triangle and issue network theories.

and

of

interest

dominated

group-

by

iron

Iron triangle theory is

usually applied to interest groups operating vis-a-vis the
Federal government.
involving members

This analysis of three-way interaction
of Congress,

agency heads,

and special

interest lobbies was often employed in the 1960s and 197 0s
and continues to be utilized in the 1990s.2

According to

this theory, there is a solid trilateral bond formed by the

2 For a recent example, see Graham K.Wilson, Interest
Groups. Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1990, p. 60 and passim.

interest

group,

its

advocates

executive branch agency.

in

Congress,

and

in

the

Government policies emerge from

this closed triangle of interests, with congressmen passing
favorable legislation, agency bureaucrats implementing these
mandates, and special interest groups supporting the helpful
elected

officials

(e.g.

with

votes

and

campaign

contributions).
According to Harold Seidman's iron triangle analysis3,
there

was

no

significant

weakening

of

the

triangular

alliances that unite interest groups with their agents in
Congress and in the executive branch's bureaucracy.
that

"[congressional]

executive

branch

representing

staff

develop

bureaucracy

interest

and

groups."4

alliances
the

With

He said
with

the

bureaucracies

regard

to

Richard

Nixon's presidency, Seidman said Nixon was initially naive
and

that

"discovery

of

the

triangular

alliance

among

departments, congressional committees, and clientele groups,
known

to

any

reasonably

sophisticated

observer

of

the

Washington scene, came as a rude and nasty shock."5
In analyzing President Ronald Reagan's relationship with
Congress, David Everson wrote about "Reagan versus The 'Iron
Triangles'"

He said:

"The specific issues involved in the

3Harold Seidman, Politics.
Oxford University Press.
4Ibid., p. 43.
5Ibid., p. 116.

Position and Power. 1980,

Reagan program would be fought out in Congress in decisions
involving organized interest groups, government bureaus, and
congressional committees and subcommittees.11

According to

Everson, Reagan's plans to cut the budget and deregulate had
to pass through the iron triangles of interlocking government
and private interests that protect their favorite programs.6
Writing about the viewpoint of an official in a Federal
executive agency, rather than a President, Graham K. Wilson
said:
"Thus, the agency leader is often obliged to engage in
a complex balancing of the wishes of the White House,
Congress and interest groups linked to legislators on
the relevant committees.
agencies which

rarely

Occasionally, particularly in
attract

controversy,

an

'iron

triangle' emerges in which the agency acts to please its
attendant interest groups so as to please the relevant
congressional

committees,

whose members

in turn

are

eager to please the interest groups representing their
constituents."7
Hugh Heclo and Anthony King critiqued
theory,

and

instead

developed

an

issue

iron triangle

network

theory.

Writing in 1978, Heclo said that "the iron triangle concept

6David Everson, Public Opinion and Interest Groups in
American Politics. Franklin Watts, New York, 1982, pp. 200201.

7Wilson, p.60.

is not so much wrong as it is disastrously incomplete."8
He defined an issue network as "a shared-knowledge group
having to do with some aspect (or, as defined by the network,
some

problem)

participants
anonymous,

of
in

public
issue

policy."

networks

are

According

to

Heclo,

shifting,

fluid

and

unlike the iron triangle concept of a defined

small circle which forms to promote specific narrow issues.
He believes issue networks are less interested in material
gain than iron triangles and often are more interested in
intellectual
definition of

or

emotional

commitment.

issue networks,

technocrats" who become

According

to

his

they consist of "political

zealots

for narrow interests

and

prefer open arguments to closure.
King said of issue networks:

"The traditional interest

groups have not disappeared; instead they have been joined by
all manner of committees, organizations, and alliances owing
their raison d'etre not to considerations of self-interest,
even corporate self-interest, but to a disinterested concern
with the common weal."9

(As examples he listed Green Peace,

Friends of the Earth, Nader's Raiders,

and Common Cause.)

King said that in the 1960s and 1970s there was "increasing

8Hugh Heclo in The New American Political System edited
by Anthony King, American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. 87-124.
9Anthony King in The New American Political System
edited by Anthony King, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1978, (pp. 371395), p. 377.

professionalization of both governmental and interest-group
politics, and the development of issue networks so porous in
their structure that

it is sometimes hard to know where

government ends and nongovernment begins, who is the person
being

lobbied,

who

the

lobbyist."10

Regarding

coalition

building, he said this language no longer described American
politics and that the primary message of his book was that
"fewer and

fewer cohesive blocs

are to be

found

in the

American polity."11

THE MUTAGON:
As

this

BEYOND IRON TRIANGLES AND ISSUE NETWORKS
dissertation

will

demonstrate,

these

iron

triangle and issue network theories are not adequate for
analyzing the structure of the political forces behind the
New York Holocaust memorial museum or any long-term publicprivate project involving both city and state governments.
First, these two theories concern themselves with interest
coalitions on a Federal level,
level.

not a state or city-state

Although they might be adjusted to analyze political

alliances on a state or city-state level, they are generally
used

for

the

relationship

between

the

President

executive agencies), the Congress, and interests.

(and

Even if

the theories were adjusted for state and city-state politics,
however, the New York City Holocaust memorial museum is not
10Ibid. , p. 387.
11Ibid. , p. 390.

being created by a political alliance that can be analyzed as
an iron triangle or an issue network.

This alliance must be

analyzed as a far more complex and changing polygon. This
polygon
mayor,

consists

or consisted of the

the governor,

past

and present

Authority (BPCA) officials,

former and present
Battery

interest groups

Park City

(including the

officially appointed New York City and then the New York
Holocaust

Memorial

Commission,

and

a myriad

of

survivor

organizations, heads of major and minor Jewish organizations,
developers, administrative staff of the Holocaust Commission
and museum, architects and exhibit designers, consultants,
and Community Board One— each with its own factions, agendas
and

issue

networks) ; and, to

a lesser

degree,

the

City

Council, the Board of Estimate, the State Legislature, and
the City Planning Commission.
At

different

times,

the

influence of

each

of

components of the polygon has increased or diminished.

the
In

addition to the varying influence of each of the concerned
parties over time,

some new alliance partners were added

along

others

the way

and

faded away.

No

one

was

ever

officially removed from office or membership in the New York
Holocaust Memorial Commission, as there is no provision for
such removal.

A distinguishing characteristic of the polygon

is that beginning in 1986 it has had two heads with power of
appointment to the Commission— the mayor and the governor.
(After Mayor Edward I. Koch, the founder, left office at the

end of 1989, there were no further appointments by either the
new mayor or the governor.)

Thus

its structure will be

analyzed not as an iron triangle or an issue network, but as
a changing and for much of the time a two-headed geometric
polygon that will be called a "Mutagon”.

(In Latin mutare

means to change; the syllable ”-gon", from the Greek, means
having angles or sides.)
In addition to not accounting for changes in a long-term
project,

iron triangle

applicable

to

this

and

case

issue network theory

because

the

are not

interrelationships

between the components of this alliance are more complex.
There

are:

two

executive

governor);

Battery

autonomous

than

Park

most

branches

City

(the

Authority

agencies

of

the

mayor
(which

and
is

the
more

executive);

two

legislative branches (the New York State Legislature, and the
New York City Council), which have a much less significant
role than the executive branches.
involved,

the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission,

officially
(unlike

The major interest group

appointed by the mayor

the

interest

groups

in

was

and then the governor

iron

triangle

and

issue

network theory).
The three sub-heads, or co-chairmen, of the Mutagon also
have conflicts that make the polygon complex:

Then Mayor

Koch appointed two of the co-chairmen, powerful Republican
real estate developer George Klein and Manhattan District
Attorney Robert Morgenthau.

When Governor Mario Cuomo became

a Founding Co-chairman in 1986, he appointed the third cochairman,

New

Ohrenstein.
Party

and

York

Senate

Minority

Leader Manfred

Besides being a leader of the State Democratic
creating

constituents
Ohrenstein

State

an

anti-development

(potentials

was

indicted

chairman Morgenthau.
September 1991.)

for
in

image

conflicts

1987

by

none

among

with
other

his

Klein),
than

co-

(All charges were finally dropped in

Thus the relationship of the players is

much more intertwined, conflictive and also more amorphous
than a triangle or issue network, and there are many more
possibilities
there

is a

for interplays and power plays.

fourth co-chairman

Cohen, but he is not a player.

appointed by

(On paper
Cuomo,

Peter

See Chapter 13.)

While the implementation of the Holocaust project cannot
be adequately analyzed as the creation of issue networks, two
components of issue networks discussed by Heclo and King can
be applied.

Regarding the tendency of issue networks to

build coalitions, King said this language no longer described
American politics and that there were a decreasing number of
cohesive blocs.

Likewise, there is no coalition building

between the members of the Holocaust Commission and other
interest groups. The Commission, which would be the component
of the Mutagon that might be considered part of an issue
network, does not want to build coalitions.

With regard to

other interest groups creating major Holocaust.memorials in
the United States, i.e., the national memorial in Washington,

10

D.C. and the Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, the Commission
views

them

museums

as

competitors— not

in general

been

allies.

considered

Nor

allies

have

or

coalition, e.g. to lobby together for funding.

part

other
of

a

As for other

groups that have sought to be memorialized as victims of
Hitler, the Commission sees the New York museum as a Jewish
memorial and offers them only minimal recognition.

There is

perhaps a self-righteous sense of justness of purpose that
precludes the Commission or its leaders

from seeking out

others to form a coalition or network.
Another aspect of issue networks, as defined by Heclo,
is

also

applicable

to

the

Commission.

As mentioned

networks

less

are

New

York

earlier,

interested

Holocaust

Heclo

in material

Memorial

believes
gain

than

issue
iron

triangles and often are more interested in intellectual or
emotional commitment.

This statement could be made with

regard to the Commission leaders, with reservations.

They

are committed to the project emotionally and are not seeking
material gain.

However, as will be clarified later, they are

also reaping their own political benefits from associating
themselves with the project.
One characteristic of Heclo7s issue network analysis
does not apply to the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission,
although it would appear to be the case.

Heclo said issue

networks prefer open arguments to closure.

Despite the years

of delay in completing their museum, the Holocaust Commission

11

seeks to complete their project as soon as possible.
they

do

so

and

come

to

closure,

they

will

Unless

not

gain

professional prestige,

prominence in the organized Jewish

community,

political

or

other

participation in the project.

advantages

Furthermore,

from

their

in addition to

the opportunities for personal political gain, the past and
present

leaders

of

the

project

appear

to

be

sincerely

interested in the importance and necessity of their cause
(like those in King's examples, op. cit.).
Heclo speaks of overlooking webs of influence, while we
look for the few with power.

In the case of the Holocaust

memorial, there are, in fact, the few with power.

They head

a complex and changing Mutagon that cannot be analyzed by
either an iron triangle or an issue network theory.

While

the political forces working to create the museum have some
aspects that could be analyzed according to one or both of
these theories,

neither is suitable and a new concept is

necessary.
This new so-called Mutagon concept can be stated as
follows:

Government policy for a long-term city-state

public-private project emerges from a changing polygon
consisting of the interest group,
governor,

the mayor,

and the

with other elected and appointed officials

involved to a lesser extent.

Although the Mutagon is

working for closure, it may instead create an impasse
because of:

1. the changes within this polygon that
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occur over time

(especially when a new major player

enters or an old major player leaves); 2. the top-heavy
structure of a political alliance that at some stages
has two heads; and 3. the complex relationship among the
polygon's web of players.

PRE-HISTORY OF THE MUTAGON
Using

this new concept,

the Mutagon,

to analyze the

structure of the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission and
its political allies, this study addresses the issue of why,
more than 46 years after the end of World War II and after a
lengthy period of great interest in the Holocaust, there is
still no major Holocaust memorial in New York City.

Instead,

this city, which has had the largest Jewish and the largest
Holocaust survivor populations in the United States, has seen
a series of failed attempts that began in 1946.
a Holocaust Memorial
originally

Task Force,

and then

appointed by Mayor Koch,

create such an institution.

has

Since 1981,

a Commission,

been working to

However, more than ten years

later, at the beginning of 1992, none yet exists and there is
not even a hole in the ground.

In order to analyze why the

current project has been at such an impasse, it is necessary
to examine the politics behind earlier and current attempts,
how the

issue of Holocaust memorialization was placed on

United States and New York City governmental agendas, and the
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project's

changing

structure

of

players,

allies,

and

processes.
Related

events

that

preceded

Koch's

creation

of

a

Holocaust Commission will be reviewed to place the current
project in historical perspective:

e.g., the emergence of

the Jewish community as an interest group
States

(Chapter

2) ;

the

increased

in the United
importance

of

memorialization of the Holocaust for the Jewish community
(Chapter 3) ; the many earlier attempts, beginning in 1946, to
create a Holocaust memorial in New York City (Chapters 4, 5
and

6);

and President Jimmy Carter's national

initiative

(Chapter 7).
Earlier failed attempts to create a Holocaust memorial
in New York City were structured much more simply than the
Mutagon.

They

were

begun

disorganized interest groups.

by

individuals

and

small,

They failed partially because

all of Mayor Koch's predecessors from William O'Dwyer in 1947
through Abraham Beame in 1977 publicly said they supported
the idea of a Holocaust memorial, but none of them made the
idea his own and aggressively led the effort.

It always

remained a private endeavor (although a small parcel of City
land for a site was offered more than once).
The first attempt to create a Holocaust memorial in New
York City began in 1946-1947.

In Riverside Park at 83rd

Street there is an engraved stone, placed there in October
1947 and intended as a cornerstone, which says:

"This is the
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site for the American memorial to the heroes of the Warsaw
Ghetto battle April-May 1943 and to the 6 million Jews of
Europe martyred in the cause of human liberty."

But 45 years

later, neither an "American" nor a major New York memorial
yet exists.
national

They are both separate works in progress:

memorial

is

under

construction

on

the

Mall

The
in

Washington, D C. and slated for a 1993 opening, but the New
York memorial is still not off the ground in Battery Park
City.
When the first Holocaust memorial was being planned in
Riverside Park in 1946-1947, the Jewish community was only
loosely organized, its foremost purpose was the creation of
a homeland in Palestine, and it was still in shock and denial
over the losses of the Holocaust.
real

threat

in

the

United

Anti-Semitism was still a

States,

and

accusations

of

Communist connections were also real and growing threats (See
Chapter 4) .
effort

at

In retrospect,
memorialization

it is more remarkable that an
was

begun

in

the

political

atmosphere of 1946-1947, than that it failed.
By the time of the second major attempt to create a
Holocaust memorial in New York City in the 1960s, the Jewish
community was much more organized than in 1947.

A committee

was again formed, and this time the effort had the backing of
Jewish organizations, rather than individuals.

Several sites

and designs were considered by the memorial committee and by
the

City.

Mayors were supportive, but there was still not
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enough political advantage from such a memorial for the City
administration to strongly back it.

Other priorities in the

organized Jewish community were also a factor in the failure.
The community itself gave up the project

and

focused on

helping Israel, especially after the 1967 Six Day War and the
1973 Yom Kippur War.
By the end of the 1970s, the situation had changed, and
memorialization

of

the

Holocaust

had

gained

increasing

acceptance in the organized Jewish community.
culminated with Carter's

1978

After this

announcement of a national

memorial, there was political advantage from strongly backing
a Holocaust memorial in New York City.

Koch, encouraged by

his political entrepreneur Herbert Rickman, was then able to
intervene and coopt the issue of Holocaust memorialization to
gain political

favor in the Jewish community in New York

City.
In 1978 a presidential political entrepreneur proposed
to

President

Carter

that

such

a project might

help

him

strengthen his position in the organized Jewish community on
a national level.

This external intervention by the Federal

government for a national Holocaust memorial project in turn
gave the then dormant New York project legitimacy and made it
more

important

for New York City's established organized

Jewish community.
his

own narrow

In 1981 the mayor of New York City created
interest

group,

a Task Force

and then

a

Memorial Commission, for the purpose of building a memorial
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and at the same time strengthening his position vis-a-vis the
established organized Jewish community in New York City.

The

mayor's specific "interest group" included some of the old
players who had been trying to create a Holocaust memorial
for many years,
control

and

but he

influence,

added people who would
especially

in

the

give him

person

of

his

powerful chairman.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS FOR THE MUTAGON'S IMPASSE
The study will analyze the internal and external reasons
why the project has not yet succeeded.
from the unwieldy

and changing

Internal reasons flow

structure

of the Mutagon

responsible for implementation, and the length of time the
project has dragged on.
alliances

over time

They include:

changes in political

(including new elected and appointed

officials); having at the helm (for much of the time) both
the mayor and the governor, sometimes with different agendas;
other

priorities

organized

Jewish

(especially

fundraising

community,

which

crises)

influence

in

the

Commission

members and potential donors; disagreement among the sub
heads

and

subgroups

that

comprise

the

Commission;

the

politics of site selection; and the personalization of the
project by one major player.
Notwithstanding

these

internal

problems,

a

positive

influence should have been the fact that since the 1970s the
idea of memorialization had grown in the organized American

17

Jewish community
demonstrated

(including New York City).

As will be

in Chapter 3, this was because non-Orthodox

segments of the community were seeking a new secular link
with Judaism in the United States, the community generally
had underlying

fears

of history repeating

itself,

and a

number of new historic events brought these fears closer to
home.

However,

although

the

idea

of

Holocaust

memorialization increased in importance, there still was not
enough interest to successfully complete a project by the
beginning of 1992.
The major external reason for failure to create the
earlier Holocaust memorial projects in New York City (from
1946 through the 1960s) was the lack of interest on the part
of government officials who had given approval but not real
commitment to helping with implementation.

The issue was not

"hot"; i.e., there was little political capital to be gained
from supporting it.

The increasing importance of Holocaust

memorialization for the organized American Jewish community,
which began gradually in 1961 and was heightened later in the
decade and in the 1970s, acted as a catalyst for government
interest

and

intervention.

Ironically,

this

very

intervention later held up the New York memorial project even
more.
The Commission that Koch had originated became CityState

in

1986,

when

Governor Cuomo

retroactively

became

"Founding Co-chairman" along with Koch, and the new structure
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of political allies was initiated.

The dissertation will

analyze the negative effects of this Mutagon in its new form:
the State government's trying to influence the final outcome
of

the

project,

the

governor's

policies

producing

bureaucratic problems and delayed implementation,

friction

between the City and the State over the project,

and the

election and appointment of new State and City government
officials

disrupting

implementation.

the

continuity

of

the

project's

Governor Cuomo's and BPCA's intervention to

block a deal and to drastically increase rent for the museum
resulted

in

delays

and

unexpected

new

decisions

by

the

Commission.
As Pressman and Wildavsky said, there was the emergence
in the "decision path of numerous diversions not intended by
the program sponsors.

The paths of required decisions, as we

can see, were soon characterized by more unexpected elements
than expected ones:

they were anything but straight lines

leading

goals."12

directly

to

Another

diversion

of

the

decision path was caused by "Black Monday" on Wall Street,
October 19, 1987, and subsequent economic crises in New York
City.
Battery

The economic climate both dropped property values in
Park

resulting

City

and

wiped

in new decisions

out

many

potential

on the best way

to

donors,
fund the

museum.
12Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation
(Second, expanded edition), University of California Press,
1979, p. xix.
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In addition to these negative aspects, the study will
also evaluate the positive effects of the mayor's, and later
the governor's, intervention on the project in New York City.
It will show how the gift of government resources such as
land and money initially helped legitimize the project and
attract more

private money.

Government

support

such as

providing skills, and the indirect positive impact of the
mayor's (and later the governor's) connection also at some
stages helped to overcome bureaucratic problems within the
government.

AGENDA SETTING
The dissertation will analyze the factors that led to an
awareness that memorialization of the Holocaust has political
value

in

the

memorialization
system.

United

States,

and

how

politicizing

this

is in accord with the American political

It will offer a new Mutagon concept for interest

group politics that involve both city and state governments,
going beyond iron triangle and issue network theories.
In addition to adding to the literature on the structure
of interest group-government alliances, this Mutagon concept
also builds on the established body of work on agenda setting
and public policy,
interest
coalition,

group

which are related to the structure of

politics.

The

changes

in

the

complex

i.e., the Mutagon, that is the political force

behind the creation of the Holocaust memorial museum in New
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York City have affected the agenda setting for and delayed
implementation of the project.

The coopting of an idea and

creation of a specific interest group by an elected official,
and the subsequent usurping of the idea and group by another
official, have led to more than ten years of stagnation.
This case study of the New York City Holocaust museum is
a deviant case study13, because the project should have been
destined for smooth sailing.

Unlike earlier attempts in New

York, the current project was placed on the agenda by the
City administration (Mayor Koch) and then eagerly embraced by
a well-established and organized Jewish leadership (including
developers

and

other

supporters

of

Koch). Rickman,

the

political entrepreneur who formally initiated this project
for Mayor
Carter's

Koch

in

creation

1981,
of

had

the

as his precedent

President's

President

Commission

on

the

Holocaust three years earlier, which gave the City project
added prestige.
Moreover, by 1981 memorialization of the Holocaust had
become

a

hot

item

for

the

major

Jewish

American

organizations. In the 1980s, the politics of memorializing
the Holocaust became a "growth industry".
1970s,

Until the early

it was not on even on their agendas.

priority when it was finally placed there.

Nor was it a

After 1978, when

13A s an example of a deviant case study, see Seymour
Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, Union
Democracy. The Free Press, New York, 1956, which analyzes why
the political structure of the International Typographical
Union, unlike most other unions, is democratic.

Holocaust memorialization was placed on the agenda of the
United States Government, the idea became more important for
the organized Jewish community and thus ripe for adoption by
Koch.

By that time a number of unrelated factors had

converged

to

make

memorialization

of

the

Holocaust

an

appropriate issue for elected officials and candidates to
place on the agenda:

e.g., the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973

Yom Kippur War had brought images of another Holocaust to the
fore; Menachem Begin, who masterfully used the Holocaust for
his own political purposes, became Prime Minister of Israel
in June, 1977; leaders of survivor organizations, realizing
their biological clocks were ticking fast, began encouraging
other survivors to share their stories; the much-publicized
television program Holocaust was the
airing on the
1978;

children

(fictionalized)
of

survivors

first major network

subject of the Holocaust in
reached

adulthood

and

began

asking questions about their parents' past; secular American
Jews

who

were

disillusioned

with

Israel

were

seeking

a

substitute secular tie to Judaism; the United States Justice
Department

in

1977

set up

a Special

Litigation

Unit

to

investigate and bring to trial Nazi war criminals living in
the United

States.

When President

Carter's

people were

searching for a domestic issue that would mend fences with
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Jewish voters in 1978, the issue of the Holocaust "arose in
the primeval soup".

It was an idea whose time had come.14

According to John W. Kingdon, patterns of public policy
are determined by what gets on the agenda.

His four stages

for the setting of federal public policy are:

setting an

agenda, specifying alternatives, choosing officially (e.g.,
by legislative vote), and implementing the choice.

He says

we need to know what made the soil fertile, rather than the
origin of the
problems.

seed,

and that

Kingdon's

model

solutions often search

has

three

streams:

for

problem

recognition, policy formulation and refinement, and politics.
When these three streams come together at a critical time, an
issue suddenly "gets hot" and policy entrepreneurs go into
action.15

Kingdon's

model

will

be

used

to

analyze

how

memorializing the Holocaust got on the agenda of the United
States government, and subsequently on those of New York City
and New York State.
As a result of President Carter's agenda setting in
197 8, by 1989, a major national Holocaust memorial museum was
beginning to rise on the Mall in Washington, D.C.

Meanwhile,

in 1981, Koch, running for reelection, had followed President
Carter's lead and created his own Mayor's Task Force on the

14John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives and Public
Policies. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1984, pp. 122123.
15Ibid. , pp. 92-94.
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Holocaust.

(He had expressed interest in creating a memorial

at least two years earlier, but did not act on the issue.)
GENESIS OF THE MUTAGON
Koch's

intervention

began

when

Rickman

approached

developer George Klein in the Spring of 1981, an election
year, and suggested the creation of a Mayor's Task Force.
Klein took the chairmanship and in July
communal leaders,

1981,

28 Jewish

survivors, Holocaust scholars, and other

prominent and wealthy Jews were named as members.

In 1982

this Task Force recommended a permanent commission, and in
1983 the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission was
appointed by Mayor Koch.

In 1986 Governor Cuomo became

(retroactively) a Founding Co-chairman along with Koch, and
at this point the Mutagon changed its form and became twoheaded.

Cuomo was allowed to appoint additional Commission

members and a co-chairman, and the name was changed to the
New York Holocaust Memorial Commission.

Because he offered

to house the museum in Battery Park City, which he controlled
through Battery Park City Authority,
power

structure

of

government

a State entity,
intervention

the

changed

dramatically.
Mayor Koch, like President Carter, did not create his
Holocaust Commission
interest

groups.

in response to pressure

Instead,

these

two

from Jewish

elected

officials

coopted the issue of the memorialization of the Holocaust and
used it to please the organized Jewish community, and thereby
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obtain

Jewish

respective

votes

upcoming

and

financial

elections.

backing

Carter,

and

for

their

then

Koch,

created a specific Holocaust memorialization interest group
that

could

potentially

bring

Cuomo's political entrepreneur,

in votes
Meyer S.

and money.
(Sandy)

When

Frucher,

decided that Cuomo, too, could and should have a piece of the
pie, the City-State Mutagon became a reality.
Koch's coopting the project should have made it more
likely to succeed than earlier efforts to create a major
Holocaust memorial in New York City, because he had a vested
interest
backing.

in

its

success

and gave

it active governmental

As will be shown, however,

a series of setbacks

delayed completion of the memorial during Koch's term as
mayor.

The most significant setbacks were caused by the

intervention of Governor Cuomo and several of his high level
officials, after the two-headed polygon structure became a
reality.
there

When Koch left office at the end of December 1989,
was

still not even a hole

in the ground

proposed Holocaust memorial and museum.

for his

His absence after so

prominently linking himself with the project,

and Cuomo's

shifting interest as he looked toward a possible national
election

for President,

impeded implementation.

will be analyzed as factors that

25

POLITICAL POWER AND THE MUTAGON
After
organized

Rickman,
Jewish

Koch's

community,

liaison

to

suggested

the

the

established

creation

Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust in 1981

of

a

(an election

year), Koch and Rickman chose George Klein as its chairman.
He was not only a multimillionaire developer and major Koch
campaign contributor but also a vice president of the New
York Jewish Community Relations Council.

At this time, the

Mutagon had not yet grown another head, i.e., Cuomo.

Koch,

as founding chairman, was at the apex, with sole power of
appointment.

Klein, as sole chairman of the Task Force, ran

the show, working closely with Rickman.
Political entrepreneurs such as Rickman and Klein (and
other developers who were members of the Holocaust Commission
and

major contributors to Mayor Koch's campaigns) knew how

to use their political resources to increase their power and
promote their agendas.

The creation of the New York City

Holocaust Memorial Commission gave Rickman, Koch, Klein and
others

the

opportunity

to

use

the

issue

of

Holocaust

memorialization to increase their potential influence in the
organized

Jewish

community.

They

used

their

political

resources efficiently to promote the idea and at the same
time to increase their own power by associating themselves
with

the

project

and

professional political

appointing

members.

These

were

"players" who knew how to use the

slack resources to their advantage.

At Rickman's suggestion,
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Koch appointed Klein, his rich long-time friend as chairman.
Klein was then in a position to encourage his friends, other
wealthy developers,

to be generous both to the effort to

create a Holocaust memorial and to Koch's mayoral campaign.
To an extent, the "player" aspect of the Mutagon concept
of government-interest group structure can be analyzed using
Robert Dahl's and Edward C. Banfield's theories of citizen
participation.

Unlike

iron

triangle

and

issue

network

theories that analyze political alliances on a Federal level,
these studies deal with power in local government.

However,

like iron triangle and issue network theories, these theories
of local citizen participation and power do not account for
changes in political alliances when projects are long-term;
nor do they account for both a mayor and governor sharing
power.
In Who

Governs?

Democracy

and

Power

in an American

City16, an examination of political influence in New Haven,
Dahl explores how the inequality of resources affects ability
to influence government in the "democratic" American system.
The

political

alliance

behind

creation

of

the

New

York

Holocaust memorial can be analyzed according to Dahl's theory
that

New

Haven's

political

system,

like

that

of

most

pluralistic democracies, has three important characteristics:
slack

resources,

or

a gap

between

actual

and

potential

16Robert Dahl, Who Governs?. Yale University, 1961, pp.
305-310.
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influence;

a small band of professional political players

that organize their lives around political activity; and a
built-in

self-operating

participants
Dahl's

limitation

of

influence

of

all

(e.g., when an incumbent loses an election).

analysis

does

not

take

into

account,

however,

a

situation such as that of the New York Holocaust museum
project, which changed its structure over the years and for
some time had two prime political players at the helm— Koch
and

Cuomo.

In

this

case,

the

built-in

self-operating

limitation of influence that occurred when Koch lost his
reelection bid

in

1989 was

distorted by

Cuomo's

earlier

intervention and subsequent takeover of some of Koch's power
vis-a-vis the project.
Likewise,
1950s17 is

Banfield's classic study of Chicago in the

useful

but

limited

for

Holocaust project's Mutagon structure.

an

analysis

of

the

His analysis of the

politics of site selection is of special interest because
from the beginning site selection was a major component in
how the players' influence affected the implementation of the
Holocaust museum.

The

location was

originally the U.S.

Custom House, and then more than one site was considered at
Battery Park City.

However, Governor Cuomo's intervention

made the New York City situation more complex than the one
analyzed by Banfield.

Just when the City administration had

17Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press
of Glencoe, New York, 1961.
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secured

the

Custom

House

as

a

site,

Cuomo's

political

entrepreneurs dangled the promise of a better deal in Battery
Park

City

(with

Cuomo

as

project

co-chairman).

Koch's

acquiescence and the Holocaust Commission's ensuing decision
to change to this

site

led to further complications and

stagnation.
Banfield's analysis of civic controversies in Chicago,
to an extent, can also explain how creation of the Holocaust
museum is affecting other Jewish institutions and groups in
New York City who feel threatened by usurpation.
to

Banfield,

maintenance

these
and

organizations.

controversies

enhancement
The

leaders

According

arise

"out

of

large

needs

of an organization

of

formal
see

advantage to be gained by changing the situation.
propose changes.

the

some
They

Other large organizations are threatened.

They oppose, and a civic controversy takes place."18
In the case of the New York City Holocaust project, the
problem with this analysis is that is does not account for
the possibility of two heads of the same organization seeking
competitive advantages for themselves.

In this case, the

controversy is internal as well as with outside organizations
that feel threatened.

For example, when one founding co-

chairman (Cuomo) proposed changes, the other one (Koch) could
feel

threatened.

There

18Ibid. , p. 263.

is

competitive

"maintenance

and
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enhancement" with other institutions,

and also within the

Commission.
Banfield said informal centralization is attempted, in
order to accomplish a major project.

In order to do so, the

actions of many people who have independent authority must be
concerted for a proposal to be adopted:
the proposal

try to

"The proponents of

concert these actions by exercising

influence— by persuading, deceiving, inveigling, rewarding,
punishing, and otherwise inducing; meanwhile the opponents
exercise influence...."19 This model can only be used to an
extent for the New York City project.

While it is true that

the proponents have in some ways and at some times concerted
their actions to achieve their goal,

at other times,

internal actions have been anything but unified.

the

In fact, at

times one part of the Mutagon, usually the governor (or his
agency,

BPCA), acted

influence"

than

more

like

Banfield's analyses,

a

like

the

proponent.

"opponent
Unlike

exercising
Dahl's

and

the Mutagon is a changing construct

which was two-headed during crucial years.

Governor Cuomo

and Mayor Koch were jointly in control, but were competing
for power and not always working together in harmony for the
benefit of the project.

19Ibid. , p. 307.
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HOW CHANGES IN THE MUTAGON CHANGED THE PROJECT
Because there was government intervention first by Mayor
Koch,

and then by Governor Cuomo,

in efforts to create a

Holocaust memorial museum in New York City, the content and
philosophy of the project was affected.

Their intervention

and the location of the project in the United States, and
specifically, in New York City, give the museum's concept a
particular

slant.

Like

interest

group

and

citizen

participation theories, theories of social construction of
reality and political symbolism are useful but limited for
analyzing how plans for the New York City Holocaust memorial
project have evolved.
There are specific governmental demands and also a kind
of self-censorship by the interest group to emphasize the
positive aspects of the United States' historical record with
relation to the event being memorialized.

In addition, there

has been an attempt by the governor's office, which has been
resisted

by

the

completely Jewish.

Commission,

to

make

the

museum

less

As will be shown, this culminated in the

First Amendment (i.e., separation of Church and State) being
cited in the 1991 Memorandum of Agreement between BPCA and
the Holocaust Commission.
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's theory of "social
construction of reality" analyzes how the historical reality
created in a museum is a reflection of where the museum is
located.

Their central hypothesis is that "knowledge" is
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different in different societies,
study must
particular

deal with
society.

what
The

is

and that a sociological

considered

authors

knowledge

state that

in a

"reality

is

socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must
analyze the processes

in which this occurs."20

In other

words, "reality" is not the same everywhere.
Karl Deutsch calls his analysis the "feedback model of
consciousness"21, rather than the

"social

reality".

is

However,

the

concept

construction of

virtually

the

same:

groups (such as creators of memorials) select certain aspects
of experience and attach symbols to them, which may distort
the message being conveyed, to suit the preference of these
groups.

Deutsch speaks of the selective interests of the

person who knows, and concludes that knowledge is a point at
which subjective and objective elements meet.
Using Berger and Luckmann's and Deutsch's theories, it
can

be

demonstrated

that

the

specific

conception

and

evolution of this Holocaust museum could only occur in New
York City.

In New York City the museum's viewpoint, or way

of remembering, is influenced by the large, organized Jewish
population.

This concentration of nearly two million Jews,

20Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social
Construction of Reality. Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co.,
Garden City, N.Y., 1966, p.l.
21Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. The Free
Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1963.

many

of

whom

development,

are

prominent

finance,

the

in

arts,

government,
public

real

estate

relations,

higher

education and other "worlds" that make New York "move and
shake" gives the City an ambience that is uniquely Jewish in
the United States

(which does not negate the influence of

other ethnic groups in what Mayor David Dinkins calls the
"beautiful mosaic"). The humorous term "Jew York" arose with
good reason.

As Nathan Glazer said:

"One could live a

completely Jewish life from a sociological point of view and
yet have no connection with any Jewish institution, religious
or non-religious.

It was here

[New York City],

words that one could have only Jewish friends,

in other

eat Jewish

food, follow Jewish mores and culture patterns, and yet have
little consciousness of being a Jew."22
The "social construction of reality" and "feedback model
of consciousness" theories are important tools for partially
understanding the planned content of the New York Holocaust
museum.

However, unlike the Mutagon concept,

they do not

take into account the possibility of the imposition of a new
"reality"

or

"consciousness"

political coalition.

as

a

result

of

a

changing

First Mayor Koch opened the door by

providing an opportunity to create a Holocaust memorial. The
leaders he chose to carry out the task expected to be able to
significantly control the content of the memorial museum and

22Nathan Glazer, American Judaism. 2nd
Chicago and London, 1972, p. 118.

ed.

revised,

make

it

uniquely

Jewish.

Because

New

York

is

such

an

ethnically Jewish city, they thought politicians and elected
officials

would

approve

of

a

memorialization of the Holocaust.

particularistic

Jewish

They further thought that

in New York City in the 1980s, the Holocaust was a powerful
symbol which would give the powerful Jewish community the
ability to make
approach.

political

Koch,

demands

for a uniquely Jewish

who needed to please Jewish sources of

campaign money and influence

(and may also agree with the

parochial concept), approved of the narrow Jewish concept of
the memorial.
Later, once the proposed museum became City-State and
the

Mutagon

politics

changed

interfered

"consciousness".

and
and

Berger

became

a

changed
and

two-headed
the

structure,

"reality"

Luckmann's

and

theories do not analyze such a situation.

or

Deutsch7s

After Governor

Cuomo intervened (by offering Battery Park City as a site),
he

learned too

planned

museum

late

how parochial

and

exhibits.

was

the

Fearing

scope

of the

criticism

from

separation of Church and State advocates, and requests for
parcels of land or air rights from other religious groups, he
tried to change the message of the "reality" of the museum.
For example,

he

insisted that the name of the museum be

changed, and "The Museum of Jewish Heritage-A Living Memorial
to the Holocaust"

thus became

"A Living Memorial

Holocaust-The Museum of Jewish Heritage".

to the

Governor Cuomo7s
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office was concerned about the Jewish "image" the museum's
original name conveyed.

His association with it would be

helpful with his Jewish voters in New York City and State,
but could be detrimental if he decided to run for President.
He decided to walk the tightrope of pleasing both his local
and potential national electorates, by keeping the name but
reversing it to minimize the Jewish component.
Distortion to change "reality" or "consciousness" can be
both a cause and an effect of government intervention.

For

example, if the museum makes the recreation of history (i.e.,
the

social

construction

of reality

or

feedback model

of

consciousness) too particularistically Jewish, a governor can
renege

on

Likewise,

a

promise

of

free

rent

on

government

land.

if the museum creators know they are subject to

government intervention, they are likely to recreate history
in a way that the government will accept.
Like

other

politicians

before

him,

most

notably

President Carter, Mayor Koch captured the powerful symbol of
the Holocaust soon after its emergence as a "hot issue" and
began using it to gain approval from Jewish constituents.
After the mayor was sure his constituency was in place, he
formed the Commission.

Once Koch appointed a Commission to

carry out his idea for memorialization,

leadership of this

Commission in turn tried to use the power of the symbol to
increase their own influence in the Jewish community and in
their negotiations with the government.

Governor Cuomo then
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got on the band wagon and pretended to be there from the
beginning.

At this point,

despite the powerful political

symbolism of the Holocaust, the project failed to go forward
smoothly.

The governor's office, in fact, took discretionary

political action that stymied the project (and did not please
his supportive audience).
Using the Mutagon concept, the dissertation analyzes the
reasons for delays and restructuring plans. For example, one
direct result of the delays caused by the Mutagon was a
vicious circle:
funds,

no visible progress because of insufficient

and unsuccessful fund raising because there was no

concrete progress.

In addition to the structure of the

political forces responsible for the project, the richness of
Jewish culture, the high level of organization of the Jewish
community,
discussed

and
as

the

concentration

possible

reasons

rather than facilitating it.

of

for

the

population

delaying

the

are

project,

As Pressman and Wildavsky said:

"People now appear to think that implementation should be
easy; they are, therefore, upset when expected events do not
occur or turn out badly.
success

We would consider our effort a

if more people began with the understanding that

implementation,

under

the

best

of

circumstances,

is

exceedingly difficult.1,23
With few exceptions, thirty years ago, the Holocaust was
spoken of in whispers or ignored.

There were virtually no

23Pressman and Wildavsky, p. xix.

university courses,

books,

movies,

television programs or

Holocaust centers and museum exhibits.

It has become

a

multimillion dollar industry here, with a national memorial
museum rising on the Mall in Washington, D.C., a national
association
children

of Holocaust

of survivors,

centers,

national

a national

gatherings

network

of

of survivors,

national academic conferences, courses in many universities,
public school curriculums in some states and cities, hundreds
of

fiction and non-fiction books,

programs.

movies,

and television

Yet, more than 4 6 years after the end of World War

II, there is still no major Holocaust memorial in New York
City, the center of the organized Jewish community in the
United States.
The dissertation will analyze why this is so, including:
the

history

memorial

of

in

New

earlier
York

attempts

City;

how

to

create

a

Holocaust

memorialization

of

the

Holocaust was placed on Jewish organizational and government
agendas; how the idea was coopted by President Carter, Mayor
Koch,

and Governor Cuomo;

the structure of the political

forces behind the memorial museum project in New York City
and how this structure has changed.

It will explain how

government

create

intervened

in

efforts

to

a

Holocaust

memorial in New York City, and how this intervention at first
seemed to facilitate and but then impeded implementation of
the project.

A Mutagon concept of changing State-City and

private political forces will be developed to demonstrate why
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the project has not moved forward smoothly.
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PART ONE:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 2: THE JEWISH COMMUNITY'S EMERGENCE AS AN INTEREST
GROUP IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER WORLD WAR II
"Jewish life without committees would be like lox without
bagels." Albert Vorspan1
Before

using

the

Mutagon

concept

to

examine

how

government intervention and changing circumstances affected
the attempt to create a Holocaust memorial museum in New York
City between 1981 and 1991, it is necessary to understand the
historical background and setting in which this intervention
has occurred.

The first effort to create a major Holocaust

memorial in New York City was in 1946, and the first
government

intervention

on

memorialization was not until
Administration's in 1978.

the
1981,

issue

of

local

Holocaust

following the Carter

The intervention by Carter at that

time and the subsequent intervention by Koch did not happen
in a vacuum.

Nor did Governor Cuomo's joining the band wagon

in 1986, which altered the structure of forces behind the New
York City memorial project.
These governmental

interventions to create Holocaust

memorial projects were directly related to two developments,
the history of which must be traced to place the Mutagon in
context.

The first development,

the rise of the American

organized Jewish community as an interest group since the end
1My Rabbi Doesn't Make House Calls. Doubleday & Co. ,
Garden City, 1969, p. 23.
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of World War II, will be analyzed in this chapter.
second

development,

the

emergence

of

The

Holocaust

memorialization as an issue for this interest group

will be

analyzed in Chapter 3.
Although the dissertation is a case study of the efforts
of a specific narrower interest group— the New York Holocaust
Memorial Commission— to build a Holocaust memorial in New
York City, background on the broader interest group, i.e.,
the established national organized American Jewish community,
is

relevant

for the

following

reasons:

1.

Unless

broader interest: group was in place and influential,

this
the

Carter Administration would have had no reason to intervene
on the issue of Holocaust memorialization (which gave Koch
increased impetus for initiating a New York city project).
2.

From

1946

until

1978,

various

plans

for

Holocaust

memorials in New York City were intended to be for a national
memorial.

3. Almost every national major American Jewish

organization has
government

its headquarters

intervention

in New York

in a project

of

City,

interest

and

to the

organized Jewish community in New York City therefore has
national

implications.

4.

After

President

Jimmy

Carter

created his President's Commission on the Holocaust in 1978
and

the

Commission began

deliberating

on

an

appropriate

memorial, New York City was considered as a possible site.
(Ultimately

Washington,

D.

C.

was

chosen

instead.

See
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Chapter 7.)

5. Koch/s intervention in Now York City very

closely resembled that of Carter on a notional level.
The effort of the American Jewish community to organize
as an interest group after World War rI had the name two key
items on the

agenda as during the war:

the rescue of Jews

from countries where they are endangered, and the creation of
a Jewish homeland in Israel— with the emphasis on the latter.
However, after the war, the effort won intensified.
One reason for the organized American Jewish community's
intensifying their attempt to become an influential interest
group after World War II may have been their guilt feelings
about not doing enough to influence the government to rescue
Jews during the war. During the war, even after reports on
the

death

camps

had

been

received,

organized

efforts

continued to emphasize a Jewish homeland, rather than rescue.
The time frame of this dissertation begins in 1946, with the
first attempt to create a Holocaust memorial
City.

in New York

Therefore, what the organized Jewish community did or

did not do during World War II is beyond its scope.
their

ineffectiveness

in rescue efforts

However,

is mentioned and

their activities during the war are summarized here, because
they led to subsequent organizational skills after the war.2

2There is a considerable literature
American Jewish community's rescue efforts
during World War II.
See, e.g., books by
Goldmann, Lookstein, Medoff, Morse and
Bibliography.

on the organized
(or lack of them)
Hauer, Feingold,
Wyman listed in

During the war and until Israel became a reality in
1948,

the issues of the creation of a Jewish homeland in

Palestine and the rescue of the victims (refugees, and then
survivors) of Nazi Europe were intertwined.
American

Jewish

community's

strongest

The organized

argument

for

the

creation of a Jewish state was that it could provide a haven
for Europe's Jewish refugees and survivors (and prevent the
United States from bearing that burden). After the creation
of

the

State

of

Israel,

the

organized

Jewish

community

continued to link the need for a Jewish homeland with rescue.
The argument has been that a secure Jewish homeland, Israel,
is necessary to prevent another Holocaust and to rescue Jews
from lands of oppression, especially the Soviet Union (and,
again, prevent the United States from bearing that burden).

The first attempt to unify as an interest group was on
January 23-24, 1943.
B'rith,

invited

Henry Monsky, the president of B'nai

delegates

from
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national

Jewish

organizations "to seek agreement on the role the American
Jewish community would play in representing Jewish demands
after the war."

(This is incredible in retrospect.

The

genocide in Europe had been reported by then, but instead of
clamoring for the United States government to rescue Jews
during the war, the leaders of the organized American Jewish
community were planning for afterward.)

This was the first

endeavor to create an umbrella organization that would serve

as

a

central

channel

to

communicate

the

consensus

of

organized American Jewish opinion to the American government.
The

32

organizations

that

sent

representatives

to

this

meeting formed the American Jewish Conference, which held its
first session on August 29,

1943.

The Conference,

which

represented 1.5 million Jews directly and another million
indirectly,

overwhelmingly

endorsed

the

1942

Biltmore

platform, which had called for a reaffirmation of the Balfour
pledge to establish a Jewish homeland.3

Although this was

at the height of World War II and the Holocaust, the major
issue was creation of a homeland in Palestine.

Throughout

the war, the emphasis was on Zionism, with rescue efforts
connected and secondary (because a homeland was necessary for
the rescue of European Jewry).
The American Jewish Committee resigned from the American
Jewish

Conference

almost

immediately,

Council for Judaism was anti-Zionist.

and

the

American

The American Council

for Judaism "viewed any friendly gesture toward Israel by an
American Jew as evidence of divided political loyalties."4
"Patrician" Jew Arthur Hays Sulzberger,

owner of The New

York Times, and others who feared being accused of divided

3Melvin I. Urofsky, We Are One. Anchor Press,
City, 1978, pp. 21-33.

Garden

4Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist. Jewish Publication
Society of America, Philadelphia, 1972, p. 311.
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loyalties,

founded this

anti-Zionist organization

in the

early 1940s.5
When the Zionist effort was organized as the American
Jewish Conference in 1943, it was headed by Rabbi Stephen S.
Wise,

who had led the American Zionist movement from the

beginning.

After the more aggressive Rabbi Abba

Hillel

Silver took over in 1944, he formed the American Zionist
Emergency

Council

to

lobby on the

issue.

For the

1944

presidential elections, both the Democrats and Republicans
had strong pro-Zionist planks in their platforms.
The American Zionist Emergency Council began to do what
an

interest

group

does,

lobbying

elected

officials

candidates on the issue of a Jewish homeland.

and

It spread the

Zionist message with a monthly political bulletin, Palestine.
sent

to

more

religious
campaign

than

leaders.
of personal

16,000
It

educational,

also

political,

"orchestrated

contacts"

with

an

editors,

and

extensive
church

and

educational leaders, political candidates, congressmen and
senators, and "at critical junctures flooded the White House,
the

State

literally

Department,
thousands

telegrams."6

and
upon

congressional
thousands

of

offices
letters

with
and

The emphasis continued to be Zionist, rather

than a plea to rescue Hitler's victims.

5Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America. Schocken,
New York, 1984, p. 226.
6Urofsky, pp. 33-34.

After the war, the picture began to change, and the bid
to organize as a powerful
dramatically.

interest group was

stepped up

Most experts on the American Jewish community

support the idea that efforts to organize after the war were
related to the realization that not enough had been done
during the war.

For example,

Arthur Hertzberg

said the

American Jewish community learned that during the war they
did not have enough power to rescue the Jews of Europe.

He

said that "during the Holocaust, Jews had not been powerful
enough among all the factions and fractions of America to
make the President and Congress feel their Jewish pain.

In

the 194 0s, this knowledge was not yet spelled out in public.
Jews continued to speak the language of goodwill,

and of

'Americans all,' but Jews would spend the next two decades
making sure that power in America was not the monopoly of the
uncaring."7
Urofsky said of the early post-war years:
"American Jewry, stung by the full awareness of the
Holocaust, moved from a passive endorsement of a Jewish
homeland to a near-unanimous commitment to active work
for

its

realization. ...And

in

the

face

of

vested

interests opposed to the Zionist dream, American Jewry
mounted one of the most intense and successful lobbying
efforts in American politics....More than at any other

7Arthur Hertzberg, The Jews
Schuster, New York, 1989, p. 300.

in

America. Simon

and

time in its history, American Jewry stood united behind
the Zionists

[in 1945-1948].

On the eve of Jewish

statehood, 955,000 men and women formally belonged to
one of dozens of Zionist organizations.

In addition,

millions of other American Jews endorsed the Zionist
position through their membership in groups affiliated
with the American Jewish Conference or through any of
the

more

than

fifty

national

practical

work

in Palestine or

agencies

engaged

in

political

support of

Zionism in the United States."8
Seeking Jewish statehood was thus still the raison d'etre for
the

stepped up lobbying from the end

of World War II until

1947-48, as it had been during the war.
Another reason for the stepped up political activities
of the organized Jewish community after World War II, which
was related to their guilt, was the fact that this community
had become by default the largest and most powerful Jewish
community in the world.

As Daniel Elazar said:

"American Jewry

had become the

community in the world,

foremost Jewish

larger by far than any other

functioning Jewish community; indeed, it was ten times
larger than its nearest functioning counterpart.

It

owned the bulk of the wealth that world Jewry could
mobilize to undertake the tremendous tasks of relief and
reconstruction

confronting

^rofsky, pp. 94 and 126.

it

as

a

result

of

the

46

Holocaust,

tasks

which

increasingly

came

to

be

concentrated in the development of the new state of
Israel....At the same time, American Jewry confronted a
new

situation

participation

at

home:

in

American

barriers

against

full

society

rapidly

fell

away..."9
Elazar was explaining both a push and pull into becoming
a powerful interest group.

On the one hand, the American

Jewish community had the responsibility, through guilt and
default, of taking on a world leadership role to fight for a
Jewish homeland, security at home, and the rescue of Jews in
the aftermath of the war.

On the other hand, after the war

ended and the full impact of the genocide of the Jews of
Europe was revealed in the United States,
changed:
became

the atmosphere

overt anti-Semitism diminished, and the government
more

receptive

to

the

demands

of

the

organized

American Jewish community.
Leonard Fein explained the general involvement of Jews
in politics as follows:
"Politics, for Jews, is the displacement of Jewish
motives onto public objects.

What are those motives?

To be a Jew means to belong to a people, not merely to
adhere to a doctrine.

It means, more specifically,to

9Daniel
J.
Elazar,
Community
and
Polity:_____ The
Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry. The Jewish
Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 166.
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belong to a people that has perforce developed special
sensitivities, through the course of its wanderings, to
the

acts

of

therefore,

rulers

that

and

the Jew

governments.
as Jew has

It

means,

learned to

pay

attention to the political, to engage with it in order
to ensure that princes and parliaments do not, wittingly
or casually, do harm to one's people."10
Although his explanation does not deal specifically with the
situation at the end of the war,
behind

the

intensified

effort

by

it captures the reasons
the

American

organized

Jewish community to create a strong interest group at that
time.
In 1946
created.

a new Zionist Political Action Committee was

There is evidence that by 1947 the organized Jewish

community had met with some success in making its presence
known as an interest group seeking to influence the Federal
government.

Harry Truman, at least, took them into account

during his campaign for President:

"In November 1947 two

political advisers, James H. Rowe, Jr. and Clark M. Clifford,
presented Truman with a state-by-state plan for a campaign
strategy.
York,

and

Rowe acknowledged that 'Jews hold the key to New
the

key

Administration does

to

the

about

Jewish

voters

Palestine.'

is

what

the

But New York was

10Leonard Fein, Where Are We?:
The Inner Life of
America's Jews. Harper & Row, New York, 1988, p. 222-223.
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probably

the

only

state

in which

Jews

would

vote

as

a

bloc."11

The issue continued to be a Jewish homeland in

Palestine, and the large concentration of Jews in New York
City, then the city with the largest Jewish population in the
world, was a target for seeking the support of Jewish voters.
In

November

1947

the

United

States

and

the

United

Nations accepted the partition plan that ultimately created
Israel.
effort

According to Urofsky:
in

1947

organization,

represented
publicity,

"The success of the Zionist

nearly

five

education,

years

and

the

of work,
careful

cultivation of key people in different fields....securing the
help of influential men and women in the press, the church,
the arts, and above all, the government."12
For the 1948 presidential elections, President Harry Truman,
Governor Thomas Dewey,
Zionist statements.

and Henry Wallace all

issued pro-

(Truman won 75 percent of the Jewish

vote, with Wallace receiving 15 percent.)
Even

the

first attempt to create

a major Holocaust

memorial in New York in 1946 (see Chapter 4) had a Zionist
orientation.
original

The ceremony to unveil the cornerstone for this

(uncompleted)

New

York

Holocaust

memorial

in

Riverside Park was held on October 19, 1947, right before the
United Nations vote to create Israel on November 29.

Because

of the timing of the memorial ceremony, it seemed likely it
11Grose, p. 218.
12Urofsky, p. 147.
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was

at

least

partially

connected

to Zionist efforts

to

convince the public that a Jewish homeland was a necessity.
This assumption there had been a Zionist connection to this
first attempt to create a New York Holocaust memorial was
verified when the unpublished memoirs of the man who had led
this effort were discovered in an archive.

He had written:

"My decision to hold the dedication ceremony in September or
October [1947] was chiefly influenced by the acute situation
in Palestine where a bitter fight raged between the Jews and
the

English which

Palestine

question

caused

the United Nations to put

the

on the

agenda before the Assembly

in

October, 1947. "13
In

1954,

six

years

after

the

birth

of Israel,

official Jewish pro-Israel lobby was created.
factions' Emergency Committee,

an

The Zionist

which fell apart after the

1948 War of Independence, had been reorganized in 1949 as the
American Zionist Council
Zionist

organizations).

established
Affairs,

(composed of the fourteen leading

an

the

In

March

American

Zionist

organization

created

1954

the

Committee

Council

for

specifically

to

Public
lobby

Washington on issues concerning Israel (called AIPAC-American
Israel Public Affairs Committee from 1959).

For the first

time, pro-Israel lobbying was coordinated by a single office.

13Adolph R. Lerner,
"The Case of the Memorial",
Unpublished manuscript, undated, archives of YIVO Research
Institute, New York, p. 4.
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Throughout

the

1950s

the

American

Jewish

community

continued to become more organized, with Israel the central
issue.

The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish

Organizations (Presidents' Conference) umbrella was formally
established in 1959.

Starting in 1955 leaders of twenty

organizations began meeting on a regular basis and laying the
foundation for the creation of the Presidents' Conference.14
The organized Jewish community in the United States
today

is being defined here as that part

of the Jewish

population (of just less than six million15) that is in some
way

connected

with

a

constituent
The

organizations

Jewish

community

of

the

is

not

Presidents'

Conference.

monolithic.

Many Jews are unaffiliated and/or dissent from

views represented by the Presidents' Conference or some of
its

constituents.

Often these

constituent

organizations

140n March 5-6, 1955, representatives of the following
20 national Jewish organizations met at the Shoreham Hotel in
Washington: American Jewish Congress, American Trade Union
Council for Labor Israel, American Zionist Committee for
Public Affairs, American Zionist Council, B'nai B'rith,
Hadassah, Hapoel Hamizrachi, Jewish Agency, Jewish Labor
Committee, Jewish War Veterans, Labor Zionist Organization of
America, Mizrachi Organization of America, National Community
Relations Advisory Council, Progressive Zionist League, Union
of American Hebrew Congregations, Union of Orthodox Jewish
Organizations, United Synagogue of America, United Zionist
Labor Party, Zionist Organization of America, ZionistsRevisionists of America. ("Conference of Presidents" file of
American Jewish Committee Library, New York)
15In 1988 the Jewish population of the United States was
estimated at 5,935,000 by Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband
and Jeffrey Scheckner, American Jewish Yearbook 1989.
American Jewish Committee, New York, and Jewish Publication
Society, Philadelphia, 1989, p. 233.
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disagree with each other.

Although only about 4 0 percent of

the Jews in the United States are affiliated with a Jewish
organization today, the Conference of Presidents claims to
speak for the Jewish community, mainly on issues of foreign
policy.

Since the Presidents' Conference can legitimately

speak for only this organized 4 0 percent but there is no
spokesperson for the unorganized others, the effectiveness of
the organized Jewish community as an interest group must be
traced through the Presidents' Conference.
Elazar said the Presidents' Conference was established
because

"increased

American

Jewish

involvement

in

the

concerns of the Jewish people as a whole [had] sharpened the
need for a communal voice that speaks as one, at least in the
field of foreign relations."16

He analyzed the Presidents'

Conference as "a structural device that has been developed to
coordinate a weak multiple-element oligarchy, in those areas
in which the constituent groups are willing to coordinate."
He defined oligarchy as when "a substantially closed group of
individuals enjoy a virtual monopoly of power by reserving
control

over

all

significant

decision

making",

and

said

oligarchy, in several varieties, is "far more prevalent in
the American Jewish world than autocracy."17
According to the

1990 brochure of the Conference of

Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations:
16Elazar, Community and Polity, p. 216.
17Ibid. , 320-322.

"The purpose of the Presidents' Conference is to
strengthen the US-Israel alliance and to protect and
enhance the security and dignity of Jews abroad.

Toward

this end, the Conference of Presidents speaks and acts
on the basis of consensus on issues of national and
international Jewish concern, as the most all-embracing
coalition of the world's largest Jewish community.... It
also

serves

as

the

representative

body

to

which

officials of the Executive and Legislative branches of
the

American

government,

Israeli

leaders,

foreign

statesmen and Jewish communities in other lands turn in
dealing with issues of mutual concern."
From 1968 on, AIPAC, the official pro-Israel lobby, was
permitted to inform Congress the Presidents' Conference (then
with 22 member organizations)
AIPAC's views.

had endorsed,

in principle,

By 1974 the Conference of Presidents had 32

member organizations,

and by 1978,

37 members.18

In 1990

there were 46 constituent organizations, and eight official
observers19.

Memorialization of the Holocaust is not one of

18A review of the early t history of AIPAC and its
relationship with the Conference of Presidents can be found
in I. L. Kenen's Israel's Defense Line. Prometheus, 1981, pp.
106-113.
19Affiliated organizations in 1990 were: AIPAC, American
Gathering/Federation Jewish Holocaust Survivors, American
Jewish Congress, American ORT Federation, American Zionist
Federation, American Zionist Youth Foundation, AMIT Women,
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Association of Reform
Zionists of America, B'nai B'rith, Central Conference of
American Rabbis, Emunah Women of America, Federation of
Reconstructionist Congregations and Havurot, Hadassah, Herut
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the "Major Areas of Activity" listed in the 1990 brochure.
In fact, it is never mentioned.
the Joint

Program Plan

This topic is dealt with in

of the National

Jewish Community

Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), a member organization of
the Presidents' Conference (discussed later in the chapter).
Elazar

said

the

President's

Conference

began

to be

eclipsed by AIPAC in the 1970s, and that "today a new balance
is in the making".20
reasons:

His analysis is inaccurate for two

First, obviously, if AIPAC, the official pro-Israel

lobby, is informing Congress that the Presidents' Conference
has endorsed its views,
competing.

AIPAC is,

in fact, an important member of the

Presidents' Conference.
been

closely

linked

they are working together and not

Second, the two groups are and have

for maximum strength as

an

interest

Zionists of America, Jewish Institute for National Security
Affairs, Jewish Labor Committee, Jewish National Fund, Jewish
War Veterans, JWB, Labor Zionist Alliance, Mercaz, NA'AMAT
USA, National Conference on Soviet Jewry, National Committee
for Labor Israel, National Council of Jewish Women. National
Federation
of
Temple
Sisterhoods,
NJCRAC,
Rabbinical
Assembly,, Rabbinical Council of America, Religious Zionists
of America, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Union of
Councils
for Soviet Jews,
Union
of Orthodox Jewish
Congregations of America, United Israel Appeal, United
Synagogue of America, WIZO USA, Women's American ORT, Women's
League for Conservative Judaism, Women's League for Israel,
Workmen's Circle, World Zionist Organization/American Section
and Zionist Organization of America.
Observers are:
American Jewish Committee, American Sephardi Federation,
Council of Jewish Federations, Development Corporation for
Israel, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Joint Distribution
Committee, Poalei Agudath Israel, United Jewish Appeal.
20Daniel
J.
Elazar,
People
and
Polity:______The
Organizational Dynamics of World Jewry. 1989, Wayne State
University Press, Detroit, p. 78.
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group:

AIPAC

is the mechanism whereby the major Jewish

organizations can lobby by proxy,
lobbyists
losing

or agents

their

of

without registering as

a foreign government

tax-exempt

status.

and thereby

Unofficially,

member

organizations of the Presidents' Conference ask their members
to

lobby

their

representatives

and

the

administration.

Officially, however, only AIPAC lobbies.
AIPAC has a reputation as one of the most effective
lobbying organizations in Washington, dealing strictly with
issues relating to Israel.
Kenen,

Urofsky said of AIPAC:

"I.L.

and his successor, Morris J. Amitai, have made the

America-Israel Public Affairs Committee a respected voice in
Washington.
national

When necessary, AIPAC can also call upon the

Jewish organizations

for

letter,

telephone,

and

telegram campaigns to impress Congress or the White House
with just how important Israel is to their constituents."21
One of the twenty original organizations that met to
form the Presidents' Conference is NJCRAC.
its own right,

An umbrella in

NJCRAC was founded in 1944 as a voluntary

association of Jewish community relations agencies.
originally had no

"J"

in its

initials,

"Jewish" was then not part of its name.
organized
displaying

Jewish
a high

community's
profile.)

fear,

(It

because the word
This reflected the

at

NJCRAC was

that

time,

founded

of

by the

Council of Jewish Federations, which is itself the umbrella
21Urofsky, p. 445.
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for local Jewish federations throughout the United States.22
NJCRAC portrays itself as "the instrument through which its
constituency of 13 national and 117 community Jewish agencies
jointly determine:

the issues of concern; what positions

they should take on them; how they can most effectively carry
out those positions;

which of the issues should be given

priority attention in the coming year."
The umbrella organization describes the purpose of its
Joint Program Plan

(first issued annually in 1953)

as "a

product of the Jewish community relations field's national
planning process.

It is designed to serve as an advisory

guide for use by member agencies as an aid in their own
program planning.

Each agency may accept or reject, modify

or expand any of the Plan's recommendations,

according to

each agency's particular roles, scope, concerns, resources,
priorities,

and needs."23

NJCRAC is the component of the

President's Conference under whose jurisdiction issues such

22For a detailed analysis of the complicated web of the
organized Jewish community in the United States,see Elazar,
Community and Polity.
23Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations.
1989-1990, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory
Council, New York, p. i.
In 1990 the constituent organizations were:
American
Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rithAnti-Defamation League, Hadassah, Jewish Labor Committee,
Jewish War Veterans, National Council of Jewish Women, Union
of American Hebrew Congregations, Union of Orthodox Jewish
Congregations of America, United Synagogue of America-Women's
League for Conservative Judaism, Women's American ORT; and
local Jewish community relations councils and committees
throughout the United States.
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as memorializing the Holocaust fall, and this topic first
appeared in NJCRAC's Joint Program Plan for 1972-1973

(See

Chapter 3).
By 1960, when John F. Kennedy was elected President,
both the Presidents' Conference and AIPAC were in place and
working in tandem on their agenda for what was in the best
interest of Israel, as perceived by the organized American
Jewish community.

Kennedy's election was a milestone in the

organized Jewish community's effort to become a mainstream
interest group, because the election of a Catholic (whom they
had

strongly

backed)

broadened

the

opportunities

for

political power by non-Protestants in the United States.

As

Charles Silberman said, Kennedy's election was:
"an event that symbolized the transformation of the
United

States

from

an

essentially

religiously pluralistic society.

Protestant

to

a

Since that time there

has been a steady decline in prejudice of every sort,
and Jews, among others have been the beneficiaries.

The

reduction in hostility toward Jews has been accompanied,
in fact, by a growth in positive attitudes.

In 194 0,

for example, 63 percent of Americans said that Jews as
a group had

'objectionable traits';

by 1981,

when a

Gallup poll asked Americans to rate Jews on a ten-point
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scale, 81 percent had favorable and only 8 percent had
unfavorable opinions.1,24
Furthermore,

because

the

Jewish

community

had

so

strongly backed Kennedy it was in a favorable position with
his administration.
vote;

(He received 82 percent of the Jewish

he carried New York by

384,000 votes,

with Jewish

precincts giving him a plurality of more than 800,000.)

As

Urofsky said:
"The understanding that marked relations between
the Kennedy administration and American Jews reinforced
the sense of belonging that characterized Jewish life in
the early 1960s....In the closely fought election Jewish
votes played a significant role, perhaps the significant
role

in

electing

the

nation's

first

Catholic

President. ...Kennedy reportedly told David Ben-Gurion in
New York in 1961, 'You know, I was elected by the Jews
of New York, and I would like to do something for the
Jewish people.'"25
Kennedy did not live to see the 1967 Six Day War, when
he clearly could have paid this "debt".

The war brought an

enormous resurgence of support for Israel from the organized
American

Jewish

community.

In

addition

to

lobbying

Washington for help, a 1967 emergency fundraising campaign by

24Charles E. Silberman, A Certain People: American Jews
and their Lives Today. Summit Books, New York, 1985, p. 109.
25Urofsky, pp. 333-336.
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United Jewish Appeal raised $240 million, and $190 million
worth of Israel Bonds were purchased.
in

Chapter

3,

the

Six

Day War was

As will be discussed
one

of the

earliest

catalysts for the emergence of the organized American Jewish
community's interest in memorializing the Holocaust.
By

the

late

organizations,

1970s,

the

the Presidents'

individual
Conference,

major

Jewish

and AIPAC were

cohesive and working more aggressively and knowledgeably in
the political arena.

In addition, Jewish PACs

(Political

Action Committees) were raising money for targeted candidates
who were pro-Israel.

Kennedy's election, the 1967 Six Day

War and 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the ethnic movement age of
the 1960s had all increased the ability of the organized
Jewish community to function as an effective interest group.
Menachem Begin, who took over as Prime Minister of Israel in
June, 1977, was a master at using the Holocaust for Zionist
and his own Likud Party political purposes.

This, and other

events which will be analyzed, made the organized American
Jewish community receptive to the idea of memorializing the
Holocaust.

This new receptiveness in the Jewish community

opened a policy door for elected officials and candidates in
the United

States

to make political

memorializing the Holocaust.
effectively,

President Jimmy

use

of the

idea

of

In order to utilize the issue
Carter

and

then

Mayor

Koch

created their own specialized interest groups to support such
memorialization.

Carter desperately needed an issue to appeal to the
organized Jewish community

in 1978,

when he created his

President's Commission on the Holocaust.

When he ran against

Gerald Ford in 1976, the organized Jewish community (which
cannot

legally keep

its tax-exempt

status

and

support a

candidate, but nevertheless informally makes its views known
to

its

constituents)

unknown.
vote.

was

wary

of

this

Southern

Baptist

Ford, however, won only 28 percent of the Jewish

As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, the American

Jewish community then came to believe between 1977 and 1980
that their 1976 fears about President Carter had not been
unfounded.

It was an effort by the Carter Administration to

assuage these fears of the Jewish community— a community that
was then ready to acknowledge the importance of memorializing
the

Holocaust— that

led

to

creation

of

the

President's

Commission on the Holocaust in 1978.
Carter's

attempt to capture

the vote

of the Jewish

community in the 198 0 presidential elections did not succeed.
Only 45 percent of the Jewish electorate voted for Carter,
the "lowest Jewish vote for a Democratic candidate since
Franklin D. Roosevelt brought Jews firmly into the Democratic
fold".

Fifteen percent of Jews voted for John Anderson in

1980, and a high 39 percent for Ronald Reagan.26
his

initiation

of

a national

effort

to

Despite

memorialize

the

Holocaust, Carter had a hard time keeping the Jewish voters
26Silberman, p. 345.
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voting Democratic in 1980.

More than one in four Jewish

voters who had voted for Carter in 1976 voted for Reagan in
1980,

and the Jewish Democratic traditional majority was

reduced to a margin of four to three.27
Although Carter's creation of a national President's
Commission on the Holocaust and subsequent U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Commission did not win him the Jewish vote (nor the
presidency)

in 1980,

he will be recorded in American and

Jewish history as the President who placed on the agenda of
the United States government the issue of memorialization of
the

Holocaust

(see

Chapter

7).

Carter's

government

intervention in an area that had previously been the private
domain of the American Jewish community was the first step in
the Federal, New York State, and New York City governments'
ability to influence how the American Jewish community would
memorialize the Holocaust.

SUMMARY
In

order

to

place

the Mutagon

of

political

forces

working to create a Holocaust museum in New York City in
historical

perspective,

American Jewish
reviewed.

the

emergence

community as an

of

interest

the

organized

group has been

At the time of the first attempt to memorialize

27Theodore H.White, America In Search for Itself:
The
Making of the President. 1956-1980. Harper & Row, New York,
1982, p. 414.
In New York State in 1980, the official vote
compiled by the Federal Election Commission was 2,893,831 for
Reagan, 2,728,372 for Carter, and 467,801 for Anderson.

the Holocaust in New York City at the end of World War II,
the American Jewish community was not yet well established as
an interest group.

Efforts of the organized American Jewish

community to lobby the United States Government to rescue
Jews

from

Europe

ineffective.

during

the

Holocaust

were

weak

and

Perhaps to compensate for this, after the war,

national Jewish organizations made a concerted bid to become
a strong interest group.

The Conference of Presidents of

Major American Jewish Organizations was formally established
in 1959,

and AIPAC,

its pro-Israel lobby constituent, was

created (with a different name) in 1954.

Today they form the

core of what could be called the organized American Jewish
community as an the interest group (although statistics show
there really is no such entity) . AIPAC and the Conference of
Presidents have the kind of relationship with their agents in
Congress and in the executive branch that can be analyzed
using

either

Chapter 1).

iron triangle

or

issue network theory

(see

The Jewish community members who are members of

the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, however, are part
of

a

much

relationship:

more

complicated

interest

group-government

a changing City-State-private coalition, or a

two-headed Mutagon.
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CHAPTER 3: WHEN AND WHY THE MEMORY OF THE HOLOCAUST BECAME
AN ISSUE FOR THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY
"Dear love, Auschwitz made me more of a Jew than ever Moses
did."
Dannie Abse1
In order to understand why a Mutagon of political forces
would be interested in creating a major Holocaust memorial
museum

in

New

York

City,

it

is

necessary

to

trace

the

increasing significance of Holocaust memorialization for the
organized American Jewish community.

Memorialization of the

Holocaust became the project of a complicated City-Stateprivate Mutagon headed by the mayor of New York City and the
governor

of

New

York

State

important for this community.

after

the

issue

had

become

When President Jimmy Carter

intervened on the issue in 1978, it was already beginning to
be "hot"

in the organized Jewish community,

and Carter's

placing it on the national governmental agenda made it even
hotter.
Before

the

subject

of Holocaust memorialization was

placed on the Federal, and then the New York City and State
agendas, it had to have become significant for the organized
American Jewish community.
political entrepreneurs,

Otherwise,

President Carter's

and then those of Mayor Koch and

Governor Cuomo, would not have chosen memorialization of the
Holocaust as their agenda item for attracting Jewish votes

1"White Balloon", a poem, in Present Tense. March-April
1990, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 40.
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and

money.

Therefore,

before

explaining

how

Holocaust

memorialization evolved into the project of a City-Stateprivate Mutagon in New York City, it is necessary to trace
when and how this subject emerged and became important for
the organized American Jewish community.
Interest in the Holocaust and its memorialization did
not

emerge

instantly

Various historical,

or

follow

a

psychological,

straightforward
political

path.

and cultural

factors all interacted to bring about the organized Jewish
community's gradual

and growing

memorializing the Holocaust.

interest

in studying and

Some key events are possible to

pinpoint, but, as will be demonstrated, not all historians of
the Holocaust and the American Jewish community agree on
which historical event was most significant.

The community's

interest in the Holocaust did not suddenly appear where it
had not been before.

Latent awareness was pushed to the

forefront by specific occurrences and also by the passing of
time.
Starting with the Adolph Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in
1961, and with more intensity during Israel's Six Day War in
1967, the organized American Jewish community gradually began
to face the Holocaust and its implications for their present
and

their

future.

There was

a proliferation

of

books,

college courses, movies, and commemorations, beginning slowly
in the 1960s.

(One of the few earlier exceptions was The

Diary of Anne Frank, published in English in 1952, made into
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a movie in 1959, and dramatized on Broadway in between.)

The

popularization of the subject of the Holocaust culminated in
the NBC miniseries Holocaust in April, 1978 (the month before
President Carter announced his President's Commission on the
Holocaust).
Once President Carter had made memorialization of the
Holocaust
government,
Jewish

an

official

program

of

the

United

this action caused a reaction.

community

jumped

on the

bandwagon,

States

The organized
applauded

the

project, and made the issue of the Holocaust more prominent
on their agenda.
Wiesel

Holocaust survivor and Nobel Laureate Elie

said that when Carter made memorialization of the

Holocaust government policy he changed the social psychology
of the country.

The subject became aggrandized in the Jewish

community, and survivors who had been considered second class
by the community suddenly gained new status.2 In the 1980s,
after Carter's intervention,

the number of books,

movies,

television programs, symposia, courses, and Holocaust studies
institutions continued to grow more rapidly.3

interview with Elie Wiesel, New York City, August 8,
1990.
3David M. Szonyi, An Annotated Bibliography and Resource
Guide, National Jewish Resource Center, New York, 1985, gives
a comprehensive listing of bocks, audio-visual materials,
exhibits, curricula, memorials, research centers, speakers
bureaus, etc.
In 1990, Social Studies School Service
published its 32 page catalogue, "Teaching the Holocaust:
Resources and Materials", which offers for sale to schools
books, audio-visual materials, curricula, etc., only on the
subject of the Holocaust.

After the organized Jewish community's general interest
in the subject of the Holocaust emerged in the 19 60s, and
before Carter intervened in 1978, the community had not been
catalyzed

into

memorial museum.

creating

a major

national

memorial

or

a

There had been small groups of individuals

attempting to do so at different times in New York City since
1946, but, for the most part, the major Jewish organizations
were not enthusiastic about these projects (see Chapters 46).

(No record was found of any attempt to create a major

Holocaust memorial
first

New

York

in the United States earlier than the

City

1946-1947

effort) .

After

1973

the

national organized Jewish community encouraged small local
memorials in the Joint Program Plan of the National Jewish
Community Relations Advisory Council.

However, there was no

national Jewish program or organizational

platform

for a

major national memorial until after President Carter placed
this specific item on the Federal agenda.

As is documented

in Chapter 7, in the case of the Federal Holocaust memorial,
the organized Jewish community was

a reactor and not an

actor.
Not unlike John Kingdon's analysis of agenda-setting in
the Federal government4 (see Chapter 7) , in the national
organized Jewish community, too, an idea whose time had come
rose in the "soup".

Beginning in the 1960s and continuing

4John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives and
Policies. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1984.

Public

through the early 1970s, the idea of memorialization of the
Holocaust gradually took hold
Jewish

community.

By

the

in the bureaucracy
mid-1970s

the

of the

concept

of

memorialization (but not a national memorial) was firmly on
the community's agenda.
together:

problem

Kingdon's three streams had come

recognition,

refinement, and politics.

policy

formulation

and

These three streams came together

at the critical time of two major wars during which Israel
faced possible annihilation, and a policy window was created
for

the Holocaust.

the

focus for the

The problem was that Israel, which was
American Jewish community,

first had its

existence endangered by two wars and then used policies of
occupation that diminished it as a symbol of Jewish identity
for

many secular

American Jews.

Policy

formulation and

refinement resulted in the memorialization of the Holocaust
becoming an important alternative and complement to Israel
for the community.
This led tothe

politics

of the

organized American

Jewish community's supporting Israel's use of the Holocaust
to

excuse

the

country's

behavior.

Regarding

Israel's

utilization of the Holocaust as a rationalization (e.g., for
its

West

Bank

policies,

requests

for

economic

aid,

or

arguments against Arab countries receiving military aid) the
organized American Jewish community, through the Presidents'
Conference and AIPAC, has supported Israel's position.
position,

especially

after

Menachem

Begin

became

This
Prime
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Minister

in

1977,

has been that

Israel

deserved

special

treatment and could behave in a special way, because of the
Holocaust.

As Boaz Evron, an Israeli leftist writer, said:

"The exploitation of the memory for these purposes has been
developed

into a fine art.

Almost any

Israeli

official

appearance abroad involves an invocation of the Holocaust, in
order to inculcate in the listeners the proper feelings of
guilt."5 Conor Cruise O'Brien, an Irish journalist, made the
same point from his perspective as a non-Israeli and non-Jew:
"Among Gentiles interested in Israel,

there is impatience

with Israeli Holocaust consciousness— and especially with
what is seen as the exploitation of the Holocaust by Israeli
leaders, since 1977 especially by Menachem Begin."6
The progression with regard to the organized American
Jewish community's general
specific
Until

interest

the

1960s,

in

interest

in the Holocaust

creating memorials

there

was

virtually

was

as

no

interest

and

follows:

commemorating the Holocaust or in creating memorials.

in
The

New York City effort that began in 1946 was an exception.
Then the 1961 Eichmann trial and the 1967 Six Day War began
changing
Holocaust

this
grew.

situation,
Some

and

general

communities

such

interest
as

in

the

Philadelphia

5Boaz Evron, "Holocaust:
The Uses of Disaster",
Outlook Discussion Paper, Israel, undated, pp. 8-9.

New

6Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Siege. Simon and Schuster,
New York, 1986, p. 318.
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created small Holocaust memorials or monuments in the 1960s.
In New York City, a number of memorials were attempted by
Jewish groups in the 1960s

and early 1970s (see Chapters 4,

5 and 6) .

the issue of memorializing the

In the 1970s,

Holocaust began to be

institutionalized

in the organized

Jewish community, and more localities began building small
memorials.

It

must

be

emphasized,

however,

that

the

community did not request that the Federal government create
a national memorial.
Although the community's interest in memorializing the
Holocaust was gradual, most experts agree the 1967 Six Day
War was the event that turned the tide.

The connection

between

possibility

the

Hitlerian

Holocaust

and

the

of

another in Israel was so frightening and blatant that it
could not be ignored:

Creation of a Jewish homeland, the

Zionist post-World War II argument in 1945-1947, had been for
the

purpose

redemption.

of

bringing

Then,

in

survivors
1967,

this

of

the

very

Holocaust

redemption

threatened with the possibility of another genocide.

to
was

Even

the creation of a Jewish homeland in Israel seemed not to be
saving

the

annihilation.

Jewish

people

from

the

possibility

of

And if the Jews could be destroyed in Israel,

perhaps they could also be destroyed in the United States.
This was the reason the Six Day War so powerfully raised
Holocaust consciousness in the American Jewish community.
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The connection between the Holocaust and the Six Day War
in the minds of American Jews is accepted by most scholars.
For example, historian Jacob Neusner said in 1979 that the
Six Day War had marked the beginning of interest
Holocaust.
a

powerful

He said:
symbol

"What turned an historical event into
of

contemporary

social

imagination was a searing shared experience.
Jews,

in the

the dreadful weeks before the

action

and

For millions of

1967 war gave a new

vitality to the historical record of the years of 1933 to
1945— the war and its result."7
Rabbi Irving

(Yitz)

Greenberg,

Director of CLAL, The

National Jewish Center for Learning and Leadership, and one
of the first advocates of education about the Holocaust, also
cited the Six Day War (and, to a lesser degree, the Eichmann
trial) as the catalyst for interest in the Holocaust in
organized American Jewish community.
1950s

the

subject

of

the Holocaust

neglected by the community.

the

He said that in the
was

all

but

totally

"People were 'ashamed' of the

'sheep to the slaughter' idea," he said.

"I think a great

deal of the credit for the turning point was the Eichmann
trial.

By turning point, I mean it moved the Holocaust from

the sense of shame to the sense of pity,
feeling.

compassion and

And it gave it significant publicity, although the

ground was still not saturated, and the publicity was soaked

7Jacob Neusner, "A 'Holocaust'
Review. August 3, 1979, pp. 976-977.

Primer"

in

National
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up and didn't show up on the surface."

(Greenberg's analogy

compares the situation to planting seeds in dry soil, which
needs to absorb water deep in the ground before irrigated
topsoil can produce vegetation.)
In 1962, Greenberg, a professor at Yeshiva University,
wanted to teach a course on the Holocaust there,

but the

faculty and administration showed little interest.

He said

he finally was able to "sell" the idea to the dean after he
renamed

the

course

Twentieth Century".

"Totalitarianism

and

Ideology

in the

He said his research in 1962 found only

one existent course on the Holocaust, at Brandeis University.
Greenberg believes the Six Day War was the breakthrough.
"There was a tremendous urgency that the Holocaust is coming
again,"

he

said.

"I

think

1967

opened

the

emotional

floodgates."8
Holocaust historian Saul Friedlander also targets the
Six Day War as the beginning of interest in the Holocaust
here.

"In the late 1960s, there was a change," he said.

"It's difficult to explain.

Elie Wiesel and Raul Hilberg

couldn't find publishers in the early 1960s.
The Six Day War.
community.
led

to

the

Why the change?

There was a need for definition by the

They were losing their Zionist dream, and this
centrality

of

the

Jewish

experience

of

the

interview with Rabbi Irving Greenberg, April 19, 1990,
New York City.
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Holocaust.

It wasn't meant to be that way, but two things

came together and made it happen."9
Melvin
emergence

of

Urofsky

connected

interest

the

Six

Day

in the Holocaust

War with

the

in the organized

American Jewish community as follows:
"The rapidity and extent of Israeli victory could
only be matched by the reaction of American Jewry during
the tense weeks of crisis in May and the actual days of
fighting, and by the emotional outburst which erupted
following the victory.
be seen

But the joy of the victory must

in contrast to the gloom and despair which

characterized

American

Jewry

during

May

1967....the

imagery of the Holocaust dominated American Jewry— the
fear that twice

in their lifetime the Jewish people

would be slaughtered and would be able to do nothing
about it."10
Charles E. Silberman said of the connection between the
1967 war and the Holocaust:
"To American Jews— indeed, to Jews everywhere— it
appeared as though another Holocaust was in the making;
equally important,

it looked and felt as though once

again the world would sit idly by while Jews marched to
their death.

Before 1967 American Jews had paid little

9Saul Friedlander, address, Society for the Advancement
of Judaism, New York, February 4, 1990.
10Melvin I. Urofsky, We Are One. Anchor Press, Garden
City, 1978, p. 350.
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attention to the Holocaust of the 1940s.

Some, perhaps,

felt guilty over their inability to prevent the dreadful
event or, failing that, to rescue more than a handful of
people; others needed the healing balm of time before
they could come to terms with what had happened;

most

were simply too caught up in their own lives and in the
exciting move from the margins of American society to
its mainstream."
Silberman said the Holocaust was rarely mentioned, and that
Wiesel's

Night was

rejected by more

although it had been acclaimed in

than

France.

six publishers

He said that even

after the Eichmann trial in 1961, "which turned the Holocaust
into front-page news in American newspapers", discussion of
the subject was "desultory".11

(Wiesel finally got his book

published in English in 1960,

and Eichmann's capture and

trial at around the same time must have helped to make it
popular.)
"Desultory",
description:
arguments

or

there

unmethodical,
were

in some circles

is

discussions,

perhaps
and

a

even

in the Jewish community.

good
heated
For

example, Hannah Arendt's vindictive account of the Eichmann
trial in The New Yorker (published as a book, Eichmann in
Jerusalem.

in

1963)

started

throughout the early 1960s.

a

controversy

that

lasted

Arendt's conclusion was that

11Charles E. Silberman, A Certain People: American Jews
and their Lives Today. Summit Books, New York, 1985, pp. 182183 .
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Jewish leaders, as well as Eichmann, were guilty, and that
the Jews went to their death like sheep to the slaughter.
However,

reactions

occurrences

are

and arguments about specific books

not

the

same

as

an

organized

effort

or
to

institutionalize the Holocaust and its memory as a primary
and major issue for the organized Jewish community.

This did

not occur until later.
Leonard Fein, too, linked the Six Day War and awareness
of the Holocaust.

He

said that

in 1967,

precise, and 'another Auschwitz' was its name.

"The

fear was

Back then, no

one yet knew how resourceful and how tough and how skilled at
war the Israelis had become.

So, when some Arab leaders

boasted that the Jews would be driven into the sea, the Jews
of America

felt

project director

terror,

as Jews."12

Michael

Berenbaum,

for the museum being built by the U.S.

Holocaust Memorial Council in Washington, concurred about the
important influence of the Six Day War.

He also mentioned

the "drive the Jews into the sea" statement of Arab leaders,
and said:

"American Jews felt their vulnerability and pulled

out all the stops."13
Samuel
believes

Norich,

both

the

Director
1967

and

of YIVO Research
1973

wars

in

Institute,

Israel

caused

interest in the Holocaust to emerge in the Jewish community
12Leonard Fein, Where Are We?:
The Inner Life
America's Jews. Harper & Row, New York, 1988, p. 18.

of

13Interview with Michael Berenbaum, March 12, 1990, New
York.
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in United States.
visual

images

He wrote: "The memories, the literary and

of European Jewry's

destruction

took on a

special valence in American Jewry's self-understanding during
the 1960's and 1970's.

The Eichmann trial and Elie Wiesel's

books figured in this, but nothing figured more importantly
than the visible danger,

in 1967 and again in 1973, that

Israel might be destroyed.

We,

all

of us,

brought the

traumas of the 1940's to the events of the '60's and '70's,
and

we

came

to

imperiled."14

see

the

Jewish

Even though

people

as

increasingly

Israel was victorious

in both

wars, the fear of annihilation that came before the victories
evoked

the

Holocaust

and helped

to

institutionalize

its

memorialization in the organized American Jewish community.
Wiesel was the only Holocaust expert who said he did not
believe the

1967 and 1973 wars had any influence on the

emergence of Holocaust memorialization in the United States.
He said:

"We worked on it...My first book came out here in

1960, which means eighteen years, after all,
intervened].

In the meantime, I was teaching and writing,

and other people were.
Then it accumulated.
Eichmann

trial

[until Carter

in

In 1960 nobody read, nobody cared.
There were television programs,

1960,

other

trials

later

on.

the

Things

happened.... The Israel wars didn't have anything to do with
it."

Asked how the idea of Holocaust memorialization grew so

14Samuel Norich, "What Holocaust Centers Tell Us About
Ourselves", The Forward. New York, March 6, 1987, p.5.

much since 1960, Wiesel said:

"A convergence of events.

Between 1960 and 1979, there was a very small group of people
who worked on this.
around

literally

Beginning in the 1960s,

from

conference

convention to convention,
speak about this.

to

I would go

conference,

from community to community to

Because nobody else did.

people began, I stopped.

from

When other

For the last twenty years or so, I

don't really speak about this subject.

But at that time,

nobody did it, so I did.

I didn't speak about museums or

memorials— only

need

about

the

to

remember."15

Although

Wiesel said the 1967 and 1973 wars in Israel had no effect on
the emergence of interest in the Holocaust in the United
States (and seemed to imply he was taking credit for it), the
wars were the very reason that the

"very small group of

people who worked on this" began to gain a sympathetic ear.
It is important to emphasize that before 1967 there was
very little published here on the Holocaust.

Wiesel's Night,

copyrighted here in 1960, was one of the first works that
talked about life inside the camps.
The

Diary

of

Anne

Frank. 1952,

(Other early books were
and

Raul

Destruction of the European Jews. 1961.)
others said,
here,

Hilberg's

The

As Wiesel

and

he had great difficulty finding a publisher

although

the

published in France.

work

had

already

been

successfully

Except for Wiesel, most experts (e.g.,

those cited above) say the date for the emergence of interest
15Wiesel interview.

76

in the Holocaust was the 1967 Six Day War (reinforced by the
earlier Eichmann trial and the 1973 Yom Kippur War).

There

is no exact moment that the subject exploded on the scene,
but evidence indicates the issue most dramatically started
attracting the interest of the organized Jewish community
after the 1967 war, and increased after the 1973 war.
middle

of

the

1970s,

commemorating

the

By the

Holocaust

was

beginning to become a "hot" item in the organized American
Jewish community.
Soon afterward, three unrelated occurrences helped to
firmly entrench the issue of memorialization of the Holocaust
in the agenda of the organized American Jewish community:
In 1977, Begin became Prime Minister of Israel.

1)

More than

any previous leader, he used the evocation of the Holocaust
to defend Israel's existence and its policies.
American

Jewish

organizations,

Presidents,

followed suit.

Immigration

and

led by

the

The major

Conference

of

2) In the summer of 1977, the

Naturalization

Services

division

of

the

United States Justice Department set up a Special Litigation
Unit to prosecute alleged Nazi war criminals living in the
United

States.

That

year

Congress

also

requested

an

investigation to determine whether United States government
agencies had obstructed investigations and prosecutions of
alleged Nazi war criminals; and on May 15, 3.978, the General
Accounting Office of the House of Representatives issued its

77

report.16

3)

In

March-April

of

1978,

NBC

television

broadcast the series Holocaust. which (albeit in a kitsch,
soap opera
across

format)

the

brought the subject into living rooms

country

and

gave

it

a

national

grassroots

acceptability.
Perhaps the best evidence of formally placing a domestic
issue on the Jewish agenda on a national scale is the Joint
Program

Plan

of

the

National

Jewish

Community

Relations

Advisory Council (NJCRAC), the national umbrella organization
under

whose

institutional

jurisdiction

memorializing the Holocaust falls.

an

issue

such

as

NJCRAC first formally

placed the idea of memorializing the Holocaust on its agenda
in

1972-1973.

That

year

there

was

a

section

entitled

"Interpreting the Holocaust" in the organization's published
annual Joint Program Plan.
local

community

relations

thirtieth

anniversary

Ghetto.17

While

of

there

This short section encouraged
organizations

to

the

of

were

uprising

earlier

various

commemorate the Holocaust by organizations,
communities
placement

and
of

survivor
the

idea

groups
on

in
the

the

observe
the

Warsaw

efforts

to

local Jewish

United

agenda

the

of

States,
NJCRAC

16Rochelle G. Saidel, The Outraged Conscience: Seekers
of Justice for Nazi War Criminals in America. State
University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1984, p. 7.
17Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations.
1972-1973, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory
Council, New York, p. 11.
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institutionalized memorialization nationally in the American
Jewish community for the first time.

(In the 1961-1962 Joint

Program Plan, there was a section on the Eichmann trial,
recommending

that

Jewish

community

relations

agencies

"cooperate in studying and assessing all the effects of the
Eichmann

trial

lessons."18

and

This

in

interpreting

is

NJCRAC's

its

only

meaning

and

its

reference

to

the

Holocaust in program plans prior to 1972.)
Beginning in 1973-1974, NJCRAC's Joint Program Plan had
a section entitled

"Commemorating the Holocaust".

other recommendations,

Among

it suggested that local communities

create "visual memorials to the Holocaust, such as permanent
exhibits,

monuments,

plagues

local archives (pp. 12-13).

[and]

signs...." and develop

These recommendations were the

same in the Joint Program Plan for 1974-1975 (p. 14), 19751976 (pp. 20-21), 1976-1977
1978-1979 (p. 13).

(p. 16), 1977-1978

(p. 23) and

Only in 1979-1980, after President Carter

had appointed his President's Commission on the Holocaust,
was there a major shift in NJCRAC's section on the Holocaust.
It had never before recommended or even mentioned creation of
a national Holocaust memorial in the Joint Program Plan. Now
that Carter had put the issue on the federal agenda, NJCRAC
came

out

in

support

of

it.

(Afterward,

the

issue

of

commemorating the Holocaust continued to appear in the Joint

18Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations:
1961-1962. "The Eichmann Trial", pp. 15-16.
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Program Plan.
"Continuing

Depending on the year, it varied from a small

But

Urgent"

segment

to

a

major

section

on

"Lessons of Bitburg" in 1985-1986.)
Irving

"Yitz"

Greenberg

described

the

eleven

years

between the Six Day War and the 1978 NBC Holocaust miniseries
as "soaking the ground"
seeds).

(like a farmer preparing to plant

"The miniseries never would have been produced or

had the reverberations,

but for this ten years before of

saturating the ground," he said.
saturating the ground,

"It took ten years of

building up a scholarly following,

building up a religious consciousness.

And then it was like

striking a match, when you had saturation with benzene.
it

blasted

off."19

(At

this

point,

the

And

President's

Commission began.)
In addition to the opinions of experts and the agenda of
NJCRAC, another indicator of when memorializing the Holocaust
became important for the organized American Jewish community
is the coverage of the subject in books about the American
Jewish

community.

When Nathan Glazer wrote his

classic

American Judaism in 1957, memory of the Holocaust was totally
absent.

As Neusner wrote in 1979, to point out the recent

emergence of the topic at that time:

"Describing American

Judaism in the mid-1950s, the great sociologist Nathan Glazer
managed to write an entire book without making more than
passing reference to the destruction of European Jewry.
19Greenberg interview.
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contrast with the 197 0s is striking.
address

the

Jewish

world

Now there is no way to

without

referring

to

'the

Holocaust. '"20
Even in the 1960s and for much of the 1970s, the subject
of remembering the Holocaust was absent from most scholarly
analyses of the American Jewish community.
said:

"When

Commentary

conducted

a

As Silberman

symposium

on

'the

condition of Jewish belief' in 1966, for example, its editors
did not so much as mention the Holocaust in the five long
questions

it

sent

to

the

participating

rabbis

and

theologians, nor did more than a handful of the thirty-eight
respondents raise the question on their own."

He said that

by contrast, "In May and June of 1967, however, the Holocaust
was on almost every American Jew's mind...."21
Six years before Neusner's article and seven years after
the

Commentary

Committee

and

symposium,
the

Jewish

in

1973,

the

Publication

American

Society

Jewish

of America

published The Future of the Jewish Community in America, a
book of essays prepared by leading academics for an American
Jewish Committee task force on the
community of America.

future of the Jewish

Although Neusner said there was no way

in the 1970s to leave the Holocaust out, he was writing in
1979.

In 1973 it was still barely mentioned in a book by

leading scholars of the community such as David Sidorsky and
20Neusner.
21Silberman, pp. 182-183.
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Daniel Elazar.

Sidorsky, a prominent professor of Jewish

history who edited this book, wrote that four recent major
events "presumably" then affected the formation of identity
in the Jewish community.

"The first is the Holocaust, and

although it may be claimed that memory has dimmed its impact,
it may also be true that only now is the realization of the
event,

which

traumatized

awareness

by

its

overwhelming

enormity, becoming absorbed into consciousness."22
Sidorsky therefore recognized that the Holocaust had
become

somewhat

important,

but he was hedging his

bets.

Furthermore, the subject was virtually ignored by all of the
experts on the American Jewish community who contributed
chapters to his book.

There was only one other reference to

the Holocaust in Sidorsky's book, and it was a comment on the
lack of interest in the subject.
1973

book:

classrooms."23

"The

Holocaust

is

Seymour Fox said in the
barely

mentioned

in

our

(This was generally the case in the early

1970s, as contrasted with special curricula in many states,
beginning in the 1980s.)

In an article entitled "Decision

making in the American Jewish Community" in the same book,
Elazar did not even mention memorialization of the Holocaust
as relevant to decision-making (although he did refer to the

22David Sidorsky, David Sidorsky,ed., The Future of the
Jewish Community in America. American Jewish Committee and
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1973, p. 20.
23Seymour Fox, Ibid., 262.
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resettlement
Glazer's

and

1957

rehabilitation

book,

the

1966

of

Europe's

Commentary

Jews).24

symposium,

and

Sidorsky's 1973 book are typical of virtually all books on
the American Jewish community between the end of World War II
and the Yom Kippur War:

the subject of the Holocaust or its

memorialization is not discussed as relevant or important for
the organized American Jewish community.

Between Sidorsky's

writing in 1973 and Neusner's writing in 1979, there was a
giant leap in interest in the Holocaust.
Soon

after

dramatically.

the

1973

war

the

picture

had

changed

The Israel wars were the catalyst for interest

in the Holocaust not only because they evoked the possibility
of another Holocaust, another genocide of the Jewish people.
There was another side to the aftermath of the Six Day and
Yom Kippur wars.

Israel's image changed in the minds of many

individual American Jews and non-Jews,
makers in Washington.

including decision

Instead of the poor defenseless David,

Israel had suddenly become Goliath.
The leaders of the organized community were able to use
the new interest in the Holocaust in connection with their
support of Israel's policies:

for them,

emergence of the

memorialization of the Holocaust was a way of saying, again,
that Israel (i.e., the redeemer of the remnant of Holocaust
survivors) was the victim, and not the victor or aggressor.
During both wars, there was the fear that Israel might be
24Daniel Elazar, Ibid., p. 279.
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destroyed— that a new Holocaust would result in mass murder
of Jews.
the

This fear brought memories of the Holocaust out of

closet— even

for

people

who

had

no

personal

recollections.
Linking the Holocaust with Israel helped the organized
Jewish community hold the interest (and donations) of some
American

Jews

who,

Israel's policies.

in

the

wars'

aftermath,

questioned

When questions about the occupation and

Israel's treatment of Arabs got in the way, community leaders
could invoke the Holocaust.
"sell"

The Holocaust was easier to

than post-occupation Israel,

because there was no

question of who was victimizing whom.
After the wars, many secular Jews who had considered
Israel

their

strongest

connection

with

Judaism

became

disillusioned with Israel's policies and were searching for
a new non-religious link.

Memorialization of the Holocaust

became their new symbolic affirmation.

This substitution of

the Holocaust for Israel among some American Jews was not
acceptable to the organized American Jewish community, which
continued to support Israel and its policies.

Therefore

leaders of the community utilized memorialization of the
Holocaust in connection with explaining the need for Israel's
existence.

This was one reason it became an important issue

on the community's agenda.

Today the organized American

Jewish community still links the idea of memorializing the
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Holocaust with the importance of the existence of a strong
Israel.
Arthur Hertzberg said the Holocaust was evoked by the
American Jewish community in the 1970s, in order to remember
anti-Semitism and the vulnerability of Israel:
"The Holocaust was a shattering memory.
guilt, compassion, and fear.

It evoked

It said to American Jews,

in an essentially optimistic time, that being Jewish is
to

know

that

life

itself

is

often

suffering, and murderous hatred.

about

tragedy,

Even the new State of

Israel, the center of Jewish hope and power, was not
merely about glory and triumph;
Arab enemies.

it was endangered by

Jews were called to rally to Israel in

the name of the slogan 'Never Again.'"25
Hertzberg said in the 1950s and 1960s it was widely
believed that the effort for Israel would somehow keep the
next generation of American Jews Jewish.

But then, he said,

"In the 1980s, the observance even of the new Jewish mitzvah.
the

commitment

to

Israel,

was

becoming

more

tepid."

Hertzberg said this cooling process was evident even at the
time of the 1973 war.
they had been
massive,

"American Jews were less involved than

in June

1967.

Contributions were just as

but there were fewer volunteers among the young.

Some American Jews had already begun to question Israel's

25Arthur Hertzberg, The Jews
Schuster, New York, 1989, p. 382.
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America. Simon

and
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policies.

In 1973, a few hundred Jews had banded together in

an organization that was named Breira
insist

that

Israel

should make peace

('alternative')
on the

Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza."26

basis

to

of a

(Breira and

other alternative movements are not analyzed here, because
they are not part of the organized American Jewish community
as defined in Chapter 2— those organizations belonging to the
Conference

of

Organizations.
discredit,

Presidents

of

Major

American

Jewish

The organized Jewish community attempts to

rather

than

encourage,

the

activities

of

the

alternative peace movement.)
The

major

American

Jewish

organizations

did

not

substitute the Holocaust for Israel; they used the memory of
the Holocaust to gain support for Israel, and they made space
in

their

agenda

memorialization.

for

institutionalizing

This was complemented,

Holocaust

however,

by the

phenomenon of many American Jews shifting their focus from
Israel to the Holocaust.

It is difficult to paint a clear

picture of this shift, because there was another influence:
it

happened

at

a

time

when

Americans

in

searching for and finding their ethnicity.

general

were

In 1960, John

Fitzgerald Kennedy, an Irish Catholic, was elected President,
and in 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr. had "a dream".
was becoming beautiful in the 1960s,
Americans were seeking their roots.
26Ibid. , p. 384.

Black

and other hyphenated
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At this very time,

Israel's occupation of the West Bank

and Gaza became painful for many American Jews in the wake of
the

1967

and

1973

wars.

Thus

the

prevailing

mood

of

ethnicity in the United States at that time— reinforced by
disillusionment

need

and

opportunity for the Holocaust's emergence as an issue.

As

Fein said:

with

Israel— created

both

the

"Along comes the Holocaust, and makes us special.

It's not the kind of special we'd have chosen, but there it
is, ours by right, and awesomely substantial.
the Holocaust, what more do you need?"27

If you have

In other words,

the Holocaust is a hard act to follow.
Jeshajahu Weinberg, Director of the museum being built
in Washington by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, said:
"Why the preoccupation with the Holocaust now?
enough

to

say

that

it

was

Wiesel,

although

It is not
he

had

an

important role in popularizing the Holocaust in the United
States.

The issue matured in the mid-197 0s.

this country had a problem.

Secular Jews in

During the 1970s, a period of

flourishing ethnicity,

secular Jews had a problem knowing

what

ethnicity

their

center

of

was."

(The

search

for

identity also helped Jewish ethnicity— including the subject
of the Holocaust— flourish.)
Weinberg, an Israeli, said that since 1948 American Jews
"thought that such support for Israel as financial, tourism,
sending their children there for programs created the Jewish
27Fein, p. 63.
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content for them.

But a few years after the Six Day War, the

glory was over and there was the divisiveness of the politics
of

occupation."

Weinberg

said:

"The

stock

of

Israel

diminished and the Holocaust became the Jewish content for
American Jews— a way to remain Jewish as a secular Jew."
Weinberg said that American Jews who had projected all of
their ideals on Israel and in the 1970s had become aware that
Israel was not the idealistic country they had perceived it
to be, adopted the Holocaust as its replacement."28
At a 1990 lecture, Hertzberg also connected emergence of
interest in the Holocaust to the climate of ethnicity that
was part of the 1960s in the United States,

and to still

unresolved fears of anti-Semitism among the American Jewish
community.

He asked:
"Why the emergence of the Holocaust in the American

Jewish experience?

The subject was treif [non-kosher]

in the 194 0s, because American Jews were breaking out of
ghettos.
came

on

They didn't want to appear to be victims.
in the

America changed.
Vietnam.

1960s,

because

the

role of Jews

It was the era of Kennedy,

It
in

Blacks,

It was easier to speak in your own name.

The

Holocaust is central here because anti-Semitism is the
only way American Jewish consciousness can objectify the
Jewish

religion.

Everything

else

28Interview with Jeshajahu Weinberg,
Washington, D.C.

in

Judaism

March

14,

is

1990,
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subjective here.

The only thing alienated American Jews

can get het up about is anti-Semitism, because it's a
threat to life and to their vision of themselves.1,29
Thus, because of disappointment with Israel's policies, fear
of anti-Semitism, and the climate of ethnicity in the United
States,

the Holocaust arose as the new symbol

of Jewish

identity.
Evidence of the rise of the issue of the Holocaust is
the

proliferation of "Holocaust centers", beginning in the

late 1970's and 1980's.

According to Norich,

of the 84

entities commemorating the Holocaust that are listed in the
1985-1986 Directory of Holocaust Centers. Institutions, and
Organizations

in

North

America

(published

by

the

U.S.

Holocaust Memorial Council), 41 of them did not exist in
1977.3°

jn the jjjQgt recent Directory. published

in 1988

(after Norich's article), there are 98 listings of Holocaust
institutions in the United States, including 19 museums, 48
resource centers,

34 archival facilities,

12 memorials, 26

research institutes and five libraries.31
The overwhelming institutionalization of memorialization
of the Holocaust may,
weakening

in

some

in fact,

American

eventually bring about a

Jews'

29Hertzberg, lecture, Society
Judaism, February 4, 1990.

ties

to

the

Jewish

for the Advancement

of

30Norich.
31Directorv of Holocaust Institutions. U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Council, Washington, D.C., 1988, p. vii.
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community.

If many Jews are secular, and the secular ethnic

manifestation of organized Judaism emphasizes mass murder and
the

past, will future generations

want to remain linked to

the

Jewish community? Fein warned

in 1988:

"The danger is

that we will come (have come?) to see the Holocaust as the
most

important thing that ever happened to us,

richest,

the

one

most

filled

with

even the

consequence

and

implication. "32
As James E. Young wrote in 1991:
"Holocaust museums are increasingly becoming the
centres

for

fundraising.

historical

education,

Consequently,

activism

and

instead of learning about

the Holocaust through the study of Jewish history, many
Jews and non-Jews in America learn the whole
history through the lens of

the Holocaust.

of Jewish
Without

other kinds of museums to a Jewish past, even to current
life in the Diaspora to offset them, Holocaust memorials
and museums tend to organize Jewish culture and identity
around this one era alone....As a result, not only will
the Holocaust continue to suggest itself as a centre if
American Jewish consciousness, but it will become all
that non-Jewish Americans know about a thousand years of
European Jewish civilization.1,33
32Fein, p. 62.
33James E. Young, "Holocaust Memorials in America: The
Politics of Identity", in Survey of Jewish Affairs, Vol. 10,
ed. William Frankel, Basil Blackwell, London, 1991 (page
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Referring to the centralization of memorialization of
the Holocaust in the organized American Jewish community,
Saul

Friedlander asked:

"Will

this be the

core

in the

future, or can we go beyond it?"34

SUMMARY
Before
virtually

1960,

the

unconcerned

organized
about

Jewish

community

memorializing

the

was

Holocaust.

Therefore an American president, a New York City mayor or a
New York State governor would not have sought to use this
issue to gain political favor in the community.

There was no

overture from any elected official, no iron triangle or issue
network,

and no Mutagon of political

creating

a

memorial.

The

allies dedicated to

community's

interest

in

the

Holocaust emerged somewhat with the 1961 Eichmann trial, and
then, much more powerfully, with the 1967 Six Day War.
1973 Yom Kippur War reinforced this.
Holocaust began to replace,

issue

of

importance

organizations,

but

they

rhetoric about Israel
Minister in 1977).

for

After the wars, the

or at least join,

focus for secular American Jews.
the

The

Israel as a

Israel remained the prime
major

integrated

the

American
Holocaust

Jewish
into

(especially after Begin became Prime

Despite growing interest in commemorating

the Holocaust, the organized American Jewish community did
proofs 1-13), p. 12.
34Friedlander, 1990 lecture.

not

seek a national

government.

Holocaust memorial

from the

Federal

Instead, as is detailed in Chapter 7, President

Carter proposed the idea to them.

After Carter announced

creation of a national memorial in 1978, memorialization of
the

Holocaust

therefore
Jewish

even

became
more

community.

official
important
This

United
to

the

background

States

policy

organized
is

and

American

necessary

for

understanding what led to Mayor Koch's naming a Task Force on
the Holocaust

in

1981,

followed by

a Holocaust Memorial

Commission in 1982, for the purpose of building a Holocaust
memorial museum in New York City.

When Governor Cuomo joined

Mayor Koch as a "founding" co-chairman of the project in
1986, the structure of the political forces responsible for
carrying out the project, the Mutagon, changed into a polygon
with two heads.
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CHAPTER 4:
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A MAJOR HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL IN NEW YORK CITYs 1946-1965
"This is the site for the American memorial to the heroes of
the Warsaw Ghetto battle April-May 1943 and to the six
million Jews of Europe martyred in the cause of human
liberty."1

The

Mutagon,

the

political

endeavoring from 1981 to

formally

Although
on the

has

been

has a long and complicated pre

memorializing

agenda

that

1991 to create a Holocaust memorial

museum in New York City,
history.

alliance

the

Holocaust

was

not

of the organized American Jewish

community until 1973-1974, in 1946 and in the early 1960s two
significant but unsuccessful commemorative efforts began in
New York City.

They did not succeed, primarily, because they

were not projects backed by the organized Jewish community,
the topic did not yet have any political value for American
government officials,

and the sponsoring groups thus had

difficulty building the political alliances necessary for
implementation.

The first attempt, in 1946, was begun by one

vigorous and dedicated person who had a small organization to
use as a power base to try to interest others.

Individuals,

rather than Jewish organizations, backed the effort.
In

the

1960s,

by

contrast,

some

organizations joined the spearheading group.

major

Jewish

However, they

did not give the project priority and appropriate political
1Plaque in Riverside Park, between
Streets, dedicated October 19, 1947.

83rd

and

84th

alliances were not forged.

Ultimately both projects failed,

but, as will be demonstrated, they helped to set the stage
for later government intervention into memorialization of the
Holocaust.

When

Mayor

Edward

I.

Koch's

administration

intervened to "initiate" a memorial in 1981, the idea already
had a history of 35 years of plans and attempts in New York
City.

Prior to Mayor Koch's tenure, interest groups came to

New York City mayors to request a memorial.
Koch,

he

coopted the

idea,

made

it his

In the case of
own,

intervened, and came to the Jewish community.

officially

He created the

public-private political alliance that became the Mutagon.
An

analysis

of

the

pre-Koch

attempts

to

create

a

Holocaust memorial in New York City will shed some light on
why they did not succeed.

Variables that account for the

early failures to create a Holocaust memorial include:

the

interest groups' inexperience in forming political alliances,
the political climate, financial problems, lack of interest
and other priorities in the Jewish community, the subsequent
lack of political

benefits

for government officials,

the

psychological inability of survivors and other Jews to face
the

Holocaust,

seeking

to

intervene

disagreements

create
in those

a

memorial.

early

within

the

The

attempts,

interest

government

because

group

did

there was

not
no

serious interest yet in the organized Jewish community, and
thus no political gain from coopting the project.
other

elected

officials

gave

lip

service

Mayors and

and

limited
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assistance and promised to cooperate, but they did not make
the project their own, as Koch later did.
The first attempt to create a Holocaust memorial in New
York City (and probably in the nation) was in 1946-1947, in
Riverside

Park between

Hudson River.

83rd and 84th Streets,

along the

The effort was coordinated by a group called

American Memorial to Six Million Jews of Europe, Inc.
William

O'Dwyer

Committee

of

memorial,
project.

Honorary

Sponsors,

Commissioner,
supportive

was

was

a

and

member

and designated
but

Chairman
Robert

of

the

National

Moses,

ex-officio.

a piece

otherwise was

of

The

City

not closely

Mayor

as

Park

mayor

was

land

for the

linked with the

Powerful Park Commissioner Moses was also generally

supportive of the idea.

The list of sponsors was long and

prestigious, including many congressmen, professors, Jewish
and non-Jewish clergymen who lent their names but were not
actively involved.

Unlike later attempts to build Holocaust

memorials in New York City, this project was not officially
sponsored by a consortium of Jewish organizations or by the
City; nor was the issue "hot".

There was no iron triangle,

issue network or Mutagon of political allies working together
on the project.
This first attempt at a memorial was really a singlehanded effort.

The initiator and guiding spirit was Adolph

R. Lerner, a Polish Jewish refugee who was a journalist and
publisher.

He

was

vice

president

of

the

National
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Organization of Polish Jews in New York, a group of refugee
professionals.2 He had fled Vienna when the Nazis took over
Austria in 1938, going first to France and then to the United
States.
Polish

During 194 3 and 1944 he worked at the official
news

agency

in

New

York,

editing

bulletins

that

arrived from the Polish underground.
Lerner had enough political savvy to know he could not
do the job single-handed,
group behind him.

and that he needed an interest

In January,

194 6, Lerner presented his

idea for a memorial to the National Organization of Polish
Jews in New York, suggesting that a memorial "in tribute to
the Heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto and the six million Jews
slain by the Nazis, be erected in New York City."3
On February 6, 194 6, Lerner used the organization's name
to submit a written request to Mayor O'Dwyer, asking him to
find an appropriate site for an "eternal light" memorial
dedicated to the fallen heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto.

In

response, the mayor invited Lerner and a delegation from the
National Organization of Polish Jews to City Hall, where they
met with Comptroller Lazarus Joseph.
involved

personally,

comptroller.)

the

mayor

(Rather than getting
delegated

his

Jewish

A few days later, Lerner and two other members

2S. L. Shneiderman, "To Memorialize the Six Million:
The Monument Controversy", Congress Bi-Weeklv. February,
1965.
3A. R. Lerner, "The Case of the Memorial", Unpublished
manuscript, undated, files of YIVO, New York, p. 1.
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were invited to visit Stuart Constable, Chief Designer of the
Park Department.

Constable told them Commissioner Moses had

approved the proposal and would be glad to cooperate.
that

meeting,

Arthur

Szyk,

a member

of

the

At

delegation,

suggested that Jo Davidson would be the best sculptor for the
project.

(There is no record of why Davidson was chosen.)4

On April 18, Lerner received a letter from Moses which
said:

"Frankly,

I am not very sympathetic to the

idea of another ETERNAL LIGHT [a light above the
Torah ark in synagogues, which was how Lerner had
described the proposed memorial to O'Dwyer].

I am

sure, however, that you can find a suitable place
in one of the parks for a fitting Memorial, if it
is

to

be

designed

by

a

first-rate

assisted by a competent architect.

sculptor,

I understand

that you have been considering Jo Davidson as the
sculptor - you could not find a better man.

It is

impossible for me to make any final decision on
the Memorial, or its location, until I see models
and plans of the Memorial.

The Art Commission

will undoubtedly make the same request."5
With Moses, who controlled the parks, lauding the committee's
first choice of Davidson as the designer, the project seemed
likely to go forward.
4Ibid., p. 2.
5Ibid.

As will be seen, however, Lerner and
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his committee did not seem to understand how to capitalize on
their choice of Davidson and push the project through.
On April 27, 1947 "Eternal Light Monument in the City of
New York in Memory of Six Million Jews of Europe" became a
corporation.

Lerner then invested time in trying to shore up

what could have become the interest group angle of an iron
triangle.

He

spent more than a year trying to get the

support of all of the Jewish organizations, without success.
"Individually nearly all the Jewish organizations made me
believe that they were wholeheartedly for the project, but
finally I came to the conclusion that all my efforts to bring
them together for a unified action were in vain," he wrote.
"I had several meetings with the representatives of the NCRAC
[National Jewish Community Relations Council] member agencies
who in general had expressed themselves in sympathy with the
sentiment. . .but many of them felt that they were not directly
concerned as organizations."6

This is evidence of the lack

of interest of the established organized Jewish community in
the subject of Holocaust memorialization at that time.

As

was stated in Chapter 3, NJCRAC did not place the topic on
its agenda until

1973-1974,

26 years after Lerner sought

their support.
Davidson wrote to Lerner on April 16, 1947 that he would
prepare a model, putting "my heart and soul into the creation
of this Monument."
6Ibid. , p. 3.

He said:

"Such a monument would be a
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symbol of the Unconquerable spirit of all freedom loving
people, and a warning to tyranny that we shall not forget."
Davidson and Constable chose the site in Riverside Park,
between 83rd and 84th Streets.

Edward Banfield's or other

analyses of the politics of site selection do not apply here:
According to Lerner's account, Davidson said he and Constable
had

seen

an

contemplation

old

bearded

Jew

standing

and

decided it was ideal.

on

that spot

On May 2,

in

1947,

Lerner received a letter from Moses stating this site had his
approval.
ceremony.7

He

also

granted

permission

for

a

dedication

The City, however, retained veto power over the

design.8
At a May 20, 1947 meeting, the name of the organization
Lerner created was changed from the Eternal Light Monument to
the American Memorial to Six Million Jews of Europe,

Inc.

Two days later a certificate of the corporation's name change
was filed with the New YorkState Secretary of State.
was reelected

president at this meeting.

Lerner

On May 28, at a

meeting in Borough President Rogers's office, Lerner reported
on plans for dedicating the Riverside Park site on October
19.

Efforts to raise funds for the dedication almost ended

in failure, until a wealthy acquaintance of Lerner's named I.
Rogosin joined the group, pledged $1000, and promised to get

7Ibid., pp. 3-4.
^olf Von Eckhardt, Eric Mendelsohn. George Braziller,
1960, p. 30.
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most of the rest of the necessary $6000 from friends.9
On September 23, 1947, Moses wrote to Lerner:
be

sure you will

Department."

have the

Lerner said:

full

"You may

cooperation of the

Park

"I was very happy about this and

felt a deep gratitude and love for [Moses]."10

Moses has

been criticized for being an "anti-Semitic Jew" who did not
even want to acknowledge his Jewishness.

At this point,

however, perhaps moved by the impact of Hitler's genocide of
the

Jews,

he

seemed

memorial

to

however,

there

genuinely

fruition.11

interested

Despite

his

in bringing

expressed

a

support,

is no record of Moses trying to push the

project through

(as he did with so many other projects he

decided he wanted).
On October 19, 1947 a ceremony was held at the site,
where a plaque

(intended as a cornerstone)

was dedicated.

Soil from concentration camps and a proclamation from the
Chief Rabbi of Palestine were among items placed in a box
beneath the cornerstone.

According to newspaper accounts,

some 15,000 people attended the dedication ceremony.

Lerner,

then Chairman of the Memorial Executive Committee, was quoted
in a September
"would

be

a

17,

1947 press

living

American

release that the memorial
symbol

of

democracy

and

9Lerner, pp. 7-8.
10Ibid. , p. 11.
11Moses's anti-Jewish attitude is documented in Robert
A. Caro, The Power Broker. Vintage Books, 1975, pp. 411-412.

100

brotherhood, and would inspire the fulfillment of the world's
obligations to those who survived the Nazi holocaust."
was

stated

in Chapter 2,

Lerner had Zionist motives

As
for

dedicating the site right before the United Nations vote on
the partition of Palestine.

In his press release,

Lerner

seemed to be saying that the Holocaust was the reason the
world (i.e., the United Nations) had the responsibility for
creating a Zionist state.
The plaque

in Riverside Park,

fence, remains today, and says:

surrounded by a metal

"This is the site for the

American memorial to the heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto battle
April-May 1943 and to the six million Jews of Europe martyred
in the cause of human liberty."

Lerner's statement and the

plaque seem to balance the distinctively Jewish aspect of the
Holocaust with a more universal message of "democracy and
brotherhood"

and

"the

cause

of human

liberty".

In the

political climate of the 199 0s, when the ethnicity of groups
is proudly displayed and Jews in the United States are less
insecure about anti-Semitism, the statement that "the Jews of
Europe died in the cause of human liberty" seems not only
historically false but unfair to the victims.

They did not

"die" for "the cause of human liberty"; they were murdered in
a

rationally

planned

genocidal

because they were Jews.

national

The effort begun

policy,

merely

in 1946 never

materialized beyond this plaque.
On November 26, 1947, the memorial committee met at the
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Hotel Roosevelt.

At that time Rogosin was elected Chairman

of the Board and Lerner was appointed executive director,
with a salary of $600 a month.
set up,

An Advisory Art Committee was

and a decision was made to launch a fund raising

campaign to raise $600,000.

On March 11, 1948, the American

Memorial to Six Million Jews of Europe,
Davidson,
confirm

sculptor

and

arrangements

Riverside Park.

Eli

for

Jacques

Inc. wrote to Jo

Kahn,

construction

of

architect,
a

monument

to
in

Davidson was supposed to deliver a scale

model no later than July 1 of that year, which then needed
approvals from the Art Commission, Park Department, and Board
of Directors of the American Memorial committee.
was to receive a maximum of $15,000,
enclosed.

Davidson

of which $5000 was

Kahn was to render preliminary architectural and

engineering services,

for a maximum of $5000.

stages were to be arranged after approvals

Subsequent
of the scale

model.12
In April, 1948, the campaign to raise $600,000 for the
memorial

was

announced

in

a

local

newspaper.13

Mayor

O'Dwyer wrote to Lerner on July 26, 1948 that "your campaign
to obtain funds to erect this monument has my wholehearted
approval

and

I am confident

that

our

liberty-loving

generous citizens will respond to your appeal."

and

He added:

12Lerner, pp. 19-2 0.
13"Drive Underway for Riverside Drive Memorial",
Side News. April 1, 1948.

West
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"This will not be a monument of bronze or concrete but rather
a spiritual citadel inscribed:

It shall not come to pass

again!11 Despite this glowing rhetoric, there is no evidence
O'Dwyer helped with fund raising efforts or made any further
commitment to the cause.
On October 20, 1948, a year after the Riverside Park
ceremony,

the

American

Memorial

to

Six

Million

Jews

of

Europe, Inc. organized a first anniversary ceremony at City
Hall.

Emphasizing the need for funds was clearly on the

agenda,

because

Lerner said in his address:

"With the

encouragement of our great Mayor and of eminent leaders of
our religious and cultural institutions I urge all of you to
give us your continued financial and moral support to the end
that

the magnificent Memorial

we

are planning will

rise

before many months have passed."14
Models by Davidson and Eli Jacques Kahn went on exhibit
at the Jewish Museum in November, 1948.

Lerner said at that

time, however, that the committee had asked other sculptors
to

submit models,

decision.15

and the committee

not yet made

a

There is no further record, but this statement

seems politically unwise,
Davidson.

had

considering Moses's

support

of

Lerner seems to have lost his chance to have Moses

as a staunch ally

for the project.

Davidson's

original

14A. R. Lerner, Address, October 20, 1948, Archive of
YIVO, New York.
15The New York Times. November 23,
clipping in archives of YIVO, New York.

1948,

fragment of
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design depicted the April 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising, and he
did at least the one scale model that was displayed.16
memorial

committee

was

not

pleased

that,

after

The

months,

Davidson's model was no more detailed than "the same little
figures which he had in November 1947".
insisted

that

Commission.
design.17

the
The

model
Art

be

The artist, however,

submitted

Commission

to

the

rejected

City

the

Art

Davidson

There is no available record of the reasons for

their rejection, nor of any lobbying attempt on the part of
the memorial committee.
After this initial impasse, the memorial committee held
a

competition

included

for

design

Davidson,

and

of
also

a memorial.
Eric

Artists

Mendelsohn

and

that
Ivan

Mestrovic, Percival Goodman, William Zorach, Leo Friedlander,
and Chaim Gross, submitted proposals.

Models were exhibited

at the Jewish Museum in October, 1949, and at the Museum of
Modern Art for one month in January, 1950.
the

Art

Commission

unanimously

backed

On June 17, 1951
the

design

by

Mendelsohn and Yugoslav sculptor Mestrovic.18 On July 18 of
that year,

the American Memorial

to Six Million Jews

of

Europe, Inc. announced approval by the Art Commission of this
16This is documented in press releases and news articles
of that time; and in Wolf Von Eckhardt, Eric Mendelsohn.
George Braziller, 1960; and in Bruno Zevi, Erich Mendelsohn.
Rizzoli, 1985.
17Wolf Von Eckhardt, Eric Mendelsohn. George Braziller,
1960, p. 30.
18Shneiderman.
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much more universal design.
eighty-foot

pylon

of

The sculpture was to be of an

two

tablets

Commandments would be inscribed,
relief

depicting

humankind's

on

which

the

Ten

a 100-foot wall of bas-

struggle

to

fulfill

the

Commandments, and a giant carving of Moses.
Although Lerner's committee had obtained, a site from the
City

Park

Commission,

placed

a

cornerstone

in

a

public

ceremony attended by government officials and thousands of
people,

engaged

a top

rate

architect-sculptor

team,

and

received official approval of the City Art Commission, this
first effort to create a major Holocaust memorial in New York
City failed.
organized

The main reason for this failure was that the

American

government,

did

Jewish
not

community,

have

the

memorialization on their agendas.

and

subject

therefore,
of

the

Holocaust

Therefore there was no

possibility of forming a strong interest group-government
coalition to see the project through.

According to S . L.

Shneiderman, a journalist who was involved with the project,
leaders of Jewish organizations urged at the time that any
money raised in the American Jewish community should be used
for rehabilitating survivors rather than creating a memorial,
and this resulted in fund raising difficulties.19

If this

is accurate, the organized Jewish community hindered, rather
than encouraged, the effort to create the first Holocaust
memorial in New York City.
19Ibid.

Lerner complained of always having to scrape for money.
He expressed his "disappointment in not succeeding to move
the leading Jewish civic and religious organization[s] to a
unified participation in the project.
of

various

religious

groups

of

Although the leaders

Jewish

sponsors of the Memorial project,

faiths

support

of

a

number

as

and also the leaders of

various civic organizations became sponsors,
active

joined

of

leading

I missed the
civic

Jewish

organizations of which the attitude was rather aloof."

In

addition, he referred to disagreements within the committee,
with Rogosin using a narrow base for fundraising and himself
wanting a mass appeal.20

He also said the contract with

Davidson and Eli Jacques Kahn "became a source of the most
distressing

intrigues

and

quarrels,

and

has

created

situations which never ceased to threaten to destroy this
whole

project."21

Rebecca

Read

Shanor

said

the

project

failed because of lack of funds, but she did not elaborate on
why the funds were not forthcoming from the organized Jewish
community.22 The fact that memorialization of the Holocaust
was not on the community's agenda is the main reason there
was not a forceful private-public coalition on behalf of the
project, nor successful fund raising efforts.

20Lerner, pp. 16-17.
21Ibid., p. 19.
22Rebecca Read Shanor, The City That Never Was. Viking,
1988, p. 219.

One

reason

the

organized

Jewish

community

did

not

aggressively support creation of a Holocaust memorial in the
early 1950s was this was the time the Jewish Agency was
negotiating

with

West

Germany

for

reparation

survivors of the Holocaust and for Israel.

money

for

The community did

not want to anger West Germany at a time when Israel was
trying to extract hefty guilt payments.

In March of 1951

Israel Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had submitted a claim to the
four occupying powers of Germany— the United States, Britain,
France and the Soviet Union— for $1.5 billion, his price for
Jewish property looted and burned by the Nazis.

When the

powers refused to deal with him and told him to deal directly
with Germany, Ben-Gurion said he would do so.
Jewish

Agency

Chairman

Nahum

Goldmann

to

He then asked
negotiate

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany,
promised

more

negotiations

than

with

$800,000,000.

East

Germany,

Goldmann was

(There
but

no

with

were

also

agreement

was

reached.)
Another reason the community may have been cautious
about supporting a Holocaust memorial was the then pervading
political climate of the Cold War.

The old ally, the Soviet

Union, was now the enemy, and the old enemy, Nazi Germany,
was now the new ally, in the form of the Federal Republic, or
West Germany.

The United States was from the end of the war

even secretly bringing into the United States known Nazi war
criminals

(e.g.,

through

Project

Paperclip)

to

get

a

107

technological edge on the Soviet Union.
climate of that time,

In the paranoid

the organized Jewish community was

afraid an activity that was anti-Nazi,
could be construed as pro-Communist.

i.e.,

anti-German,

They may also have been

afraid a memorial would draw attention to the fact that so
many resistance fighters and heroes had been Communists.
This

was

not

an

atmosphere

in

which

the

conservative

establishment Jewish organizations wanted to actively support
and raise hundreds of thousands of dollars for a monument
that would be both specifically Jewish and anti-German.
The organizations had reason to be cautious,

because

this was the era when Senator Joseph McCarthy began his
infamous investigations of people he considered Communists,
and many Jews were high on his list of targets.

In March 22,

1947, Truman issued Executive Order 983 5, which launched a
program to search out "infiltration of disloyal persons" in
the United States government.
of

1952,

some

6.6

Between this time and the end

million

people

were

investigated.

Meanwhile, external events such as the 1948 Berlin blockade,
the 1949 Communist victory in China and the Soviet Union7s
explosion of its first atomic bomb, and the 1950 beginning of
the Korean War were portrayed as signs of an international
Communist

conspiracy.

As

Howard

Zinn

said,

the

Truman

administration "established a climate of fear— a hysteria
about Communism— which would steeply escalate the military
budget and stimulate the economy with war-related orders.
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This combination of policies would permit more aggressive
actions abroad, more repressive actions at home."23
McCarthyism made the Jewish community especially afraid,
because it had a decidedly anti-Semitic element to it.

By

the summer of 1950, the prosecution of (Jewish) accused spies
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg was a major component in the anti
communist mood of the country; they were found guilty of
espionage and executed on June 19, 1953.

Naomi W. Cohen's

history of the American Jewish Committee quotes a 1947 office
memorandum of that organization which said:

"For a number of

years, anti-semitic activists have assiduously promoted the
smear that Jews are Communists.

They have found this to be

the most effective line with which they were left, since the
decline of organizational activity.

The acceleration of the

anti-Communist campaign has come as a windfall to them, and
our reports
operators

indicate

a steady procession of anti-semitic

from their regular sphere of activity onto the

bandwagon of the general anti-Communist movement."

Cohen

named Gerald L. K. Smith, Conde McGinley, and Upton Close as
among these "hatemongers".24
Many

of

those

accused

by

McCarthy

and

others

were

Jewish, and Jewish organizations and individuals were thus

23Howard Zinn, The Twentieth Century:
A
History. Harper and Row, New York, 1980, p. 128.

People's

24Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist:
The American
Jewish Committee. 1906-1966. Jewish Publication Society,
Philadelphia, 1972, p. 346. See Chapter 13, pp. 345-382.
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extremely

sensitive

to

past

and

present

accusations

of

"international conspiracy", Communist party membership, and
disloyalty.

Some

major

Jewish

organizations

bent

over

backward to prove their loyalty, even offering to sell out
their suspect members.

For example,

in 1953 there was a

letter of understanding between such organizations as the
Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish War Veterans and American
Jewish

Commit^e

and

the

House

Unamerican

Activities

Committee, in which the Jewish organizations offered to draw
up dossiers for the Committee.25
This was the political climate of the United States at
the time that the group called the American Memorial to Six
Million Jews of Europe, Inc. was trying to create a Holocaust
memorial in Riverside Park.

And New York City was one of the

cities most affected by the Cold War and McCarthyism.
a

concentration

of

leftist,

socialist,

and

individuals and organizations, many of them Jewish.

It had

Communist
Although

then Mayor O'Dwyer lent his support to the idea of the 1947
project, he would not have dreamed of initiating the creation
of a Holocaust memorial or aggressively supporting one:

this

25"Part I:
Open Letter to the Jewish People of the
United States" by the Editors; "Part II: Memorandum of the
ADL (July 3, 1953); "Part III:
The Harap Testimony Before
the Unamerican Activities Committee, Jewish Life. September
1953.
Charles R.
Allen,
Jr.,
"A Talk with Velde
Collaborators:
An Interview that Reflects a Policy of
Appeasement by Three Jewish 'Defense' Organizations toward
the McCarthyite Danger to Democracy", Jewish Life. October,
1953, New York.
Also, Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist.
Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1972, p. 354.
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was

not

the

time

for

gaining

political

advantages

from

intervening and placing such a memorial on a governmental
agenda.

The major American Jewish organizations, themselves,

were not aggressively supporting the idea nor backing it
financially.

To the contrary, there is evidence they were

opposed, as such a project would take away from fund raising
efforts

for

Israel

and

for

resettlement

of

Jewish

refugees.26
The Holocaust survivors, themselves, were in no mental
or financial condition to organize the creation of a memorial
in the decade following the war.

Psychologically, it would

take many years for some of them to begin talking about their
experiences.

(Some never were able to do so.)

They were

beginning new lives in a strange country with a different
language— a

feat

that

suffered near death.

is

difficult

even

without

having

In addition, as Elie Wiesel said, the

survivors were considered

"second class citizens" by the

organized Jewish community at that time, and their leadership
in such an effort would not have been well received by the
community.27 As new Americans, survivors were also "walking

26Letter from A. R. Lerner to Emil Shneiderman, February
24, 1965. Memo from S. L. Shneiderman to Richard Cohen,
American Jewish Congress, April 21, 1977 (about April 18
meeting). Memorandum from Victoria Free to Richard Cohen,
"Notes from a press conference at the Jewish Community
Relations Council-March 24, 1977", March 25, 1977. Archives
of YIVO, New York (archival box filed under "American
Memorial to Six Million Jews of Europe).
27Wiesel interview, August 8, 1990.
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on eggs" to show gratitude to their adopted country and to
prove they had no connection with their countries of origin,
most of which had become Soviet-bloc.
forward rather than backward.

They were looking

(Survivors and survivor groups

were involved in later efforts.)
A national fundraising drive for $500,000 to finance the
Riverside Park memorial was not announced until September,
1952, five years after the dedication ceremony.

There has

been no published history or analysis of why the project
failed, and almost everyone active in this first attempt to
create a Holocaust memorial is no longer alive.
history of the project,

the

following

factors

components in the ultimate failure of the project:

From the
emerge

as

the Cold

War political climate of the time; financial problems, lack
of interest and other priorities in the organized Jewish
community;
government

the subsequent
officials;

lack of political benefits

the

psychological

inability

for
of

survivors and other Jews to face the Holocaust; disagreements
within the interest group seeking to create a memorial; and
inability to raise sufficient funds.
these

factors

made

it

impossible

The combination of
to

form

a

political

coalition that might have moved the project forward at that
time.

A coalition such as the Mutagon, which followed the

initiation of Mayor Koch's 1981 project, was not even a gleam
in anyone's eye.
The paranoia caused by the Cold War and connected fear
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of

anti-Semitism

committee made
Jewish.

are

about

likely
the

reasons

project

that

were

statements

not

the

distinctively

The universal approach of the group sponsoring the

memorial was underscored by Rabbi

David de Sola Pool,

a

member of the Advisory Design Committee for the Memorial
committee, who wrote:

"The monument will seek to express, as

only an artist can, the aspiration of man toward the moral
law of a universal God and the ideal of brotherhood and love
among men."

While he said that the Nazi atrocities must not

be forgotten, he added:
Jewish memorial.'

"The memorial is not 'a strictly

It does, indeed, record the sacrifice of

the six million Jews who lost their lives under Nazi rule.
But the remembrance of them belongs to all men
nazism

is

repugnant

and

odious.

Many

for whom

Christians

are

After the failure of the first project in 1952,

ten

associated with the memorial. ...1,28

years elapsed before a new effort was mounted.

Meanwhile,

the Cold War continued, but the domestic political scene was
changing.

In 1954 the Supreme Court had struck down the

"separate but equal" doctrine with the Brown v.
Education decision.

Board of

Rosa Parks had sat down in the white

section of a bus in Alabama in 1955 and had been arrested.
This set off a boycott and other actions that resulted, in
November, 1956, in the Supreme Court's outlawing segregation

28D. De Sola Pool, letter to the editor, The New York
Times, June 20, 1952.
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on local bus lines.
history

was

In 1960 the first Catholic in American

elected

President.

By

the

summer

of

1963,

Martin Luther King had told 200,000 black and white Americans
assembled
August,

in Washington,

1965,

D.C.,

"I have a dream...."

In

President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting

Rights Act into law.29
Between 1962 and 1965, in this new atmosphere of civil
rights demonstrations and legislation, and ethnic pluralism,
there

was

memorial

a second

attempt

to

in Riverside Park.

create

a major

Holocaust

The new struggles

for human

rights for Blacks in the United States and the new climate of
ethnicity may have consciously or unconsciously influenced
this renewed effort to memorialize the violation of the human
rights of Jews by the Nazis.
This next effort in Riverside Park was not by the same
people as the 1947-1952 attempt.

In fact,

groups

different

were

trying

to

erect

two

two different
memorials

in

Riverside Park in the early 1960s, both designed by sculptor
Nathan Rapoport.
were

involved

Some leaders of Holocaust survivor groups

in this

second attempt,

although

the

real

emergence of survivors as a visible united group did not
occur for almost twenty more years.
do

a

rational

analysis

of

(It might be possible to

competing

interest

groups

to

explain why one memorial in Riverside Park was not enough at
this point.

However,

29Zinn, pp. 152-162.

the

following

classic Jewish

joke
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explains

the

irrational

situation

context

of

better,

Jewish

by

placing

communal

it

life:

in

the

A Jew was

shipwrecked on a desert island and build two mud huts.

When

he was rescued, he explained to his puzzled rescuers why he
needed two of them.

They were both synagogues, one of which

he refused to enter.)
The

first,

Holocaust

broader based

survivors,

Organization

(WAGRO),

organizations.

the
with

group
Warsaw

the

consisted
Ghetto

backing

and

Polish

Resistance

of

34

Jewish

This WAGRO effort, which was the stronger of

the two, was headed by survivor Vladka Meed,
WAGRO

of

the

Workmen's Circle.

survivors,

and

Benjamin

representing

Gebiner

of

the

Using the WAGRO organization headed by her

husband, Benjamin Meed, as her base, Vladka Meed, along with
Gebiner, brought together a coalition of 34 major and mostly
minor survivor organizations to create the Memorial Committee
for the Six Million Jewish Martyrs and Heroes.30

Rapoport's

design for WAGRO, submitted to the group on October 13, 1964,
was a Torah scroll, with bas reliefs of Holocaust episodes.
30In addition to WAGRO, memorial sponsors were: American
Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Jewish Labor
Committee, Jewish War Veterans, B'nai B'rith, Workmen's
Circle, Farband-Labor Zionist Order, New York Board of
Rabbis, National Council of Jewish Women, Bergen-Belsen
Association, Club of Polish Jews, Jewish Nazi Victims of
America, Federation of Polish Jews, Association of Yugoslav
Jews, United Galician Jews of America, United Rumanian Jews
of America, World Sephardi Federation, World Federation of
Russian Jews, World Federation of Hungarian Jews, DanishAmerican Jewish Committee, Bulgarian Claims Committee, World
Federation of Ukrainian Jews.
(Files of WAGRO, New York
City.)
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According

to the

artist,

"On this

scroll

is written

sculptural language the history of the Jews.

in

It tells of

martyrdom, fight and of liberation."31
On November 12, 1964, WAGRO and 25 representatives of
Jewish organizations met with Mayor Robert F. Wagner and
Parks Commissioner Newbold Lewis to request that a memorial
be erected.

As with Mayor O'Dwyer, a group approached the

mayor; he did not intervene and approach the group.
the mayor,
support

Besides

this group had already sought other political

in the

State

Legislature.

New York State

Senate

Minority Leader Joseph Zaretzki accompanied them and spoke on
their behalf.
involvement

However, there is no further record of his

and the triangular political

coalition

never

evolved.
Rapoport was present at the meeting with the mayor and
gave him a photograph of the planned Torah scroll monument.
At about the same time, WAGRO announced that pianist Artur
Rubinstein

would

assume

chairmanship

of

its

memorial

committee, the Memorial Committee for the Six Million Jewish
Martyrs and Heroes.32

As is common for Jewish and other

causes in New York City, a famous superstar had been enlisted
to add glamor and gain publicity.

This did not, however,

31Letter from Nathan Rapoport dated October 13,
files of WAGRO, New York.

1964,

32WAGRO translated reprint of articles in Yiddish Daily
Forward. November 14, 1964 and The Dav-Jewish Journal.
November 15, 1964, files of WAGRO, New York.
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give the group enough clout to carry out their project.
In December 1964 WAGRO retained Rapoport to create a
sketch and scale model of the sculpture, based on earlier
diagrams and illustrations.

The clay scale model was to be

completed in approximately three months, and payment was to
be $2000.33

On January 19, 1965, WAGRO called a meeting at

the Statler Hotel in New York, which was attended by almost
80 representatives of Jewish organizations and chaired by Dr.
Joachim Prinz, president of American Jewish Congress.
said the purpose

of the meeting was

"to create

Prinz

a broad

organizational and moral basis for the efforts to erect the
memorial".

He pointed out there were memorials in Warsaw,

Israel, Paris, Amsterdam and a new one in Philadelphia, but
not in New York, the largest Jewish community in the world.
Vladka Meed,

who

spearheaded the project

for WAGRO,

reported on the group's warm reception by Mayor Wagner on
November 13, 1964.

She said the mayor had pledged his full

support and reiterated the City's promise of the Riverside
Drive site. There were, however, powerful opposing forces.
She pointed out, that she was concerned about the position of
the Commissioner of Parks, Newbold Morris.

She reported that

Morris had recently written to Rapoport and expressed his
idea

that

"a public

recreation and not

park

is

a place

for exposing users

for

enjoyment

and

of

a park to

the

tragedy and horrors of one of the most dreadful chapters of
33Agreement, files of WAGRO, New York.

117

human history".
that

the

She said it was WAGRO's "unshaken belief"

united

Jewish

organizations

overcome these difficulties.

would

be

able

to

(The major Jewish organizations

were not, however, "united" in giving this project priority
financial or political backing.)
At this meeting, Rapoport unveiled his model.
be two scrolls cast in concrete,
wide.

It was to

26 feet high and 40 feet

In addition to bas-reliefs representing the Holocaust,

names of camps, ghettos, and sites of Jewish resistance would
be

inscribed.

There

wouldalso

auditorium, museum and library.

be

provision

for

an

Thus, as early as 1964, the

concept of a Holocaust memorial in New York City included a
museum.

The estimated cost was $1,000,000 (which seems too

low) and members of WAGRO pledged the first $100,000.
The following resolution was adopted by the Conference:
"Representatives of 32 major Jewish organizations
assembled on the 19th of January, 1965 at the Statler
Hotel, New York City, express their full
devotion to the idea of a

support and

proper Memorial for the Six

Million Martyrs and Heroes of the Holocaust, in New York
City.

This resolution is subject to the ratification by

the respective organizations.
"The Conference authorized Dr. Joachim Prinz and
WAGRO

to

form

a

Steering

Committee

from

among

the

organizations, and to present to the Steering Committee
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a detailed program of further action."34
The

second

proposal

for

a

Holocaust

memorial

in

Riverside Park in the early 1960s was sponsored by a much
narrower-based group, the Artur Zygelboim Memorial Committee,
supported

by

some

Jewish

labor

groups.

The

Zygelboim

committee's proposal, which had been commissioned in 1962,
was a figure with outstretched arms, engulfed in flames and
thorns.

It was much more specific than Rapoport's design for

WAGRO.

This sculpture commemorated the heroic suicide of

Zygelboim, a Jewish Bundist labor leader who was a member of
the Polish parliament-in-exile in London. When he learned
about the death camps and his

family's

fate in 194 3, he

killed himself to protest against the world's indifference to
the mass destruction of Polish Jewry and the defeat of the
Warsaw Ghetto fighters.35
Vladka Meed's warning to the WAGRO meeting about the
negative attitude of the Commissioner of Parks was soon to
prove

accurate.

At

the New

York

City Art

Commission's

January 28, 1965 meeting at the home of its president, Arnold
Whitridge,

the

Commission

Rapoport's designs

unanimously

rejected

both

of

for Riverside Park.36 The minutes show

34|,Conference of Jewish Organizations for the Memorial
to the Six Million Martyrs and Heroes: Summary Report" [of
January 19, 1965 meeting], files of WAGRO, New York.
35Shneiderman.
36The Art Commission consisted of seven members appointed
by the Mayor and four ex-officio members. Of the appointees,
there had to be one painter, one sculptor, one architect and
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that

submission

10894— Riverside

Ghetto Monument Certificate 10803
"2287-AV" and "AW")

Park,

Manhattan,

Warsaw

(represented by Exhibits

and submission 10895— Riverside Park,

Manhattan, Zygelboim Memorial Certificate 10804 (represented
by Exhibits "2287-AX" and "AY") were disapproved.37
Eleanor Platt,
member,

was

a

a sculptor who was an Art Commission

forceful

opponent.

She

wrote

Commission members before the meeting:

"The

to

other

[Zygelboim]

figure is depicted in so tragic a posture that it does not
seem to be appropriate for location on park land intended for
recreation and relaxation.

It does not seem to be desirable

to confront children with sculpture of such distressing and
horrifying significance,
relevant place.

worthy as it might be in a more

I can reach no other conclusion than that a

public park is not a proper place for it."

She wrote that

the Torah scroll sculpture was "excessively and unnecessarily
large".
Platt

also

wrote

that

placement

of

either

of

the

memorials "would set a highly regrettable precedent" because
it might provide an opening for other "special groups" who

one landscape architect. The other three appointees were to
have no connection with the fine arts. The Mayor was an ex
officio member.
37Minutes,
Special Meeting of New York City Art
Commission, January 28, 1965, archives of YIVO, New York,
archival box filed under "American Memorial to Six Million
Jews of Europe, Inc." A copy of the original disapproval of
the Zygelboim Memorial Certificate 10804 is in the archives
of The Bund, Zygelboim biographical files, New York.
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wanted to erect memorials on public land.
would

we

answer

other

special

groups

similarly represented on public land?

She asked:
who

wanted

"How
to

be

In an attempt to treat

all equally we could well end up with a profusion of such
memorials and become responsible for a progressive violation
of the basic concepts for park land use."38
The

New

York

Times

supported

the

An editorial in

decisions

of

the

Art

Commission, on the basis that city parks are not the proper
place for monuments.

"Each new installation brings one more

invasion of the open land that was carefully landscaped and
preserved by men of vision as long as a century ago," the
editorial said.39
Dr. Emanuel Scherer of the Zygelboim committee protested
and

said his

statue.

committee

would

continue

to

press

for

the

After the Art Commission's rejection, however, the

Zygelboim group transferred their effort to the creation of
a memorial in the New Mount Carmel Workmen's Circle Cemetery
in Brooklyn, where Zygelboim's ashes had been brought from
London and interred on September 24, 1961.

(In April 1972,

a memorial stone with a flame motif on top of it was unveiled
there.)

The statue that Rapoport had designed for the WAGRO

committee ultimately found a home in Israel in 1971, at the
apex of Martyrs' Forest in the Judean Hills near Jerusalem.
38William E. Farrell, "City Rejects Park Memorials to
Slain Jews", The New York Times. February 11, 1965, p. 1.
39"Memorials in the Parks",
Times. February 13, 1965.

editorial,

The

New

York
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Mayor Wagner was sent a telegram of protest by the
executive committee of Workmen's Circle, drafted at a special
meeting.

The telegram asked Wagner to intervene, reverse

the Commission's decision, and

"immediately to call a public

hearing to determine whether the Municipal Arts Commission
should not be reversed and censured."40

Dr. Prinz, chairman

of the steering committee

for WAGRO and 34 other

Jewish

organizations

construction

scroll

sculpture,

supporting

sent a telegram

shock" and urging the Mayor

of the

to Wagner expressing "profound
to intervene.

Rabbi Max Schenk, president of the New York Board of
Rabbis, also sent a letter to the Mayor, referring to Platt's
description of the memorial backers as a "special group".
said:

"We Jews

who

live

in New

ourselves a 'special group.'
million

inhabitants

of

this

York

do

not

He

consider

We happen to be almost three
city

of

eight

million,

an

integral part of the warp and woof of America's greatest
community."

The memorial steering committee met on February

15 at the Wellington Hotel to discuss their next step.41
This next step was a February 24 meeting of the steering
committee, headed by Rabbi Harold H. Gordon of the New York
Board of Rabbis, with Wagner.
Platt had really stepped on a sore toe when she called

40Farrell, February 11, 1965.
41Farrell, "2 Jewish Leaders Protest Art Ban", The New
York Times. February 12, 1965, p. 31.
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the Holocaust memorial committees, i.e., the Jews of New York
City,

a

"special

group".

They considered themselves

an

integral and influential part of the City's power structure.
Therefore,

they expected speedy and adequate intervention

from Mayor Wagner to reverse the situation.
response, however, was typically weak.

The mayor's

He issued a statement

on March 6, 1965, in which he said:
"The distinguished committee with which I met is
not committed to any particular design, nor any specific
structure,
project

in

interested.

nor any designated
which

I,

location.

personally,

have

This
been

is a
deeply

As far back as 1947 my late father [U. S.

Senator Robert F.Wagner] enthusiastically supported such
a memorial and it was my honor to represent him when the
plot

of

ground

Riverside Drive.

was

dedicated

for

this

purpose

on

I have also been one of the first

sponsors of the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance Organization
(WAGRO) who initiated the present project.
"What

happened

during

the

Nazi

unparalleled in the annals of mankind.
destroyed were part of all mankind.

period

is

The Six Million

We fought a world

war to defeat a government that made such horrors not
only possible, but a reality.
to forget the Six Million.

The world cannot afford
A memorial to these Six

Million would serve to remind all of us of our share in
the guilt of indifference and our responsibility to
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prevent a repetition.
"All New Yorkers are proud of our varied population
and the major faiths to which they adhere.

While the

representatives of one of the major faiths seek the
funds to establish the memorial I believe that it is a
project in which the entire community should - and would
want to - share.

The Committee has assured me that it

has taken the responsibility for raising the funds for
the memorial.

Similar memorials have been erected in

prominent places in Paris, Philadelphia and Warsaw.

I

can assure the distinguished Committee and my fellow
citizens that the City of New York will provide the
appropriate site for this very necessary memorial in a
location readily accessible to millions of residents and
visitors.I|42
Wagner's weak reaction is evidence that once again a
memorial
aligned

committee
and

did

not

ready to move

have

their

the project

political

forces

forward.

Wagner

clearly was not ready to take a stand and put himself in the
forefront of efforts to create a Holocaust memorial in New
York City.

In making this statement, which never mentioned

the unfavorable action of the Art Commission, Wagner promised
the Steering Committee that the City would still provide a
site.

He made it clear that funding would be private and

42Press Release, City of New York, Office of the Mayor,
For Release: PM papers, March 6, 1965 and AM papers, March
7, 1965. Files of WAGRO, New York.
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that a Holocaust memorial would be beneficial for the whole
City and not only for the Jewish interest group that had
approached him.

He also made it clear that the location and

design were both unspecified.

Dr. Prinz, Steering Committee

chairman, said the Mayor's statement was a confirmation "that
a monument will be built in an appropriate and accessible
place in our city."

A spokesman for the Art Commission said

the sponsors of the memorial would have to resubmit plans
after a site had been agreed upon with the mayor.43
On

February

24,

1965,

the

same

day

the

Steering

Committee met with Wagner,

Lerner,

originator of the 1946

project,

to

colleague

wrote

from

Rome

his

Shneiderman.

Lerner had read in the international edition of The New York
Times that new models for a memorial had been submitted to
the Art Commission.
Prinz

"of

all

Lerner asked Shneiderman to inform Dr.

details

about

the

history

of

the

[first]

Memorial project and without waiting and struggling for a new
approval by the Art Commission,

he

should go ahead with

building of a monument based on the [Mestrovic-Mendelsohn]
models

already

approved....Also,

if

I

would

have

the

documents that I left with you, I would write to Mayor Wagner
and remind him that the model of Mestrovic and Mendelsohn has
already been accepted and therefore there is no necessity for

43Farrell, "Mayor Promises a Monument Site",- The New York
Times, March 7, 1965.
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new models."44

There is no further documentation of whether

Lerner's idea was pursued.
Lerner also asked Shneiderman a pointed question in his
1965 letter:
happened

that

"I would be grateful if you inform me how it
suddenly

the

Jewish

organizations

became

interested in the erection of the Memorial - when I struggled
for seven years to get their help the answer I got was 'it is
more important to care for the living'."45

Lerner could not

know then that this attitude had not yet changed and would
continue to hinder efforts to create a Holocaust memorial for
many years.

SUMMARY
Beginning in 1946 and again in the early 1960s, there
were two unsuccessful attempts to create Holocaust memorials
in Riverside Park in New York City.

Neither project had a

broad enough or strong coalition of political forces, and the
respective mayors offered only a site and lip service.

In

the first case, the effort was really a "one man band" who
created an interest group that was mostly on paper.

At one

point this group appeared to have the approval of both Mayor
O'Dwyer and powerful Park Commissioner Robert Moses, which

44Letter
from Adolph
R.
Lerner
to
Emil
(S.L.)
Shneiderman, Rome, Italy, February 24, 1965. Archive of YIVO
Research Institute, New York, file labeled "American Memorial
to the Six Million Jews of Europe, Inc."
45Ibid.

126

might have made successful implementation possible.

However,

the Art Commission, which the group did not court, rejected
the

project

of

Davidson,

the

artist

favored

by

Moses.

Although it then approved Mendelsohn's model, Lerner could
not raise sufficient funds, his weak coalition fell apart,
and the project did not move forward.
The second major attempt, in the 1960s, had a somewhat
broader base of major Jewish organizations.
stage

it also had the

At an early

support of a leader of the

legislature, as well as the mayor.

State

However, as in the first

case, all of these political allies offered little more than
lip service.

This coalition,

like the first one, was too

weak and never took hold firmly enough for the interest group
to achieve its goal.
Commission.

Again the project was vetoed by the Art

Mayor Wagner

refused

to

intervene

and

the

project did not move forward.
In both cases, the issue of Holocaust memorialization
was

not

on the

agenda

of the

organized American

Jewish

community, and therefore the interest group was not powerful
enough to rally the required political forces.
demonstrated,
1970s.

the

issue

became

politically

As will be

"hot"

in

the

This led to Mayor Koch's initiation of an alliance of

political forces in 1981 to once again attempt to create a
major Holocaust memorial in New York City.

This changing

alliance, or Mutagon, then remained at an impasse for more
than ten years.
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CHAPTER 5:
CONTINUES:

THE QUEST FOR A NEW YORK CITY HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL
1965-1974

"The Six-Day War and other events of the sixties
released the Holocaust genie from the bottle in which it had
been trapped for over 20 years. But once the genie was out
of the bottle, it could not be recaptured and stuffed back
in...."
Aviva Cantor1
In 1965 a new phase began in the history of attempts to
create a major Holocaust memorial in New York City.

Like the

earlier

an

projects,

this

cannot

be

triangle, issue network, or a Mutagon.

analyzed

as

iron

The City government,

i.e. the City Council president and mayor, did intervene for
the first time, both in site selection and in design of a
memorial.

However, this was not cooperative intervention at

the request of an interest group that had formed an alliance
with the government.

Nor was it a step that was intended to

win the organized Jewish community's favor.
community's

and

the

memorial

committee's

vehemently negative at one point.

In fact, the
reactions

were

(Unlike Mayor Koch in

1981, then Mayors Robert F. Wagner and John Lindsay

did not

intervene to coopt the project and make it their own.)
The 1965-1974 time frame covered in this chapter was one
of

startling

change

in

the

organized

American

Jewish

1Aviva Cantor, unpublished manuscript (p. 973), Jews and
Relationships:
A Feminist Analysis. Chapter 15— "Denying,
Exploiting,
Identifying with— And Doing Everything but
Confronting— the Holocaust: Why American Jewry Became 'Holocentric'", forthcoming, Harper, San Francisco, 1992.
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community's interest in the subject of the Holocaust:
beginning,

in

1965,

before

the

1967

Six

Holocaust was still not on their agenda.

Day

At the

War,

the

At the end, after

the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the subject was getting hot, and for
the

first

time

commemorating

the

Holocaust

had

been

officially placed on the community's agenda in 1973-1974 (see
Chapter 3).
Meanwhile,

the

attempt

to

build

a

major

Holocaust

memorial in New York City went through a number of phases.
Following the Art Commission's rejection of the Rapoport
memorials

and

its

aftermath,

there

was

a

brief

and

problematic interlude of government intervention by the City.
First the City suggested and then reneged on a new location
at Times Square.

Then the City endorsed a new design for a

memorial in yet another location, across from Lincoln Center,
without consulting the Memorial Committee.

The intervention

became official and two-pronged on September 1, 1965 when
Mayor

Wagner

supported

the

suggestion

of

City

Council

President Paul Screvane that Times Square replace Riverside
Park as the site of the Holocaust memorial.

Screvane had

suggested a paved mall between 45th and 4 6th Streets, south
of the mall with memorials to Father Duffy and George M.
Cohan.

Screvane

said:

crossroads of the world,
unless

each

generation

"A

suitable

memorial,

at

the

can be a constant reminder that
of

Americans

not

only

jealously

safeguards, but enlarges, its inheritance of personal liberty
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and dignity,

a retrogression to bigotry,

intolerance and

human degradation can occur."

(Ironically, nineteen years

later The Wall

would

Street Journal

suggest that George

Klein, co-chairman of the New York City Holocaust Memorial
Commission and developer of Times Sguare through the Urban
Development Corporation, build a Holocaust memorial there—
rather than in Battery Park City.

If the journalist knew

this early history of site selection,

he did not mention

it.2)
This

was

not

a decision

made

as

the

result

interest group-government alliance of any kind.

of

an

Instead, it

was a case of the mayor and City Council president telling an
interest group what the government had decided without the
group's

request

Committee

for

or
the

even

their

Memorial

input.

for

the

Leaders
Six

of

Million

the
were

reportedly pleased with the idea of locating a Holocaust
memorial at Times Square in 1965, even though they had not
participated
relocation.

in

the

decision-making

Rabbi Max Schenk,

Board of Rabbis, said:

process

for

the

President of the New York

"We feel this is ideally located."

Rabbi Harold Gordon, also with the Board of Rabbis, said the
Committee was studying new sketches for submission to the Art
Commission, and that the Committee expected to work closely
with the Art Commission to get an idea of what

kind of

2Raymond Sokolov, "Rm to Let. Landmark Bldg. 77,000 Sq.
Ft.", The Wall Street: Journal. October 3, 1984, p. 28.
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memorial would be satisfactory.3 However, by November, 1965,
the City had shifted the promised site to the northern end of
Lincoln Square Park, across from Lincoln Center at Columbus
Avenue and 65th Street.

On November 23, the Committee wrote

to Mayor Wagner and formally accepted this site.
Then,

in

December,

for

the

first

time,

the

City

intervened in design selection, choosing Cain and Abel as a
memorial

theme

without

consulting

the

Committee.

The

Memorial Committee was appalled to learn that the City Art
Commission had proposed a design for the Lincoln Square Park
site,

not approved by the Committee and deemed completely

unsuitable.

The Committee objected to both the theme of the

design and the lack of participatory process.

The interest

group had not even been offered the opportunity for input or
review.
The Committee met for three hours on December 30 to
discuss the Art Commission's proposal.

Dr. Joachim Prinz,

Chairman of the Committee for the Six Million, told The New
York Times after the meeting, "We are against the theme, not
the art."

The proposed memorial was a 30 foot high slab of

granite or marble,
depicting

Cain

on which would be a scene

slaying

Abel

(designed

by

in bronze,

sculptor

Neil

Easton). Objections by committee members were on the ground
that Nazis were not brothers of the Jews, and that Cain's

3Martin Tolchin, "Times Square Memorial Urged", The New
York Times. September 2, 19 65.
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murder of Abel was universal and not applicable.

By saying

they were not against the art, Prinz was clarifying that the
Committee was

not disputing the

artistic

quality of the

design, but the subject matter.4
On December 30, Prinz released a statement that said:
"The design proposed by the City Art Commission as a memorial
to the Jewish victims of Nazi murder was never approved by
the Committee for the Six Million.

This Committee represents

thirty-four national and local Jewish organizations that have
joined hands in the effort to erect a fitting monument to the
Jewish martyrs of 1933-45.
by the Committee.
memorial

was

The cost will be borne entirely

The campaign for the erection of such a

originated

by

the

Committee.

It

seems

reasonable, therefore, that the City Art Commission should
consult closely with the Committee for the Six Million, and
that together a fitting tribute to be erected in this city be
agreed

upon

jointly."

The

statement

said

many

members

organizations of the Committee had rejected the design and
theme

when

the

Art

Commission

earlier in the month,

released

it to

the

press

and that the Committee planned to

conduct an international design competition.5
After their rejection of the City Art Commission's Cain

4"Monument to Jews Scored at Meeting", The New York
Times, December 31, 19 65.
5"Statement Made by Dr. Joachim Prinz, Chairman of
Committee for Six Million", December 30, 1965, files of
WAGRO, New York.
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and Abel motif for a Holocaust memorial near Lincoln Center
in

December

1965,

the

Committee

to

Commemorate

the

Six

Million Jewish Martyrs more aggressively sought to create a
Holocaust memorial

at another site.

There

still was no

alliance with the City government regarding a memorial.

By

March 16, 1966 Benjamin Gebiner, then acting chairman of the
steering committee, said the committee was "wrestling with
the

Manhattan

Borough

President's

office

and

the

Parks

Commissioner regarding a suitable location."

These officials

had

would

feared

the

Lincoln

Center

location

traffic, and again wanted to change the site.

obstruct

The Committee,

meanwhile, had decided the Riverside Park site was "hidden in
the

bushes",

and

they

wanted

a

better,

more

prominent

location.
Gebiner
President
Thomas

said

he

Constance

Hoving

or

hoped

Baker
their

question of a site.

to

meet

Motley

and

soon
Parks

representatives

with

Borough

Commissioner

to

resolve

the

He added that afterward, there would be

a design contest and a fund raising drive for the project.
The committee also was planning a "memorial shrine" to house
documents and artifacts.
our project.
these

"We are in the initial stages of

But we are confident of struggling through

conflicts

and

achieving

an

appropriate

memorial,"

Gebiner said.6 Gebiner, an attorney and officer of Workmen's

6Helen Sutton, "Memorial to Jews: Where and When?", New
York Journal American. March 16, 1966, p. 46.
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Circle, and Secretary Vladka Meed, a survivor representing
the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance Organization (WAGRO), wrote to
the Art Commission on March 22,

1966.

They said:

"Our

committee did not authorize any person or any group to submit
in

our behalf

for your

consideration

any model

for the

erection of a monument commemorating the six million martyred
Jews, annihilated during the Nazi period.

We call to your

attention that a sculptor's model for such a monument, on the
theme of Cain-and-Abel, was rejected by our committee."
letter

asked

monument.7

for cooperation
This was

late

in erecting

an

The

appropriate

in the game to begin building

political bridges.
In August, 1966, Vladka Meed and Gebiner wrote from the
Committee to Commemorate the Six Million Jewish Martyrs to
its affiliated organizations to bring them up to date.

They

seem to have made progress in forging alliances that would
move the project forward.

The letter announced that the

Steering Committee had chosen from a number of possibilities
suggested by the City an area in Battery Park.

The letter

said:
"During the last few months, we have been engaged
in discussions with the New York Dept, of Parks, for a
suitable site on which to erect our proposed memorial.
We must state that Commissioner Thomas Hoving was most
7Letter dated March 26, 1966 from Benjamin A. Gebiner
and Vladka Meed to the New York City Art Commission, files of
WAGRO, New York.
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cooperative and understanding.
"It was pointed out to us,

that the previously

assigned corner of Lincoln Center on 66th Street and
Columbus Avenue, is a very small and noisy triangle with
heavy traffic;

a danger to any public gathering and

unsuitable for a memorial.
"We also met with Borough President Motley.

The

Battery Park site was her suggestion.
"The

several

sites

available

in New

York were

considered by the Steering Committee at a series of
meetings before the choice was made of Battery Park, on
the

basis

of

its

unique

historic

significance

and

because it looks out on the Statue of Liberty and is
visited

daily

by

thousands

of

tourists

and

New

Yorkers."8
Almost the same wording as the last paragraph was used,
some twenty years later, to encourage acceptance of and then
to describe the site of the Living Memorial to the HolocaustMuseum

of Jewish Heritage,

which the New

York Holocaust

Memorial Commission was planning at adjacent Battery Park
City in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Like the earlier attempts

to create a major Holocaust memorial in New York City, the
effort begun in 1965 failed.

The history of these failed

®Letter from Benjamin Gebiner, "Chairman pro. tern." and
Vladka Meed, "Sec'y pro. tern." to "Dear Friend", August 1966,
stationery of Committee to Commemorate the Six Million Jewish
Martyrs, files of WAGRO, New York.
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projects documented and analyzed here is the pre-history of
Mayor Koch's coopting the idea of Holocaust memorialization
in 1981.
Gebiner and Meed's August 1966 letter (op. cit.) advised
participating organizations that the Committee to Commemorate
the Six Million Jewish Martyrs was organizing its own art
committee of "prominent citizens".

Rabbi Moshe Davidowitch,

Chairman of the National Council of Art in Jewish life, was
to be coordinator of the art committee,

and David

Lloyd

Kreeger, a Washington attorney, Jewish community leader, and
arts patron,

was to be chairman.

smart move:

the Committee was actively asserting its own

expertise

in

the

selection

This was a belated but

process

for

a

design,

by

appointing leaders whose art credentials would impress the
City Art Commission.

In the same letter,

Leon Joelson,

"prominent industrialist" was named as chairman of a new
financial
reminded

committee
to

purposes.9

pay
The

and

their
fact

participating
dues

of

$100

organizations
for

were

administrative

that both Kreeger and Joelson were

prominent and wealthy should have helped the Committee's
prestige, giving it more clout with both the organized Jewish
community and elected officials.
While the participation of Kreeger and Joelson did not
lead

to

successful

implementation,

after

they

became

involved the Committee did have more say in the decision9Ibid.
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making process.
October 13,

(This may have been coincidental.)

1966, Arthur Rosenblatt,

On

design consultant to

Parks Commissioner Hoving (under Mayor Lindsay) , sent Gebiner
a map of the suggested site for a monument.

"I

think the

site is

a proper one as it is also adjacent to

the Emma

Lazarus

memorial

tablet,

consider it," he wrote.10
on

November

21,

1966,

agreement on the site.

and I

suggest

your

committee

Following a reply from Gebiner,

Rosenblatt

sent

him

a

letter

of

He enclosed a site plan of Battery

Park marking the exact limits of the site, and asked for a
meeting to discuss the choice of an architect and sculptor,
and the method of financing the project.

He reminded Gebiner

the total cost, as well as perpetual maintenance, would be
borne by the Committee.11
On February
release

18,

announcing

committee,

which

1967,

the

Kreeger's

consisted

of

Committee

issued

chairmanship
seventeen

of

a press
the

art

architects,

art

historians, museum curators and others prominent in the art
field.12

According to the press

release,

this committee

10Letter from Arthur Rosenblatt to Benjamin A. Gebiner,
October 13, 1966, files of WAGRO, New York.
11Letter from Rosenblatt to Gebiner, November 21, 1966,
files of WAGRO, New York.
12Members of the Art Committee were:
Harry N. Abrams,
publisher of art books; H. Harvard Arnason, vice president of
the Guggenheim Museum; Thomas S. Buechner, director of the
Brooklyn Museum; David Finn, president of the Jewish Museum;
Rene d'Harnoncourt, director of the Museum of Modern Art;
Emily Genauer, art critic for the New York World Journal
Tribune; Bruce Glaser, director of Gallery of Israeli Art;
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would commission the design of the memorial, in consultation
with "leading Jewish historians and religious and cultural
personalities".

The

press

release

also

announced

an

educational and fund-raising campaign "to gather support for
whatever proposal is finally approved".

Kreeger was quoted

that New York, "the world's political, business, and cultural
center, with the largest Jewish population in the world, will
at last have a suitable memorial

for our generation and

future generations."13
Records

of

this

effort

indicate

it

was

much

more

sophisticated and organized that the former ones, more savvy
in public relations, dealing with government officials, and
raising money.

However, an event intervened that changed the

project's prospects for success:

the June 1967 Six Day War.

Pressman and Wildavsky would call this a "diversion" in the
"decision path".14

Thus the very event that nearly every

scholar credits with creating an atmosphere that made the

Percival Goodman, architect; Robert Hale, retired from the
Metropolitan Museum of Art; Dam Hunter, director of the
Jewish Museum; Philip Johnson, architect; Louis I. Kahn,
architect; Sherman E. Lee, director of the Cleveland Museum
of Art; Abram Lerner, curator of the Hirshorn Collection;
Thomas M. Messer, director of the Guggenheim Museum, Charles
Parkhurst, director of the Baltimore Museum of Art; Meyer
Schapiro, professor at Columbia University (and, at that
time, at the Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University).
13Press release, February 18, 1967, files of WAGRO, New
York.
14Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation
(Second, expanded edition), University of California Press,
1979, p. xix.
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idea of Holocaust memorialization possible
States also took away the potential

in the United

funding to make such

memorialization possible at that time.

Under the direction

of the United Jewish Appeal, a massive fund raising effort
was mounted, with an emergency campaign to support Israel
during and after the war.

In the wake of such crucial

financial needs for living Jews, the idea of a monument to
dead Jews seemed frivolous to Jewish communal leaders.

The

Six Day War raised consciousness of the Holocaust, but this
new consciousness encouraged the organized Jewish community
and individual American Jews to give money to support Israel-not

to

give

money

to

a

project

that

memorialized

the

Holocaust.
Despite the dry financial prospects for its project, the
Memorial Committee carried on its business throughout 19671968.

A meeting was called for December 27,

Wellington

Hotel,

at

which

Philadelphia presented his
participating organizations.

architect

design

1967 at the

Louis

Kahn

for a memorial

of

to the

With the Kreeger connection the

Committee was able to interest this important sculptor.

(At

some

the

time

in

1967,

the

umbrella

group's

name

on

letterhead changed from "Committee to Commemorate the Six
Million Jewish Martyrs"
Jewish Martyrs, Inc."

to

"Memorial

to the

Six Million

This was only to make the language of

the name smoother, and not a reflection of any substantive
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change

in

the

committee.15)

Department

of

Parks

Commissioner August Heckscher wrote to Gebiner on March 22,
1968, formally advising him of the department's approval to
erect a monument in Battery Park.
informal presentation

His letter referred to an

that Kahn had

already made

to

the

Municipal Art Commission.16
On the same date,
representatives

Gebiner and Vladka Meed wrote to

of participating

organizations,

informing

them that Kahn's model had been delivered to Heckscher and to
the New York City Art Commission for approval.

A meeting was

called for April 10, 1968 at the Wellington Hotel, "at which
time

detailed

reports

will

be

rendered

about

our

accomplishments up to now and plans for the future will be
made."
discussed

The letter said that final arrangements would be
for

a ground

Battery Park on

breaking

April 21.

ceremony

to

be

held

at

The ground breaking was later

announced for May 5, 1968.17
This time the Committee had made a conscious effort to
win the required government approvals.

The decision to use

Kahn as the designer was not only aesthetic but political,
according to Vladka Meed.

She said the Kahn abstraction did

15Interview with Vladka Meed, May 7, 1990, New York.
16Letter from August Heckscher to Benjamin A. Gebiner,
March 22, 1968, files of WAGRO, New York.
17"Dear Friends" letter dated March 22, 1968 signed by
Gebiner and Meed, and "Dear Member"
undated and unsigned
letter, files of WAGRO, New York.
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not

satisfy

all

of

the

something more graphic.
the abstraction,

survivors,

some

of

whom

wanted

But with the famous name of Kahn and

the committee thought they would have a

better chance of getting through the City Art Commission.
They

therefore

decided

to go

ahead

with

it.18

(It

is

important to remember that the Art Commission had approved
the Mestrovic-Mendelsohn design for Riverside Park in 1951,
and this project was never carried out.

Approval of the Art

Commission was not a guarantee for successful completion of
a memorial.)
The memorial was

formally approved by the

City Art

Commission in March 1968, and by October of that year, a sixfoot scale model was on display at the Museum of Modern Art.
(The

project

architect for the Kahn

Meyers of Philadelphia.)
the design as follows:

A museum press release described
"It consists

each10' square and 11' high
pedestal.

design was Marshall

of seven glass piers

placed on a 66' square granite

The center pier has been given the character of a

small chapel into which people may enter.
chapel will be inscribed.

The walls of the

The six piers around the center,

all of equal dimensions, are blank."

The minimalist design

of the proposed memorial prefigures Maya Ying Lin's Vietnam
memorial in Washington, D.C.
Huxtable
chilling".

characterized
She said:

the

Architecture critic Ada Louise
design

as

"beautiful,

and

"There is about it a silent, almost

18Vladka Meed interview.
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frozen

formality,

a

crystalline

sense

of

the

eternal

emptiness of death....This is architecture and, at the same
time, sculpture, and it is symbolism of the highest order,
timeless and contemporary."19
This new committee was operating in a political climate
quite unlike that of the original 1947 attempt-— a climate
that

should

have

memorial.

nurtured

Civil

rights

the

concept

and

of

a

Holocaust

anti-Vietnam

protests

reverberated throughout the country during the 1960s.
Lai massacre on

The My

March 16, 1968 (which, on a smaller scale,

was not unlike such Nazi massacres as Babi Yar or Ponar) may
have

increased

at

least

subliminal

consciousness

of

the

Holocaust. In addition to civil rights and Vietnam movements,
there were other groups standing up for their rights, e.g.,
a

women's

movement.
general

movement,

a

prisoners'

movement,

As Howard Zinn said of this era:

revolt against oppressive,

unquestioned ways of living.
personal life:

an

Indian

"There was a

artificial,

previously

It touched every aspect of

childbirth, childhood, love, sex, marriage,

dress, music, art, sports, language, food, housing, religion,
literature,

death,

schools."20

These

movements,

particularly those bringing ethnicity to the forefront of
American consciousness, should have provided fertile ground
19Ada Louise Huxtable, "Plan for Jewish Martyrs' Monument
Here Unveiled", The New York Times. October 17, 1968.
20Howard Zinn, The Twentieth Century:
A
History. Harper and Row, New York, 1980, p. 237.
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for creation of a memorial which could be described as a
manifestation of Jewish ethnicity in the United States.
Within this political mood of movements, ethnicity, and
struggles to understand unnecessary killings in Vietnam, the
Art

Commission

approved

the

design

of

the

Committee

Commemorate the Six Million Jewish Martyrs in March,

to

1968.

The leaders of this effort to create a Holocaust memorial do
not recall making any connections between the civil rights
struggles and revelations of war horrors of the time and
their own project, nor do their limited available records
provide any evidence.
1960s

had

nothing

Gebiner said the upheavals of the

to

do

with

the

committee's

work.21

However, these crucial issues of that time, which affected
both

the

consciousness

and

consciences

of

Americans

in

general, could not have been absent from the minds of the
committee members.
Copies

of

correspondence

organized as follows:
organizations was

show

that

the

effort

was

A committee of participating Jewish

nominally behind the

effort,

including

major national organizations, survivor groups, and the New
York Board of Rabbis.

Twenty-eight organizations are listed

on the letterhead, whereas the 1347 letterhead listed only
individuals.

The return address of the Memorial to the Six

Million Jewish Martyrs,

21Benjamin A.
Bayside, New York.

Inc.

Gebiner,

is that

interview,

of American Jewish

April

26,

1990,
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Committee, which demonstrates that this memorial committee,
unlike the one in the 1940s-50s, was linked to major Jewish
organizations.

However,

this

appearance

of a broad and

unified interest group of major Jewish organizations was more
window dressing than reality.

Correspondence reveals that

crucial decisions were made by the Steering Committee, mainly
by Gebiner (representing Workmen's Circle) and Vladka Meed
(representing

WAGRO

and,

from

1968,

the

Jewish

Labor

Committee), with strongest secondary support from American
Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress.
above,

the

participating

other

components

organizations

of

the

received

As documented

"broad
such

news

base"
as

of
site

selection as a fait accompli.
The theme of the memorial was described by Art Committee
Chairman Kreeger in a letter to Kahn:

"The monument

is

envisioned as one which will reflect and evoke the emotional,
psychological, and historical impact of the tragedy of the
period....It should also deal with man's struggle to retain
his dignity under the most horrendous of circumstances, and
express hope for a better future, where man will not merely
survive

but

prevail."22

The

theme

thus

was

to

be

both

particularistic and universal.
The cost of the memorial was projected to be at least
$1,300,000, but the dedication ceremony originally scheduled

22Rebecca Read Shanor, The City That Never Was. Viking,
1988, p. 219.
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for April 1968 never took place.

Asked why, Gebiner said:

"We were confronted with a terrific budget....it pertained to
the question of raising millions of dollars.
move."

He

said

that

not

only

did

And it didn't

the New

York Jewish

community never succeed in voluntary efforts to raise the
money needed for creation of a monument here, but that it was
also the fault of the Holocaust survivors living here.

"I

also accuse the survivors who had among them many people of
great

means

Holocaust,

who

talked

a

lot

about

monuments

and

the

but when it came to brass tacks there was no

response," he said.

"And it began to peter out little by

little and that's all."
Gebiner's

analysis

is not

fair to the

survivors

he

accused, because the memorial was not their responsibility,
but that of the organized Jewish community.

They were only

a small part of the community, and there were non-survivors
with equal or greater wealth who contributed substantially to
other

Jewish

causes

but

not

to

this

one.

The

most

significant reason for failure to raise funds was probably,
as already stated, the Six Day War.
else, however,

Gebiner said something

that was more to the point:

"Every major

organization that participated in this committee had their
own problems for raising money for their own causes and own
organization."

This statement highlights two problems:

1.

It was extremely difficult for a new organization to come on
the scene and raise funds for a new cause,

in competition
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with the highly structured Jewish communal organizations that
were already in place.

2. These organizations, although they

put their names on a letterhead, had other priorities for
which they were already raising funds.
American

Jewish

Committee

as

the

Gebiner singled out

only

organization

that

contributed a considerable amount of money to the memorial,
but all they paid was part of Kahn's fee of some $17,000.
The reasons the memorial failed, he said, were lack of money,
self-sacrifice and devotion.23

To put it another way,

it

failed because the interest group behind it was very narrow
and the major Jewish organizations had no real commitment to
push for it.

Without the backing of the organized Jewish

community, it held no political value for elected officials,
and it was therefore difficult for the small interest group
to

build

a

public-private

coalition

for

successful

implementation.
Insufficient funding was clearly a major issue.

On

October 23, 1968, Jerry Goodman, then of the American Jewish
Committee,

reported

to

Bertram

Executive Vice President,
Committee members.
been

discussed,

suggested

Gold,

the

organization's

on a small meeting of Memorial

Raising the necessary $1.5 million had

and

an

appeal

for

large gifts

had

been

(with a small number of people underwriting the

entire project).

This would be supplemented by a public

23Gebiner interview.
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subscription campaign.24

Soon afterward, Kahn presented the

Memorial Committee with his bill, for a total of $17,687.93,
some of which had been owed to him for more than a year.25
Kreeger wrote from Washington to Gebiner on December 3, 1968
of his embarrassment at the delay in paying Kahn's bill.

He

urged that each of the constituent organizations contribute
from $500 to $2 500 in the next two weeks, and he suggested
that a chairman should be selected "who has been active in
Jewish and philanthropic affairs in the New York area."26
His suggestions were not followed.
By July 18,
raising area.

19 69 not much had happened

in the fund

Goodman wrote to Kreeger on that date about a

meeting of "some of the national [Jewish] agencies involved,
or interested".

He said:

"At that meeting the problem was

put squarely on the agenda

and while several

ideas were

analyzed, the most concrete proposal was made by Bert Gold.
While it is very tentative, he has succeeded in interesting
a few leaders of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies in
New

York

to

discuss

the

connected to their work,

project

and

see

if

it

and their fund-raising.

can

be

At the

24Memorandum from Jerry Goodman to Bertram Gold, October
23, 1968, Records Room of American Jewish Committee, New
York.
25Bill from Louis I. Kahn to Committee to Commemorate the
Six Million Jewish Martyrs, November 6, 1968, Records Room of
American Jewish Committee, New York.
26Letter from Kreeger to Gebiner, December 3,
Record Room of American Jewish Committee, New York.
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present stage there is no commitment, merely a willingness to
talk. ...At the same time,

Ban Gebiner has been urged to

secure money

of the

from several

agencies to settle the

short-range debt to Lou Kahn.”27
The idea of the Federation's involvement did not seem to
get anywhere.

The leaders of Federation would consider such

a project competitive with their ongoing local programs and
United Jewish Appeal commitments to Israel.

As explained

earlier, they used the Holocaust to fund raise for Israel and
immigration,

not to fund raise for a memorial.

In June,

1971, Kreeger and the American Jewish Committee were still
corresponding about where to find the relatively small amount
of money for Kahn.

Between May and November of 1971, Gold

wrote to all of the major American Jewish organizations,
asking for contributions to the memorial, especially to pay
Kahn.

In the end, he received some money from them,

and

American Jewish Committee paid the rest of the money due.
By December 16, 1971, Kahn had finally been paid and the
Memorial Committee tried to go forward.

At a meeting that

night, a fund raising campaign task force was set up under
Julius Schatz of American Jewish Congress.

Schatz reported

that someone connected with the Bergen-Belsen survivors had
pledged $25,000 and WAGRO had promised to match this.
Farband had

committed themselves

The

to a campaign to raise

27Letter from Goodman to Kreeger, July 18, 1969, Records
Room of American Jewish Committee, New York.
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$50,000,
itself

and
to

a

The Forward Yiddish newspaper had committed
fund

raising

campaign.

The

major

Jewish

organizations, none of which had made a commitment, would be
"approached for a financial commitment".

The projected' date

for completion was April 1973, the 30th anniversary of the
Warsaw Ghetto uprising.28
All of this scrambling for funds never produced the
necessary

financial

backing,

because

the

major

American

Jewish organizations had other priorities and never gave the
idea of a Holocaust memorial the necessary funding.

The

small amounts promised by the smaller groups mentioned above
could not get the job done.

According to Gebiner, Israel was

always the first priority, and the memorial could not compete
for financial attention.
Vladka
priority.

Meed

concurred

She said:

that

Israel

was

the

first

"The momentum for the Kahn project

ended with the 1967 war emergency campaign.

Then we started

again, and again there was an emergency in 1973."

She did

not, however, blame the major Jewish organizations for the
project's failure.

"You can't accuse the organizations," she

said.

"To create such a project, you need individuals with

money.

You need a group of dedicated people with financial

resources to complete the project."

(A survivor herself, she

did not say, as Gebiner did, that those individuals should be

28Memorandum from David Geller to Bertram Gold, December
17,1971, Records Room of American Jewish Committee, New York.
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survivors.)

Meed also pointed out that the project had not

really gotten underway before the emergency of the Six Day
War.

"When the Jewish community faced other priorities and

the construction of the memorial hadn't really started, there
were

emergency

campaigns

and

none

of

the

national

organizations were able to undertake financing the memorial,"
she said.
Even while the meager fund raising efforts continued
until the end of 1971, Gebiner and Vladka Meed had already
written to Mayor John Lindsay on May 18, 1971 thanking him
for his cooperation but calling a halt to their activities.
They wrote:
"At this moment, the American Jewish community is
confronted with the responsibility of standing by the
side of Israel and Soviet Jewry, and is rendering every
possible assistance to insure their survival.

It is

incumbent upon us, therefore, to desist at present from
any other major fund raising.

We are sure that you

understand our attitude and the responsibility on our
part.
"We are, therefore,

asking that the City of New

York, and you as the mayor, publicly announce that this
site will be reserved for the above project, so that at
a future date, when the crises are lifted, and hopefully
it will be soon, we can resume our sacred work to create
a remembrance and a reminder that our six million Jews
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did not die in vain."29
Ten days later, Marvin Schick, Assistant to the Mayor
for Intergroup Relations, replied to Gebiner and Vladka Meed:
"As your letter indicates the Mayor believes that Battery
Park is a suitable site for the Memorial.
decision

not

to proceed

right

now with

In view of your
the

project,

we

believe that it would not serve any purpose for the Mayor to
make a public statement now."

He said the Mayor had asked

him to be available to meet with them about

"this noble

endeavor which is so much needed to remind our people of what
happened a generation ago and also to teach them of the evil
that can result from group hatred."30
Mayor Lindsay clearly did not want to make a public
statement

in support

of

a moribund

project,

and he

had

assigned his liaison to the organized Jewish community to
smooth things over for him.

At that time the strong support

of a Holocaust memorial would not have given him much credit
with

the

organized

Jewish

questioned about the episode

community.

When

(for this study)

Schick

was

in 1990, he

either could not or did not want to remember details.
Thus,

in

the

era

of

movements,

memorialize the Holocaust did not succeed.

the

movement

to

Gebiner, Vladka

29Letter from Benjamin A. Gebiner and Vladka Meed to
Mayor John V. Lindsay, May 18, 1971, files of WAGRO, New
York.
30Letter from Marvin Schick to Benjamin A. Gebiner and
Vladka Meed, May 28, 1971, files of WAGRO, New York.
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Meed and others active on the committee stated in interviews
that the June 1967 Six Day War, and then the 197 3 Yom Kippur
War, interrupted the project, because many committee members
and

the major Jewish

organizations

felt

all

fundraising

should instead be directed toward Israel's needs.

They did

not

and were

seem

angry or bitter

about past

failures,

looking forward to the completion in the 1990s of Holocaust
memorials in Washington, D.C. and New York City.
Julius Schatz, who was involved with the memorialization
effort in the 1960s (representing American Jewish Congress),
was one of those who mentioned the Six Day War as a prime
reason fundraising efforts for the memorial failed.

He also

recalls that there were continuous heated discussions about
a monument versus a museum.

Finally, there was an agreement

to "go for whatever was possible in terms of money."

At that

point the money situation required a monument rather than a
museum.31
An undated
which

seems

to

and unsigned draft in Vladka Meed's files,
be written

in

1973-74

and addressed

to

representatives of participating organizations, recommended
that fund raising cease.

The letter said:

"For the past year and a half, our committee has
endeavored

to launch

a

$1,000,000

to construct

fund

raising campaign

themonument.

What

for

has

31Telephone interview with Julius Schatz, New York City,
March 19, 1990.
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happened?

During these crucial months Israel has been

attacked by the Arab world
Union.

supported by the

Soviet

Every dollar and every tangible support have

been expended to keep Israel alive and to preserve the
security of her 2 1/2 million people.

America has been

in the midst of a severe financial crisis, and a stock
market which has been heading into a tailspin.
"In

the

face

of

these

unforseen

crises,

the

steering committee for the Memorial for the 6,000,000
has unanimously recommended a suspension of the campaign
to raise a million dollars for the monument.

To do

otherwise would be an interference with the massive
efforts

to

ensure

Israel's

urgent

requirements

for

defense and survival."
The draft also said:
"We favor at this time a decision to launch a more
modest campaign to create a museum and center which
would

encourage

remembrance.

research,

exhibits,

visitation

and

We pledge to fulfill the sacred task of

remembrance of our

6,000,000 martyrs

and we

further

pledge that at such time when Israel's existence

is

ensured, we will then reactivate our campaign to build
a monument in New York City worthy of the heroism and
sacrifice of our 6, 000, 000.1,32
A letter dated May 1974 may be the final version of the
32Undated draft, Files of Vladka Meed, WAGRO, New York.
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above draft.

This

letter addressed to

"Dear Friend and

Colleague" recapitulated the history of ten years of efforts,
beginning

with

Nathan

Rapoport's

Riverside Park in 1964.

rejected

design

for

It said that a broad coalition of

Jewish organizations had decided to pursue two goals:

a

suitable monument on a desirable site, and a memorial center
for activities and programs related to the Holocaust.

The

Memorial Center committee failed because of the huge sum of
money required.

The Monument Committee had tried to raise

$1.5 million for the Kahn memorial in Battery Park.
was not a "huge" sum, as the letter said.

(This

In fact, it was a

small amount for a major piece of public art.)
"This necessitated the reorganization of the committee
to create a new structure with professional staff and a major
fund-raising campaign.

There were numerous meetings with

leaders of national Jewish agencies and unproductive searches
for a campaign chairman and fund-raiser," the letter said.
It mentioned the difficulty of raising even the $17,000 owed
to Kahn

for his preliminary work,

organizations helped to pay it:

saying that only

American Jewish Committee,

WAGRO,

American Jewish

Congress

Ladies

Garment

Union— which

Workers

four

and

ILGWU
is

(International

not

listed

as

a

participating organization on the letterhead).
The

letter went

situation,

cost

on:

estimated

inflation mounted.

"With the

worsening economic

for the monument

increased

as

Israel's struggle for survival in recent
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years (The Six Day War, War of Attrition, and Yoxn Kippur War)
and the crisis of Soviet Jewry have further complicated our
task by making it more difficult to raise funds."
pointed out another setback:

It also

Louis Kahn had died on March

17, 1974.
Unlike

the

draft,

the

letter

did

not

call

for

a

suspension of the campaign to raise money for the memorial.
Instead,

it said the committee was

stalemated.

"We are

unable to proceed further without the firm commitment and
financial help of the organized Jewish community toward a
monument or memorial center.

Nevertheless,

it is our hope

that you will give serious thought to alternatives and arrive
at practical

ideas

to

help

create

a project

which

will

memorialize the heroism and martyrdom of the Six Million in
a dignified and meaningful manner."
the Executive Committee:
Meed,

Secretary;

The letter was signed by

Benjamin Gebiner, Chairman; Vladka

Julius Schatz,

American Jewish Congress;

David Geller, American Jewish Committee; and Joseph Mlotek,
Workmen's Circle.33
Schatz said that after the committee had given up on
Battery park because of the lack of funds, they approached
the Jewish Museum on Fifth Avenue, with architectural designs
for a Holocaust library to be built on top of an addition to

33Letter from Executive Committee of Memorial to the Six
Million
Jewish
Martyrs,
Inc.
to
representatives
of
participating organizations, May, 1974, files of WAGRO, New
York.
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the museum.

The museum,

or its parent organization,

the

Jewish Theological Seminary of America, never acted on the
proposal.34

A memo dated June 13,

1972

in Vladka Meed's

files verifies that the committee contacted Dr. Gerson Cohen,
then Chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary,
this idea.35

about

People connected with the Seminary said the

idea was rejected because the Seminary wanted to remain an
autonomous institution.

SUMMARY
During the years 1965-1974,
movements

and

ethnicity was

Holocaust memorial in New York.

ripe

the political climate of
for the

creation

of

a

In 1965 Mayor Wagner and the

City Council president intervened in the project to mandate
site changes, and the Art Commission arbitrarily imposed a
monument design without consulting the Memorial Committee.
Neither the interest group nor the government entities tried
to build a political coalition to get the job done.

The

Memorial Committee seemed not to know how to build political
alliances to achieve their goal, and the City officials did
not

include

process.

the

interest

group

in

the

decision-making

After the Memorial Committee refused to accept the

Art Commission's design in 1966, both the City government and
the committee began acting more like an iron triangle.
34Schatz interview.
35Vladka Meed files, WAGRO, New York.

In an

effort to win over City officials,
named

a

blue

internationally

ribbon
famous

memorial.

Mayor

Manhattan

Borough

committee

art

the Memorial Committee

committee

sculptor

Louis

and
Kahn

contracted
to

Lindsay's Park Commissioner
Presidentboth

cooperated

design

a

and

the

with

the

to find a suitable site, and the Art Commission

accepted the Kahn design.

However, memorialization of the

Holocaust had not yet emerged as an important issue for the
organized Jewish community and the interest group,
seemed impressive on paper, was in reality very narrow.

which
When

the 1967 Six Day War, and then the 1973 Yom Kippur War, got
in the way of fund raising efforts,

the committee itself

decided

project.

launched

to

temporarily

his

political

abandon
alliance

the
to

create

When
a

Koch

Holocaust

memorial museum in 1981, he inherited a pre-history of this
and earlier failed attempts.
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CHAPTER 6:
FINAL EFFORTS TO CREATE A HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL
BEFORE MAYOR KOCH TAKES OVER THE IDEA: 1975-1978
"The days when people held their breath at the mention
of the Holocaust are gone.
As are the days when the dead
elicited meditation rather than profanation.91 Elie Wiesel1
When Mayor Edward I . Koch interceded in the issue of
Holocaust memorialization and announced his Mayor's

Task

Force on the Holocaust in July, 1981, there was no interest
group in New York City actively seeking to create a memorial.
The Memorial to the Six Million Jewish Martyrs,

Inc., the

last such group, had dissolved itself three years earlier.
Vladka Meed's and Benjamin Gebiner's May 1974 letter had not
definitively killed the Memorial Committee, but on June 29,
1978 it was officially dead.
Resistance

Organization

Committee (attention:

On that date, the Warsaw Ghetto

(WAGRO)

wrote

to

the

Memorial

Vladka Meed) saying that the work of

the committee should end.

The letter said:

"For years we have had the opportunity of working
together with

your

committee

trying

permanent memorial in New York City.

to

establish

a

Unfortunately, we

were not successful, although we know that honest and
sincere

attempts

matters

have

were

made

developed

by

lately,

national

committee

will

permanent

memorial

under

be
the

your
we

created

committee.

know,
to

auspices

an

overall

establish
of

As

a

President

1Elie Wiesel, A Jew Today. "A Plea for the Survivors"
(1975), Vintage Books, 1979, New York, p. 241.
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Carter.

Therefore, we think, the work of the Memorial

for the Six Million Jewish Martyrs should be concluded."
The

letter pointed

out that WAGRO was

one of the major

contributors to the Memorial Committee, and requested that
available funds be returned to WAGRO.

It concluded that

WAGRO was looking forward to working with Vladka Meed or the
memorial committee to establish a permanent memorial in the
United States.2
This

letter

from

WAGRO

is

signed

by

Robert

Treasurer, and Hirsh Altusky, Executive Secretary.

Born,

It could

have been signed by Benjamin Meed, who is Vladka's husband
and also president and founder of the organization.

When

WAGRO headed a coalition of Jewish organizations to try to
create the rejected Rapoport memorial

in Riverside Park,

Vladka Meed was secretary of the project and was representing
WAGRO.

After 1968, she worked for the Jewish Labor Committee

and considered that entity,

rather than WAGRO,

the Jewish

organization with which she was most closely affiliated.
WAGRO,

as

one of the participating

organizations

but

Now
no

longer the spearheading one, is writing to her as executive
secretary of the Memorial to the Six Million Jewish Martyrs,
Inc.

The illusion of the "broad base" of support has come

full circle.

While the major American Jewish organizations

had given the project lip service, most of the real work was
2Letter from Robert Born and Hirsh Altusky of WAGRO to
Vladka Meed of Memorial to the Six Million Jewish Martyrs,
June 29, 1978, files of WAGRO, New York.
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done

by Vladka

American

Meed

Jewish

and Gebiner,

Congress

and

with

several

Julius
staff

Schatz

of

members

of

American Jewish Committee the only representatives of major
Jewish organizations who gave consistent support.

American

Jewish Committee was the major source of limited emergency
money for the project.
It

is

significant

(See Chapter 5.)
that

the

1978

letter

ending

the

Memorial Committee indicates the idea of a major memorial in
New

York

City

was

shelved

announced his President's
1978.

because

President

Commission on the Holocaust

had
in

The influence of the Federal project on the one in New

York City will be analyzed in Chapter 7.
note

Carter

here,

however,

that

in

1978

It is important to
President

Carter's

intervention on a national level had an indirect effect on
the effort to create a memorial in New York:

it was the

final death blow to an already dying project.
Before Carter's intercession in 1978, there were yet
other Jewish community efforts to create a major Holocaust
memorial in New York City during the 1970s.

WAGRO itself

(not the Memorial to the Six Million Jewish Martyrs, Inc.)
tried to establish a Holocaust memorial in New York City at
that time.

An undated WAGRO memorandum, which is probably

from 1975, says "it is high time that the city which is the
home of the largest Jewish community in the world should have
a permanent shrine and museum of the Holocaust to serve as a
reminder to the world that the impossible and unspeakable
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could happen again if we do not teach future generations of
the horrors of the Nazi era."

The memorandum proposes that

a building being sold by New York City be acquired for this
purpose.

The building (parcel no. 18, section no. 1, block

197, lot 1) is located on the northeast corner of Lafayette
and White Streets, and is a 3-story former firehouse, Engine
Co. 31.
The memorandum wants to "involve in this project the
entire Jewish community of New York.

Above all, this museum

should serve to present a warning to future generations that
the atrocities of World War II must not be repeated against
any people,

regardless of race,

closing paragraph,

color or creed."

In the

"We appeal to all men of good will who

sympathize with our objectives to lend us their support.

We

are urging the people of the City of New York and the entire
Jewish community to help us realize this dream."3
By

this

time,

in

around

1975,

commemorating

the

Holocaust was already on the agenda of the National Jewish
Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC). The 1973 Yom
Kippur War had reinforced the Holocaust consciousness that
emerged with the 1967 Six Day War.

However,

nothing ever

developed regarding this proposal, according to WAGRO's files
and WAGRO president Meed.

Perhaps one important reason was

that it was a narrow-based effort led by a survivors' group.
Memorandum from WAGRO, undated, but reference to 3 0
years after Holocaust places it circa 1975, files of WAGRO,
New York.
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As Elie Wiesel said, until President Carter placed the issue
of Holocaust memorialization on the agenda in 1978, the major
Jewish organizations did not consider survivors an important
interest group within the greater Jewish community.4
Meanwhile,

WAGRO soon started yet another effort to

obtain space for a Holocaust memorial center, at the New York
Cultural

Center

correspondence

in

at

Columbus

their

Circle

files).

On

(according

December

9,

to

1976,

Benjamin Meed wrote to Charles G. Bluhdorn, Chairman of the
Board of Gulf and Western Industries.

He congratulated him

for buying the building and donating it to the City of New
York, but expressed "sadness" that WAGRO was "undercut" from
its own attempts to obtain the building.

The letter said:

"Within the last two months the abovementioned building was
called to our attention [as a site for a Holocaust center]
and we visited it several times.

We met with Mr. John J.

Rowan, Vice President of New York Urban Servicing Co., Inc.
Meetings

were

held

on

several

levels

within

the

Jewish

community to work out plans of purchasing and maintaining
such an

institution.

Naturally,

our basic

obstacle was

obtaining the necessary funds and we are afraid we missed a
unique opportunity."

Meed asked Bluhdorn to include "our

^Interview with Elie Wiesel, August 8, 1990, New York.
Also see his A Jew Today, chapter entitled "A Plea for the
Survivors" (written in 1975), Vintage Books, 1979, New York,
pp. 218-247.
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project of remembrance" in the cultural center.

A copy of

this letter was sent to Mayor Abraham D. Beame.5
Meed tried to form a political alliance with Mayor Beame
to achieve his goal.

He actively pursued the mayor to gain

his ear and approval, but neither he nor his WAGRO group had
enough power or influence to win the mayor's support.

At

that time, along with the copy of the letter to Bluhdorn,
Meed sent Beame a letter with a "special appeal" to include
WAGRO as a "participating group in the New York Cultural
Center.

I feel that if you agree in principle, the details

should be worked out in conference."
with

the

Mayor

or

his

He requested a meeting

representative,

and

with

the

Commissioner of Cultural Affairs.6
Michael Mehlman,

then Administrative Officer for the

Department of Cultural Affairs,
December 29, 1976.

answered Meed's letter on

(The level of the respondent to WAGRO's

letter to Beame is an indication the issue was not high on
the mayor's agenda.)

Mehlman said it was premature to make

decisions about public use of the building at the present
time, and that the interest of WAGRO would be considered in
due time.7

(i.e., "Don't call us, we'll call you.")

In

5Letter from Benjamin Meed, President, WAGRO, to Charles
G. Bluhdorn, December 9, 1976, files of WAGRO, New York.
6Letter from Benjamin Meed to Mayor Abraham D. Beame,
December 10, 1977, files of WAGRO, New York.
7Letter from Michael Mehlman to Benjamin Meed, December
29, 1976, files of WAGRO, New York.
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response to a letter and phone call, Meed received another
letter from the Department of Cultural Affairs on January 19,
1977, this time from Janet Langsam, Deputy Commissioner.

She

reiterated it would be difficult to then discuss programmatic
uses

of

the

building.

She

suggested:

"There

are,

fortunately, many other attractive real estate opportunities
in the City of New York which I am sure you can explore and
I hope the fact that you were not successful in acquiring the
New York Cultural Center will not dampen your enthusiasm for
a most worthwhile endeavor."8

This was a polite "goodbye"

to Meed from the Beame administration.
us, and we won't call you.")

(i.e., "Don't call

The political alliance WAGRO

sought with Beame at that time never got anywhere.
At around this time, a powerful new player arrived on
the Jewish communal

scene in New York City:

Community

Council

Relations

of

New

York

(JCRC).

umbrella and coordinating body was organized
officially established in 1976.

the Jewish
This

in 197 5 and

The lineup of players was a

formidable list of New York City movers and shakers:

The

first president was Richard Ravitch, a developer who later
became Chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(MTA) and head of Koch's Charter Revision Commission.
estate developer Jack Weiler was honorary president,
developer George Klein

Real
and

(who later would head Koch's Task

8Letter from Janet Langsam to Benjamin Meed,
WAGRO, New York City.

files of
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Force cn the Holocaust) was a vice president.
presidents included Maxwell M. Raab,
Laurence A. Tisch.
Silverman was

Other vice

Daniel S. Shapiro, and

Irvin D. Husin was secretary and Irving

treasurer.

Malcolm

Hoenlein,

a masterful

political entrepreneur who went on to run the Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, was the
executive director.
The officially stated purpose of JCRC was "to serve as
the

central

coordinating

and

resource

metropolitan area Jewish community.
agency

for

religious
catalogue

62

major

civic,

organizations,
of

Jewish

the

for

the

By 1990, as the umbrella

communal,
agenda

activities,

body

of

issues

educational
the

JCRC

and

and

was

a

programs

reflecting the concerns, needs and aspirations of the Jewish
community of New York.

The broad range of issues

addressed

by the JCRC include:

Israel and international

concerns,

domestic and urban affairs, government relations, intergroup
relations, anti-Semitism and discrimination, Jewish security
and neighborhood stabilization."9
One of the unofficial, unstated purposes of JCRC was to
serve as a power base for politically hungry Hoenlein and his
wealthy and well-connected backers, who were,
part, developers.

for the most

These developers who backed the founding

of JCRC in 1976 became more powerful in the City after Koch

information sheet, Jewish Community Relations Council
of New York, 1990.
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won the mayoral election in 1977 and took office in 1978.
After Koch took office, only three years after the height of
New York City's 1975 financial crisis,

he made deals and

alliances with developers that made them one of the most
influential groups of "movers and shakers" in the City.

Most

of these developers are Jewish, and were appointed by Koch to
the New York City Holocaust Memorial

Commission when he

created it in 1982.
One

hallmark

of

the

giveaways to developers.

Koch

administration

was

its

Jim Sleeper describes the Koch era

as one of "abdication of government's

legitimate

'police

powers' over burgeoning development" and "abandonment of any
civic

mission

define".10

broader

than

what

'development'

might

Between the time the development boom began in

1981 and 1987, about 45 million square feet of new commercial
space were built in Manhattan.

The Koch administration made

developers enormously wealthy and powerful by offering tax
incentives ($1.3 billion in 1981-87), zoning variances (e.g.,
greater building density and height in exchange for public
amenities), and sale of City property to the highest bidders
without regard for planning.

Developers, in turn, were among

the largest contributors to Koch's campaigns.

For example,

in 1985 half of the $9 million in campaign gifts to Koch and
the

other

members

of

the

Board

of

Estimate

(i.e.,

the

10Jim Sleeper, "Boom and Bust with Ed Koch", Dissent, A
Special Issue: In Search of New York. Fall 1987, New York,
p. 437.
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Comptroller,
presidents)

City

Council

president,

and

five

borough

came from 175 donors, most of them developers,

brokerage houses, and their attorneys.11
One

of

the

developers

who

backed

the

creation

of

Hoenlein's JCRC, its first vice president George Klein, soon
emerged as an important force among developers in New York
City.

His office building at 59th Street and Park Avenue,

begun in 1977, was the first new office building in New York
City in five years (following the financial crisis of 1975).
Hoenlein

and

Klein

began

seeking

power

in

the

Jewish

community and influence in City Hall at around the same time,
and

found an open door

after Koch was

elected

in

1977.

Someone close to the situation said that Klein and Hoenlein
"made each other" politically in New York's organized Jewish
community.
The

reciprocal

close

relationship between

Klein

and

Hoenlein enabled them to help each other build a pyramid of
power in the establishment organized Jewish community, and in
their dealings with the Mayor's office.

Klein became Koch's

personal friend, and Herbert Rickman, Koch's liaison to the
organized Jewish community, was also closely connected with
Hoenlein and Klein.

(Dahl's analysis of how a pyramid of

power is created and reinforced applies here.
8 .)

11Ibid. , p. 448.

See Chapter
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JCRC

soon got

memorial

in New

into the act of creating a Holocaust

York

City.

At

a March

24,

1977

press

conference, JCRC president Ravitch listed among issues of
concern for the Jewish community of New York a serious effort
to commemorate the Holocaust.

(JCRC was an affiliate of the

NJCRAC

umbrella,

community

relations

which

had

been

suggesting this since 1973-74 in its Joint Program Plan.)

At

that time, JCRC had 2 0 constituent member organizations and
50 others with applications pending.

S. L. Shneiderman, who

had

memorial

worked

on

the

1947

Holocaust

ceremony

Riverside Park, was present at the press conference.

in
He

interjected at the press conference that he had archives on
previous
"some

attempts to establish a Holocaust memorial,

of

the

organizations

you

[JCRC]

represent

and

killed

it. »12
On April 7, 1977, Ravitch sent letters to Shneiderman,
Benjamin Meed and "a selected group of individuals" to meet
in his home, 1021 Park Avenue, on Monday, April 18 to hear
Gideon Hausner,

chairman of Yad Vashem in Jerusalem

(and

prosecutor at the trial of Adolph Eichmann). The purpose of
the meeting was to "discuss the conceptual
preparatory
memorial."

steps

for

initiating

a

framework and

'living'

[Holocaust]

The letter also said:

12American Jewish Congress memorandum from Victoria Free
to Richard Cohen, "Notes from a press conference at the
Jewish Community Relations Council-March 24, 1977", March 25,
1977, Archive of YIVO, Files of American Memorial to Six
Million Jews of Europe, Inc., New York.
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"Over the past thirty years, numerous attempts have
been made to create a proper memorial to the six million
martyrs of World War II.

For a variety of reasons, New

York City remains the only major Jewish community in the
world without a commemoration of the Holocaust.
was an exaggeration for two reasons:

[This

New York was not

the only one, and it was not without any commemoration.]
Recognizing the unique opportunity presented by the
creation of the Jewish Community Relations Council and
the fact that the passage of time mitigates against the
possibility

of

this

long

sought

dream

becoming

a

reality, representatives of the Survivors' organizations
and

other

concerned

persons

approached

the

JCRC

to

undertake this project.
The General Assembly of the JCRC authorized the
President to appoint an organizing committee to explore
the possibilities and develop plans."13
This

meeting

representatives

raises
of
or

a number

which
did

of

survivor
JCRC,

in

questions:

Which

organizations
fact,

approach

had

approached

JCRC,

the

survivors?

Was JCRC's takeover of the project approved by

the Committee to Commemorate the Six Million Jewish Martyrs,
which did
later?

not officially

cease

functioning until

a year

Was JCRC stepping in to institutionalize the effort

13Letter from Richard Ravitch, JCRC, dated April 7, 1977
to Benjamin Meed (in WAGRO files) and to S. L. Shneiderman
(in YIVO archive), New York.
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and render powerless any potential attempts by smaller groups
(such as WAGRO or the earlier Zygelboim committee)?
JCRC,

then

a

new

umbrella

group,

using

the

issue

Was
of

memorializing the Holocaust (which had then recently begun
getting "hot") as a means of making itself more important in
the Jewish community and with the City government?

Was there

already any informal discussion between JCRC and Edward I.
Koch, who was to run for mayor that coming Fall?
No

files,

answers.

archives

or

interviews

provided

concrete

However, there is an unconfirmed report that when

Koch ran for mayor for the first time in 1977, creation of a
Holocaust memorial in New York City was on his laundry list
of

items

of

interest

to the organized Jewish

community.

Manny Behar, who worked on the 1977 campaign, said he wrote
this item into the campaign platform,
available.

but no evidence is

Behar did not, however, remember any connection

between the idea and JCRC's project.14

If Koch,

in fact,

did make mention of a Holocaust memorial in 1977, he then
shelved the idea until 1981.

Hoenlein (saying he did not

remember) refused to discuss JCRC's early history regarding
a Holocaust memorial, and the organization's files from 1977
were not accessible.
The presence of Hausner, chairman of Yad Vashem , at the
Spring

1977 JCRC-sponsored meeting

is an indication that

^Telephone discussion with Manny Behar,
1990.

December 20,
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Ravitch took the idea of a memorial seriously.
Holocaust memorials

in the world,

Of all of the

Yad Vashem Heroes

and

Martyrs Memorial Authority in Jerusalem is recognized as the
memorial,

complete

with

exhibitions,

historical

museums, archives, shrines and artifacts.

and

art

Yad Vashem is a

government museum, established by law in 1953 for the purpose
of commemorating "the disaster and its heroism and to promote
a custom of joint remembrance of the heroes and the victims."
It is still the major Holocaust memorial, not only in Israel,
but in the world.

(Yad Vashem has been described as "second

only to the western wall in its sacredness as a shrine of the
Israeli civil religion.
dignitaries

are

taken

It is the place to which foreign
to

celebrate

and

solemnize

their

relationship to Israel by sharing its identification with the
victims of the Holocaust.
to

the

Jews

Holocaust.

and

Jewish

Yad Vashem is the major memorial
communities

destroyed

It is maintained as a religious

in

the

institution.

Visitors are expected to cover their heads...."15)
Ravitch recalled that the subject of a memorial came up
after one of the survivor groups joined the newly formed
JCRC.

(Based on the history of this issue, it is likely the

group was WAGRO.)
New York,
"There

was

Ravitch agreed JCRC should do something in

and this led to the meeting in his apartment.
a

city-owned

site

on

43rd

Street

and

First

15Charles S. Leibman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Civil
Religion in Israel. University of California Press, 1983, p.
151.
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Avenue,"

he

said.

"I

remember

that

in

a

relatively

compressed period of time I had an architect by the name of
Davis, Brody do some sketches.

I also had a meeting with Dr.

[Yitzhak] Arad of Yad Vashem, and we got [Ernest] Michel very
much involved.

I even remember flying to Florida once with

him to try to solicit a major contribution from a wealthy guy
in Miami.
raising

We were on the verge of some very serious fund

for this.

All we wanted

from the City was the

conveyance of that property."16
Ernest Michel, a German Holocaust survivor who for many
years headed Federation-UJA's fundraising operation in New
York City, has been active until today in efforts to create
a memorial.

He is co-chairman of development of the current

Commission.

Ravitch was on Koch's original Task Force, but

was not active on the issue after he became MTA director in
1981.
The timing of the meeting in Ravitch's home should have
been

conducive

project:

to

the

success

of

a

Holocaust

memorial

On April 7, 1977, the very day Ravitch sent out

invitations to the April 18 meeting, Yitzhak Rabin announced
his resignation as the Prime Minister of Israel.

On May 17,

1977 Menachem Begin's Likud Party became the largest party in
the

Israel Knesset,

Begin,

and Begin

formed a cabinet

in June.

much more than the earlier Labor government,

used

Holocaust rhetoric to verify the existence of Israel and
16Richard Ravitch, interview, May 4, 1990, New York.
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defend its policies.

His election, combined with the 1961

Eichmann trial and the 1967 and 1973 wars, can be pointed to
as a turning point in increased awareness of the Holocaust in
the

organized

Hoenlein,
Party.

American

Jewish

the JCRC director,

community.

was

close to

Furthermore,
Begin's

Likud

This combination of circumstances, however, was not

enough to make the JCRC initiative successful.
Shneiderman, who attended the meeting in Ravitch's home,
reported

on

it

to

Richard

Cohen,

then

Director of American Jewish Congress.

Public

Relations

Shneiderman had been

invited as the correspondent for the Israeli newspaper A1
Hamishmar and the New York Yiddish Jewish Daily Forward, but
he also seems to have been
Congress.

"spying"

for American Jewish

He said the meeting was "devoted to a project of

establishing a 'Living Memorial to the Six Million Jewish
Martyrs.'"
people,

According to Shneiderman,

including representatives

of

there were about 30
survivor groups

and

religious organizations, and "probably potential contributors
to a fund of about 25 million dollars for the erection of a
building, preferably in the vicinity of the United Nations."
He said that Ravitch had outlined the project as an institute
for research on the Holocaust, with archives, a library, a
museum, exhibits, and auditoriums for lectures.

Shneiderman

added that, as far as he knew, there were no representatives
of American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith or YIVO.

(This information was important for American
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Jewish

Congress,

which

was,

no

doubt,

keeping

tabs

on

potential competing organizations.)
According

to

Shneiderman's

report,

the

various

participants at the meeting were seeking to protect their own
"turf" and particular interests: Benjamin Meed, whose WAGRO
ran yearly Holocaust commemorative services on Yom HaShoah (a
day

of Holocaust

commemoration

designated

by

the

Israel

government as the 22nd day of the Hebrew month of Nisan) ,
suggested that the projected memorial have a meeting room for
30,000 people to house his commemoration.

Eli Zborowski, a

resistance group survivor who heads the International Society
for Yad Vashem,

suggested the new

Friends of Yad Vashem.
Banfield

said

of

institution be

called

Both proposals were rejected.
civic

controversies

in

As

Chicago,

controversies arise "out of the maintenance and enhancement
needs

of

large

formal

organizations.

The

heads

of

an

organization see some advantage to be gained by changing the
situation.

They propose changes.

are threatened.
place."17

Like

Other large organizations

They oppose, and a civic controversy takes
civic

organizations,

the

major

Jewish

organizations have as one of their prime concerns their own
"maintenance and enhancement", and their self-serving stances
at this meeting reflect this.

17Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press
of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p. 263.
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Shneiderman wrote that Michel announced he was attending
in a private capacity,
would

directly

support

as a survivor.
a

fund

When asked if UJA

raising

initiative

for

a

Holocaust memorial, Michel answered with a categorical "no",
according
later

to Shneiderman.18

that

he

Federation-UJA

never

had

leadership

(Michel
any
about

said

thirteen years

negative

reaction

building

a

from

Holocaust

memorial, and that some leaders of Federation-UJA have been
major supporters of the current project.19 However, this is
not the

same as Federation's putting the

issue on their

agenda and making an allocation for it— something that was
never done in New York City.)
Shneiderman also said in his report that completion of
the 1947 monument was prevented by "active opposition" from
the

UJA

and

the

Jewish

Federation

(then

separate

organizations). He added that Jewish Agency representatives
had

hinted

Ben-Gurion

was

opposed

in

1947,

because

Holocaust memorial would hamper fund raising efforts
Israel.

No empirical

a
for

evidence to prove of disprove his

allegations has been found.

Shneiderman reported that when

he told participants at the meeting the "painful" story of
the Riverside Drive attempt in 1947, most of those present
18Memorandum to Richard Cohen, American Jewish Congress,
from S. L. Shneiderman, "Living Memorial for 6 Million Jews",
April 21, 1977, archive of Yivo Research Institute, file of
American Memorial to Six Million European Jews, New York.
19Interview with Ernest Michel, May 8, 1990, New York
City.
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were

"astonished".

Ravitch announced at the end of the

meeting that he would immediately open a bank account for the
JCRC project,

and hinted the first seed money would be a

seven figure sum.20
By the Fall of 1977, JCRC and its executive director,
Hoenlein were clearly in the lead in efforts to establish a
Holocaust memorial in New York.

This was when Koch first ran

for mayor and won, but no records or interviews substantiated
any collaboration between him and JCRC on this issue at that
time.

On September 26, 1977, Ravitch wrote to Benjamin Meed

as one of "a few key individuals" to come to a meeting in
Michel's

office

to

discuss

the

design

framework of a proposed Holocaust memorial.

and

conceptual

Ravitch would be

reporting on developments of the past few weeks,

"in hope

that we can then develop plans to bring this to fruition."
(The date of the meeting was inadvertently omitted from the
letter.)
On November
Directorate

of

6,
Yad

he

1977,
Vashem,

thought

Yitzhak Arad,
wrote
JCRC

to

Chairman

Hoenlein

should

proceed

of the

at

JCRC,

outlining

how

with

the

memorial.

Responding to a request by Ravitch, on December

12, 1977 John Zuccotti of the law firm of Tufo, Johnston,
Zuccotti

&

Allegaert

reported

on

the

State

regulations that would affect JCRC's proposal
Holocaust monument and museum.
20Ibid.

and

City

to build a

The proposed site was on
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City-owned land at the southeast corner of First Avenue and
Forty-second

Street.

In

addition

to

outlining

the

complicated demapping and Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
(ULURP) processes, Zuccotti warned of organized opposition.
He predicted this would come from the community, objecting to
the loss of playground space, and from the United Nations,
over loss of potential development space.

(Kurt Waldheim,

whose own Nazi past was later exposed, was then Secretary
General.)
Zuccotti

analyzed

the

situation

with

a

keen

understanding of the political implications of pursuing the
project.

He wrote to Ravitch:

"In addition, the opposition

may invoke the argument that the monument is a mere give-away
of City land to a special interest group.

Notwithstanding

its lack of merit, the argument may have some impact on the
relevant political actors.
sensitive

both

to

the

This is because they will be

suggestions

of

local

ethnic

or

religious groups that the City provide them with land for
some

pet

project,

regardless

of

its

merit,

and

to

constraints imposed on the City by the fiscal crisis.

the
JCRC

should take exceptional care, both in the land disposition
agreement and in its public relations effort, to elaborate
the

importance

of

the

monument

to

the

intellectual

and

cultural life of the City and to its tourist industry, and to
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articulate fully the value of the consideration being given
for the land."21
Zucotti's political savvy is impressive.

This is the

first documentation of a Holocaust memorial committee in New
York City's having a sense of the project's effect on other
interest groups.

This is not a case of worrying about anti-

Semitic reactions, as in the 1946-1950S attempt.

It is a

case of being sensitive to the interests of competing groups-both those that would not want the memorial intruding in the
neighborhood, and those who would want the City to give them
the equal opportunity to build a memorial or similar project.
Banfield's "maintenance and enhancement needs" again applies.
JCRC was proposing changes which could threaten other large
organizations.
take place.22

If they opposed, a civic controversy would
Zucotti was warning JCRC that they should try

to avoid such a controversy.
The next month, Koch took office as mayor of the City of
New York, and a new chapter was about to begin in the long,
long saga of efforts to create a Holocaust memorial.

At this

point, however, the New York City story took a detour through
Washington,

D.C.

Ravitch said that when he learned the

President's Commission on the Holocaust was to be formed, and

21Letter from John E. Zuccotti to Richard Ravitch,
December 12, 1977, Municipal Archive of the City of New York,
Rickman files.
22Banfield, p. 263.
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then it began with Wiesel as chairman, he

concluded it was

"absolutely silly" to try to compete with a Presidential
Commission

dealing

memorial.

"I

with

thought

this
we'd

and

planning

never

raise

a

the

national
money

in

competition with what they were doing, and the project was
sort of aborted," he said.

"The last thing I remember is

having

Elie

a

conversation

with

Wiesel,

and

saying

the

symbolism of having the memorial across the street from the
United Nations was overwhelming, and that's what I thought
the Presidential

Commission ought to recommend."23

After

this discussion with Wiesel (which must have been in 1978),
Ravitch said JCRC dropped the idea of pursuing a Holocaust
memorial.

No empirical evidence indicates JCRC tried to make

a political alliance with Mayor Koch after he took office in
1978, in order to carry the project forward.
Ravitch,

however,

was

not

the

only

New

Yorker

who

thought the President's Commission on the Holocaust should
recommend that the national memorial be in New York City.
September

29,

1978,

Mayor Koch wrote

to

On

President Jimmy

Carter, offering him full support for creation of a National
Holocaust

Memorial.

Koch then

asked

locating the memorial in New York City.
reasons this would be a good idea:

Carter

to consider

He enumerated the

Families of many New

Yorkers were touched by the Holocaust and it would have an
enthusiastic community? New York has the largest Jewish and
23Ravitch interview.
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survivor communities outside of Israel; most national Jewish
organizations are headquartered in New York; New York is the
diplomatic capital of the world; New York City has been known
as a haven for the oppressed; New York City is an amalgam of
many heritages.
"In short," Koch wrote, "a Holocaust Memorial located in
New York City would not only serve as a reminder of the
world's past indifference to human rights, but as a visible
symbol of continuing efforts to protect and promote human
dignity and rights."

Then, with typical Koch chutzpa, he

said he had "taken the liberty of enclosing a list of people
who, in my opinion, would be particularly helpful in planning
and realizing the Memorial."

He closed by telling Carter not

to hesitate "to ask my help and the help of all New Yorkers
in bringing the National Holocaust Memorial to completion.
I look forward to working with you on this."24
No response from Carter was found, but history records
that

the

national

Washington,
Koch's

Holocaust

memorial

was

D.C. and not New York City.

intervention

in

the

issue

in

destined

for

Before analyzing

New

York

City,

by

creating his own Holocaust Commission, the next chapter will
examine how its precursor, the President's Commission on the
Holocaust

(and subsequent U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council)

came into existence.
24Letter from Mayor Edward I. Koch to President Jimmy
Carter, September 29, 1978, Municipal Archives, Rickman
files, New York.
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SUMMARY
When Carter's President's Commission put the issue of
Holocaust memorialization

squarely

on the

agenda

of

the

United States government in 1978, there had already been a
history of 32 years of failed attempts to create a memorial
in New York City,
Leaders

of

the

the center of Jewish life in America.

last

efforts

before

Carter's

understand better than their predecessors

seemed

to

that political

alliances are necessary in order to carry out a project that
requires governmental cooperation and approval. However, they
still were not successful.

WAGRO failed to get Mayor Beame

to intercede and make space for a Holocaust memorial in the
Columbus Circle cultural center in 1977.

JCRC, which was

established in 1976 as an umbrella organization for community
(including government) relations, began a different effort in
1977 to build a memorial near the United Nations.
became a member of JCRC and encouraged this move.
of

the

founders

of

JCRC

were

wealthy

and

WAGRO

A number

power-hungry

developers, who became much more wealthy and powerful after
Koch took office at the beginning of 1978 and became their
staunch

political

ally.

One

of

these

developers,

JCRC

officer and Koch ally George Klein, later became chairman of
Koch's Task Force on the Holocaust.

After Carter announced

in 1978 that he would create a national Holocaust memorial,
JCRC abandoned the idea of building a major memorial in New
York City.

Thus, by the end of 1978 there was no interest
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group of any kind operating to create a Holocaust memorial in
New York City.
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PART TWO: THE POLITICS OF CREATING A HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL MUSEUM IN NEW YORK CITY
CHAPTER 7: PRESIDENT CARTER INTERVENES AND PLACES HOLOCAUST
MEMORIALIZATION ON THE GOVERNMENT'S AGENDA
"The Holocaust memorial was born out of politics and it was
born out of domestic political crisis." Presidential Aide
Mark Siegel1
In 1977-1978, President Jimmy Carter was in trouble with
the organized Jewish community.

The efforts of his high

level staff members to "mend fences" after his hard line
statements and decisions on Israel led to his intervening on
the

issue

of

Holocaust

memorialization

and

subsequently

creating the President's Commission on the Holocaust in 1978.
Carter's

problems began

months after his inauguration.

on March

9,

1977,

only two

That afternoon he told a Town

Meeting and press conference in Clinton, Massachusetts that
a Palestinian homeland was one of the major elements for
peace

in the Middle

East,

and that United States policy

called for Israel's return to the pre-1967 borders with only
insubstantial changes.

The Conference of Presidents of Major

American Jewish Organizations (Presidents' Conference), which
claims to speak for the organized Jewish community, expressed

interview with Mark Siegel, March 16, 1990, Washington,
D.C.
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its displeasure to the Carter Administration both publicly
and privately.2
As a result of the organized Jewish community's profound
indignation about the March, 1977, Town Meeting, Carter named
Mark Siegel as his liaison to the Jewish community.

Siegel,

who was deputy to Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan,

assumed

this

additional

responsibility.

"That

Spring,

I

was

determining in a very systematic way how the community could
be involved in the decision-making process with respect to
the Geneva peace conference," he recalled.

"I laid out a lot

of political steps so that the Jewish community would have
trust and confidence in the President and the Administration,
because
required.
things.

at

some

point

in

this

process

It was not going to be easy.

faith

would

be

I sequenced a lot of

One of the things I said the President should push

for was passage of the Genocide Treaty,
building measure.

as a confidence-

Other measures were regular meetings with

the community, with major Jewish organizations."3
At this point, Siegel hit upon an idea that was to make
history and ultimately have a crucial effect on efforts to
create a Holocaust memorial in New York City.

"I was aware

that the United States was the only western country that did
not

have

an

official

memorial

to

the

victims

of

the

2"Report for the Year Ending March 31, 1978: Conference
of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations", New
York, p. 3.
3Siegel interview.

184

Holocaust," he said.
Jordan

that

overdue,

went

and

community."

"I suggested in a memo to Hamilton

on

that

to
it

the

President

would

be

that

well

it was

received

When they responded favorably,

in

long
the

Siegel asked

Ellen Goldstein, who was working for Chief Domestic Policy
Advisor Stuart Eizenstat,
memorials.

for a briefing memo on kinds of

He said she responded quickly that many countries

had memorials, but the United States did not.

She added that

none was being planned or publicly discussed, and this would
be a very novel idea.

"She proceeded to do a good deal of

research on it, talking about the kinds of memorials that
existed around the world", Siegel said.4

The idea was then

shelved until March, 1978.
Meanwhile, Rabbi Alexander Schindler, then Chairman of
the Presidents'

Conference,

said on June

7,

1977 he was

concerned by what appeared to be an "erosion" of Carter's
"commitment to Israel."

He said American Jews were "worried

about the expectations Carter is raising in the Arab world."
Three days later, The New York Times reported in an article
by Bernard Gwertzman that Carter was "stung" by the criticism
of

American

Jews

and

was

taking

steps

to

repair

the

4Mark Siegel, Stuart Eizenstat and Ellen Goldstein all
said in March 16, 1990 interviews that a national Holocaust
memorial was Siegel's idea originally. Siegel's first memo
has not been found by any of them or by the Carter Library.
However, the Carter Library does have a copy of Ellen
Goldstein's June 21, 1977 reply to the Siegel request for a
briefing on Holocaust memorials. His original memo to Jordan
and Carter must have been written between March and June 21,
1977.
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relationship.

His creation of the President's Commission on

the Holocaust the next year was part of his attempt to do so.
On July 6, 1977, Carter met with more than 50 American
Jewish leaders to discuss his views on Israel and peace in
the Middle East.

Afterward, Schindler, speaking as Chairman

of the President's Conference, said he was reassured.5
August 8, 1977, however,
States

was

in

On

Carter announced that the United

contact

with

the

Palestine

Liberation

Organization (PLO), and that the PLO would be an acceptable
participant in the Geneva peace talks.

He said the PLO would

only have to say they recognized United Nations Resolution
242, and that the Palestinians have additional status than
that of refugees.
"deeply

disturbed

position."6
further.

The Presidents' Conference reported it was
by

this

deterioration

in

the

American

On October 1, 1977, the situation deteriorated

The Carter Administration and the Soviet Union

released a joint statement on the Middle East, calling for
Palestinian representation at the Geneva Peace Conference,
and speaking of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people."

Schindler sent a telegram to Carter, saying he was

"profoundly disturbed", and this was "a shocking about-face
of the President's public pledges."7
5"Report for the Year Ending March 31, 1978: Conference
of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations", New
York, pp. 7-8.
6Ibid., pp. 9-11.
7Ibid., p. 12.
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In early 1978, President Carter announced his proposal
to sell jet warplanes to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia as a
package.

He stated at a White House press conference on

April 25, 1978 that if Congress rejected the sale of planes
to any of the three countries, he would withdraw the entire
package.8

Siegel said that in early 1978 he was growing

increasingly uncomfortable with his role as liaison to the
Jewish community.

"It was my clear opposition to the sale of

the F-15s to Saudi Arabia, and it was expected of me to sell
this sale to the Jewish community, and it became untenable
for me," he said.

"Ultimately in March 1978 it led to my

resignation, which unlike most resignations of public figures
was not an exchange of happy letters.
a resignation that was guite public.

I laid out my views in
At that point there had

been great tension developing within the Jewish community on
a range of issues— a Palestinian homeland, the Geneva peace
conference, the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, and there was
a real crisis in relations between the White House and the
American Jewish community."
resignation

fueled that

Siegel said he was "afraid my

fire," because people thought

proved their fears about the Administration.
in

early

March,

relationships

between

it

After he left
the

Carter

8David Friedman, "Senators say if Carter wants all or
nothing on his plane package deal he way wind up with
nothing", Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin,
April 26, 1978, vol. 45, no. 82, New York, p. 1.
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Administration and the organized Jewish community therefore
deteriorated further.
Siegel places the initiation of "the politics of the
Holocaust memorial" at this point, March 1978.

He had put

forth the idea almost a year earlier, but there had been no
action

on

it.

"As

the

situation

[vis-a-vis

the Jewish

community] continued to deteriorate in March and April, 1978,
apparently what happened in the White House was to decide
what to do to repair this hemorrhage," he said.

"And the

idea of the Holocaust memorial was resurrected at that point.
And I must say I was not pleased, because what was done was
at the height of the battle with the Senate over the F-15s,
a very ugly battle with [Carter's National Security Advisor
Zbigniew] Brzezinski making a number of unfortunate comments
[e.g., that he would "break the back" of the Jewish lobby on
Capitol

Hill]

that

some

people

determined

to

be

anti-

Semitic. 1,9
A memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stuart Eizenstat,
dated March 28, 1978, corroborates Siegel's recollections.
She wrote:

"Some time ago, Mark Siegel asked me to research

a question he had concerning a U. S. memorial for the victims
of the Nazi holocaust.

The

contained in the attached memo
dated June

21,

1977] .

results

of my

research

are

[from Goldstein to Siegel,

While many

countries

outside

of

Eastern Europe have memorials or plans for memorials, there
9Siegel interview.
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is in the United States no official memorial or plans for a
memorial.

Even

concentration

though

camps

some

within

of

these

their

countries

borders,

citizens are survivors of such camps.

many

had

of

no

their

The United States

certainly has its share of Nazi survivors as well."
Goldstein's memo said a column by William Safire on
March

27,

dealing with

Nazis

and

Skokie,

reminded her of Siegel's original request.
how

far Mark's

travelled

in

idea

the

or proposal,

White

House,

attention now," she wrote.

if

but

Illinois,

had

"I have no idea

indeed he had
I

bring

it

to

one,
your

"If the Administration were to

advance, in some way, the construction of a memorial built
with private and/or public moneys, it might be an appropriate
gesture in honor of Israel's thirtieth anniversary and a
symbol of the United States' support of Israels' [sic] birth
and continued life.

The idea deserves consideration on its

merits, although such a move might appear to some people to
be glib public relations."
Eizenstat

hand

wrote

on

the

memo that

it

was

an

interesting idea and

he wanted to sit down and discuss it.10

Thus it is possible

to pinpoint the date when a national

Holocaust memorial became "an idea whose time has come" and
was placed on the agenda.

It is also possible to document

10Memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stuart Eizenstat,
Subject:
Holocaust Memorial, March 28, 1978,
The White
House, Washington, D. C., archive of the Carter Library,
Atlanta (DPS-Eizenstat Collection).
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that the initiation of the idea was for political purposes.
As

John W.

Kingdon

said,

patterns

of public policy

determined by what gets on the agenda.

are

He asks why, after

many years, a particular time proves right for an issue to
emerge.

He

lists

four

stages:

an

agenda

is

set,

alternatives from which a choice will be made are specified,
an authoritative choice is made (e.g., by legislative vote),
and there is implementation.
officials,

staff,

and

Participants (parties, elected

media)

and

processes

(problem

recognition, policies generated, and politics of reelection)
affect both agenda settings and alternatives.11
According to Kingdon, we need to know what made the soil
fertile,

rather than the origin of the seed.

incremental theories,
model.

and is closer to the

"garbage can"

He says solutions often search for problems.

case of a national Holocaust memorial,
fertile for at least four reasons:
needed

He rejects

a positive

community.
recently

issue

to mend

In the

the soil was made

1. Carter desperately
fences

with

the Jewish

2. The idea of memorializing the Holocaust had
emerged

as

a pertinent

American Jewish community.
"Americanized"

by

the

issue

3. The

airing to

in

the

organized

idea had even become

a mass

audience

of

the

miniseries Holocaust on NBC television at about that time;
the number of books being published on the subject had also
11John W. Kinadon.Agendas. Alternatives
Policies, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 184.

and
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increased.

4.

The

issue

of

the

presence

of

Nazi

war

criminals in America had been placed on the national agenda
in 1977, with the creation of a Special Litigation Unit in
the

Immigration

and

Naturalization

Service.

Systematic

denaturalization and deportation hearings of accused Nazi war
criminals

(some of whom had worked for the United States

Government)

were beginning.12

A memorial was a much less

embarrassing way for the government to address the Holocaust.
Kingdon's model
setting

has

formulation

three
and

for the processes of Federal

streams:

refinement,

problem
and

recognition,

politics.

These

agenda
policy
three

streams operate largely independently, but come together at
critical

times:

a problem

is recognized,

a solution

is

available, and the political climate is right for a change.
There is an opportunity for pushing a proposal,
window,

at the time that an issue suddenly

a policy

"gets hot"13.

Policy entrepreneurs willing to invest resources in the hope
of future return then go into action.

(There is a "tipping

point" in coalition-building, with people and groups joining
for fear they will be excluded from possible benefits.)
Kingdon's

model

can

be

used

to

analyze

the

Carter

Administration's decision to memorialize the Holocaust as
12See Rochelle G. Saidel, The Outraged Conscious:
Seekers of Justice for Nazi War Criminals in America. SUNY
Press, Albany, New York, 1984, pp. 3-8, 103-138; and Charles
R. Allen, Jr. Nazi War Criminals in America: Facts...Action:
A Basic Handbook. Highgate Press, New York, 1986.
13Kingdon, pp. 92-94.
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follows:
opened

In 1978, the issue "got hot".
and

the

streams

came

A policy window had

together:

the

problem

of

addressing the Holocaust in a way that would divert attention
from a much more volatile item already on the agenda

(the

beginning investigations of utilization of Nazi war criminals
by the government) and from Carter's foreign policies that
had enraged the organized establishment Jewish community; the
policy

of

Holocaust

commemoration;

and

the

politics

of

reelection, of finding a domestic issue that would appeal to
Jewish voters, whose support for Carter had badly eroded.
The need for such an issue had been placed on the agenda,
policy entrepreneurs went into action as documented above, a
Holocaust

memorial

alternatives,

an

in

Washington

official

Commission on the Holocaust,

act

was

created

chosen
the

from

the

President's

and the implementation phase

began.
Following Goldstein's memorandum to him,

on April 4,

1978 Eizenstat wrote a note by hand to "B", mentioning that
the

idea

of

Bookbinder,

a memorial
American

should
Jewish

representative, and others,
received."u

be

discussed

Committee's

was

Hyman

Washington

"to make sure it will be well

This further documents that the purpose of the

project was to appeal to the Jewish community,
Carter

with

having

problems.

The

Carter

with whom

Administration

uNote from Eizenstat to "B", April 4, 1978,
Library, Atlanta, Ga., DPS-Eizenstat collection.
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initiated the creation of a political
organized

Jewish

community

on

the

alliance with the

issue

of

Holocaust

memorialization, for the purpose of improving his image and
winning their support.
Eizenstat (and White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz) next
wrote a memorandum to Carter on April 25, 1978.
was

"Holocaust Memorial".

The subject

The memo stated there was no

official American Holocaust memorial and that there was then
stronger

support

than

ever

to

create

Americans— not just Jewish-Americans.
included

the

recent

television

one,

"among

many

Reasons they listed

program,

Holocaust; the

creation of memorials in other countries; and the aging of
the

"thousands

country".

of

concentration

survivors

in

this

Only the first reason would probably make "many

Americans" amenable to the idea,
proven.

camp

Nevertheless,

and even this cannot be

these

were

Eizenstat's

rationalizations to Carter.
He added there would soon be a White House celebration
of Israel's 30th anniversary, and that the creation of the
State of Israel was closely tied with the Holocaust.

"If you

are interested in pursuing an official U.S. memorial to the
Holocaust victims, that date would seem an appropriate time
to announce plans for such a memorial,"

Eizenstat wrote.

"The memorial would serve not only as a reminder to all
Americans of the millions who died in the Holocaust, but also
of the birth of Israel and its continued life."

The memorandum said there were questions to be resolved
about

what

the

memorial

should

be,

where

it

should

be

located, how it should be funded and what would be the role
of the Federal government in sponsoring or maintaining it.
It

then

recommended

a

fifteen

member

committee

of

"distinguished Americans, both Jewish and non-Jewish" to be
appointed by the President to resolve those questions, and to
make recommendations within six months.

It concluded that

there should be "sufficiently wide support" so that private
funds would be used to pay for the building, and in whole or
in part, for the maintenance.

"We do not believe that any

federal dollars will need to expended.
reasons,

However, for other

we might want to have the government contribute

toward the memorial, if not through direct expenditures then
at least through the gift of land."

(It would follow from

the above history of the situation that these "other reasons"
would be to please the alienated organized Jewish community.)
There

is

a handwritten

notation

on the

memorandum:

"I

concur— and so does Cy, Z. B." (indicating that Brzezinski
and

Secretary

of

State

Cyrus

Vance

were

consulted

and

approved of the plan) .15
Eizenstat

said

in an

interview

that

the

idea

of

a

President's Commission on the Holocaust came to his attention
through Goldstein, who got the idea through Mark Siegel.

He

15Memorandum from Stu Eizenstat and Bob Lipshutz to the
President, "Subject: Holocaust Memorial", April 25,1978, The
Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga., DPS-Eizenstat collection.
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said, "As one who lost relatives in the Holocaust, it seemed
compelling to me.

I mentioned it to President Carter and

sent him a memo [above].
financial.

The President's major concern was

It didn't take a lot of arm twisting.

We talked

about the idea of a Commission and a suitable memorial.

He

asked who should be the chairperson, and I said that only one
person, Elie Wiesel, was suitable.
was out of the country.

I called Wiesel, and he

When I found him,

he was very

excited, agreed, and came to see the President."16
Wiesel,

who

later

resigned

as

chairman,

Commission was created for political purposes.
in the beginning

it was a political

act,

said

the

He said that

because Carter

wanted to ingratiate himself with the Jewish community and he
realized

this

subject

was

important.

Wiesel

said

that

Carter's desire to get the Jewish vote was behind the idea,
and that Eizenstat was the person who engineered it.17
Asked

whether

the

purpose

of

creating

a

Holocaust

Commission was political, Eizenstat hedged and said:
decision has political and substantive aspects.

"Every

Sometimes

you make a decision that is not political,

or you try to

minimize

long

the

politics.

This,

to me,

was

overdue,

because of revisionism, lack of records, and survivors dying.

16Interview with Stuart Eizenstat, Chief Domestic Policy
Advisor for President Carter, March 16, 1990, Washington,
D.C.
17Interview with Elie Wiesel, August 8, 1990, New York
City.
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I felt it was extremely strong substantively, or I would not
have recommended it even if it had good political aspects.
Politically, it showed the Presidents sensitivity to Jewish
concerns at a time when some Jews were still not comfortable
with a Southern Baptist.
reasons,

It was not done

for political

but we knew it should be popular

in the Jewish

community.1,18
Siegel was more direct about the political implications
of

the

President's

Commission

on

the

Holocaust:

"The

Holocaust memorial was born out of politics and it was born
out of domestic political crisis. I know that's the case.
know that's what happened," he said.

I

He added that it went

on to do very good things, he was happy it is being built,
and

"every

time

I

go

by

that

site

I

feel

wonderful."

Nevertheless, it was created for political purposes.19
As Eizenstat had suggested in the April 2 5 memorandum to
Carter, the President announced at the May 1, 1978 Israel
30th anniversary celebration at the White House that he was
appointing

a commission to recommend to him an

American Holocaust memorial.

official

He followed Eizenstat's lead,

both in tying the memorialization of the Holocaust to Israel,
and in connecting the memorialization to the United States,
and to a broader symbol of human rights violation.

At the

May 1 ceremony, which was attended by Israel Prime Minister
18Eizenstat interview.
19Siegel interview.
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Menachem Begin and 1000 invited guests,

(most of whom were

American Jewish community leaders, government officials and
rabbis), Carter referred to the Holocaust as "the ultimate in
man's

inhumanity to man".

He said the six million Jews

murdered by the Nazis died in part "because the entire world
turned its back on them", and that a memorial would "insure
that we in the United States never forget."

He added that

"we will never waver from our deep friendship and partnership
with Israel and our total, absolute commitment to Israel's
security. "20
The
quickly,

creation

of

a

President's

Commission

now

moved

especially since during the last week of April,

Senator Wendell Anderson (D-Minn.) had introduced a bill to
establish a national memorial to victims of the Holocaust.
This bill would have authorized the President to appoint an
eleven-member

commission

to

develop

construction and location of a memorial.
the President's

staff wanted to

plans

for

design,

Evidence indicates

"beat the Senate to the

punch" so credit would not be diluted.

This is proven most

directly by a July 20, 1978 memorandum from Eizenstat and
Lipshutz

to

Tim

Kraft,

which

included

the

following

paragraph:
"We would like to get a memo to the President shortly
after his return from Bonn, (emphasis in original)

Senator

20Helen Silver, "Carter Moves to Create a Memorial to the
Victims of the Holocaust", Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily
News Bulletin. May 3, 1978, p. 3.
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Anderson, who had introduced legislation to form a similar
commission before the President's announcement,

is getting

pressured to pursue his legislation because of apparent White
House lack of interest.

David Rubenstein and Ellen Goldstein

from Stu's staff will be available to assist you and your
staff in preparing a memo for the President.”21
An earlier memorandum from Goldstein to Eizenstat on May
2,

1978

also

indicates

implementation phase.

pressure

Handwritten

ASAP.

Let's

move

initiate

Please set up [a staff

on this."

This

mentions the proposed Anderson legislation.
the

staff

Carter's

should
"public

memorial."22

"move

quickly

commitment"

A day earlier,

the

across the top is a note

(most likely by Eizenstat): "Ellen:
meeting]

to

and
to

too,

Goldstein said

wisely"
create

memo,

to
a

fulfill

Holocaust

the day of the White House

ceremony, Eizenstat had written to Carter, telling him he had
spoken with several senators and congressmen, who thought
announcement of a Holocaust commission was a good idea and
appropriate at that time.
wrote

by

hand:

"Stu,

On the bottom of this memo, Carter
Bob— Be

careful

not

to

make

any

21Memorandum from Stu Eizenstat and Bob Lipshutz to Tim
Kraft, "Subject: President's Holocaust Memorial Commission" ,
July 20, 1978, p. 5, Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga. , DPSEizenstat files.
22Memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stu Eizenstat,
"Subject:
Presidential
Commission
on the Holocaust
Memorial", May 2, 1978, Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga., DPSEizenstat files.
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promises— JC".23

The

President thus was willing to make

vague commitments, but not ready to back them with concrete
and specific action.
Carter's staff, however, was ready to move ahead with
specific action.

They began creating a political coalition,

under their control, that would get the project started.
May 10,

1978,

Goldstein wrote to Eizenstat,

On

presenting a

"rough agenda" of issues that needed to be resolved before
the Commission could be named and begin to work.

She was

concerned about the choice of Commission members, and said:
"Clearly, the most important issue to settle is whether the
Commission is to be a 'blue-ribbon' panel, but there are also
other issues about Commission members that must be resolved:
Jewish and non-Jewish proportion, bi-partisan participation,
federal arts officials, etc.
candidates.
Krim,

As a possible chairman,

who had the

skills,

and

she suggested Arthur

following qualities:

articulate

fundraiser,

She included a list of possible

he

moderator,
is

highly

"keen political

Democrat,
regarded

and

consummate
respected."

Political considerations were thus clearly spelled out in
black and white.

(Furthermore, Eizenstat's statement that

Wiesel was the "only person" considered "suitable" for the
chairmanship was not accurate.24)

23Memorandum from Stu Eizenstat to the President, May 1,
1978, Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga, DPS-Eizenstat files.
24Eizenstat interview op. cit.
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Goldstein then implied that the Administration staff,
rather than the Commission,
decisions:

"We

may

would be making some crucial

want

to

further

influence

the

Commission's decision concerning what the. memorial should be,
where it should be located and how it should be funded.

Many

believe that, in order for it to be an 'official' memorial,
it must be in Washington.

It is also accepted that the

memorial should not be just a marble statue, but educational
as well.

However, the Commission must be careful not to add

further to the competition and rivalry, both for funds and
recognition,

in this

area."

She

said

funding would

be

private, but the government "must have a significant role in
this effort."25

Goldstein did not explain what she thought

this "significant role" should be.
By

July

Eizenstat

20,

1978,

and Lipshutz

the
wrote

project

had

moved

forward.

a memorandum to Tim Kraft,

saying they had contacted members of the Jewish community
about

the

Commission.

choice

of

They wrote:

Elie

Wiesel

as

chairman

of

the

"Wiesel is the undisputed expert on

the holocaust period and his appointment would be without
controversy, but his political and fundraising abilities are
not clearly established."
political.

Again,

the considerations were

Also included was a list of recommendations for

25Memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stu Eizenstat,
"Subject:
Briefing Memorandum Re:
Memorial Commission
Meeting", May 10, 1978, Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga., DPSEizenstat files.
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advisory board members, and for the Commission itself.

The

memo said the Commission should include camp survivors,

a

rabbi, and recognized leaders, including representatives from
the arts.

They pointed out they had included four women and

a black.26
On

September

9,

1978,

Eizenstat

President Carter another memorandum,

and

Goldstein

sent

recommending that he

sign a congressional resolution (H. R. 1014) that designated
April 28 and 29 as "Days of Remembrance of Victims of the
Holocaust".

They suggested that the President's Commission

on the Holocaust, which he had promised to appoint on May 1,
also

be

announced

announcement

of

at

the

the

same

time.27

President's

Linking

Commission

with

the
the

Congressional resolution reinforced the creation of an iron
triangle of sorts for nationally memorializing the Holocaust.
On September 18, Lipshutz and Eizenstat sent Carter a
memorandum

with

their

list

of

members, with Wiesel as chairman.

24

recommended

Commission

(Coincidentally, the Camp

David accords providing a framework for peace between Israel
and Egypt were signed the day before.)

Then, on November 1,

1978, Goldstein sent Eizenstat, Lipshutz and Ed Sanders (then
liaison to the Jewish community) a memorandum with specific

26July 20, 1978 memorandum op. cit.
27Memorandum from Stuart Eizenstat and Ellen Goldstein
to The President, "Subject: Enrolled Resolution H. R. Res.
1014-Days of Remembrance of Victims of the Holocaust",
September 9, 1978, Carter Library, Atlanta.
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political considerations regarding the public announcement of
the Commission:

1. Announcement would be on Monday, at the

recommendation of the Press Office.

(Monday is a usually a

slow news day, and thus good for getting press coverage.)
2.Courtesy calls would be made to Congressional offices.

3.

It was necessary to think about the possible roles of the
religious press and the Washington Jewish community.
addition,

In

it stated Wiesel was chairman and Irving "Yitz"

Greenberg would be the Commission's executive director.

The

34-member Commission included survivors, Holocaust scholars,
elected officials, and other prominent Jews and non-Jews.28
(Wiesel said Carter's Commission continued to be political
28Memorandum from Bob Lipshutz and Stu Eizenstat to The
President, "Subject:
President's Holocaust Commission",
September 18, 1978. Memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stu
Eizenstat, Bob Lipshutz and Ed Sanders, "Subject: Holocaust
Commission", November 1, 1978, Carter Library, Special
Advisor-Moses
Collection,
Atlanta.
Members
of
the
President's Commission on the Holocaust were: Elie Wiesel,
Chairman; Congressman James J. Blanchard, Hyman Bookbinder
(American Jewish Committee's Washington Representative),
Senator Rudy Boschwitz, Professor Robert McAfee Brown, Dr.
Gerson Cohen (Chancellor of Jewish Theological Seminary of
America), Senator John C. Danforth, Professor Lucy Davidowicz
(Holocaust historian), Kitty Dukakis, Benjamin Epstein (AntiDefamation League of B'nai B'rith), Rabbi Juda Glasner,
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, Professor Alfred Gottschalk
(Hebrew Union College), Congressman S. William Green, Father
Theodore Hesburgh (University of Notre Dame president),
Professor Raul Hilberg (Holocaust historian), Senator Henry
M.
Jackson,
Professor Norman
Lamm
(head of Yeshiva
University) , Frank R. Lautenberg, Congressman William Lehman,
Senator Claiborne Pell, Arnold Picker, Rabbi Bernard Raskas,
Hadassah Rosensaft (survivor) , Bayard Rust in, Marilyn Shubin,
Isaac Bashevis Singer, Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, Senator
Richard B. Stone, Sigmund Strochlitz
(survivor), Mark
Talisman (UJA-Federation Washington representative), Telford
Taylor, Glenn E. Watts, and Congressman Sidney Yates. There
was also an advisory board of 27 additional people.
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after

its

Republican

creation,
on

because

it.29

there

was

at

least

However,

not

a

one

single
member,

Congressman S. William Green, was a Republican.)
On November 1, 1978, President Carter signed Executive
Order

12093,

officially

establishing

Commission on the Holocaust.

the

President's

The charge of this Commission

was to submit a report "with respect to the establishment and
maintenance of an appropriate memorial to those who perished
in the Holocaust, to examine the feasibility for the creation
and maintenance of the memorial through contributions by the
American people, and to recommend appropriate ways for the
nation

to

Congress

commemorate April
has

resolved

28

shall

and

29,

be

'Days

Executive

Order,

1979,

of

which

Remembrance

the
of

Victims of the Holocaust.'"30
By
interest

signing
group

this
and

included

means

which
of

created

an

memorialization

designated by both the President and Congress, Carter created
an iron triangle with a twist.
theory,
interest

there

is

group,

a solid
its

trilateral

advocates

executive branch agency.

According to iron triangle

in

bond

formed by

Congress,

and

in

the
the

Government policies emerge from

this closed triangle of interests, with congressmen passing
favorable legislation, agency bureaucrats implementing these
29Wiesel interview, August 8, 1990.
30Report to the President: President's Commission on the
Holocaust. September 27, 1979, U. S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C., p. 1.
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mandates, and special interest groups supporting the helpful
elected

officials

(e.g.

with

votes

and

campaign

contributions).
Harold Seidman said there was no significant weakening
of the of triangular alliances that unite interest groups
with their agents in Congress and in the executive branch's
bureaucracy.
alliances

He said that "[congressional]

with

the

executive

branch

staff develop

bureaucracy

and

the

bureaucracies representing interest groups."31
The

reason

Carter's

Holocaust

memorialization

iron

triangle had a twist is that Carter created the interest
group, and the executive sought out alliances both with the
interest group and with Congress.

According to Seidman, the

relationship between an agency and its constituency (i.e.,
the

interest

generally

group)

is based

established

Congress.32

by

on mutuality

provisions

of

of

laws

interests,
enacted

In the case of the Holocaust Commission,

by
the

iron triangle was somewhat different than that analyzed by
Seidman.

Here,

the

President,

rather

than

Congress,

initiated the legal means for uniting forces to accomplish
his goal.

He even created

an

interest

group,

and then

included ten members of Congress as part of the 34-member
Commission,

or

interest

group

"angle"

of

the

triangle.

31Harold Seidman, Politics. Position and Power. 1980,
Oxford University Press., p. 43.
32Ibid.
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Seidman did not account for such a blend:

in his model,

Congress is one angle and the interest group is another angle
of

the

triangle.

In

the

case

of

Carter's

Holocaust

Commission, almost a third of the interest group are also
members of Congress.

(Likewise, the New York Mutagon has a

blend of elected officials as interest group members.)
The main purpose of the Commission was to recommend a
suitable memorial to Carter, and its first meeting was held
February 15, 197 9 in Washington.

As Commission member and

Congressman Stephen J. Solarz told his constituents:

"There

are no constraints on what we may recommend other than the
limits of our own imagination and the requirements of good
taste.
endeavor

We are free to recommend that the funds for such an
be

structure— be

public

or

private

or

both.

If

a physical

it a monument or a museum— is going to be

constructed, we can suggest that it be built in Washington or
New York or any other location we deem suitable."33
On March 25, 1979, Solarz held a public hearing in his
Brooklyn district to hear what his constituents recommended
as an appropriate memorial.

On April 6, 1979, another member

of the Commission and of Congress, Rep. Green, conducted a
similar hearing in his Manhattan district.

Herbert Rickman,

Special Assistant to Mayor Edward I. Koch, said he testified
at the Green hearing that the national memorial should be in
33Congressman Stephen J.
Solarz,
"Remembering the
Holocaust", Community Report. undated (February or March,
1979), Washington D.C. and Brooklyn, N.Y.
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New York City.

"We fought against having it in Washington.

We fought to have it here in New York," he said.

"I remember

testifying for the City and organizing others to testify for
the

City

at

Commission.

a

hearing

in

New

York

by

the

President's

We made a very telling argument that this is the

largest Jewish city,

largest survivor city in the United

States— that it really belonged here.

Also because of the

heavy tourist concentration, that it belonged here.

When we

went down to defeat on that, then we began in earnest to plan
for it [a different memorial] in New York City."34
Records of the two hearings reveal that most of the
scholars, authors, religious and organizational leaders and
survivors

who

testified

did

not

address

the

issue

of

location.

Because they were testifying before a Presidential

Commission, they seem to have taken for granted that the site
would be Washington, D.C.

There are only three people whose

recorded testimony made a "pitch" for New York City as site
of the proposed memorial,
His

prepared

remarks

and Rickman's is the strongest.

for

the

March

speaking on behalf of Mayor Koch,

25

said:

Solarz

hearing,

"How appropriate

such a memorial would be in the City which is the center—
symbolically
States.
research.

and

factually— of

New York City

immigration to the United

is also the center of Holocaust

Nowhere else can one find resources such as those

■^Interview with Herbert Rickman, March 30,
York.

1990, New

of our academic and intellectual communities and our great
libraries and archives.
as

the

YIVO

Nowhere else are there centers such

Institute,

Leo

Baeck

Institute,

Yeshiva

University or the Oral History of the Center for Holocaust
Studies. .. .Not only does New York have the largest Jewish
community of any city in the 4,000-year history of the Jews;
among our residents is also the largest group of Holocaust
survivors.

Obviously, New York is the place where such a

living memorial belongs, in a setting both appropriate and
enduring."35
April
there.

According

6 Green hearing,

to

handwritten

notes

from

the

Rickman presented similar remarks

Notes from the April 6 testimony of Malcolm Hoenlein,

then Executive Director of the Jewish Community Relations
Council of New York (JCRC), reveal that he, too, advocated
New York as the site.

His reasons included:

New York City

is the major center of scholarship of the Holocaust,
media

center,

the

visitors per year.

business

capital,

and

has

17

the

million

He said the commitment of the mayor was

paralleled by that of the whole Jewish community, and that
all groups were ready to join the effort.36

Congressman

Marvin Greisman, who then represented the Lower East Side,

35,,Remarks by Mayor Edward I. Koch (Delivered by Herbert
P. Rickman, Special Assistant to the Mayor)", March 25, 1979,
Brooklyn,
N.Y., Archives
of U.S.
Holocaust Memorial
Commission, Washington, D.C.
36Untitled and unsigned handwritten notes from April 6,
1979 hearing held by S. William Green, archives of U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Commission, Washington, D.C.
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sent a letter to Green outlining his proposal to establish a
Holocaust Memorial "both in the nation's capitol [sic] and in
New York City - the heart of America".

More specifically, he

said the memorial should be on the Lower East Side.37
In

all

of

the

testimony

available

from

the

1979

hearings, only Rickman, Hoenlein and Greisman advocated that
the national memorial be in New York City.
had an obvious vested interest:

All three of them

it would have been a real

coup for the mayor and for the head of the umbrella of local
Jewish organizations,

of course,

for the Congressman

representing a heavily Jewish district.

For many others who

testified— e.g.,

and,

heads of other Jewish institutions,

most

with their own programs for Holocaust education— a new major
institution could be viewed as competition.

They therefore

would have had no desire to push for its location in New York
City.
It is significant to note that George Klein did not
testify nor send a written statement
according to the
Commission.

records

for either hearing,

of the U.S.

There is no documentation,

Holocaust Memorial
but it is common

knowledge in Jewish communal circles in New York City that
Klein

and

Hoenlein

were

extremely

close.

Klein

was

a

founding vice president of the JCRC, which Hoenlein created
as a power base for himself and its founders, many of whom
37Letter from Congressman Marvin Greisman to Congressman
S. William Green, April 5, 1979, files of U. S. Holocaust
Memorial Commission, Washington, D.C.
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were real estate developers.
Koch,

who

Koch's

political

community,
Koch,

described

was

him

as

Klein was also close with Mayor
a

entrepreneur

"old
to

friend".38
the

organized

Rickman,
Jewish

in a position to bring together Hoenlein,

and Klein to launch the Mayor's Task Force on the

Holocaust, after the national project selected Washington as
its site.

It is likely that Hoenlein encouraged Klein to

become involved with the Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust
in 1981, although no one seems able to or wishes to recall
the exact circumstances through which this occurred.
of the interconnection between the players,

Because

Rickman's and

Hoenlein's appearance at the 1979 hearings could be said to
be setting the stage for Klein's entrance on the scene two
years later.

JCRC had dropped the idea of creating a New

York City Holocaust memorial in 1978, after Carter announced
the national project.

Now both Koch (and Rickman) and JCRC

wanted the national project to be located in New York City,
so they could have a piece of the pie.
Although Rickman said he tried hard to have the Federal
Holocaust memorial located in New York City (and Mayor Koch
wrote to President Carter so requesting,

as documented in

Chapter 6), this possibility apparently was never realistic.
Rabbi

Greenberg,

Commission, said:

the

first

director

of

the

President's

"I don't think it's correct that New York

38Interview with Edward I. Koch, May 18, 1990, New York
City.
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was considered.

I wasn't privy to the first conversation

that Stuart Eizenstat had with President Carter, but the idea
of New York City as

an alternate to Washington

Federal memorial was never seriously discussed."

for the

He said the

idea of a national memorial in New York "didn't make any
sense at all."
the

President's

Washington,

Greenberg explained that in the thinking of
Commission,

"the

Federal

close to the White House,

government

was

and New York was a

different constituency, if you will."39
Hyman Bookbinder, a member of the Commission, recalled
that the idea of New York City as a location was quickly
dismissed.

"At the very first meetings, there was a question

of location," he said.

"But this was one of the first things

decided and is in the minutes.

The decision was made that

the memorial was national and should be in Washington.1,40
Eizenstat concurred:
memorial

would

Commission,

be

"I think it was always assumed the

in Washington,

but

it was

up

which was monitored by presidential

At its second meeting on April 24,

1979,

to

the

staff."41

the President's

Commission recommended the memorial should be in Washington,
it and approved this decision at a third meeting on June 7.

39Interview with Irving Greenberg, New York, April 19,
1990.
40Telephone interview with Hyman Bookbinder, March 16,
1990, Washington.
41Interview with Stuart Eizenstat,
March 16, 1990.

Washington,

D. C.,
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On

September

presented

27,

1979,

its official

report said:

the

report to

"Location:

President's
President

Commission

Carter.

The

The Commission resolved that the

memorial should be built in Washington, D. C. , the capital of
the country and the seat of government, for the materials to
be presented by it affect all Americans...."42
On October 7, 1980, Public Law 96-388 was enacted by the
96th

Congress,

establishing

the

United

States

Holocaust

Memorial Council, which would "plan, construct, and oversee
the operation of, a permanent living memorial museum to the
victims of the holocaust"....and "develop a plan for carrying
out the recommendations of the President's Commission on the
Holocaust in its report to the President of September 27,
1979....1,43

This

set

in place the second

implementation

phase (following that of the President's Commission's work)
of the Federal plan to create a Holocaust museum.

(The

government was to provide the site, but funding was, for the
most part, to be private.)

SUMMARY
Carter's creation of the President's Commission on the
Holocaust and subsequent United States Holocaust Memorial
Council are analyzed here only as background for the related
creation of the Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust and New
42Report to the President. September 27, 1979.- p. 11.
43Public Law 96-388, Washington, D. C., October 7, 1980.

York

City

Holocaust

Memorial

Commission.

When

Carter

intervened on the issue, he did so for political reasons, to
ingratiate himself with

the disgruntled

community.

an

He

created

organized Jewish

iron triangle

of

sorts,

with

members of Congress also part of the interest group— the
President's Commission on the Holocaust.

There were efforts

by the City to have the Federal memorial placed in New York.
When these efforts

failed,

they led to an agenda-setting

stage for a major Holocaust memorial in New York City.

The

Federal enactment of Public Law 96-388 in October, 1980 gave
a legal precedent and added legitimacy to Koch's efforts to
establish a Mayor's Task Force in 1981.
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Chapter 8:
MAYOR KOCH INTERVENES AND CREATES THE MAYOR'S
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL TASK FORCE
"George Klein is an old friend, he's a very proud Jew, he's
a very rich man, and he was an immediate candidate to be
involved— by virtue of all of that." Edward I. Koch1

The complicated Mutagon of political forces trying to
create a Holocaust memorial in New York City in the late
1980s and early 1990s began as a unilateral act by Mayor
Edward I. Koch in 1981.
initiative,

the

Unlike President Jimmy Carter's 1978

beginning

Holocaust memorialization
is no

"smoking gun"

Archives

of

Koch's

involvement

is difficult to document.

of staff memoranda

(where they legally should be,

with
There

in the Municipal
if they existed).

Staff memoranda in the Carter Library make it possible to
trace the allegedly step-by-step political thinking behind
the creation of the President's Commission.

In New York,

where the cast of players was much smaller (mainly Koch and
his Special Assistant Herbert Rickman, probably with behindthe-scenes maneuvers by Jewish Community Relations CouncilJCRC

head

Malcolm

Hoenlein) ,

the

absence

of

such

documentation is evidence that decisions were informal and
oral.

A high level JCRC staff member who worked with Rickman

confirmed there would be no written records about the genesis
of such a project in New York City

(as there are for the

Carter Administration).
interview with Edward I. Koch, New York, May 18, 1990.

It is also difficult to pinpoint the origin of the idea
for three other reasons:

1. The President's Commission, and

even the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council which succeeded it,
had been set in place before Koch announced creation of his
Task Force
project,

in July,

1981.

The existence of the Federal

by virtue of its very existence and because of

factors analyzed in Chapter 7 and this chapter, affected and
sometimes intervened in the New York City process.

2. New

York City is the Jewish capital of the United States.

It has

the

Jewish

headquarters

organizations,

of

the

most

largest

of

the

national

number of Holocaust

survivors

outside of Israel, the largest and most concentrated Jewish
population,

and historically has been the seat of Jewish

American culture.

This wealth of Jews and things Jewish,

which has created a density and diversity of minor and major
Jewish organizations that are often at each other's throats,
frequently

results

in organizations

and their

affiliated

"machers" (leaders) seeking and taking undeserved credit.
In New York City,

unlike Washington,

D.

3.

C. , there was a

record dating back to 1946 of attempts to create a memorial.
Koch,

therefore,

"clean slate".

unlike Carter,

was

not

starting with

a

Although this was the first time a New York

City mayor created a Jewish interest group for a Holocaust
memorial project, interest groups had tried to influence five
other mayors before Koch.

Historically, they were actors,
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but with the Koch Administration, they became reactors.

As

will be demonstrated, Koch made the idea his own.
The

recollections

entrepreneur
Commission,
facts:

who

created

Rickman,

his

Koch's

Holocaust

Task

political
Force

and

do not fit the chronology of the documentable

Rickman said:

elected.

of

"Elections were in 1977 and Koch was

During the transition, I had a firm commitment in

my own mind that we were going to create a memorial.

I

reached out to the survivors, such as Ben Meed and others.
No

one

was

encouraging

at

the

time,

bitterness over earlier experiences.
a miracle.

because

of

their

They said it would take

The mayor had given me the tacit okay to go

ahead, although he was not very involved.

The idea was that

it had to be Jewish and not just bricks and mortar.

The

concept from the very start was a living memorial."

(In

other words, it would be a museum rather than a monument, and
the historical
educational

framework of the museum and its component

programs

would have

approach to the Holocaust.)

a particularistic Jewish

"We then began in the early days

of the administration, in 1978, to assemble people,

ideas,

talking to leaders of the community, to gauge the support."2
There is no evidence that such early discussions took
place.

Neither the files of the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance

Organization

(WAGRO), the

Municipal

interview with Herbert Rickman,
York City.

Archives,

nor

other

March 30,

1990,

New

available files in JCRC or elsewhere show any record of a
meeting between Meed, JCRC leaders,

or other survivors or

community leaders and Rickman at this time.

Although no

staff memoranda

a Holocaust

exist

regarding

creation

memorial during the early Koch years

of

(before April 1981),

there should have been copies of letters, especially in the
WAGRO files, if such a meeting had taken place.

If Rickman

had written to or spoken with Meed, who heads WAGRO, in 1978,
there is no available documentation.

Meed's first specific

recollection is of a June or July 1979 meeting.

The first

letters on file are from Meed to Koch on June 26, 1979 and to
Rickman on July 17,
record

in

Meed's

elected

officials

absence

of

records

1979

(see below).

archives
about
of

shows

this
such

Meed

issue

for

Since the written
corresponded
many

correspondence

with

years,

with

the

Koch

or

Rickman before June 1979 could indicate Rickman's recollected
chronology

is not accurate.

If there was

discussion, no one but Rickman remembers it.

informal

oral

While it is

possible and even likely such an item would be included, no
one and no archive had written evidence.
The only other person with an early recollection of the
subject is 1977 Koch mayoral campaign aide Manny Behar, who
said the idea of a Holocaust memorial was included in the
"Jewish laundry list" of Koch's Jewish New Year message that
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year.

Behar, then a college student, said he wrote it in,

and that Koch was never consulted about it.3
The first available record of Koch's public expression
of support for a memorial was April 1979, two years before he
set his Holocaust Memorial Task Force in place.

At the

commemoration of the 3 6th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto
uprising, sponsored by WAGRO on April 22, 1979,
front of thousands of attendees:

Koch said in

"Yes, Mr. Meed, a living,

permanent memorial to the victims of the Holocaust must rise
here in New York City.
eventually be built.

It belongs here.

And here it will

I support this undertaking as a Jew, as

a New Yorker, as mayor of this city, and as a human being
who, with all of you, is totally committed to commemorating
the searing

inhumanities of the Holocaust,

so that never

again will they befoul and shame the history of mankind."4
WAGRO's annual Holocaust memorial service,

which has

drawn thousands of participants each year, may have helped to
convince

Koch

politically.

that

creating

a memorial

was

a good

idea

Meed said Koch became involved with the idea of

a memorial because of his annual participation in the WAGRO
commemoration.

"I think the commemoration had a tremendous

telephone interview of Manny Behar, December 21, 1990.
4Remarks by Mayor Edward I. Koch at commemoration of the
36th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, Temple EmanuEl, Fifth Avenue, New York,
1:30 p.m. on April 22, 1979.
Municipal Archives, New York, record group Mayor Koch,
subgroup Herbert Rickman.
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influence on Koch," he said.5

Meed was referring to the

emotional content, which may have influenced Koch.

However,

the huge attendance with standing room only and thousands of
people

listening

to

loud

speakers

outside

would

influence any astute political candidate such as Koch.

also
These

attendees at the WAGRO memorial service were potential voters
and

political

contributors,

and

they

were

committed

to

commemorating the Holocaust.
Shortly after the 1979 WAGRO memorial ceremonies, then
Comptroller Harrison
picture.
Koch

J.

Goldin

stepped

briefly

into

the

He wrote to Meed on June 14, 1979 that he had told

about

Meed's

idea

of

using

the

Cultural

Columbus Circle for a Holocaust memorial.

Center

at

Goldin said Koch

had suggested that Meed send the City a written proposal.6
(Meed

had

originally

presented

administration in 1976.

this

See Chapter 6.)

idea

to

the

Beame

On June 28, 1979,

Meed sent such a proposal to both Koch and Governor Hugh L.
Carey.

He wrote:

present

a

memorial

proposal

"The purpose of this memorandum is to
for

the

establishment

of

a

suitable

in New York City to the Jewish victims

Holocaust in World War II."

of the

He pointed to the precedent of

the President's Commission:

interview with Benjamin Meed, May 7, 1990,

New York

City.
6Letter from Harrison J. Goldin to Benjamin Meed, June
14, 1979, files of WAGRO, New York.

"The significance of commemorating the victims of
the

Holocaust

recently

has

been

given

an

added

recognition by the President and Congress of the United
States

in

establishing,

on

November

Commission

on

the

President's
Advisory Board

1,

1978,'

the

and

its

Holocaust

[of which Meed was

a member].

This

Commission expressed itself in favor of setting up a
living

institutional

memorial

meeting spaces, archives,

which

libraries,

would

contain

exhibitions,

and

other educational facilities related to the Holocaust.
This memorial most likely will be created in Washington.
"We,

however,

believe

that

a

similar

memorial

should also be created in New York City, the site of the
United Nations as well as the site of the largest single
Jewish urban community in the world."7
The letter went on to state that WAGRO had "conducted an
extensive review of the different opportunities in New York
City for the implementation of the proposal to establish a
suitable memorial",

and had concluded the New York

City

Cultural Center at Columbus Circle was "the most promising
opportunity".

It closed

by

saying:

"Recently

we

have

congratulated President Carter for taking the initiative in
establishing the President's Commission on the Holocaust.
Similarly, we are now looking toward Governor Carey and Mayor
^Memorandum from Executive Committee of WAGRO to Mayor
Koch and Governor Carey, "Subject: Holocaust Memorial in New
York City", June 28, 1979, files of WAGRO, New York.
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Koch

in

expectation

of

their

support

and

leadership

in

establishing a Holocaust memorial in the city of New York."8
Meed's appeal to both the mayor and the governor could be
seen as a clue to the way the issue would develop in 1986,
with both elected officials heading the Mutagon responsible
for building a memorial.
In a letter dated two days earlier, June 26, 1979, Meed
had written to Koch asking for an appointment to discuss the
New York Cultural Center at Columbus Circle as the site for
a permanent Holocaust memorial.9

This

vetoed by the donor of the building.

idea was

later

On September 21, 1979,

the president of Gulf and Western Foundation, which was about
to give the Columbus Circle Cultural Center property to the
City, wrote to Koch and said the company refused to have it
used as a Holocaust memorial.
as

such

a

memorial

might

The letter said:
be,

it

would

be

"As worthy
a

complete

perversion of the reason we bought the building in the first
place."10

(The reason for the purchase and gift to the City

was for use as a cultural center.)
Although

Rickman

said

the

Koch

Administration

was

thinking about a Holocaust memorial from the very beginning
of his first term, which began in January 1978, there is no
8Ibid.
9Letter from Benjamin Meed to Mayor Koch, June 26, 1979,
files of WAGRO, New York.
10Letter from Samuel J. Silberman to Koch, September 21,
1979, files of WAGRO, New York.
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substantial evidence of Koch's interest in a memorial until
his April 22, 1979 speech and his response to Meed's June 26
and June 28 letters.
planted the seed,

Meed's letters that year may have

following Carter's

intervention on the

issue a year earlier, but Koch still did not act for two more
years.

Furthermore,

Meed was not a major player in the

organized Jewish community in 1979.

His power base, WAGRO

and the annual commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising,
was connected with but not particularly important to the
community.

(After

he

headed

the

first

International

Gathering of Holocaust Survivors in Jerusalem in 1981 and the
first American Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors in
1983, he became more prominent.)

Koch thus did not act in

response to Meed's suggestion that he create a Holocaust
memorial.

When he did initiate a memorial project in 1981,

it was not at the request of Meed or of other leaders of the
organized Jewish community.

When he finally acted on the

issue, he took the lead, coopted the idea and made it his own
at a time that was politically expedient.

As head of his

effort, he chose George Klein, a major developer who was his
close

friend,

political

ally,

and a

founding officer of

Hoenlein's JCRC.
Meanwhile, in response to Meed's June 26, 1979 letter
about Columbus Circle, a meeting with Rickman evidently took
place

on July

16.

On July

17,

Meed wrote

to

Rickman,

thanking him for the meeting of the day before, at which they
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had discussed "the proposal for a holocaust memorial in the
city

of New York".

This

letter

is the

first

available

written evidence that the Mayor's office was thinking about
a New York City Holocaust Commission.

Meed wrote:

"I should

also like to refer to the proposal to establish a Mayor's
Commission on the Holocaust."
survivors,

including

(Meed then suggested that

WAGRO

members,

be

part

of

the

commission, and he offered to recommend specific names.)11
Koch's intervention in 1981,

in creating a Holocaust

Task Force and subsequent Commission, was both beneficial to
survivors in particular and the organized Jewish community in
general, and to Koch himself.
an issue network.

It was not an iron triangle or

Instead it was the initial stage of the

ensuing Mutagon, a polygon of political forces that changed
over time and created an impasse for ten years.

It was a

two-way reciprocal political contact between the organized
Jewish

community

community,

of New

especially

York

City

Chairman

and

Klein

the
and

mayor.
the

The

survivor

community, gained prestige from this recognition by the mayor
of

the

importance

survivors,

whom

of

even

a
the

major

memorial

organized

Jewish

project.
community

The
had

treated as "second class citizens" (whether out of guilt or

11Letter from Benjamin Meed to Herbert Rickman, July 17,
1979, files of WAGRO, New York.
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fear

of

class.

their
Klein

being
had

different12)

a visible

and

community's leader for the project.
prestige

among

his

constituents

suddenly

became

prominent

role

first
as

the

But Koch, too, gained

in the

organized

Jewish

community by intervening and making the project officially
one of the City government.
Koch's

intervention in Holocaust memorialization was

mutually beneficial for him and Jewish communal leaders.

As

Robert Dahl said of "democracy and power" in his analysis of
New Haven:

"The relationship between leaders and citizens in

a pluralistic democracy is frequently reciprocal:

leaders

influence the decisions of constituents, but the decisions of
leaders are also determined in part by what they think are,
will

be,

or

constituents."13

have

been

the

According

to

preferences
Dahl,

leaders

of

their

need

support of subleaders and of voting constituents,

the

so they

shape their policies to insure a flow of rewards to those
whose support they need.14
Edward

C.

Banfield

also

analyzed

how

government

intervenes and creates its own interest group to advocate its
ideas.

He said the situation is often a "two-way street":

12Interview with Elie Wiesel, August 8, 1990, New York
City.
See also his book A Jew Today. Vintage Books, New
York, 1979, chapter entitled "A Plea for the Survivors", pp.
218-247.
13Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Democracy and Power in an
American City). Yale University, 1961, pp. 89-90.
14Ibid., p. 102.
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Organizations that want something from government use "civic
leaders" or civic organizations as their intermediaries to
political

leaders,

and political

leaders also use

"civic

leaders" as intermediaries, for example, by appointing them
to commissions (such as the Holocaust Commission). Often the
political leader has already made up his mind as to what the
decision

of

a

intermediaries

commission
for

other

will

be,

purposes

and

than

he
those

"uses

his

that

are

publicly announced" (e.g., to obtain campaign contributions).
According to Banfield's classic study of how influence and
power operated in Chicago in the 1950s, political leaders use
these

civic

leaders

for

the

following

purposes:

to

communicate or negotiate with constituent groups, to create
a favorable climate of public opinion, to legitimate plans,
to disarm criticism and direct it away from themselves.15
Dahl's and Banfield's analyses can be applied to Koch's
Holocaust memorial project to an extent.

In the case of the

New York City project, however, there is another dimension to
the

reciprocity

or two-way

street.

As

in their

cases,

Rickman's decision to encourage Koch to support a Holocaust
Memorial Task Force and subsequent New York City Holocaust
Memorial Commission was based on Rickman's determination that
this was a preference of a powerful constituent group— the
organized Jewish community.

Dahl's and Banfield's analyses,

15Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press
of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p. 276.
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however, do not take into account another aspect of the New
York City case.

Rickman and Koch went one step further:

they crafted from this larger interest group, the organized
Jewish community,

a Task Force

and then Commission that

included

powerful

and wealthy

courting

for another purpose— real

Jews

whom

they

estate

were

developers

also
and

attorneys.
Thus the reciprocity between Koch and the real estate
development-related members of the Commission worked on two
levels at the same time:

on one level, they began a project

to help each other memorialize the Holocaust; and on a second
level, at the same time, they were working together to become
wealthy.

Koch

concessions,

gave

them

tax

incentives

and

zoning

and they gave Koch the bulk of his campaign

contributions.

Jack Newfield and Wayne

Barrett

said of

Koch's connections to Klein and other rich and powerful real
estate developers:

"The dollars rolled into the 1981 Koch

campaign coffers in the millions,

primarily from the very

real

gotten

estate

interests

that

had

fat

abatements granted by his administration.
that the man collecting contributions

on

the

tax

It didn't hurt

as Koch's campaign

finance chairman was the former deputy mayor who'd awarded
the abatements,
said

they

Peter Solomon."16

personally

are

committed

(Both Rickman and Koch
to

memorializing

the

16Jack Newfield and Wayne Barrett, City for Sale:
Ed
Koch and the Betrayal of New York. Harper & Row, New York,
1988, p. 182.
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Holocaust17, and their project's political expediency does
not negate this.)
While there is no written record of how the idea of the
Task

Force originated, both Rickman and Meed said the idea

came

from

Rickman, on behalf of Koch.

with Herb Rickman.
City

Hall,

commission.

and

Meed said:

"I met

I remember it was in a coffee shop near
we

discussed

the

creation

of

such

a

Herb Rickman was the man who kept the contacts.

He came to me."

Meed does not remember the date of the

meeting to which he referred.18
After July 1979, no record has been found about creation
of a Holocaust Commission or Task Force until April 22, 1981,
an election year.

The idea seems to have fallen between the

cracks for two years.

Koch said:

"If you're the mayor of the City of New York, you
have

to be bouncing a thousand different things in the

air at the same time.
pressures
suddenly

are,

who

becomes

Then it depends on what the

talks

to you,

predominant

whether

because

writers are writing about it.

the

something
editorial

I cannot tell you what

the pressures were at that time.

I only know that there

were

always

several

things

that

I've

wanted

to

be

identified with, as having been instrumental in creating
them.

One was the Holocaust museum, doing it here in

17Rickman interview; Koch interview.
18Meed interview.

226

New York City,

I thought it was very important.

The

second one I always wanted to do something about was a
ticker

tape

parade

monument to them.
monument,

for

the

Vietnam

veterans

and

a

I did both the ticker tape parade and

and the Holocaust museum— at least I moved

them along."19
Rickman said he was "hazy" on the details and had not
looked at the files in years.
Carter

of creation

of his

He blamed the announcement by
President's

Commission

Holocaust for "sidetracking" the New York project.

on the
He said:

"I know the community knew we were doing it and there was
excitement about it.

And then, lo and behold, word came that

there was a commission that had been created by Carter to
determine where this would take place— and we got sidetracked
because we then tried to get the [national] memorial in New
York. "20
Carter's

initial announcement was May 1,

1978.

The

first proof of preliminary discussions between Rickman and
Holocaust survivors (i.e., Meed) is June-July, 1979, and the
Task Force was not formed until two years after that.
discrepancy

in

timing

cannot

be

accounted

for.

This
It

is

evidence that Mayor Koch's creation of a Holocaust Memorial
Task Force was not placed on the agenda as early as Rickman
claims.

It was not, in fact, publicly announced until July

19Koch interview.
20Rickman interview.
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1981, perfect timing to help Koch in his bid for reelection
that fall.
and

After 35 years of requests by Jewish individuals

organizations

for

Holocaust memorial

help

from

a

mayor

in New York City,

making the issue his own.

in

creating

a

this mayor was now

To use an analysis similar to

Dahl's (above), Koch's decision to create the Task Force was
determined in part by what he thought his Jewish constituents
wanted,

or

what

he

thought

would

be

most effective

in

arousing and mobilizing public opinion on his behalf.
After Koch's political entrepreneur, Rickman, had been
influenced

by

what

he

thought

the

organized

Jewish

constituency wanted, he finally began by April, 22 1981 to
set the agenda for a Holocaust Memorial Task Force on the
Holocaust.

This

is

the

memorandum on the subject.21

date

of

the

first

available

This memo has neither a "to"

or "from" on it, but its placement in Rickman's section of
the Koch records at the Municipal Archives indicates he was
at least

involved.

Since the subject

is a meeting

with

George Klein and both Rickman and Koch give Rickman credit
for asking Klein to head the project, it is likely the

memo

is from or possibly to Rickman.
The memorandum states the Task Force should exist for
four to five months, beginning with a target date for its
21Unsigned memorandum, "Meeting with George Kline [sic]
Re:
Holocaust Memorial Task Force", April 22, 1981,
Stationery of the Office of the Mayor, Municipal Archives,
Mayor Koch Accession Record Group, Special Assistant Herb
Rickman Subgroup, New York.
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announcement on May 3, 1981.

The Task Force's scope would be

to determine the nature, site and financing of a Holocaust
memorial, and to recommend a permanent body for developing
the memorial.
clearance

needed

announcement.
officials

A press conference was planned for May 3, with
from

all

members

before

the

public

The memo reported that Klein wanted political

to be

included as members

"to demonstrate

seriousness (and political clout) of the task force".

the

These

elected officials were to be listed as "ex-officio", with
"lay members"

as

the

Task

Force members.

An

executive

committee would be designated to do much of the work.
According to this memo, Klein seemed to think he had a
lot of influence regarding the initiation of the Task Force.
He not only asked for inclusion of political officials, but
also said he would like the first meeting of the Task Force
to be held at Gracie Mansion.

Klein was, however, mentioned

in another section of the memorandum, entitled "Issues to be
cleared with the Mayor".
was

Klein's

The issue that needed to be cleared

"involvement

Rosenbaum's campaign".

with

[Republican]

Richard

This section of the memo demonstrates

that the creation of the Task Force indeed included political
concerns.
"Klein wasn't anyone's idea but mine," Rickman said.
"And it wasn't because Klein was a developer.

At that time

developer

was

was

not

a nasty

developer that he is now.

word,

and

Klein

He was only a beginner.

not

the

It was
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because Klein was a survivor.
a commitment.
wanted it.

He certainly had a passion and

It was not an easy sell in those days— no one

And we very much wanted access into money, and we

thought that he would give us that access.
felt strongly
reputation.
negatives

about him.

And the survivors

They knew him,

they knew his

And I checked very carefully.

There were no

on him.

In that period,

stature that he has now.

he did not have the

And he certainly was not a major

figure in the development community, as he is now.

If we did

not have his expertise in building and development, lord only
knows how much it would have cost us in the long run."22
Koch explained the choice of Klein much more succinctly:
"He's an old friend, he's a very proud Jew, he's a very rich
man, and he was an immediate candidate to be involved— by
virtue of all of that."23

Koch had chosen his rich "old

friend", a prominent developer closely tied with JCRC and the
organized
influence

Jewish
and

community,
power

base

rather
were

than

Ben

limited

Meed,
to

whose

survivor

organizations.
Klein, in fact, is not a survivor, as Rickman stated.
He was born in Vienna, and came here as a small child with
his

parents

after

Kristallnacht,

November,

1938.

His

credentials among leaders of survivor organizations stem from
his father's leadership in Orthodox rescue efforts
22Rickman interview.
23Koch interview.
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Vaad Hatzalah) during the war.

Although

Rickman said Klein

was not a "major figure in the development community"
1981, in fact he was a major figure from at least 1977.

in
His

office building at Park Avenue and 59th Street, begun that
year, was extremely important to the future of real estate
development

in New York

City.

This

project

gave

Klein

prestige as an important developer, because it was the first
new office building begun there in five years (following the
fiscal crisis) .24
On July 6, 1981, Koch sent out letters of appointment to
the Mayor's Task Force.
Lee's

creation

As Dahl says of New Haven Mayor

of a Citizens Action

Committee

for urban

redevelopment, Koch's task force was supposedly a structure
of citizen participation, but it was deliberately created by
a mayor to endorse his proposals.25

One function of both

Lee's and Koch's group of subleaders was to sell the project
to the community, to assure acceptability.
Koch

said

appointments:
New

Rickman

was

responsible for

"Probably Rickman did that.

York Jews."

These 28

These are leading

"leading New York Jews"

invited to Gracie Mansion on July 22,

were

1981 for the first

meeting of the Holocaust Memorial Task Force.
members were:

Task Force

Task Force

George Klein, Chairman (President, Park Tower

24"First New Office Building in New York City in 5
Years", The New York Times. August 4, 1977, Section 2, p. 1.
25Dahl, Who Governs?. "Chapter 10:
Redevelopment", pp. 115-140.

Leaders in Urban

Realty Corp.) ; Elie Wiesel, Honorary Chairman; Rabbi Chaskell
Besser

(Agudah

Bialkin,

Israel

National

and

close

to

Klein); Kenneth

President of Anti-Defamation

League

J.
of

B'nai B'rith and attorney (partner, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher);
Leonard David (Founder and a Director, Colonial Penn Group);
Yaffa

Eliach,

Studies,

Holocaust

scholar

(Center

Brooklyn); Murray Finley

for

(President,

Holocaust

Amalgamated

Clothing and Textile Workers' Union); Judge Marvin Frankel
(managing partner, Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn); Alan
Greenberg

(Chief Executive Officer,

Bear Stearns

& Co.);

Rabbi Irving Greenberg (Director of National Jewish Resource
Center and ZACHOR Holocaust Resource Center); Judah Gribetz
(partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie & Alexander); Ludwig Jesselson
(President, Phibro Corp.); Leonard Lauder (President, Estee
Lauder,

Inc.);

Benjamin

Meed

(President,

WAGRO);

Bess

Meyerson; Ernest Michel (Campaign Director, UJA-Federation);
Rabbi Israel Mowshowitz (former President, New York Board of
Rabbis); Richard Ravitch, past President of JCRC (Chairman,
Metropolitan
Schindler

Transportation
(President,

Authority);

Union

of

Rabbi

Alexander

American

Hebrew

Congregations) ; Rabbi Arthur Schneier (Chairman, World Jewish
Congress— American Section) ; Irving Schneider (Executive Vice
President,

Hemsley-Spear

Corp.);

Beverly

Sills

(General

Director, New York City Opera); Bernice Tannenbaum (immediate
past

national

President,

Hadassah);

Laurence

Tisch,

President, JCRC (Chairman of the Board, Loews Corp.); Peggy

232

Tishman

(past

Vice

President,

Federation

of

Jewish

Philanthropies of N.Y.); Marvin Traub (Chairman of the Board,
Bloomingdales); Walter Weiner (President, Republic National
Bank

of

New

York); and

Solomon

Zynstein,

President

of

American Federation of Jewish Fighters, Camp Inmates and Nazi
Victims

(president,

Zynn Fashion).

The Advisory Council

consisted of Rickman; Henry Geldzahler, Commissioner of the
Department

of

Cultural

Affairs;

Malcolm

Hoenlein,

JCRC

Executive Director; Karl Katz, Director of the Metropolitan
Museum of Art's Office of Film and Television; and Howard
Rubenstein, President of Howard Rubenstein Associates.
With few exceptions, none of the people named to the
Task Force were expert in Holocaust education.

Only Wiesel

(whose position was merely honorary), Eliach and Greenberg
were Holocaust scholars.

Eliach, Meed, Zynstein and Michel

were survivors, with Michel also heading the UJA-Federation's
fundraising operation in New York City.

Rabbis represented

each of the three major branches of Judaism.

Other than

that, the members were mainly men who were wealthy and wellconnected in both the Jewish and business, financial, real
estate or legal communities.

(When the ensuing Commission

was formed, many more developers were appointed by Koch.)
Only

five of the

addition

to

Cultural

Affairs

scholar

and

the

28 Task Force members were women.
famous

and

glamorous

Commissioner)

survivor,

and

and

Meyerson

Sills,

Tannenbaum

and

(not

Eliach
Tishman

In
yet

was

a

were
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communal

leaders— the

latter

also

from

a

real

estate

developer's family.
Whereas President Carter's political entrepreneurs who
initiated the national project in Washington, D.C. insisted
the members of the President's Commission of the Holocaust
include non-Jews, Koch, on the contrary, appointed only Jews
to his Task Force.
Jewish Holocaust.

He said of this decision: "This is the
The Museum in Washington is not."

He said

there were no pressures from other groups to be included, and
that the project was all privately funded.26

(He did not

mention that the possibility of using City land, which has
monetary value, would also give the project public funding.)
Rickman insists there was nothing political about the
appointments or about the timing of creating the Task Force.
However,
election,

during

the

months

preceding

the

any such action was political

1981

mayoral

per se.

Koch's

naming these prominent and mostly rich members of the Jewish
community to a Holocaust Memorial Task Force at that time
could only have helped him win the 1981 election with 75
percent of the vote,

including 73 percent of the Jewish

vote.27

likely

It

is

also

to

have

helped

him

obtain

campaign contributions from wealthy members of the organized
Jewish community,

although no study has been made of any

26Koch interview.
27In 1977, Koch won 65 percent of the Jewish vote.
Figures were provided by Jerry Skurnik,
Director of
Operations for both campaigns.
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correlation

between

contributions.

announcement

(Board

of

of

Elections

the

Task

records

contributions are destroyed after five years.)

Force

on

and

campaign

Klein was at

the very top of Koch's list of contributors when he ran for
election in 1981 (and for governor in 1982).28
Following the Task Force's Gracie Mansion

breakfast

meeting on July 22, a press release the next day announced
that Koch had named this committee to develop a plan for
creation

of

a permanent

Holocaust

memorial.

The

press

release said Koch had "acted at the request of a number of
Jewish groups and communal organizations in announcing the
formation of the task force at that time."
evidence to support such a statement.

There is no

It was,

in fact,

Rickman, who initiated the project on Koch's behalf.

This is

consistent with Dahl's analysis of Mayor Lee's deliberately
creating

a

proposals.

Citizens

Action

Committee

to

Koch's Holocaust project was

support

his

initiated by the

mayor, and was then eagerly embraced by the organized Jewish
leadership.

They did not come to him with the idea.

The July 23 press release said Koch had asked the Task
Force

to

report

to

him

by

December

1,

1981,

with

recommendations on the nature of the memorial, its location,
how to fund raise to build it, and the method of continuing
the work of the Task Force and carrying the project forward.

28Edward I. Koch, Mayor.
Schuster, 1984, pp. 297-298.

Warner

Books,

Simon

and
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It concluded with a quote from Koch: "The city of New York,
which has the largest Jewish community of any city in the
4,000 year history of the Jews, also has the largest group of
survivors of the Holocaust outside Israel.

Here we must have

a living memorial to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, a
place in which to pledge a renewal, a reaffirmation of the
oath:

never again."29

This is not a bad "campaign pitch"

in what he himself has just described as the city with "the
largest Jewish

community

of

any

city

in the

4,000 year

history of the Jews."
Klein, and other developers in New York City who became
members of the Holocaust Commission and major contributors to
Mayor Koch's campaigns, were in a position to effectively use
their political influence and build upon this strength to
then gain even more influence and power.
Commission,

and

especially

resources to the fullest.

Klein,

Some members of the

used

their

political

The members of Koch's Task Force

had the political resources for influencing government, and
the political savvy to use these resources to increase their
influence even more.
The creation of the Holocaust Memorial Task Force and
subsequent Holocaust Memorial Commission gave Rickman, Koch,
Klein

and

Holocaust

others

the

opportunity

memorialization

to

to

increase

use

the

their

issue

of

potential

29Press Release, Office of the Mayor, July 23, 1981, no.
203-81, Municipal Archives, files of Mayor Koch, subfile,
Rickman, New York.
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influence in the establishment organized Jewish community and
New York City's developer community (the two of which often
overlap). They used their political resources efficiently to
promote the idea of a memorial museum in the community and
with elected officials.
increase

their

own

At the same time they were able to

power

in

the

community

and

in

the

political arena by associating themselves with the project.
Membership

in

the

Task

Force

gave

them

more

status

as

"players", and as professional political players, they knew
how to use the slack resources to advantage.
As Dahl said, a political resource is only a potential
source

of

influence,

resources.
fewer

and most

citizens

hardly use their

The more active the form of participation, the

people

with

political

confidence are more likely to make an attempt,

and these

people

are

who

the

participate.

"better

off".

Those

Dahl

contractor who constructs buildings,
other

expensive

through

projects

financial

is

likely

contributions

said:

"The

large

streets, highways and
to

than

participate
party

more

activity."30

This could be a description of Klein and other developers on
the Task Force.
At the suggestion of Rickman, Koch had appointed Klein—
a

rich

and

prominent

developer,

philanthropic

friend— as chairman of the Task Force.

Jew,

and

Klein was then in a

position to encourage his friends, other wealthy developers,
30Dahl, Who Governs?. p. 295.
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to be generous both to the effort to create a Holocaust
memorial and to Koch's mayoral campaign.
was

later

to

get with

Reciprocally, Klein

Koch's backing millions

of urban

renewal dollars for his Times Square redevelopment project.
Klein thus had the opportunity to use slack resources with
high efficiency, gaining influence with Koch and the Jewish
community,
further

and

with

projects.

thus
the

building

up

community,

his

Koch,

own
and

resources
his

even

development

Koch said there were many developers named to the

Holocaust Memorial Commission (that succeeded the Task Force)
because

of

Klein's

connections.

developer involvement:

He

said

"That's for money.

a lot of money for this.

of

the

heavy

You have to raise

And George Klein is a developer, so

they would be his personal friends."31
According

to

Dahl,

the

political

systems

of

most

pluralistic democracies have three important characteristics:
slack

resources,

or

a gap

between

actual

and

potential

influence; a small band of professional political players
that organize their lives around political activity; and a
built-in

self-operating

participants.

limitation

of

influence

of

all

Using slack resources with high efficiency

leads to more actual influence,

and this creates building

blocks for obtaining even more resources.32

31Koch interview.
32Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 305-310.
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While Koch was using the Task Force and later Memorial
Commission for his own political ends, Klein and some of the
members who had the skills of political players were thus
able to use their appointments to build up and upon their own
resources.

For example, in addition to Klein, Meed also used

his connection with the New York project to increase his
resources in the Jewish community.

As head of WAGRO, a chief

organizer of the 1981 World Gathering of Holocaust Survivors
and

a member

of the

U.S.

Holocaust

Memorial

Council

in

Washington, he was able to add his affiliation with the Task
Force to increase his power among survivor organizations.

He

also was able to use the new strength given to survivor
organizations by all of these activities to increase the
power of survivor organizations in the organized American
Jewish community.

By 1987, the American Gathering/Federation

of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, which grew out of the World
Gathering, was a member of the Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations.
Two Advisory Council members, Hoenlein and Rubenstein,
are also examples of political players who used the Task
Force to expand their resources efficiently.

As Executive

Director of JCRC and a close ally of (JCRC Vice President)
Klein's

in the Jewish community,

Hoenlein volunteered to

provide staffing for the fledgling Task Force.

He was thus

able to work behind the scenes and recommend appointments to
the subsequent Commission through Klein.

This increased his
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power

in

the

organized

Jewish

community.

Rubenstein's

political public relations firm had the Koch campaign and
many developers (including George Klein's Park Tower Realty)
as

important

accounts.

His

connection

with

the

mayor

increased his power with the developers, and vice versa.

His

firm's volunteer public relations work for the Task Force and
subsequent

Holocaust

Commission

gave

him

a

vehicle

for

further connecting himself with the interests of all of these
clients, and his power increased.
operating

limitation

of

The

influence

occurred

built-in
for

self-

Koch

Rickman when Koch lost his reelection bid in 1989.

and

Dahl's

analysis of this characteristic of "pluralistic democracy"
does not take into account, however, a situation such as that
of the New York Holocaust museum project, which changed its
structure over the years and for some time had two prime
political players at the helm— Koch and Governor Mario Cuomo.
In this

case,

the

built-in

self-operating

limitation

of

influence that occurred when Koch lost his reelection bid in
1989

was

distorted

by

Cuomo's

earlier

intervention

and

subsequent takeover of some of Koch's power vis-a-vis the
project (see Chapter 10) .

(The use of the Holocaust memorial

project as a tool for building power does not mean the above
political

players

were

not

also

committed

to

the

memorialization of the Holocaust for its own sake.)
As chairman for the Task Force, Klein, guided by Rickman
and Hoenlein, began this newest attempt to create a Holocaust

memorial.

On October 2, 1981, he wrote to Task Force members

that "we want to proceed with all deliberate speed to carry
out the mission of the Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust
Memorial."

He said that since the July 22 meeting in Gracie

Mansion "we [he does not identify who "we" are] have explored
possible locations, financing and various ideas, and there
are some exciting possibilities."
dividing the work
Memorial,

into

Location,

Klein's letter recommended

four committees:

Funding and Budget,

Content

of the

and Inventory of

Resources (to avoid duplication of what was already available
in New York City).

He then announced that four people had

already agreed to chair three of these committees:

Judah

Gribetz for Inventory of Resources, Rabbi Irving Greenberg
for Content of Memorial, and Irving Schneider for Location.
It was perhaps a preview of the fundraising problems that
were

to

ensue

that

the

Funding

slot

was

not

filled.

Interestingly, the letter says, "I am discussing with some
members the Chairmanship of the Funding Committee."
am",

however,

substituted.

is

crossed

out

by

hand

and

"we

The "I
are"

The use of "I am", changed to "we are" only at

the last minute could be another preview of problems
follow.

is

to

Most Commission members interviewed did not want to

be quoted but said that a major problem in the history of
creation of the memorial museum was George Klein's failure to
delegate
project.

responsibility

and

his

view

of

this

as

"his"
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Klein said in the letter that committees would meet in
early October, with the entire Task Force meeting toward the
end of October and again in November.

He said the goal was

an end of the year report to the Mayor, but he would need
"full cooperation to meet our timetable."

The letter added

that Klein's 499 Park Avenue office would be the temporary
mailing address for the Task Force, and that Rabbi Greenberg
and Hoenlein had agreed to supply staffing.33
There is no further archival material until January 20,
1982.

A letter with that date informed Task Force member

Meed that a public hearing would be held on February 1, 1982,
regarding the creation of a memorial, at the request of Mayor
Koch.

The letter said notices of the hearing had been sent

to "every Jewish organization, community and Holocaust group
in the City,"

and asked Meed if he would be able to attend

and help chair the meeting.

The letter added that the draft

report, which was to have been finished by the end of 1981,
was almost complete, and would be sent for Meed's comments
"shortly" .34
The only available report with a date at more or less
this time is entitled "Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust:
Ideas for a NYC Holocaust Memorial Center".

It is dated

33Letter from George Klein to Task Force members, October
2, 1981, files of Municipal Archive, New York City, Record
Group Mayor Koch, Accession 82-27, Subgroup Special Assistant
Herb Rickman.
34Letter from George Klein to Benjamin Meed, January 20,
1982, files of WAGRO, New York City.

December 1981, and appears to be a report of the committee
headed by Rabbi Greenberg, which was to have explored content
of the memorial.

The report recommends that a Holocaust

memorial center should address:

the culture of European

Jewry that was destroyed, a detailed factual account of the
destruction or European Jewry (including resistance) , and how
this

could

have

happened

twentieth century".

The

in

"the

supposedly

report calls

civilized

for an exhibition

center for the general public, a scholarly archive that would
become

"America's

survivors'

Holocaust

space,

memorabilia.

with

scholarship

personal

center",

taped

and

memoirs

a

and

It says that "only through a sophisticated

holistic approach can this museum fully realize the idea of
uniting the scholarly and the popular", and adds that the
proposal can be scaled down according to funds and can be an
ongoing project with additions

in years to come.35

This

modest preliminary proposal eventually became a Mutagon at an
impasse:

a grandiose project that included a complicated and

changing political alliance; intricate real estate deals; the
hiring

of

top

level

sophisticated

fund

raising,

public

relations and design professionals; and a projected budget of
more than $100 million.

35"Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust: Ideas for a NYC
Holocaust Memorial Center", no author cited, December 1981,
(Record Group Mayor Koch, Acc'n 82-87, Subgroup Special
Assistant Herb Rickman), Municipal Archives, New York City.
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The Mayor's Holocaust Memorial Task Force held hearings
on February 1, 1982 in the Board of Estimate Chamber at City
Hall,

with Klein

remarks.
Task

as chairman

and Rickman making opening

Rickman said the purpose of the hearing was for the

Force

to

"solicit

opinions

Yorkers on this vital memorial."

from

all

concerned

New

He made it clear, however,

that this memorial was not for "all" New Yorkers, but for the
Jewish community.
memorial
encourage

to

He

the

other

said:

Jewish
groups

"It is our hope that
martyrs of

who

the Holocaust

perished

through

this
will

genocidal

campaigns during this century to establish memorial task
forces along similar lines, and we will be proud to work with
them as we have with the Jewish community."36

This was a

politically polite way of excluding the Armenians, Gypsies,
homosexuals, Poles, Ukrainians, and any other group that had
ideas

about

being

included

in

this

exclusively

Jewish

memorial.
After the hearing, which had given interested parties
the opportunity to present their ideas,

and thus added a

veneer of "participatory democracy", the Task Force moved
forward and recommended the establishment of a permanent
Holocaust Memorial Commission.

36"Remarks by Hon. Herbert P. Rickman, Special Assistant
to the Mayor, Introducing Public Hearings of Mayor's
Holocaust Memorial Task Force", February 1, 1982, (Record
Group Mayor Koch, Acc'n 82-87, Subgroup Special Assistant
Herb Rickman), Municipal Archives, New York City.
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SUMMARY
The first available record of Koch's public expression
of interest in creating a Holocaust memorial was in April
1979, although he may have included the issue in his Jewish
"laundry list" of campaign promises in 1977.

Koch's special

assistant, Rickman, met with WAGRO head Meed in July 1979 and
the subject of creating a Holocaust Commission was discussed.
Koch did not act on this idea until Spring 1981, an election
year.

When he did so, he chose to head his Mayor's Task

Force on the Holocaust millionaire real estate developer
George Klein, who was a founding vice president of JCRC.

Of

the 28 members, most were wealthy men with connections to
both the Jewish and business-finance-real estate communities.
Banfield's and Dahl's analyses of local power can be applied
to an extent.

However they do not account for a second

agenda between the players, nor for the changes in political
alliances over time.

In addition to forming an alliance to

create a Holocaust memorial museum, Koch and Klein were also
helping each other gain power and money through real estate
deals and campaign contributions.
Koch's Mayor's Holocaust Memorial Task Force met for the
first time on July 22, 1981, and held a public hearing on
February 1, 1982.

The political alliance between this Task

Force and Koch was not an iron triangle or issue network; it
was the initial stage of a Mutagon.

It can best be described

as a reciprocal arrangement or two-way street between the

mayor

and

New

York

City's

organized

Jewish

especially the developer community and JCRC.

community,

This Task Force

was the

first step in an evolving political

alliance,

a

Mutagon,

that for more than ten years created an impasse

rather than successful implementation of a major Holocaust
memorial museum in New York City.
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CHAPTER
9:
THE TASK FORCE
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL COMMISSION

BECOMES

THE NEW

YORK CITY

"There is not anybody I know who is opposed to a museum
of the Holocaust in New York City.
[But for] an enormous
neo-Renaissance palazzo— dedicated to a manifestation of
power, money and nothing but money— to be transformed into a
museum of the Holocaust is displeasingly, offensively
ironic." Brendan Gill1

On

September

14,

1982

Mayor

Edward

I.

Koch's

intervention in the effort to establish a Holocaust memorial
in New York City was formalized.
unsuccessfully
individuals

attempted

since

by

This effort, which had been

Jewish

community

groups

and

194 6, was now officially a "permanent"

project of the government of the City of New York.

At this

point Koch was fully in control of the project, for which he
created the interest group and chose or approved its cochairmen and members.

At this initial stage, the Mutagon's

structure was simple:

Koch and his political entrepreneur,

Herbert Rickman formed a political alliance with an interest
group

they

had

created,

Holocaust memorial museum.

for

the

purpose

of

creating

a

The chairman of the interest

group was developer George Klein, who both received political
favors (for his development projects) from Koch and returned
these favors in the form of major campaign contributions.

1Brendan Gill, chairman of the New York Landmarks
Conservancy and a leader in efforts to revive the Custom
House, as quoted in The New York Times by David W. Dunlap,
"Plans for Custom House are Presented to Board", August 2,
1984.
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During the last week of August and the first week of
September, 1982, Koch sent letters to prospective members and
officers of the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission.
The letters said a permanent Commission was being created
upon recommendation of the temporary Task Force, and stressed
the

importance of New York City as the site of a major

memorial:

"Because New York City is regarded by all as the

cultural and spiritual nucleus of American Jewry and is home
to the largest number of Holocaust survivors, it is fitting
that a Memorial be erected....It is tragic that the City with
the largest Jewish population in the world outside the state
of Israel, still does not have a fitting memorial to the six
million martyrs lost in the Second World War."2
The letters said the first meeting of the Commission was
scheduled for September 14 in City Hall, and that a press
conference with the mayor would follow.

Invitees were asked

to call Herbert Rickman, the Mayor's Special Assistant (and
the project's midwife), to tell him whether they would serve
and whether they would attend this first meeting.
According to Rickman,

the mayor's office "had always

said from the beginning that we did not want the dollars and
cents to come
raised.

from government.

It had to be privately

We were very clear on that.

What the City was

offering was our services, help in the selection of a site,

2Record Group Mayor Koch Acc'n 82-27, Subgroup Special
Asst. Herb Rickman, Municipal Archives, New York City.
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and the imprimatur of the administration— plus the help in
putting together the Task Force. And as we put together the
Task Force, we also prepared to put together the Commission."
Except for the possibility that a site would be City-owned
land and the time Rickman and others put in while on the City
payroll, it is true no public money was involved.

Rickman

said developer George Klein, who had headed the Task Force,
informed him he would not continue alone at this point and
wanted a co-chairman.
Rickman said he then began the search for one, and at
that time Henry Morgenthau, the father of Manhattan District
Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, was being hailed as having
been the only Jew in government during World War II who spoke
up about saving Jews from extinction.

(The elder Morgenthau

had been President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Secretary of the
Treasury and did have an important role in urging rescue
efforts.

It is unclear why Rickman said he was then "being

hailed".

As mentioned in Chapter 8, Klein's father, too, had

an important role in rescue efforts, through the Orthodox
Vaad Hatzalah.

Ironically,

they had

in common as their

qualifications for being co-chairmen their fathers' histories
and their political support of Koch.)
Rickman
Morgenthau]

continued:
then

to

be

"And
a

very

I

knew

Bob

passionate

[Robert
Zionist.

M.
I

recommended him to Klein, and Klein thought it was wonderful.
And I went in to the mayor and the mayor thought it was a
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terrific idea.

I called Morgenthau and he accepted it.

that was the dual chairmanship at that point."3
Morgenthau

was

appointed

"because

of

his

name,

So

Koch said
and

his

stature and his desire".4 However, he was also a Koch-allied
Democrat, to balance Klein.

(Klein was a political ally of

Koch's but was known in the organized Jewish community as a
prominent Republican and a strong supporter of President
Ronald Reagan.)

Morgenthau refused to be interviewed and

said he had "no inside information" on the Commission.

He

said he became Co-chairman, because the mayor asked him and
he said "yes".5
At the September 14 meeting in City Hall, Klein said the
proposed Holocaust memorial would be "strictly Jewish", and
would be financed through an endowment fund because it was
"too holy for fundraising".

He mentioned as two possible

locations the Huntington Hartford Museum at Columbus Circle
and the U.S. Custom House at Bowling Green.

Klein announced

that he and Morgenthau were to serve as co-chairmen, with
Elie Wiesel and former United States Senator Jacob Javits as
honorary chairmen.

Koch's title became Founding Chairman.

3Interview with Herbert Rickman,
York City.

March 30,

1990,

New

interview with Mayor Edward I. Koch, May 18, 1990,
offices of Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman,
New York City.
telephone conversation with Manhattan District Attorney
Robert M. Morgenthau, December 21. 1991.
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Klein

said

he

had

asked

the

YIVO

Institute

for

Jewish

Research on Fifth Avenue and 86th Street and the Center for
Holocaust Studies Documentation and Research in Brooklyn to
sell their buildings, join the memorial museum to be created,
and

contribute

funds

from

their

property

sales

to

the

said

the

Commission's planned endowment fund.6
A

press

release

from

the

mayor's

office

Commission had more than 100 members and Mincludes Holocaust
survivors, scholars, rabbis, business, political and cultural
leaders and interested citizens."
Task Force report,
recommended

"a

The press release said the

released at the September 14 meeting,

memorial

educational facilities.

with

a

museum,

archives

and

The proposed memorial center will be

housed in an existing building in the city and established
with between $30 million and $40 million in private funds."
Possible components of the memorial were to be:

a museum

with exhibits on the Holocaust and Jewish life before Hitler;
computer data banks, video consoles and other equipment to
encourage

active

participation by

visitors;

archives,

including written and oral testimonies; a monument outside;
a special area inside for prayer, mourning and contemplation;
an educational program for schools and the general public.
The press release said:
and

coordinate

its

"The Commission will cooperate

efforts with other

Holocaust

Centers

6First meeting of New York City Holocaust
Memorial
Commission, City Hall, September 14, 1982, remarks by George
Klein from author's notes.
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across

the country,

especially with the planners

proposed national Holocaust Memorial

of the

in Washington,

D.C.,

and, if possible, with Holocaust centers around the world.
The commission may invite existing centers of Holocaust study
and research in New York City to join the Memorial center."7
Thus the Mutagon entered its second stage, with two cochairmen, both Koch's political allies in a broader arena,
heading the Koch-created interest group.

Koch,

as mayor,

represented the government side of the Holocaust project's
political alliance; but as titular "Founding Chairman" and
the real creator of the Commission, he also represented the
interest group side.

This duality of Koch's role is but one

manifestation of the Mutagon's complex relationship among the
polygon's web of players.
As will be demonstrated in later chapters, many of the
goals articulated by Klein and the mayor's press release at
the original meeting did not come to

fruition:

"holy"

supplemented

endowment

fund

was

eventually

Klein's

massive and growing (and not sufficiently successful)
raising

campaign

with

well-paid

professionals

by

a

fund
and

consultants; the cost of $30 to $40 million dollars increased
by more than an additional $100 million when the idea of
building a museum from scratch eventually replaced the plan

7Press Release, Office of the Mayor, September 14, 1982,
no. 244-82, Record Group Mayor Koch Acc'n 82-27, Subgroup
Special Asst. Herb Rickman, Municipal Archives, New York
City.
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for a museum in an extant building; solely private funds were
augmented by air rights donated by the State.

The Huntington

Hartford Museum at Columbus Circle, which Klein mentioned as
a possible site, had already been ruled out by owners Gulf
and Western, and they would not acquiesce; the Custom House,
then only a gleam in Klein's eye, was obtained and later
abandoned by the Commission.

The Commission, instead, opted

for Battery Park City, which changed the Mutagon dramatically
and added Governor Mario Cuomo as a retroactive "Founding CoChairman", equal to Koch.
Other projections for the future also did not come to
pass;

The YIVO institute was not interested in merging, and

the Brooklyn Center did not do so until 1990, after serious
financial problems made independence impossible.

Cooperation

with the Washington, D.C. project turned into competition,
with some key staff people playing "musical chairs"

(e.g.,

New

became

York

consultant

Jeshajahu

(Shaike)

Weinberg

director in Washington, and New York project director David
Altshuler came from Washington). In September 1982, however,
none

of

these

developments

(nor

the

fall

of

Commission

members Bess Meyerson, Ivan Boesky, Associate Chairmen Donald
Manes and Stanley Simon, and finally of Koch, himself) were
foreseen.

The Mutagon was only at the beginning of its

tortuous path, which led to ten years of impasse.
With the exception of Associate Chairpersons, who were
all current or past City, State and Federal elected officials
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(and many of whom were coincidentally Jewish) , all of the
appointees named to the New York City Holocaust Memorial
Commission were Jewish.8

The Associate Chairpersons were

appointed by virtue of their office, and not on their merit
as individuals.
Rickman said:

"We labored long and hard to create a

very balanced Commission, and I'm very proud of that because
we did most of the work in our office (i.e., on government
time, with the government creating the interest group).
made

certain

community

and

we

had

from

community— Zionists,
wing,

right wing.

representation
every

major

non-Zionists,

from

the
the

We

survivor

sector

of

Jewish

Reform,

Orthodox,

left

It truly reflected the community as a

whole— even geographically.

We strove to have representation

from the outer boroughs as well.

They were appointed by the

mayor, but I worked on them with George and then we submitted

Associate Chairpersons were Attorney General Robert
Abrams, Congressman Joseph Addabbo, State Senate Majority
Leader Warren Anderson, Former Mayor Abraham Beame, City
Council President Carol Bellamy, former Governor Hugh Carey,
City Council Majority Leader Thomas Cuite, Senator Alphonse
D'Amato, State Assembly Minority Leader James Emery, State
Assembly Speaker Stanley Fink,
Staten Island Borough
President Anthony Gaeta, Brooklyn Borough President Howard
Golden, City Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin, Congressman S.
William Green, former Governor Averell Harriman, former Mayor
Vincent Impellitteri, former Mayor John V. Lindsay, Queens
Borough President Donald Manes, Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, State Senate Minority Leader Manfred Ohrenstein,
State Comptroller Edward V. Regan, Bronx Borough President
Stanley Simon, Manhattan Borough President Andrew Stein,
former Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Sr. , and former Governor
Malcolm Wilson.
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them to the mayor and we had no problem with any of them."9
According to Rickman, he and Klein chose the people to serve
on the Commission, with Koch's approval.
The Commission was not as "balanced" as Rickman said it
was.

The 66 members appointed to the original Commission

(not including the Associate Chairpersons) can be divided in
four categories:

1. high level officers and philanthropists

of the organized Jewish community; 2. developers, real estate
attorneys and high level members of the financial sector
(with these two categories often overlapping); 3. less than
ten Holocaust survivors; 4. only three Holocaust scholars.
The first category included Morris B. Abram, Julius Berman,
Ivan F. Boesky, Rabbi Chaskell Besser, Kenneth J. Bialkin,
Rabbi Gerson Cohen, Dr. Saul Cohen, Rabbi Alfred Gottschalk,
Judah Gribetz, Marvin Josephson, Rabbi Norman Lamm, Herman
Merkin,

Paul Milstein,

Judge Simon Pifkind,
Lewis Rudin,
Arthur

Felix Rohatyn,

Dr. Raymond Sackler,

Schneier,

Tannenbaum,

Richard Ravitch,

Daniel

Shapiro,

Herbert Tenzer,

Abraham Ribicoff,

Howard J. Rubenstein,

Irving Schneider,
Leonard

Stern,

and Peggy Tishman.

Rabbi

Bernice
With the

exception of the rabbis, most of these people are also part
of the second category.

Other New York "movers and shakers"

included union leader Barry Feinstein, close Koch associates
Kenneth Lipper and Bess Meyerson, Brooklyn College president
Robert Hess,

and Beverly Sills.

9Rickman interview.

Survivors

included Sam
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Bloch, Jack Eisner, Yaffa Eliach, Ernest Honig, Leon Jolson,
Benjamin Meed, Ernest Michel and Eli Zborowski, and child of
survivors' leader Menachem Rosensaft

(Bloch's son-in-law).

The scholars of the Holocaust were Henry Feingold,
Irving Greenberg,

and survivor Yaffa Eliach.

Rabbi

Only seven

members were women.
The vast majority of the Commission was comprised of
Jewish men who were rich and/or well-connected to Jewish
money

(especially

in

the

real

estate

development

and

financial sectors) and establishment Jewish organizations in
New York City.

The

survivor community was

not

as well

represented, and many of the appointed survivors, themselves,
were

wealthy

Holocaust,

and/or

who

undertaking,

should

well-connected.
have

been

prominent

were scarcely included.

Yaffa Eliach,

Scholars
in

of
such

the
an

(One of the three,

could triple in the categories of scholars,

survivors and women.)
Not only was the Commission not nearly as broad-based as
Rickman stated, but the "left wing" he spoke of was nowhere
in sight.

The members were,

in fact, very linked to the

generally conservative establishment Jewish organizations and
Koch supporters.

Rosensaft, a Labor Zionist who was later

criticized for meeting with Palestine Liberation Organization
leader Yasir Arafat, could be considered "left wing", but he
was invited as head of the children of survivors network,
which was not at all a "left wing" organization.

Because it was comprised of so many powerful and rich
New Yorkers
community

in

in general and members of New York's Jewish
particular,

and

because

it

was

officially

empowered by the mayor (who was also part of the interest
group), the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission was
seemingly in a position to move government and accomplish its
goal and create a memorial.
tacit mutual cooptation:

The relationship was one of

high level leaders of the Jewish

community were getting the mayor to build them a Holocaust
memorial, and the mayor was getting these leaders to back him
politically and financially.

The leaders and the mayor could

pretend the idea of the Holocaust memorial museum was pure,
noble, and above politics, while, in fact, it was an integral
part of the mayor's political outreach to the community.

The

structure of this political alliance cannot be analyzed as an
iron triangle or an issue network; at this stage the Mutagon
was still a mutual admiration society, or a reciprocal twoway street (complicated by the fact that the mayor created
and was part of the interest group).
By the Spring of 1983, Koch's Commission was in full
swing.

Not unrelated was the first American Gathering of

Jewish Holocaust survivors, which took place in Washington,
D.C. on April 11-14.

The presence of President Reagan at

this event and the surrounding publicity for an event at
which thousands of survivors met for the first time in the
United States made the idea of a Holocaust memorial even more
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acceptably "American", legitimate, and important.

Moreover,

since this event specifically heightened attention for the
national memorial being planned in Washington, D.C., it is
likely that Rickman and Klein realized their own New York
project needed an immediate boost of publicity.
On May 3, 1983, before consultation with or approval by
the Commission, Klein wrote to Gerald Carmen, Administrator
for the General Services Administration

(GSA), requesting

that the Custom House be the site of a memorial.

The letter,

which began "Dear Gerald", said:
"Relative to our recent discussion, I am at this
time formally requesting, on behalf of the New York City
Holocaust Commission, the use in whole or in part of the
Old Customs [sic] House located at Bowling Green.
"As you know, our Commission, initiated by Mayor
Edward I. Koch, seeks to establish in New York City a
museum and memorial dedicated to the millions of victims
of the Holocaust. I am certain that you agree that such
memorial is appropriate and would surely be welcomed by
many people as a fitting tribute.
"We,

of

course,

are

prepared

to

abide

by

all

applicable federal standards related to the use of the
building and are prepared to submit a formal proposal in
the near future...."
Copies of the letter were shown being sent to Senators
Moynihan and D'Amato, Congressman Theodore Weiss, local GSA

Director William Diamond, and Commissioner Richard Hasse.10
By trying to win support from congressional allies and an
executive agency, Klein, representing the Mutagon, was trying
to form an iron triangle on a Federal level so the Commission
could

achieve

the

local

political

obtaining the Custom House.

goal

he was

This iron triangle,

seeking—
or solid

trilateral bond formed by an interest group, its advocates in
Congress,

and in the executive branch agency,

had as its

interest group angle the Mutagon— the local interest groupgovernment

alliance.

To

complicate

the

case

further,

Senators D'Amato and Moynihan, who were approached as the
congressional angle of the triangle,
members.

were also Commission

As was often the case, according to many Commission

members, Klein acted first (in consultation with Rickman or
Koch)

and then asked

Commission.

for rubber stamp approval

from the

This approval was formally granted at a meeting

of the Commission that took place in City Hall on June 8,
1983,

with

Mayor

Koch

and

53

members

and

chairpersons (or their representatives) attending.

associate
Minutes,

which were sent to Commission members on June 24, included
the following information:
Morgenthau

sending

his

Klein presided, with co-chairman

regrets,

because

of

"unavoidable

circumstances".

10Letter from George Klein to Gerald Carmen, May 3, 1983,
Record Group Mayor Koch Acc'n 87-45, Subgroup Special Asst.
Herb Rickman, Municipal Archives, New York City.
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According to the minutes, in addition to Koch, former
Mayors Wagner and Beame

(Commission Associate

Council President Bellamy,
Comptroller
Rabbi

Goldin,

Israel

Bronx Borough President Simon,

and

Governor

Moshowitz,

pledged

Commission"s activities.

Chairmen),

Cuomo's
their

representative,
support

of

the

The State Department of Education

had approved the incorporation of the Commission as a notfor-profit corporation (on June 3) , and procedures should be
complete and filed with the Secretary of State by June 17,
1983.

Dr. David Blumenfeld had been appointed as Executive

Director of the Commission, which was now headquartered at
the offices of the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC).
The Law Department of the City of New York had ruled the
Commission is "an official City commission" and is entitled
to use the seal of the City of New York on its letterhead.
(The "schizophrenic" private-public status of the Commission,
of which JCRC headquarters and a City seal were components,
will be analyzed in Chapter 15.)
Most significant in the minutes was information about
the Custom House.

Klein reported that "A number of sites

were given consideration, but it was determined that the Old
Customs [sic] House located at Bowling Green would best serve
the

requirements

of

a memorial

"determining" is not addressed.)
vacated

by

the

Federal

museum."

(Who

did

the

The U.S. Custom House was

government

in

1973

when

customs

service operations were moved to the World Trade Center.
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Built in 1907, it is considered one of the finest examples of
Beaux-Arts architecture in the United States.
Klein said that a letter of intent to lease space had
been sent to the GSA and that on June 3 a meeting had- been
held in the Regional Director's office, which requested that
the Commission prepare and submit a proposal for use of the
space.

He then introduced Charles Forberg, an architect, who

presented "preliminary concepts" of the museum.
said:

The minutes

"Using schematic charts and blown-up photographs of

the Old Customs House,

Mr.

Forberg

indicated that

space

requirements would consist of the second (rotunda) floor, the
first floor and the lower level.
floors

above

prerequisite

for

federal

This would allow five

government

is to develop

use.

One

basic

a plan whereby the Holocaust

museum center space is a self-contained unit, that separate
ingress and egress be provided for the federal facilities and
for

the

business

Holocaust
depended

Memorial
on

his

facilities."

ability

to

sell

Klein,

whose

proposals

for

development, clearly knew how to present his proposal to the
Commission in a professional and persuasive manner.
The minutes said:
further

elaboration

"After discussion, clarification and
of

the

preliminary

plan,

it

was

unanimously approved that the Co-Chairmen, George Klein and
Robert M. Morgenthau,

or either of them, be authorized to

further develop a proposal and to enter into discussion with
the General Services Administration and the New York City
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Department of Parks, in behalf of a corporation to be formed,
to

be

known

as

the

New

York

City

Holocaust

Memorial

Commission, Inc., with a view towards obtaining a lease for
such space in the Old Customs House and for use of Bowling
Green

Park as may be needed

Holocaust memorial and museum.

for the establishment

of a

Assurances were given that no

decision would be reached without the final approval of the
full Commission and that other sites would not be precluded
from consideration should the need arise.”
The minutes added that Klein "cited the urgency for
financial support of the project", and he asked members of
the Commission to serve on one of four committees:
Building

Contents

and

Program,

Finance,

Building Construction

and

Development, Memorial Park (in front of building).11
The Certificate of Incorporation, to which the minutes
referred, was signed by the State Attorney General's office
on June 8 and by Donald J. Sullivan, a Justice of the Supreme
Court, on June 10, 1983, and then filed with the Secretary of
State, under Section 402 of the Not-for-Profit Corporation
Law.

The purposes of the corporation included (but were not

limited to) the following functions:

"(a) To perpetuate the

memory of the six million Jews who died in the Holocaust; to
commemorate the victims of the Holocaust not only as they
died, but as they lived; to communicate the uniqueness of the
11"New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, General
Meeting-Official Minutes, June 8, 1983" with cover letter
dated June 24, 1983.
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Jewish experience in the Holocaust; to teach the history and
lessons of the Holocaust to all people for generations to
come.
(c)

(b) To create a Holocaust memorial in New York City,

To

conduct

programs

and

materials.

lectures,

to

seminars

publish

and

articles,

(d) To raise funds...."

other

papers

educational

and

research

Signators, as initial

directors of the corporation, were:

Klein, Morgenthau, Dr.

Irving Greenberg (who headed Zachor/National Jewish Resource
Center in New York and was an early director of the U.S.
Holocaust

Memorial

Council), Judah

Gribetz

(an

attorney

active in Democratic politics and Jewish communal affairs),
Benjamin Meed

(survivor and head

of WAGRO Warsaw Ghetto

Resistance Organization), and Ernest Michel

(survivor and

head of the Jewish Federation's fundraising).
Weil,

Gotshal

& Manges,

The firm of

represented by Ira Millstein and

other associates, provided free counsel for the incorporation
and other legal matters.12
On December 6, 1983, the Holocaust Commission sent to
the

GSA

Regional

Office

a

memorandum

regarding

the

Commission's "informal proposal" to lease space in the Custom
House.

The stated purposes were somewhat different than

those listed in the Certificate of Incorporation:

"a. To

perpetuate the memory of the 6,000,000 Jews who were murdered
by Nazi Germany in the Holocaust.

b. To commemorate the

12Certificate of Incorporation of New York City Holocaust
Memorial Commission, Inc., files of the Commission, New York
City.
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lives of the victims of the Holocaust by creating a record of
Jewish life, society and culture in Europe.

c. To portray

the arrival of Jewish immigrants to New York City and to
restore to memory the vigorous traditions and lifestyles
which formed a trans-Atlantic bond between European Jewry and
the Jewry of New York City.

d. To support and encourage the

widest dissemination of educational materials and curriculum,
so

that

future

generations

would

gain

history and lessons of the Holocaust.

knowledge

of

the

e. To provide for

appropriate commemorative ceremonies and remembrance programs
honoring the memory of those who died in the Holocaust."
Portrayal of Jewish immigration to New York City was not
mentioned

in the earlier document,

and may have been an

attempt to "Americanize" the image of the museum for the GSA
and the Federal government.

An intended use of space was

appended,

footage

including

architect Forberg.

square

figures

prepared

by

The request was for 86,200 square feet

for the Commission's project, and referred to a November 18,
1983 letter from GSA to the Commission, regarding the project
and the square footage available.13
On February 11, 1984, three months after GSA's letter to
the Commission and nine months after Klein's

(first name

basis) letter to GSA administrator Carmen, GSA officially and

13Memorandum to GSA, Region 2 from New York City
Holocaust Memorial Commission, December 6, 1983,
"Re:
Informal Proposal to Lease Space in the Old U.S. Custom House
at Bowling Green", files of Commission, New York City.
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publicly announced the availability of space.

A display ad

in the real estate section of The New York Times said of the
Custom House:

"The U.S. General Services Administration is

offering to lease approximately 80,000 square feet of space
on three floors of the building, including the Rotunda, to a
non-profit cultural/educational institution.

The space will

be offered on an "as is" basis and the potential user will be
required to rehabilitate it for its intended use— subject to
architectural control by the government."

Proposals were to

be received no later than May 9, 1984.14 The Commission had
thus

begun

their

"homework"

of

creating

a

Federal

iron

triangle of support nine months before availability of the
space was publicly announced.
Soon after the GSA's official announcement, Klein and
Morgenthau (who always co-signed Klein's letters, although he
was

never

as

availability.
24,

1984:

involved

as

Klein)

took

credit

for

this

They wrote to Commission members on February

"After an arduous

effort on the part of our

Executive Committee, and with the superb help of government
officials and friends, we are pleased to inform you that the
GSA has finally consented to offer for lease approximately
80,000

square

institution."
other

feet

to

a

non-profit

cultural/educational

But the battle was only beginning, because

"cultural/educational

institutions"

were

also

14The New York Times. February 11, 1984, New York City.
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interested

in

the

space

and

trying

to

align

their

own

political allies.
One weapon in the Commission's arsenal was a slick 24
page brochure describing the need for a memorial museum,
Jewish beginnings
House) , the

in lower Manhattan

suitability

of the

(site of the Custom

Custom House

intended components of the memorial museum,
drawings

of

the

museum

reaching

out to the

in

the

community

Custom

as

a site,

architectural

House,

plans

and networking with

for

other

Holocaust institutions, and, of course, the prestigious list
of members and officers, headed by Founding Chairman Edward
I. Koch.

This was to serve as a public relations and fund

raising tool in the Commission's effort to win the Custom
House.

The new brochure was announced in the February 24

letter, and described as the basis for the proposal to be
submitted to GSA by May 9, 1984.
The letter also said:
months much must be done.

"Obviously, during the next two
Building plans must be formulated,

our fundraising effort must commence and public support must
be

encouraged.

We,

therefore,

will

be

calling

on

our

Commission members to lend us their assistance.

By such a

coordinated

stand

effort,

we

are

confident

excellent chance of being successful.
opportunity of achieving

our goal

that

we

an

We now have the real

of building

a

'living
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memorial7 which is both impressive and befitting our great
city.''15
Rickman said:

"We had pretty much targeted the Custom

House Building, and the Mayor was in agreement with me that
it was a suitable site.

The Custom House became our target.

We thought that would be the best site possible for the
memorial.

And what we did was, we pretty much put it on hold

as far as the Feds were concerned.
Moynihan7s office

I reached out to Senator

and they were very

Senator D 7Amato7s office].

supportive

[as was

The American Indian [museum] were

trying to get hold of it then.

It wasn7t so much that we

were stopping American Indian, but we had a strong commitment
to keeping it in Washington Heights and to making sure it
expanded its operations there and became an important vital
part of the community."

(A 1978 letter from Koch to the

director of the Museum of the American Indian stresses the
importance of this policy for the Koch Administration.16)
Koch, Rickman, Klein and others on the Commission used
their influence, which their affiliation with the Commission
had

increased,

elected

to gain the

officials.

Since

support
many

of

of a broad
these

range

officials

of

were

15Letter from George Klein and Robert M. Morgenthau to
Commission members, February 24, 1984, files of Senator
Manfred Ohrenstein, New York City.
16Rickman interview. Regarding Indian museum, see letter
from Mayor Koch to Dr. Roland W. Force, June 1, 1978, Files
of Mayor Koch, Subgroup Rickman-1978, Municipal Archives, New
York City.
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already

connected

with

the

Commission

as

Associate

Chairpersons, it was easy to create a Federal iron triangle
of support and the "sell" was not difficult.

D'Amato, who

was close to the Republican Reagan Administration, and Klein,
a high

level

contributor to Reagan,

were

influential

in

getting the Federal government to agree to lease the space.
D'Amato told the JCRC at the time:

"I am convinced that this

much-needed and long-awaited memorial to six million people
would find an appropriate home in this historic structure."
He said:

"In New York City, we now have the leadership and

the means to place before Christian and Jew, young and old,
a living memorial to the people who where exterminated by the
Third Reich."17

(D'Amato used the word "people" instead of

the more specific and appropriate word "Jews" two times in
two consecutive sentences.)
In

the

continued

next
to

few

months,

solicit

the

support

Commission

from

elected

leadership
officials,

favorable press, and private funding from contributors in the
Jewish

community.

On

May

8,

1984,

a

meeting

of

the

Commission was held in the Tent Room of the Regency Hotel,
"to bring the Commission up to date on the progress being
made regarding our site (Custom House) acquisition proposal".
Klein

asked

for

and

received

formal

approval

to make

a

proposal to the Federal government to lease approximately
17Eric Greenberg, "Custom House in N.Y. may become
Holocaust memorial", The Jewish Week. March 9, 1984, New York
City.
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100,000 square feet at the Custom House "for the creation,
development and building of a memorial to the Holocaust."18
Again,

the

procedure,

full

Commission

after Rickman,

meeting

was

Morgenthau,

a

a

rubber

stamp

few others,

and

mostly Klein had already placed "all the ducks in a row".
One purpose of creating the Commission was to have a
body of leaders from the Jewish establishment linked to the
Mayor, and in a position to demonstrate their approval for
decisions he and Special Assistant Rickman had already made.
(Koch was generally close to the organized Jewish community,
outspokenly pro-Israel and anti-Jessie Jackson, and accused
of engendering black-white— which often was black-Jewish—
polarization.)

Like Robert Dahl's analysis of Mayor Lee's

Citizens

Action

function

of

Committee

Koch's

(and

for
later

redevelopment19, the
also

Governor

main

Cuomo's)

Holocaust Memorial Commission was to sell the project to the
community and to assure acceptability (and funding).

Both

groups are supposedly structures of citizen participation,
but they were deliberately created by a mayor to endorse his
proposals.

As Dahl said, the relationship between leaders

and citizens is often reciprocal in a pluralist democracy:
leaders influence decisions of constituents,

but leaders'

18New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, General
Meeting-Official Minutes, May 8, 1984.
19Robert Dahl, Who Governs?. Yale University,

1961.
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decisions are also influenced by what they think constituents
want.20
In
somewhat

the

case

of

different

the

than

Commission,

Dahl's

the

analysis.

situation
One

was

community

leader— George Klein— had as large a role in shaping policy
as

the

mayor

Furthermore,

and

as

Rickman

time

went

in

by

this

and

two

way

the Mutagon

street.
political

coalition changed, the mayor was no longer in control of the
Commission or the project.
the

alliance

and the

The many changes in structure of

length

of time that passed

led to

impasse, rather than implementation.
In

the

Commission,
community

beginning,

in

the

case

of

the

Holocaust

Koch and Rickman thought the organized Jewish
wanted

a

Holocaust

memorial,

and,

more

specifically, they then thought the Custom House would please
the Jewish leadership.

Klein certainly wanted it there, and

pushed hard for it at this point.

At the May 8 meeting, he

"indicated that the Commission is indeed fortunate that the
Custom House,

a quality,

available for public use."

landmark building,

is being made

He said the May 9 deadline for

proposals had been extended to May 24, 1984.

He also said

that because the Federal government had allocated $28 million
for general renovation and many supplies would be donated for
the museum, only $5 million was needed to build it.

Klein

added that the Federal government could not grant use of the
20Dahl, Who Governs?. p. 90.
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facility without the approval of the mayor of New York City
(the creator and Founding Chairman of the Commission).21
Construction

Committee

Chairman

Irving

Fischer,

a

developer, reported that a team of architects and engineers
led by James Stewart Polshek had inspected the Custom House,
with work donated by developers on the Commission, including
Klein.

Klein announced that he and Leonard Stern had each

agreed to make $500,000 contributions over the next five
years, and introduced a newly hired professional fund raiser,
Bernd Brecher.

Klein said the goal was $40 million— $15

million for renovation and $25 million for an endowment fund
to preclude yearly fund raising.

He asked that the Executive

Committee be empowered to determine a realistic amount of
rent for the GSA proposal before submitting it.
(This "Executive Committee" was not defined on paper.
It changed over the years, but always consisted of Klein,
Morgenthau, Rickman, the official incorporators, and a few
others.

Generally, Klein and Rickman made the decisions and

then rounded up enough members of the Executive Committee to
make the decision
listed

official

and

"democratic".

The

on the New York City Holocaust Memorial
granted April

27,

1984,

names

Museum's

Provisional

Charter,

are

Klein,

Morgenthau,

Irving Greenberg, Judah Gribetz, Benjamin Meed

and Ernest Michel— the same as those on the June 1, 1983

210fficial Minutes, May 8, 1984, op. cit.
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Certificate of Incorporation of the New York City Holocaust
Memorial Commission.)
Between

July

and

October

1984,

decision about the Custom House,

when

GSA

made

its

letters on file indicate

there was a letter-writing campaign orchestrated by either
the

Commission,

the

mayor's

office,

or

both.

William

Diamond, GSA Regional Director received letters of support
for a Holocaust museum from Jewish organizations and elected
officials that included:

National Jewish Community Relations

Advisory Council, American Jewish Congress, Senator Moynihan,
Senator

D'Amato,

Mayor

Koch,

and

Governor

Mario

Cuomo.

Executive Director Blumenfeld said the Commission had
letters

of endorsement

60

from major Jewish organizations.22

At this stage, there was a Federal iron triangle of political
forces aggressively working to obtain the Custom House, with
the local Mutagon as the interest group angle of this iron
triangle.

Ironically,

while Cuomo had sent a letter to

Diamond urging that the museum be in the Custom House, his
political
siting

brokers

the project

were
in

already beginning

to

Battery

and making

Park

City

think about
the

governor Koch's equal partner.
Meanwhile,
space,

five other groups were also vying for the

and one serious contender emerged to challenge the

22Copies of letters listed are in files of author.
Blumenfeld statement in "Hope Rises for N.Y. Holocaust
Memorial" by Julius Liebb, Jewish Press. October 5, 1984, New
York, p.2.
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Holocaust

Commission

Community Board,

in

seeking

support

elected officials,

from

the

local

and the press.

At a

Community Board 1 meeting on July 31, 1984, most of the six
competing

applicants

made

presentations,

with

Executive

Director Blumenfeld appearing for the Commission.

The other

proposal under serious consideration by GSA was that of an
arts consortium,

to make the Custom House a cultural and

educational center.

Plans included an Ocean Liner Museum,

seven theaters, restaurants and a half-price ticket booth.
The consortium included the Alliance of Resident Theatres/New
York,

the

Byrd

Information,

Hoffman

the

Foundation,

Cultural

Council

the

Center

Foundation,

for
the

Arts
Dance

Theater Workshop, the Kitchen Center, the Ocean Liner Museum
and the Theatre Development Fund.

The Community Board did

not make a recommendation at the meeting, but complained they
had only learned of GSA's plans to lease the space one week
earlier.23
A New York Times

editorial, Governor Cuomo's head of

the New York State Council on the Arts— Kitty Carlisle Hart,
Chairman

of

the

National

Endowment

for

the

Arts

Frank

Hodsoll,and others publicly supported the arts consortium.
Hart's support may have been a precursor of Cuomo's later
recommendation

that

the

Holocaust

elsewhere, in his Battery Park City.

project

be

The Times said:

housed
"But

23David W. Dunlap, "Plans for Custom House Are Presented
to Board", The New York Times. August 2, 1984.
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is the Customs House, extravagantly decorated with statuary
symbolizing

civilization's

triumphs,

appropriate

for

a

Holocaust memorial?

In the midst of its celebratory art,

somber

of

revelations

depraved

discordant, even trivialized.1,24

inhumanity

Hart said:

may

seem

"I would like

to express my support for the proposal which would bring
together under
productive

one

arts

Street Journal

roof

some

of the most

organizations
said:

in New

respected

York."25

The

and
Wall

"Perhaps the mayor should consider

putting the city behind a fresh and dramatic plan instead of
encouraging the commission to pay rent in perpetuity to the
federal government for a space that would never, legally or
sentimentally or architecturally, be its own." The article
suggested
develop

that

in

Corporation)

Klein

Times
and

use

Square
build

part

of the property he would

(through

there

as

the

Urban

Development

a Holocaust

memorial

a

replica of a wooden Polish synagogue.26
GSA's decision, scheduled for August, was delayed until
October.
public

Meanwhile, Blumenfeld spoke at Community Board l's
session

Commission's

on

September

project.

12,

Despite

1984,
his

to
oral

advocate
and

the

written

2A"What to Do With the Customs [sic] House", editorial
in The New York Times. August 11, 1984.
250wen Moritz, "A split on Bowling Green", New York Daily
News. June 30, 1984.
26Raymond Sokolov, "Rm to Let. Landmark Bldg. 77,000 Sq.
Ft.", The Wall Street Journal. October 3, 1984, p. 28.

274

arguments, the Board voted eighteen to three in favor of a
cultural center.

The Board's vote was only a recommendation.

Endorsements for the Commission, on the other hand, came from
the elected officials who also sat on the advisory board of
Diamond, the GSA regional administrator who was to make the
final decision.
On

October

17,

after

six

months

of

lobbying

and

competition between the Holocaust Commission and the arts
consortium, GSA announced the Commission would be awarded a
lease in the Custom House.

Diamond said the Commission was

chosen because its "proposal was the strongest and the best
deal

for the Government,

offered."

based upon the amount

of money

He said the Commission would provide $5 million

toward the restoration of the building,
year renewable

and that a twenty

lease had not yet been negotiated.27

The

facts that Koch, Cuomo, Moynihan, D'Amato and Congressman. Ted
Weiss

sat

on Diamond's

Commission's

project,

advisory board,
and

all

but

all

Weiss

endorsed the
were

Commission, were clearly in the Commission's favor.

on

the
Their

Federal iron triangle had prevailed.
Rickman said of the GSA decision:

"We won the Customs

House, despite local criticisms from people like Brendan Gill
who felt it was ill-suited for our purpose and they wanted to

27Joseph Berger,
"Custom House Will be Museum on
Holocaust", The New York Times. October 18, 1894, p. B3.
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use it for other purposes."28

The year 1984 thus ended on

a high note for the Commission.
for

operating

expenses

(as

It had $47,719 in the bank

opposed

to

$2 3,741

a

year

earlier)29, and now that the Custom House was in its hands,
it was going "full steam ahead" to complete the Holocaust
memorial museum by Spring 1986.

SUMMARY
In September 1982 Mayor Koch launched his New York City
Holocaust Memorial Commission,

headed by developer George

Klein and Manhattan District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau.
At this stage the Mutagon was still a reciprocal two-way
street between the Commission leaders and the mayor, as his
earlier Task Force had been.
Commission,

Of the 66 members named to the

all were Jewish and most were rich men well-

connected to the organized Jewish community; many were real
estate developers and their attorneys.

In May 1983 Klein

single-handedly

wrote

(with Koch's

approval)

to

the

GSA

requesting the Custom House as the Holocaust memorial museum
site.

A

Federal

mobilized

to

Senators,

and

iron triangle

obtain

this

other

of political

site,

elected

including

officials,

organizations, and board members of the GSA.

forces was
Congressmen,

major

Jewish

The Mutagon— at

28Rickman interview.
29Report
by
Eisner
and
Lubin,
Certified
Accountants, March 21, 1985, New York City.

Public

that stage, the mayor's office and the Commission— was the
interest group angle of this Federal
October

1984,

despite

strong

iron triangle.

opposition

from

an

In
arts

consortium, the Holocaust Commission was chosen to be awarded
a lease for the Custom House.

Governor Cuomo was among the

elected officials who supported the Commission's bid.
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CHAPTER 10:
GOVERNOR CUOMO INTERVENES AND THE HOLOCAUST
COMMISSION BECOMES CITY/STATE
"The Custom House, I believe, is a particularly fitting
site for this significant endeavor." Mario Cuomo, July 27,
19841 "Objections have been raised that this building is an
inappropriate place to house the museum." Mario Cuomo, April
5, 1985.2
The early part of 1985 was an ambivalent and pivotal
time

for

the

Holocaust

Commission,

influenced

by

the

intervention of Governor Mario Cuomo in processes that since
the

Spring

of

Administration.

1981

had

been

the

province

of

the

Koch

By the beginning of 1985, Governor Cuomo's

political broker began negotiating with the Commission for
the site of the memorial museum to be changed from the Custom
House

to

Battery

Administration

and

Park
New

City.
York

The
City

work

of

Holocaust

the

Koch

Memorial

Commission Co-Chairman George Klein to create a Federal iron
triangle of forces and obtain the Custom House was about to
be negated.
with

New

Likewise, Koch's reciprocal two-way arrangement
York

City's

organized

Jewish

community,

the

beginning stage of a changing polygon, was about to change
drastically.

The Mutagon was about to become a monstrous

polygon of political forces with two heads sometimes at odds
with each other.

1Letter to William Diamond, GSA Administrator.
2Michael Oreskes, "Battery Park City Offers Holocaust
Museum a Site", The New York Times. April 5, 1985, p. Al.
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Cuomo's public reason for intervening and grabbing a
piece of the "Holocaust pie" was his belief in the importance
of memorializing

the

document the reasons
appear to have been:
his

old

rival,

Holocaust.

It

is not

behind the public

possible

stance,

to

but they

1. to take away some of the glory from

Koch;

2.

to

organized Jewish community;

ingratiate

himself

with

the

3. to find a suitable public

museum, in keeping with his plan to give Battery Park City "a
soul"; 4. to seek a different use for the Custom House, more
in keeping with his own purposes.
Cuomo's chief power broker for the change was Meyer S.
(Sandy) Frucher, who was his close friend and president of
Battery Park City Authority (BPCA).

Assisting Frucher were

Ellen Conovitz, the Governor's Appointments Secretary, who
has close ties to the organized Jewish community, and Rabbi
Israel

Mowshowitz,

the

Governor's

director

of

community

affairs, whose unofficial title was liaison to the organized
Jewish community.

(As a former president of the New York

Board of Rabbis, Mowshowitz had been named to Koch's Task
Force and original Commission in his own right.

He later

also served as Cuomo's representative on the Commission.)
Perhaps
organized
Stuart

Frucher

Jewish

Eizenstat,

ingratiation
organized

with

(who

also

community)

for President

close

saw himself

performing
the

has

for

Jewish
Carter

Cuomo

community
in

1978

as
the

ties
a

the

latter-day

same

that

to

act

of

Eizenstat

(see Chapter

7) .
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Cuomo, however, already had good relations with the Jewish
community

in

New

York

State.

The

idea

of

making

him

prominent in a major Holocaust memorial project— which was on
a scale to compete with the national memorial— may have been
to give him

a more

national

connection with

the Jewish

community, in the event he would decide to run for President.
Frucher could not give a specific date for his entrance
into the project, and recalled it as follows:
"At a point in time there was a lot of controversy
associated with going to the Custom House.

I saw a

piece in the paper and it described the controversy.

I

read in the newspaper there was a lot of controversy
associated

with

Custom House.

the

Holocaust

museum

So I did two things:

going

to

the

One, I had lunch

with Brendan Gill [chairman of the New York Landmarks
Conservancy] to determine whether or not there was any
great opposition to the notion— or his opposition within
that community— about this Holocaust museum.

He said

no, it was really the location [in the Custom House].
He thought the building wasn't appropriate although the
project was appropriate.

I then met with the head of

the Municipal Art Society, Kent Barwick, and determined
the

same

governor

thing
and

from

said

Kent.

that

And

there

then

might

I
be

called
a

the

proposed

compromise associated with all of this— and that is to
somehow move them to Battery Park City, and thereby save
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the Custom House.

The governor said that he thought it

was a good idea and I should pursue it.

And then I met

with George Klein, and a subsequent meeting with Klein,
[Robert M. ] Morgenthau and Judah Gribetz.
around the site.

We walked

The initial proposal was to put them

in a park that was to be in the southern tip of Battery
Park.

In the master plan there was an idea for a public

institution in the park, like a museum."3
No doubt Frucher, who was one of Cuomo's top political
advisors and closest friends and "plugged in" to the Jewish
community,
benefits

also discussed with the governor the political
of

such

a move.

He

insisted

for

the

record,

however, that his primary motive was other than political.
Asked whether his deal with Koch, Klein and Morgenthau for
the governor to become Koch's equal "Founding Co-chairman"
was

for

political

purposes,

Frucher

said:

"I

was

not

unmindful of the fact that making him a co-founder had some
residual benefits.

But it wasn't being driven by that.

was being driven by inequities and unfairnesses.

It

If the

State was going to be the principal player in securing the
land

and

putting

it

together,

at

that

point

it

necessary and appropriate to have the governor do it.
was not unmindful of the political benefits."4

became
But I

The State

interview with Meyer S. (Sandy) Frucher, New York City,
February 4, 1991.
4Ibid.
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would

have

player",

no

other

except

reason

for

the

for

becoming

purpose

of

the

giving

"principal

the

governor

political benefits with the Jewish community, but Frucher
would not say so.
Almost

from

the

beginning

of

1985,

there

were

two

simultaneous scripts being played out with regard to site
selection.

Publicly,

the Custom House venture proceeded,

with its Federal iron triangle of forces in place.
meanwhile,

Frucher

was

negotiating

with

Quietly,

Commission

co-

chairmen Klein and Morgenthau and Koch's political broker,
Herbert Rickman, to create a two-headed Mutagon and move the
site of the Holocaust museum to Battery Park City.
January,

1985,

there

was

already

negotiations with BPCA were underway.
"Intelligencer"

column,

a

public

In mid-

clue

that

In New York Magazine's

philanthropist

Brooke

Astor

was

reported to be lobbying against placing the Holocaust museum
in the Custom House.

She reportedly told both Koch and

Morgenthau she was opposed, and then said the mayor agreed
with her.

Koch then told the magazine "he hadn't told Astor

he was against the memorial— only that 'everyone has pointed
out that there are problems with that site and there may be
alternatives.'"

New York then went on to report:

those is Battery Park City.
development,

Sandy

Frucher,

"One of

The president of that state
said

he

is

talking

with

Morgenthau and the commission's co-chairman, developer George
Klein, about putting the museum on a three-acre site there.
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'We proposed this before,' he said.

'Now that they have one

bird in hand, they're looking at our offer.'"5

(There is no

evidence of any earlier offer by Frucher.)
Five

weeks

later,

The

Jewish

Week.

the

Jewish

Federation-linked establishment newspaper reported:

"The

memorial commission is negotiating a lease with the U.S.
General Services Administration for the Custom House after it
was chosen last October to occupy the site over several other
museum commissions and arts groups.

Designs for a three-

level 'living museum' include a chapel and meditation room,
video and computer-based study centers and exhibit space
devoted to the rise of Nazism,
birth of the State of Israel."

Jewish resistance and the
The article said renovation

of the Custom House was already underway, and that the museum
was expected to open in about three years (a year and a half
more than the

original

Spring

1986 target.)

Commission

director David Blumenfeld is quoted, defending the site as
"very appropriate".

He also said that "the fact that it was

a customs house fits in with the immigration theme.

The

beauty of the murals and the building in a way commemorate
the beauty

of European Jewish art and

of the

old world

ambiance."

BPCA was not mentioned in this story.6

The two

5Mary Anne Ostrom, "Intelligencer:
Mrs. Astor Argues
Against Holocaust-Shrine Site", New York Magazine, January
14, 1985, New York City, p. 10.
6Adriel Bettelheim, "City's Holocaust Museum seeks
exhibits, funds" The Jewish Week. February 22, 1985, New York
City, p. 13.
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articles reflected the two-pronged negotiations then taking
place: one between Koch's office and Commission leaders and
the

Governor's

office,

and the

other

between

Commission

leaders and the General Services Administration (GSA).

The

appearance of the Custom House story in the Federation-linked
Jewish Week at that time

is an

indication this was

the

negotiation the Commission wanted publicized.
On March 1, 1985, the Commission was still communicating
with the GSA, providing information that had been requested.
A proposed schedule of meetings between Commission and GSA
personnel was included, with dates running to May 21, 1985.
That date was said to be the deadline for lease negotiations,
extended from February 20.7

(This extended deadline bought

time for a decision regarding BPCA.)
Daily

News

said

that

"the

A March 3 story in the

memorial

commission

negotiating a home for the museum.

is

still

Although use of the

Customs House at Bowling Green was approved by the General
Services

Administration,

the

state

is

negotiating

for

a

possible site in Battery Park City."8
In the midst of these wheelings and dealings for a site,
the

New

York

City

Holocaust

Memorial

Museum

(which

different from the Commission) became a legal entity.
February

15,

1985,

the

Trustees

of

the

New

York

is
On

City

7Letter from David L. Blumenfeld to John M. Marcic, GSA,
March 1, 1985, Commission Files, New York City.
8John Webb, "To keep the memories alive" Daily News.
March 3, 1985, New York City, p. 12.
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Holocaust

Memorial

Museum

signed

a

"Statement

of

Organizational Action of Trustees in Lieu of Organization
Meeting".

Signators were the same as those who incorporated

the Commission:
Judah

Gribetz,

Statement

Klein, Morgenthau,
Benjamin

elected

Meed

officers,

and
who

Dr.

Irving Greenberg,

Ernest

were:

Michel.
Koch,

The

Founding

Chairman; Jacob K. Javits and Elie Wiesel, Honorary Chairmen;
Morgenthau and Klein, Co-chairmen of the Board; Blumenfeld,
Secretary

and

Executive

Trustee;

and

Ira

M.

Millstein,

Counsel.

These men constituted the "Board of Trustees",

which the by-laws said could not exceed 25 people.
empowered

to

designate

from

their

number

three

trustees to constitute an Executive Committee.

They were
or more
The first

officers were appointed by Koch (who thus still controlled
the Mutagon), and thereafter the trustees were to elect the
officers at annual elections.
Although the Commission and the Museum were officially
two separate entities, the same men controlled both, and Koch
was in command.

Now, the governor wanted to step in and take

away as much of that command as possible.

The politics of

site selection became crucial, because whoever controls the
site of the museum has tremendous power over the Commission
and the Museum Board of Trustees.

By accepting Battery Park

City as the site, Koch, Klein, Morgenthau and company would
allow Cuomo to suddenly wield power in a project where he
formerly had virtually none.
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The political importance of site selection is analyzed
by Edward C. Banfield,
political

influence

who presented six case studies of

in

civic

controversies

in

Chicago:

construction of a branch hospital, the merger of county and
city welfare departments, extension of rapid transit lines,
construction

of

the

Fort

Dearborn

Project

civic

center,

creation of a permanent branch of University of Illinois, and
creation of an exhibition hall.
are

similar

to

each

other

All of these case studies

and

to

the

creation

of

the

Holocaust museum, in the use and intermeshing of influence by
public

officials,

entrepreneurs.

interest

groups,

media

and

private

Banfield analyzes many factors that influence

the choice of the site for his six case studies:

e.g., how

they will affect business, elected officials, neighborhoods,
the alternative sites not selected, government services.9
Site selection has been a major component of creation of
the Holocaust museum from the beginning.

Consideration of

how the site of the museum would affect elected officials was
crucial,

because the Custom House site was chosen by the

Koch-affiliated Commission leadership, and Battery Park City
was chosen by the governor's

political broker.

As part of

the deal for the land, he was to become an equal "founding
co-chairman"

(retroactively)

with

Koch.

The

choice

of

Battery Park City thus enhanced the governor's position and

9Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press
of Glencoe, New York, 1961.
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diminished

Koch's.

(The

effects

on

business,

the

neighborhood, and the site not chosen were less important in
this case than in Banfield's study.

With or without a new

Holocaust museum, both Battery Park City and the Custom House
had the capacity to flourish— neither site solely depended on
it.)
Banfield's

questioning

whether

the

"scientific"

evaluation of a chosen site is important for public relations
and/or as a means of stalling initiation of a project is also
relevant for an analysis of the Holocaust project.

Experts

evaluated the Custom House and deemed it highly suitable, a
conclusion

that

was

publicly

seconded

officials and Commission leadership.

by

all

elected

This "scientific" or

"expert" evaluation was used for public relations, to promote
the obtaining of and public acceptance of the Custom House.
Initiation of the project was then stalled while the experts
determined that in fact Battery Park City would be a better
location.

A public relations campaign was then launched by

the Commission to convince the organized Jewish community
that this second site was better.
Meanwhile,
Commission,

encouraged

by

on February 25, 1985,

the

leadership

of

the

City Councilwoman Susan

Alter's (D-Brooklyn) resolution, which placed the Council's
"moral

support"

behind

the

concept

of

establishing

Holocaust Memorial, was approved by the City Council.
said the resolution

(no.

1063-A)

a

Alter

did not cite the Custom
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House,

because

project.10

it was

not meant

to

focus

on a specific

She did not say publicly that the Commission's

indecision between the Custom House and Battery Park City at
that point precluded her from being specific.

Most of those

who testified at Alter's hearing were Commission members,
including Rickman, Klein, Meed, Michel,
Herbert Tenzer,

Judge Simon Rifkind,

former Congressman

Rabbi Judah Nadich,

Henry Feingold, and Menachem Rosensaft.11
Because Alter's hearing was intended as a gesture of
support for the Commission, she did not invite testimony from
representatives
negative,

of

groups

that

would

be

expected

e.g. emigre Polish or Ukrainian societies.

to

be
The

testimonies, in fact, were orchestrated by David Blumenfeld,
who then was the Commission director.
triangle of support
Federal

Just as an iron of

for the Custom House was built on a

level with GSA and members

of Congress,

in this

instance the Mutagon— i.e., the Commission and the mayor's
office— was using the City Council to give the appearance of
local

unity

and

acceptance

of the

project.

(The Alter

resolution was merely good public relations, as a resolution

10Stewart Ain,
"Council approves concept of city
Holocaust memorial", Long Island Jewish World. February 28,
1985.
11"New York City Council Adopts Resolution Urging City
to Establish a Holocaust Memorial Center", Jewish Telegraphic
Agency Daily News Bulletin. March 1, 1985, New York City, p.
4.
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by the City Council

then had no power to

impact on the

Mutagon.)
The Federal iron triangle and local support, however,
had already been undermined by the governor's intervention.
Exactly how Cuomo got into the act with his Battery Park City
offer

is not clear,

except that Frucher was his broker.

Koch's explanation was:

"We needed them [the governor].

Holocaust is bigger than anybody I know of,

The

and the more

people you can bring in, and help, the better off you are.
So the issue became where would it be— before a decision was
made that the Custom House was not the best place.
needed Battery Park City.

And we

You can't do Battery Park City

without the governor, and the governor was very desirous of
being

involved.

So

it was

a natural

marriage

made

in

heaven.1,12
This
Commission

explanation
decided

makes

Battery

it
Park

sound
City

like

Koch

would

be

location, and then they sought out the governor.

and
a

the
good

However,

according to Rickman and others, Frucher, on behalf of the
governor, sought out the Commission and "made them an offer
they couldn't refuse".

Frucher corroborated this.

He said

he not only had the idea for moving the project to Battery
Park

City,

but

that

he

also

evolved

the

idea

from

the

museum's standing alone in the park to its being part of an

12Interview with Mayor Edward I. Koch, New York City, May
18, 1990.
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apartment building, and thereby generating some revenue for
the Commission.

Frucher said he went to Klein with his idea

for a museum-apartment complex,

and Klein liked the idea.

"During the course of that, two things happened," Frucher
said.

"One, if it was going to become a State project, it

seemed appropriate to reconstitute the Commission; and the
mayor,

who had originally been the founder,

in this new

construct would share the honorary founder role with the
governor. "13
Koch would not or could not say exactly how the governor
got involved.

"I can only tell you everyone agreed Battery

Park City would be a better place than the Custom House," he
said.

"You'd start from scratch and build your building.

In

the Custom House, there was the problem of murals that are
extraordinary,
there."

but don't fit in, and they'd have to stay

Asked whether the governor came to him and the

Commission,

or they came to the governor,

Koch said:

"I

think this was probably all done through Klein and Morgenthau
doing it, but I don't have a recollection of how we brought
the governor in.

I suspect it was they who initiated it."u

It was not, however, Klein and Morgenthau but Frucher
who "brought the governor in".

Frucher said:

"I made the

offer of Battery Park City to the Holocaust Commission, but
I did it with the knowledge of the [governor's] chamber.
13Frucher interview.
uKoch interview.

I
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personally spoke to the governor about it and to Michael Del
Giudice, who was the secretary at the time.
effort to do it within the chamber.

There was an

Del Giudice served as an

intermediary and we were able to work it out so that the
State was able to do it.1'15
Unlike
responsible

Koch,
for

Rickman
the

(the Mayor's

project)

initiative was the governor's.

Special Assistant

specifically

stated

the

"The Reagan Administration

awarded us the Custom House, and no sooner did that happen
than the governor interceded," he said.

"And the governor at

the time, as we understood it, had strong interest in using
the Custom House for his offices, or for offices that would
be part of the State Executive.

The building would be shared

by the governor's office and some other institution.
Indian Museum was again being mentioned.

The

And we were given

an offer that we could not refuse— and that was Battery Park
City— which means a complete shift to a different kind of
institution."16
Rickman, like Koch and Frucher, cited the problems with
the incongruity of the architecture and decoration of the
Custom House and the theme of the Holocaust.

He said:

"The

deal of the governor and the State was a brilliant one for
us.

Not

only

did

we

get

a site

in

a very

attractive

15Frucher interview.
16Interview with Herbert Rickman, New York City, March
30, 1990.
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location, but we got a commitment to do the exterior shell of
the building.

The State was going to do nothing in the

interior, but they would do the building as part of the deal.
As I remember it, Battery Park [City] Authority had in its
mandate the creation of a museum.
leeway here.

And they had a lot of

So we were not just going to get a site.

We

were going to get either the entire exterior or help toward
the entire exterior.
cost reduction.1,17
offering
promise

(There is no record of the State or BPCA

to provide
was

Commission

for

It meant a great deal of production

air

the

exterior of

rights

above

the

building.

the museum,

could build an apartment house to

The

where

the

offset

the

museum costs, and token rent of one dollar per year.)
The possibility of the new site was announced on April
5, 1985 in The New York Times, with Cuomo prominent in the
lead sentence,

as he "announced plans yesterday to put a

museum and memorial to Holocaust victims in a new apartment
building at Battery Park City."

The governor is mentioned

four times in the article, before Koch is finally named in
the sixth paragraph.

At this point, in the print media, the

governor has taken over as the prime player,

17Ibid.

and Koch's
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position

vis-a-vis

the

project

has

diminished.18

The

Mutagon was evolving and changing shape.
In a July 27, 1984 letter to GSA Administrator William
Diamond,

Cuomo had written to

"express my wholehearted

support and endorsement of the proposal of the New York City
Holocaust Memorial Commission to acquire leased space for the
establishment
House."

He

of a
wrote

'living memorial'
at that

time:

in the U.S.

"The

Custom

Custom House,

I

believe, is a particularly fitting site for this significant
endeavor.

Not only is the Custom House's grandeur and size

ideally suited to a memorial of this importance,

it is a

building endowed with a feeling of tradition and Old World
dignity which reflects the venerability of pre-war European
Jewish civilization so brutally destroyed by the Nazis....I,
therefore, urge you to approve the leasing of the U.S. Custom
House to the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, so
that it can be put to the noble purpose for which it is
preeminently suited."19
By

April

5,

1985,

Cuomo

was

telling

the

press,

"Objections have been raised that this building [the Custom

180reskes, The New York Times, op. cit. See also, Kevin
Freeman,
"New Location Approved in Principle for NYC
Holocaust Museum and Memorial", Jewish Telegraphic Agency
Daily News Bulletin. April 12, 1985, p. 3; and B. George
Allen, "Proposed Holocaust hall at Battery", New York City
Tribune. April 10, 1985.
19Letter from Governor Cuomo to GSA Administrator William
Diamond, July 27, 1984.
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House]

is an

inappropriate place to house the museum.1,20

Since nothing in the Custom House had changed in the nine
months since Cuomo had written the letter to Diamond, the
change must have occurred in the heads of Cuomo's political
entrepreneurs who dealt with the Jewish community.

They

determined that a connection with memorializing the Holocaust
would be politically good for Cuomo, because of the power of
that subject for the Jewish community.
of

linking him with

They then found a way

the project underway:

by making

a

generous offer of land and air rights to the Commission, in
exchange for Cuomo's becoming founding co-chairman.
As

Banfield

said

of

the

structure

of

influence,

government is decentralized from a formal standpoint, and has
many

possibilities

for

absolute

vetoes.

Therefore,

government could not function without an informal centralized
network of influence.

Political leaders are willing to pay

a price to such people of influence as newspaper publishers,
civic leaders, and other elected officials, in order to get
their support.
overcome

Chicago Mayor Daley and others

decentralization,

people who had influence.

and

they

"traded"

willing

political

to

credit

explain

with

other

Cuomo and his entrepreneurs did

likewise with Koch and the Commission.
was

"paid" to

why

Koch,

who

for creation of the

None of the players
was

getting

Commission

full

and the

planned Holocaust museum, was suddenly so willing to share
20Oreskes, op. cit.
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the limelight and the political benefits of the project with
Cuomo.

However, circumstances had placed Klein in a unique

position to wield considerable "political
both the mayor and the governor.

influence" with

After a bitter Democratic

primary battle for mayor in 1981 and another for governor in
1982, Koch and Cuomo were far from close political allies.
Klein, who was Koch's friend and at the top of his list of
contributors to both of those campaigns, surely must have had
an important role in bringing them together for the Holocaust
Commission and museum.
In 1982 Klein had been designated as the developer of
the Times Square redevelopment project in Manhattan.
strongly backed by Koch,

He was

and both the mayor and governor

endorsed and praised the project, which is connected with the
State Urban Development Corporation

(UDC).

In 1984,

the

project came before the City Board of Estimate for approval,
and both the governor and mayor testified glowingly on its
behalf.

In 1984, Klein's agreement with UDC made him liable

for all site acquisition costs up to the modest sum of $88
million.

Anything beyond that would be reimbursed,

with

interest, by the City, and Klein also had to pay about $25
million for subway improvements.

The Village Voice said that

Klein, "the heir to the Barton's candy fortune must see this
as

the

sweetest

deal

of

his

life."21

21D.D. Guttenplan, "Klein's Square",
December 15, 1987, New York City, p. 20.

(It

Village

may

be

Voice.
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coincidental that BPCA, the State agency responsible for the
new

site

for

the

Holocaust

museum,

was

organized

as

a

for

a

subsidiary of UDC.)
Klein's

position

as

the designated

developer

highly visible huge project that involved both the mayor and
the governor gave him leverage to act as a middle man between
them.

They had both placed their bets on him to make a

success of the Times Square project,
their own political positions.

and thus to increase

Thus, in early 1985, Klein

was in a unique position to make a "shiddach", a betrothal
agreement,

between

the mayor and the governor about the

creation of a Holocaust museum.
The

wheeling

and

dealing— in

Banfield's

term,

the

political influence— that led to the Commission's accepting
Cuomo's proposed site change is reflected in an article in
The New

York Times;

"Mr.

Frucher has

been

negotiating

aspects of the plan for months with the Holocaust Commission
and developers.

He said the Holocaust Commission would be

renamed the New York City/New York State Holocaust Memorial
Commission.
subsidiary,

Either
the

directly

commission

or

would

through
sign

a

a

lease

nonprofit
with

the

Battery Park City Authority for the site at the southern end
of the complex."

The article said an architect's rendering

had been done by James Stewart Polshek, dean of the Columbia
School of Architecture,

showing an apartment tower with a

residents' separate entrance over the museum.

Frucher is

296

quoted that the ground breaking is expected in the Fall of
1986,

making the site change a fait accompli before the

Commission voted.22
This vote formally took place on May 2, 1985, when a
general meeting of the Commission was held at the Regency
Hotel

on

Park

Avenue.

The

executive

committee

of

the

Commission, which was empowered to make final decisions, had
already approved the change of site, "in principle, subject
to further negotiations",

during the week of April

8.23

Once they had made their decision, they rounded up all of
their heavy players in the luxurious setting of the Regency's
Tent Room to get their decision rubber stamped.

Seated at

the head table were Rickman, Rabbi Mowshowitz (representing
Cuomo), Senator

Javits,

Morgenthau and Klein.
also present.

Comptroller

Harrison

J.

Goldin,

Former Mayors Beame and Wagner were

(Neither Koch nor Cuomo attended.)

Phil Rosen, an attorney from Weil, Gotshal & Manges,
presented a legal report: BPCA would control the land until
2069, giving a developer group that included some members of
the Commission the right to build a 525,000

square

building.

residential

building

400,000
and

square

125,000

would

feet
be

would

be

a memorial

a

museum.

foot

The

residential portion would either be sold as condominium units
or rented, depending on market conditions.

Profits would go

220reskes, op. cit.
23Freeman, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, op. cit.
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first to the developer group to pay back costs,

and the

remainder would be used by the Commission as a full-term
endowment for the museum.

BPCA would give the Commission two

separate leases, one for the apartment building's land and
one for the museum.
scheme" are "terrific".

Rosen said the advantages of "this
The new building would be built as

the Commission wished, and once construction costs were paid
back, there would be an endowment forever.
was

"politically

advisable",

because

the

Rosen added it
State

and

City

governments want it, and the Federal government is amenable.
He said BPCA had already voted the week before and approved,
with a letter of intent, and the mayor, governor, and New
York City Legal Department had given full approval.

Rosen

added that the approval of the Public Authority Control Board
was also needed,

and they would meet on May 8.

zoning approval was needed by May 20.

He said

The GSA deadline for

the Custom House was May 21, and the Commission wanted the
BPCA deal approved by May 20.
Klein announced that a group of developers, which he
said represented 80 percent of the developers in New York
City, had agreed to "join forces and oversee completion of
the project".

They included himself

(Park Tower Realty),

Zeckendorf, Fred Rose, Burt Resneck, Mack, and Leonard Stern.
He said the risk was whether the apartments would sell, but
if all went well, the Commission could build a major museum,
have an endowment fund, and not raise a great deal of money.
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Polshek then gave an architect's report, pointing out
that Site 14, the designated site at the southernmost tip of
Battery Park City, was "forever protected by sea and land,
with a view of Ellis Island and the Statue of Liberty.

He

explained the museum would have its own identity and seem
separated from the apartment tower.

He made a strong pitch

for the project, emphasizing that buildings in New York are
"often wedded together invisibly" and that the 34 story high
apartment tower would be

a

"background building".

This

explanation was always used by Commission leaders whenever
critics of the project pointed out the incongruity or even
the obscenity of putting a luxury apartment tower above a
memorial

to the Holocaust.

(It is a reflection

of the

impotence of the full Commission that they read of Polshek's
plan in The New York Times before they heard about it from
Commission leaders.)
After Polshek spoke, Klein presented another reason for
moving the site.

He said the Custom House rental would be

$600,000 annually and BPCA was charging only $1.00 per year.
Although he did not enumerate how, he said that the total
savings to the Commission would be $7 to $8 million a year,
if they chose Battery Park City.

He asked that someone move

that the Commission approve entering into a lease with BPCA,
and said the Commission would be converted into a New York
City-New York State Commission.
were to become

The mayor and the governor

founding chairmen,

and both were

to have
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rights of appointment to the Commission.

In other words,

there would be two heads instead of one— a City-State-private
Mutagon would be created.
During a question and answer session,
developer

group,

not

the

Commission,

Klein said the

would

have

legal

responsibility for the financing of the apartment building.
"No one will make any profit," he said.
gimmick.

"This is not a

The developer group will assist in the development.

The bank won't accept the signature of the Commission— it has
no money."

Someone asked whether the Commission could build

a museum without an apartment house at Battery Park City, if
enough money were raised.
State

was

giving

apartments— which
bidding.

the
is

Klein said "no".

Commission
usually

the

done

He said the

ability

with

to

build

bidding— without

There was to be an arbiter to determine what the

cost would be to build the apartment tower.

The Commission

would get the rights to build the museum free, and pay a fair
price for the right to build the apartment house, for which
they had the air rights.
The motion to move to Battery Park City was made by
Senator Javits, and seconded by Cuomo's representative, Rabbi
Mowshowitz
interests,

(which

would

on his part).

seem

to

present

It said:

a

conflict

"Resolved,

of

that the

Commission continue its discussions with Battery Park City
Authority and commence lease negotiations with the Authority
for a ground lease of Site 14 at Battery Park City."

The
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motion was accepted unanimously.

Mowshowitz then said the

governor had initiated the idea, and he asked for a formal
motion to thank him (which showed exactly where his interest
was).

This was agreed to, only after it was decided to also

thank

Koch.

Klein

closed

the

meeting

by

stating

the

Commission was determined to open the memorial museum in two
and a half to three years.24

At the end of 1985,

the

Commission had only $115,000 in assets, $50,000 of which came
from a special grant from the New York State Legislature.25
After the May 1985 meeting of the full Commission, which
voted to move the site to Battery Park City,
record

of

any

action

until

1986.

On

there is no

August

21,

1985,

however, Eric Lane, New York State Senate Democratic Leader
Manfred Ohrenstein's counsel and liaison to the governor's
office, wrote to Del Giudice, the governor's Secretary.

Lane

said he was "writing to make some suggestions with respect to
the

planned

proposal

to

reconstitute

the

New

York

City

Holocaust Commission into a New York State and City Holocaust
Commission."

Lane pointed out Ohrenstein's role in creating

a Holocaust exhibit and resource center in the New York State
Museum, for which the Senator had obtained $300,000 in State

24,,New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, General
Meeting, Official Minutes, May 2, 1985" and "Memo from
Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, May 3, 1985 meeting of
NYC Holocaust Commission".
25,lNew York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, Inc. ,
Report as at December 31, 1985, Eisner & Lubin, Certified
Public Accountants", New York City.
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appropriations.

He

then

suggested

that

Ohrenstein

be

appointed by the governor as one of the co-chairpersons of
the new board.
On

February

24,

1986,

the

six

directors

of

the

Commission gave their unanimous written consent for the name
to be changed to the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission.
This removed the word "City" from the title, and, in effect,
also removed Koch as sole titular head of the project.

It

was no longer a "City" commission, and therefore he was no
longer in charge.

The name change was officially approved by

the State Commissioner of Education,

who had granted the

Commission's provisional charter, on March 7, 1986.
On April 21, 1986, a special meeting of the Board of
Trustees of the museum

(then called The Museum of Jewish

Heritage), and a concurrent meeting of the Board of Trustees
of the Commission were attended by trustees Klein, Greenberg,
Meed and Michel.

The following resolutions were adopted:

State Senate Minority Leader Ohrenstein, whose district is
Manhattan, was elected a trustee and a co-chairman of the
board of both corporations;

Cuomo was elected a Founding

Chairman of both corporations; the lease between BPCA and the
corporation, dated January 16, 1986, was approved; any one of
the co-chairmen of the boards could execute the lease; and
David

Altshuler

corporation.

was

elected

project

director

of

the
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As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters,
addition of Ohrenstein,

as well as Cuomo,

the

complicated the

structure of the Commission and the roles of the players. The
Mutagon

not

only

gained

a

new

retroactive

Founding

chairman (Cuomo), but also a new Co-chairman head.

Co-

Frucher

said Ohrenstein was appointed by Cuomo because he "had been
so

intimately

involved

with

sustaining

the

Holocaust

Commission through legislative action and because he had a
strong personal

feeling

about

it,

felt

should be one of the three co-chairs."

strongly that he
Frucher described

Ohrenstein's appointment as "a combination of institutional
as well as political realities".
saying,

He then was more explicit,

"Fred went to the governor and insisted on it.

engineered that with Klein and Morgenthau."26

I

It must have

been a difficult selling job, because Koch said he was not
especially happy about it.
imposed himself.

He said:

"Manfred Ohrenstein

By that I mean he was not my choice."27

About a month after the new appointments,

on May 23,

1986 the Provisional Charter of the New York City Holocaust
Memorial

Museum

(granted April

27,

1984)

was

amended to

change the name of the corporation to the Museum of Jewish
Heritage.

Then,

in

October,

1986,

there

was

a

second

petition for amendment to the Provisional Charter, requesting
that the name become "The Museum of Jewish Heritage-A Living
26Frucher interview.
27Koch interview.
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Memorial to the Holocaust".

The reason for the name change

could best be summed up by a comment by project director
Altshuler at a June 16 meeting of the Commission:

"How can

you sell luxury apartments over a museum named the Holocaust
Museum?"28
At this June 16 meeting, the new names of the Commission
and museum were announced by Klein.
"founding
members,

co-chairman",

had

He said Cuomo, now a

appointed

50

new

many from outside New York City.

commission

Altshuler was

introduced as the new project director, and Shaike Weinberg,
formerly of Bet Hatfutsot Museum of the Diaspora in Tel Aviv,
as consultant.

(Weinberg later left the New York project and

became director of the museum being built
D.C.)

Projected completion

in Washington,

for the museum was

in three

years, Spring of 1989.
Klein said there was now a developers committee of "90
percent of the big developers in New York City", and that the
museum would cost about $90 million, with about $10 million
in materials donated by construction firms.
apartment tower would

cost

about

He said the

$100 million,

and that

income from sales should be about $160 million

(assuming

prices went up in the future) .

The shortfall to pay for

completion of the museum was $20 to $25 million.
said

the

Commission

had

embarked

on

an

Klein also

endowment

fund

28Notes of author, Commission meeting, Regency Hotel, New
York City, June 16, 1986.
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campaign to pay for operating costs
trying

to

raise

$40

million,

forever.

and had

They were

already

raised

$8

million.29
At this point, after Cuomo had rewarded "everyone and
anyone"

with

Commission

appointments

became

to

even more

the

of

Commission,

a rubber

stamp.

the

full

Cuomo-

appointed members were from as far away as Buffalo and never
came to meetings.

Some of the newly appointed legitimate

Holocaust experts were from out of the State or even from
other countries.

For the most part, Cuomo appointed people

who were from New York State (outside of New York City) and
were

in

three

categories:

1.

anyone

who

Conovitz

was

convinced had credentials making him or her knowledgeable
about the Holocaust (and some were "lightweights" at best);
2. Jewish communal leaders from throughout the State to whom
Cuomo owed political favors (in payment for campaign help);
3. a small number of Holocaust survivors.
The pivotal event of 1986 was the public lease signing
ceremony between the Commission and BPCA, on September 4 (see
Chapter

11).

especially

Fund

toward

the

raising
end

of

efforts
the

were

year.

intensified,
Meir

Rosenne,

Ambassador of Israel to the United States, was even brought
to speak at a high level fund raising supper given by Mr. and
Mrs. Ludwig Jesselson (who themselves pledged $500,000) on
29"Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein,
Report on NY Holocaust Memorial Commission meeting 6/16/86",
New York City, June 17, 1986.
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December 17.

This was the apex for the Commission, which

began showing signs of trouble by the end of the year.

By

December

in

31,

1986,

the

Commission

had

$1,674,148

contributions and $7,432,900 in pledged donations for a total
of $9,107,048.

In addition to Klein, Commission members S.

Daniel

Abraham,

Ronson

each

pledged

Leonard

pledged

$500,000,

Stern,

Peter

$1 million.30

and

was

now

Kalikow

Klein

doubling

and

had
his

Howard

previously
commitment.

However, as will be shown, at about this time the project
gradually began to deteriorate.

SUMMARY
At

the

beginning

of

1985,

BPCA

head

and

Cuomo's

political broker, Sandy Frucher, began courting the Holocaust
Commission away from the Custom House and toward Battery Park
City.

While the Commission and its Federal iron triangle of

forces that had obtained the Custom House appeared to be
going forward with that deal, a second deal was being made to
move the site to Battery Park City and make the governor an
equal

founding

co-chairman with Koch.

Frucher made the

Commission a deal they could not refuse, with air rights for
an apartment tower over the museum and a museum rent charge
of a symbolic one dollar per year.

The decision to move to

Battery Park City, which was approved by the full Commission

30New York Holocaust Memorial Commission,
Fundraising Status Report, December 31, 1986.

Year

End

in May 1985, was made official by the Board of Trustees on
April 21, 1986.

It is unclear why Koch agreed to share his

project with Cuomo, but Klein was in a position to act as a
middle man.

With Cuomo as a new Founding Co-chairman and

Ohrenstein as the governor's

newly appointed Co-chairman

(serving with Klein and Morgenthau), the project became that
of a City-State-private Mutagon with two heads and three sub
heads.

A public lease signing ceremony at Battery Park City

on September 4, 1986 was the Commission's high point.
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CHAPTER 11:

THE HOLOCAUST MUSEUM AS A REAL ESTATE DEAL

"The profits from this [condominium] are being used— a
la MOMA— to pay for the construction of the museum. I find
something profoundly disquieting about this arrangement....
Clearly some mixes are incompatible.
One wouldn't add a
condo at a cemetery, at the Lincoln Memorial, at Treblinka
itself." Michael Sorkin1
The deal that Governor Mario Cuomo and Battery Park City
Authority (BPCA) offered the New York City Holocaust Memorial
Commission at first seemed like a dream come true for the
Commission.

This

intervention by New York State,

which

changed the site of the project and the structure and size of
the

political

alliance,

later became

a nightmare,

after

circumstances changed and the State reneged on promises.

The

Mutagon, the changing polygon of political forces attempting
to implement the Holocaust museum, was becoming embroiled in
an

impasse.

complicated

As

will

structure

be

demonstrated,

of the

political

both

alliance

the

more

and the

extended time frame for the project's implementation resulted
in a stalemate.
The

plan to move to Battery Park City was probably

difficult for Mayor Koch to accept (although he did not admit
this when interviewed), because he was forced to share the
political glory associated with the project with Cuomo.

But

George Klein and the other leaders of the Commission, who
were trying to create what they deemed the best possible
1Michael Sorkin, "Reconstructing the Holocaust",
Village Voice. June 23, 1987, New York, p. 94.
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museum at the least cost, were overjoyed with the governor's
offer.
real

Battery Park City, the biggest and most expensive
estate

venture

in

New

York

City,

was

real

estate

development at its apex, and this was where Klein wanted to
be.
It was at this point that the plans for the museum took
off in a new direction and became a real estate venture,
created by a two-headed Mutagon of political forces.

(The

Commission subsequently dropped the word "City" from its name
as part of the deal with Cuomo and became the New York
Holocaust Memorial Commission.)

The Mutagon not only had two

heads, Koch and Cuomo, but these two heads were both playing
dual

roles.

They

were

dealing

with

the

Commission

as

respective heads of New York City and New York State, but
they were

also part

of the Commission— its

Founding

Co-

chairmen.
Once Klein had jumped at BPCA President Meyer S. (Sandy)
Frucher's idea of a luxury apartment tower on top of the
Holocaust museum— following the Museum of Modern Art's method
of the tower paying for the costs of the museum— there was no
serious opposition from the executive committee.

If such an

arrangement seemed obscene, or at least inappropriate, any
whispered questions were drowned out by Klein's enthusiasm
and ability to promote the plan.

From the very beginning, he

had architect Polshek's firm portray it in two and in three
dimensions,

and

then

emphasize

how

the

entrances

were
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different

and the complex would seem like two different

buildings.

Mega-developer Klein knew how to sell

a new

development project to his "clients", the Commission.
In private discussions among cynics familiar with the
Commission's
journalists,

project

(i.e.,

support

staff,

Jewish

and a few members who were not developers) ,

there were sarcastic comments about naming the apartment
complex

"Treblinka

Tower"

and

the

surrounding

"Auschwitz Avenue and Birkenau Boulevard".

streets

This reflected

their gut feeling that the idea of the combination of luxury
apartments and a Holocaust museum was not a fitting setting
for

memorializing

However,

Hitler's

six

million

Jewish

victims.

ideological and philosophical discussions had no

place in the meetings of the executive committee, presided
over by developer Klein.

The only serious discussion about

the combination was about whether the market value of the
apartments would be affected because of their location over
a museum with an unpleasant theme.

This was a real estate

deal.
Since this deal was for a site in Battery Park City,
some background on BPCA is necessary:
corporation,

BPCA

was

created

by

the

A public benefit
New

York

State

Legislature in 1968 to develop Battery Park City, a 92 acre
landfill site at the bottom of Manhattan, along the Hudson
River.

It is bounded by Pier A and Battery Park on the south

and Chambers Street on the north.

In 1979,

following a
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hiatus caused by New York City's fiscal crisis, BPCA prepared
a development

"Master

Plan"

that

zoned the property

for

different types of development: 42 percent residential, with
14,000

housing

units;

nine percent

commercial,

with

six

million square feet of office space opposite the World Trade
Center; 30 percent open space, including public parks, plazas
and esplanade; and 19 percent streets and avenues.
The Master Plan and design guidelines were prepared by
BPCA and Cooper, Eckstut Associates.

The designs of private

developers who respond to BPCA's Requests For Proposals (RFP)
must follow these Master Plan guidelines.

Battery Park City

includes the $2.5 billion World Financial Center,

a four-

building office complex of 6 million square feet that houses
the headquarters of Merrill Lynch & Company,
Company,

the

Home

Insurance

Company,

Dow Jones &

American

Express

Company, and Oppenheimer & Company.
In 1979 then Governor Hugh Carey,

Koch,

and Richard

Kahan, then president and chief executive officer of both the
State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) and BPCA, signed a
memorandum of understanding.

This allowed the UDC to condemn

the site, which was City-owned landfill.
agency

which

redevelopment.)

condemns

City

property

(UDC is a State
to

be

used

for

UDC then owned the land, which was released

from the City's financial and planning control.

The City

received in exchange one dollar and future profits and tax
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equivalents.

Ownership was to revert to the City after BPCA

bonds and funds advanced by the State had been paid off.2
Revenue
residential

collected

by

developments

BPCA
is

from

the

the

commercial

principal

source

and
for

repayment of outstanding bonds in the amount of $200 million
issued in 1972 and $185 million issued in 1986.

The revenue

will also support $400 million net in bonds issued to provide
funds for low and moderate income housing, under the Housing
New York Program.
the

State

This program, passed into law in 1986 by

Legislature,

(section

1974

of

the

Public

Authorities Law), created the Housing New York Corporation,
to develop low income housing.

It

also authorized BPCA to

assign excess revenues to secure bonds and notes issued by
the Housing New York Corporation for use by the City of New
York to subsidize low income housing.
is complete,

When Battery Park City

there will be a working population of about

31,000 in the offices and 20,000 to 30,000 residents in the
apartments.3
Olympia & York Developments Ltd., the Canadian-based
company owned by the Reichman family, developed and manages
the four office towers.

Although the family was instrumental

2Brendan Gill, "The Sky Line:
The New Yorker. August 20, 1990.

Battery Park City",

in

information on BPCA from "Battery Park City Fact
Sheet", office of Ellen Rosen, BPCA, New York City, 1986; and
Manual for the Use of the Legislature of the State of New
York. 1986-1987. Gail S. Shaffer, Secretary of State, Albany,
N.Y., pp. 713-714.
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in rescue efforts during the Holocaust and is philanthropic
to Jewish causes, Olympia & York is one of the few Jewish
development companies in New York City that did not donate
money

to

or

become

involved

with

the

creation

of

the

Holocaust museum in Battery Park City.
The

supposed

implementation

phase

memorial museum began in August 1986,

of

the

Holocaust

when the Holocaust

Commission and BPCA began to plan jointly for a public leasesigning ceremony on September 4 at Site 14, the southernmost
site.
would

This was designed as a highly visible event, which
engender

Personal

good

press

and

stimulate

fund

raising.

letters of invitation were sent to all past and

potential contributors.

In addition, 2,000 invitations were

mailed to Commission members,

elected officials,

survivor

organization leaders, major Jewish organizations leaders, top
contributors to United Jewish Appeal/Federation, clergy, the
Mayor's personal list, the Jewish Community Relations Council
list, museum associates, BPCA invitees, Community Board One,
Holocaust organizations, financial sector leaders, university
presidents and union

leaders.

Phone calls were made to

elected officials, the Executive Committee, the developers
committee, major contributors and other key people associated
with the projects.

(The developers committee included most

of New York's successful Jewish developers:

Larry Fisher,

Eugene Grant, Peter Kalikow, Earl Mack, Martin Raynes, Burton
Resnick, Howard Ronson, Frederick Rose, Stephen Ross, Jack
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Rudin,

Larry

Leonard

Silverstein,

Stern,

Robert

Sheldon

Tishman,

Solow,
Fred

Zeckendorf Jr. and Morton Zuckerman.)

Jerry

Wilpon,

Speyer,
William

Howard Rubenstein's

office sent out a press advisory and coordinated the press
operation, working with press personnel from BPCA and new Cochairman Senator Manfred Ohrenstein's office.4
A long agenda for the event was organized.
included:

Frucher; "Founding Co-chairmen" Governor Cuomo and

Mayor Koch;

Co-chairmen Klein,

Senator Alfonse D'Amato;

Morgenthau and Ohrenstein;

Elie Wiesel; Ernest Michel;

architect James Stewart Polshek.
president

Speakers

of

the

New

York

and

Rabbi Haskell Lookstein,

Board

of

Rabbis,

gave

the

invocation, and Cantor Joseph Malovany chanted a concluding
memorial prayer.

The press release said ground breaking was

"anticipated" in Spring 1987, with an opening "projected" for
1989.5
Meanwhile, J. Philip Rosen of Weil, Gotshal & Manges,
the Commission's pro bono attorney, was examining the leases
for the museum and for the apartment tower.

He wrote to

members of the executive committee on August 29, clarifying
certain points in the leases.

He emphasized that the base

4"Memorandum to George Klein, Robert Morgenthau, Manfred
Ohrenstein et al from David Blumenfeld, August 20, 198 6, re:
Lease Signing Ceremony".
5Press release, "Lease Signed for Site of Holocaust
Memorial Museum at Battery Park City", BPCA, September 4,
1986.
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rent for the land for the museum was $1.00 per year.6

One

paragraph discussed the right of the Commission to assign
completion of the apartment tower to a developer,
provides for this, only with the consent of BPCA.

The lease
The lease,

however, specifically forbids assignment to Klein or his Park
Tower Realty.

"The Authority wanted this express prohibition

in the Lease so that even the appearance of any sweetheart
arrangement

between

Mr.

Klein,

as

co-chairman

of

the

Commission, and the Authority is avoided," Rosen wrote.

He

also emphasized that the scheduled completion date of all
buildings was to be December 15, 1989.7
The 165 page lease for the apartment tower at Site 14,
which was

signed

with

great

fanfare

on

September

4,

is

between BPCA and the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission,
Inc.

The scheduled construction commencement date was April

15,1988,8 and the lease was to expire on June 17,
From commencement

of

the

lease

until

"Rent

Date", base rent rate was $1.00 per anum.

2069.

Commencement

For each lease

year (or portion thereof) from rent commencement date up to
but not including the first appraisal date, base rent was
$1,234,800 per anum.

For the lease year commencing on the

first appraisal date and for each lease year until the end of
6Letter from J. Philip Rosen to Executive Committee,
August 29, 1986, New York City, p. 1.
7Ibid., p. 3 .
8Lease between BPCA and New York Holocaust Memorial
Commission, signed September 4, 1986, p. 4.
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the term, rent was to be an amount per annum equal to six
percent

of

the

$1,234,800.

fair

market

of

the

land— not

less

than

For 15 years thereafter, base rent would not

exceed $1,420,020 per annum.9
The second lease, for the museum, (which was also signed
at

the

ceremony)

is between

BPCA and

"Museum

Heritage"— not the Holocaust Commission.

of Jewish

(These are two

separate legal entities, although their boards of trustees
are

identical.)

The

Commission

is

responsible

for

the

completion of the apartment tower (either by building it or
finding an outside developer to do so) and the museum board
is responsible for building the museum.

Under Article 3,

section 3.01 (a) the museum lease says: "For each Lease Year
beginning

on

the

Rent

Commencement

Date

and

continuing

thereafter throughout the Term, Tenant shall pay to Landlord,
without notice or demand, the annual sum of $1.00 per annum
(collectively, the "Base Rent") ."10

The term is until 2069.

Thus, BPCA expects to collect fair rental from the Commission
for the apartment tower, but only $1.00 per year from the
museum.

Neither the Commission nor the museum was paying any

money for the lease of the land from BPCA.

The museum and

the air rights to build the apartment tower over it were to
cost the museum only $1 a year.

9Ibid., p. 16.
10Lease between BPCA and Museum of Jewish
September 4, 1986, New York City, p. 9.
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316

The purposes for use of the land for the museum were set
out

in

Section

23.01

of

the

lease:

"Subject

to

the

provisions of law and this Lease, tenant shall use, occupy
and operate the Premises on all Business days during Business
Hours continuously and without interruption throughout the
Term as a museum, conference center, exhibition area, library
facilities,

archives

and

facilities

for

exhibitions,

scholarly research and other purposes consistent with the
purposes specified in Tenant's Certificate of Incorporation,
in

accordance

with

the

Certificate

or

Certificates

of

Occupancy for the Premises, the Master Development Plan and
the Design Guidelines, and for no other use or purposes."11
Through

the

terms

of the

lease,

the

State,

through

its

entity, BPCA, imposed on the Commission and the museum the
regulations concomitant with choosing New York State land as
a site.
In an earlier section, the lease had said:

" 'Business

Days' shall mean any day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or
a day observed as a holiday by either the State of New York
or the federal government and, as long as New York Holocaust
Memorial Commission, Inc. is the Tenant, the following Jewish
holidays:
(first

Rosh Hashanah

two

Passover

(2)

days),

(first two

11Ibid. , p. 51.

(both days), Yom Kippur,
Shmini

Atzereth,

(2) days and last two

Simchas

Succoth
Torah,

(2) days)

and
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Shavuoth

(both days).")12

As will

be demonstrated

in a

later chapter,

this definition of "business days" was to

cause

friction

future

between

the

governor

and

the

Commission.
As soon as the lease was signed, raising money and how
to go about developing the site became the two most important
topics in discussions about implementation.
the

executive

committee

immediately

At a meeting of

following

the

lease

signing, Klein said he estimated the museum would need $85$95 million to open.

He anticipated $65 million from the

sale of apartments, and thus said $3 0 million more was needed
in donations.

In addition, he wanted $30 million donated for

an endowment fund,
suggested
million.
develop

setting

for perpetual expenses and upkeep.
an

announced

fund raising goal

of

He
$75

The possibility of "flipping", or selling rights to
the

apartment

tower

to

a

developer,

was

also

discussed.13
At

an

October

6,

1986

meeting

of

the

executive

committee, professional staff and "Commission invitees" held
in Klein's office, he announced that the proposed budget for
the museum until May 31, 1987 was $7,795,000.

This included

$3 million for architects and consultants, $1,181,000 for a
"design team", $1,750,000 for "exhibit fabrication", $869,000

12Ibid. , p. 1.
13Notes of author, September 4, 1986 meeting at BPCA
construction office, following lease signing.
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for

research,

collections

and

administration,

$1,000,000 for construction and "soft costs".

and

about

A list of "top

prospects" for donations was handed out, and a "Division of
Top

Prospects"

was

divided

among

Klein,

Morgenthau,

and

Michel.14
By December 1986,

the project was already not being

implemented in a manner that boded success.

One significant

clue to the Commission's problems was a December 1 letter
from architect Polshek to Klein.

He wrote:

"I am concerned about the future of The Museum of
Jewish Heritage and the Memorial to the Holocaust.
we both agreed when we spoke last week,

As

there is a

general ennui— a sense of drift and lack of direction.
"For the past year and a half since we have been
working together, your energy and leadership alone have
held the effort together.

But since the signing of the

lease, you have become more and more isolated and the
Executive Committee more fragmented.

Obviously Fred

Ohrenstein and Bob Morgenthau can put little time into
this— this leaves you alone.

The perception is that you

have time, money, staff, and freedom from conflicts of
interest— all enabling you to be a one-man band, raise
30-40

million

dollars,

oversee

the

design

of

the

14"Memorandum from George Klein, Robert M. Morgenthau,
and Manfred Ohrenstein to Executive Committee, Professional
Staff, and Commission Invitees", September 12, 1986, New York
City.
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building and exhibits and be the political and spiritual
arbiter of its content.

This is obviously absurd.

You

cannot be expected to do this and I do not believe any
one

person— even

you— could

do

it

under

any

circumstances."
Polshek then went

on to

say this

was

a once-in-a-

lifetime opportunity that should not fail.

He offered the

following suggestions for implementation:

reorganize the

executive committee, with only five or six committed people
that meet once a week with an agenda that includes progress
reports on all phases of the project;
director;

develop

an

immediate

short

hire an executive
term

fund

raising

strategy; call in all pledges at once; get the Commission to
commit

itself

to

moving

ahead

to

the

point

of

actual

construction.
He concluded:

"It has always been my observation that

nothing tests the reality of a project or moves it along
better than

the necessity to spend money.

The

aura

of

reality created by the forward movement of architectural,
engineering and exhibition design documents will energize the
entire effort."15
Implementing a Holocaust memorial museum in New York
City, the center of the organized Jewish community in the
United States, sounds like it should be an easy job:

The

15Letter to George Klein from James Stewart Polshek,
December 1, 1986.
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large Jewish population,

concentration of Jewish wealth,

largest survivor population outside of Israel,

and highly

organized structure of the community should all contribute to
the project's being politically beneficial to the governor,
mayor and other elected officials,
implement.

and therefore easy to

By December, 1986, however, the implementation

had hit a number of snags.
Perhaps this was inevitable.
said:

As Pressman and Wildavsky

"People now appear to think that implementation should

be easy; they are, therefore, upset when expected events do
not occur or turn out badly.
success

We would consider our effort a

if more people began with the understanding that

implementation,

under

the

best

of

circumstances,

is

exceedingly difficult."16
The implementation phase was difficult for some of the
very reasons that sound as though they should have made it
easy:

Because the Jewish population of more than two million

is so vast,

many Jews

in the New York City metropolitan

region are blase about their affiliation with the organized
community.

In a small town with a small,

isolated Jewish

community, Jews often feel the need to "belong", but in New
York City this need is often met simply by living in the
ethnically Jewish "atmosphere"
events,

ethnic

(with synagogues,

food and restaurants,

cultural

organizations,

many

16Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation
(Second, expanded edition), University of California Press,
1979, p. xix.
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other Jews, etc. easily and plentifully accessible).

Thus

the large Jewish population does not necessarily mean that
most

individuals

affiliated

Jews

in this
who

population

would

be

are

largely

financially

or

active,

otherwise

interested in supporting the project.
As the center of organized Judaism, New York City is a
difficult locale to initiate a new, competing organization or
major project— competing for both financial contributions and
attention.

Even the large concentration of survivors does

not necessarily contribute to success, because their number
is great enough to have their own competing groups and powerhungry leaders.

Polshek also alluded to another serious

problem with implementation:

Klein made this project too

much his own personal effort,

which some potential major

contributors and other Jewish leaders resented.
Thus the governor stepped into what Frucher and his
other advisors said was politically important for him in the
organized

Jewish

community,

but

he

also

stepped

into

a

project that only seemed easy to implement on the surface.
Pressman

and

Wildavsky

explained

why

some

of

the

above

factors can cause delays and retrogression in implementation:
"Our normal expectation should be that new programs will fail
to get off the ground and that,
considerable time to get started.

at best,

they will take

The cards in this world

are stacked against things happening, as so much effort is
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required to make them move.

The remarkable thing is that new

programs work at all."17
In the case of the Holocaust museum, the new program
worked

as

well

as

Pressman

and

Wildavsky's

"normal

expectation"— for at more than five years after the first
lease was signed, it did not get off the ground.
reasons

are enumerated above.

vicious circle that
concrete
series

progress

in another

In addition,

there was a

impeded implementation:

(e.g.,

a temporary

location,

no visible,

exhibit

a ground

The main

breaking

or

lecture

ceremony)

because there was not enough money; and insufficient success
with fund raising because there was no concrete progress.
This was compounded by the lack of a master plan for fund
raising.
At

Polshek had alluded to all of this in his letter.
a

December

4,

1986

meeting

of

the

executive

committee, there was a sense that the project was drifting.
Klein announced that the Commission needed three to four
million dollars in the bank to move forward, that Polshek had
been owed half a million dollars for many months, and that
interior designers Chermayeff and Geismar (who had been hired
for the project) would also need to be paid.
the project as in a "crisis stage".

He described

When the need for a

finance committee and chairperson was emphasized, Klein kept
coming back to himself and to other developers, rather than
expanding

the

fund

17Ibid. , 109.

raising

base.

This,

again,

was

a
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reflection of his personalizing the project too much for its
successful implementation.
Government intervention was the subject of two informal
discussions

(non-agenda items)

at the meeting.

The week

before, Governor Cuomo's office had conveyed his displeasure
(or that of his attorneys) with the name of the museum, "The
Museum

of

Jewish

Holocaust".

Heritage-A

Living

Memorial

to

the

Now that he was, in effect, the landlord, his

intervention

regarding

the

name

could

not

be

ignored.

Although the reasons for his complaint were not spelled out
in detail, they were with regard to the emphasis on "Jewish
Heritage"

and

a

possible

Church

and

State

conflict.

Eventually, pressure from the governor's office forced the
Commission to change the name of the museum to "A Living
Memorial to the Holocaust:

Museum of Jewish Heritage".

(The

name was officially changed in November 1987 at a special
meeting of the board of trustees of the museum, and the next
month a petition for an amendment to the provisional charter
was filed with the Regents of the University of the State of
New York.

This was granted on April 22, 1988.)

The second item of government intervention concerned
Koch, rather than Cuomo.

Klein, Morgenthau and Michel said

they were meeting with him soon to ask him to seek donations
from potential big givers, principally the developers with
whom he had close relations.

They were also going to ask the

Mayor to host a fund raising breakfast for developers on
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January 10, 1987 in Gracie Mansion.

The possibility of a

dinner at Gracie Mansion for big givers a little later, in
March or April, was also discussed.
place

on March

speaker.)

23,

1987,

(This event did take

with Henry Kissinger

as

guest

Any fund raising help from the governor was said

to be contingent on compliance with his pressure for a name
change.
At the meeting, Klein rattled off a lot of numbers about
the lease for the apartment tower— that the lease was at a
rate of $40 per square feet, and that current bids were for
as much as $60 to $117.
allowed

them

to

He reminded the Commission the lease

either

build

the

apartment

building

themselves or "flip" a set of plans and a contract.

At one

point his numbers had the Commission making $35 million for
doing nothing, and at another point the Commission could lose
money.

As he said, it all depended on the market.

In other

words, at that point the project's financial success was not
assured

and

was

nothing

but

a

speculative

real

estate

deal.18
The next year, 1987, could be called the Commission's
year of "professionalization".

Commission Executive Director

David Blumenfeld, who had become superfluous, was eased out
and the Commission no longer had a director.

Instead, the

museum director, David Altshuler, was in charge (with Klein
18Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein,
"Report on this evening's executive meeting of Holocaust
Commission," December 4, 1986, New York City.
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still the unofficial ultimate authority)

Altshuler's three

year contract for $125,000 per year, plus moving expenses and
twenty percent

in lieu of benefits,

was approved by the

executive committee in November 1987.
Jeshajahu Weinberg had been hired as a consultant for
the New York project in the summer of 1985 and was a key
member of the professional team in 1987.

He said he came at

the request of George Klein, who wanted him because of his
experience

and

reputation

Diaspora in Tel Aviv.

in creating The Museum

of the

Weinberg said he told Klein that Klein

couldn't "run the shop" and create a museum without a person
on staff who knows the Holocaust.
in Altshuler

Weinberg therefore brought

(who had worked on the Washington Holocaust

museum project) as the project manager.
played

the

role

of

project

Blumenfeld's departure:
in the wall.

Earlier, Klein had

manager.

Weinberg

said

of

"He didn't know museums from a hole

Clearly he was not the guy to create a museum."

He was carried for a long time until he ultimately resigned
in 1988.
Like other S

WiiC

d id not want to be quoted, Weinberg said

one of the major problems with professionalizing the project
was Klein's personalizing it.
spirit.
said.

"George Klein is the moving

With him, the project stands or falls", Weinberg

He said Klein is much too possessive about the project

and doesn't give the director enough leeway.

"He [still]

acts

keeps

as the project

director very much

and

David
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[Altshuler] as deputy," Weinberg said.

"He shouldn't.

is talented and should have the power of decision.
very restrictive."19

David

Klein is

(In October 1988, Weinberg left his

consultancy on the New York project and became a consultant
for the Washington museum,

of which he became director in

April 1989.)
Besides Altshuler and Weinberg, professionals working on
the New York museum project in 1987 included Ralph Schwarz,
Senior Advisor;

Karl Katz

(of the Metropolitan Museum of

Art), Museum Consultant; a grant secretary, a research team
with associated free lancers; a Hall of Learning coordinator
and

computer

specialist,

with

consultants;

Polshek's

architectural firm; Chermayeff and Geismar's exhibit design
firm;

David

Edell

and

Linda

Low,

specialists

in Jewish

Federation big gifts, as fund raising consultants; and Luisa
Kreisberg,

a

specialist

in

museum

publicity,

as

public

relations consultant.
In addition to the expanded staff and consultants,
Survivors

Steering

Committee

and

a

Young

a

Leadership

Association were created (both for fund raising).

A slick

new booklet was created, primarily as a fund raising tool,
and a news brochure began to be issued every other month.
Fund raising was the prime concern:

the campaign was headed

by Peter A. Cohen, who was then Chairman and CEO of Shearson

19Interview with Jeshajahu Weinberg, Washington,
March 14, 1990.
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Lehman Brothers, Inc., Stephen Robert, Chairman and CEO of
Oppenheimer and Company, Inc., and Rosa Strygler, a survivor.
The announced goal was $100 million, with $70 million for
construction and $30 million for an endowment fund.
January 12

At a

meeting, the Survivors Steering Committee agreed

to raise $5 million among survivors.
At

a

September

15,

1987

meeting

of

the

executive

committee, only a few members were present, along with many
of the newly appointed staff and consultants.

Klein asked

for approval to sell the air rights for the apartment tower,
and, since there were no objections, he said he then assumed
he had the approval of the executive committee.

He said

Frucher had told him BPCA was about to seek a RFP for a major
hotel on the southernmost parcel east of the museum, and that
in the next six to eight months there would be RFPs for the
space between the north and south sections of Battery Park
City, which were undeveloped.

Klein said that based on this

information, he thought the timing was right for selling the
air rights for the apartment tower.

He said he thought it

was "impractical" for the Commission to build the apartments,
and that flipping the contract would yield about $110 per
square foot for property for which the commission was paying
only $40 per square foot.

Klein said the Commission would

therefore make about $28-30 million.

There was discussion
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about a November 9 symbolic ground breaking ceremony,

to

coincide with Kristallnacht.20
Then an unexpected event occurred, which was to have a
major
October

negative
19,

subsequent

impact on the project:

1987.

loss

After

the

stock

of high-paying Wall

Black Monday on
market

Street

crash

jobs,

and

luxury

residential property in the Wall Street area, such as Battery
Park City,

dropped in value.

Thus the bargain price the

Commission had agreed to pay BPCA for the right to build the
apartment tower was no longer a bargain.
ground breaking did not take place.

The November 9

At a November 12, 1987

meeting of the executive committee, there was still some talk
about flipping the air rights for the apartment tower.

Klein

said that before Black Monday the profit would have yielded
$30 million,

but now there was no

property value

was

or

would

assurance

become.

An

RFP

as

to what

was

being

prepared, but Klein now said there was "no rush" to sell.21
On

December

31,

1987,

the

total

in

contributions

$3,770,646, with $7,888,308 in receivables,

was

for a total of

20Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, "Exec.
Committee Meeting of NY Holocaust Commission 9/15/87",
September 24, 1987, New York.
21Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, "Exec,
committee meeting NY Holocaust Memorial Commission, this
morning", November 12, 1987, New York.
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$11,658,95422— far

short

of

the

necessary

amount,

which

continued to escalate as time went by.
Klein's push to sell the air rights in September was
followed by his being in "no rush" to do so in November, as
a result of Black Monday.

An unexpected occurrence caused

unexpected decisions to emerge:

besides the changed decision

on the air rights issue, there would be no further discussion
of a possible ground breaking on November 9.
effect

of

the

activities,

crash

drying

was

its

influence

up

or

reducing

philanthropic sources.
was

the

emergence

Another serious
on

fund

some

raising

potential

As Pressman and Wildavsky said, there

in

the

"decision

path

of

diversions not intended by the program sponsors.

numerous
The paths

of required decisions, as we can see, were soon characterized
by more unexpected elements than expected ones:

they were

anything but straight lines leading directly to goals."23
During 1988 more "diversions not intended by the program
sponsors" made the lines leading to their goals even more
circuitous:

the

site

changed,

Frucher

left

the

BPCA

presidency, and the original deal of $1.00 per year rent for
the museum
January,
copies

increased

Altshuler
to

dramatically

(see Chapter

sent a memorandum to the

Commission

chairmen

and

others,

12) .

staff,

In
with

recommending

22New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, End of Month
Statement— December 31, 1987.
23Pressman and Wildavsky, p. 112.
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breaking ground and beginning construction in the Spring.

He

said there would be a crucial executive committee meeting
around March 15, which would decide whether to break ground
and begin construction in early June.

In the meantime, fund

raising efforts would be stepped up.24
At the March 15, 1988 meeting of the full Commission, a
resolution

was

passed

to

authorize

ground

beginning of construction for June 1988.

breaking

and

A second resolution

authorized the launching of a capital campaign with a goal of
$70 million, plus $30 million for an endowment fund; and a
third, the establishment of inter-institutional links with
related institutions.25

The executive committee then met on

March 29 to agree on how to implement these resolutions.

A

decision was reached to have the ground breaking take place
on November 10, 1988.

SUMMARY
In 1986,

after Governor Cuomo offered the Holocaust

Commission the opportunity to own free air rights for an
apartment tower over their museum (and pay only $1 per year
rent

for

the

museum), the

consummate the deal.

Commission

moved

forward

to

Leases for both the museum and the

24The Museum of Jewish Heritage, Memo from David
Altshuler to Staff Planning Group, "Preparations for Decision
to Break Ground and Begin Construction", January 18, 1988,
New York.
25New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, Minutes,
Meeting held March 15, 1988, Regency Hotel, New York.
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apartment tower were signed with great fanfare at the Battery
Park City site on September 4, 1986.

The governor, the new

Co-chairman of the Mutagon, thus gained power in the polygon
of forces trying to create the Holocaust museum.

At this

point the coalition of political forces, the Mutagon, was top
heavy

and

"incestuous".

The

government

angle

had

two

government officials at the helm and the interest group angle
had three Co-chairmen.

The two officials in charge of the

government angle, however, were also officers of the interest
group angle.

Moreover, two of the three Co-chairmen of the

interest group were also elected government officials; and
Koch's political entrepreneur, Herbert Rickman, and Cuomo's ,
Frucher,

were members

of the

executive

committee

of the

Commission.
During the following year, the Commission became more
professional

with

increased

staff

and

consultants,

but

Despite,

the

raising money continued to be a problem.

increase in professionals, Klein continued to try to "run the
show".

He

was,

however,

subject

to

the

powerful second head of the Mutagon, Cuomo.

wishes

of

the

Cuomo's office

began pressuring for a name change, to make the museum appear
less Jewish,
conflict.

and therefore less subject to a Church-State

The Commission acquiesced.

In September 1987

Klein told the Commission the time was ripe for selling the
museum's air rights.

However, after Black Monday on October

19, he reversed this, and a planned November 9, 1987 ground

breaking ceremony never took place.
off until June

1988,

Ground breaking was put

and then until November 1988.

The

longer the implementation phase languished, the more external
and

internal

circumstances

Mutagon's success.

interfered

and

impeded

the
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CHAPTER 12:

NEW YORK STATE AS A FICKLE LANDLORD

"When a man you like switches from what he said a year
ago, or four years ago, he is a broad-minded person who has
courage enough to change his mind with changing conditions.
When a man you don't like does it, he is a liar who has
broken his promises.®8 Franklin P. Adams1

With plans progressing for a November 10, 1988 ground
breaking ceremony at Site 14, both the New York City and New
York State Founding Co-chairmen of the Mutagon intervened and
delayed implementation plans again.

Commission co-chairman

George Klein announced to the executive committee on June 27
that they had been offered a new deal by the governor and
Battery Park City Authority

(BPCA), based on a connection

made by the mayor's office.

NOGA, a Swiss firm, wanted to

build a luxury hotel in Manhattan.

(NOGA is owned by an

internationally known philanthropic Jewish leader, the Swiss
head of the World Sephardi Federation, Nessim Gaon.) Gaon had
approached

City Hall,

and Koch deputy Robert

Esnard had

introduced him to BPCA, because such a project in Battery
Park City would give New York City funds for low- and middleincome housing.

BPCA president Meyer S. (Sandy) Frucher, who

was also part of the Mutagon as a member of the New York
Holocaust Memorial Commission's executive committee,

then

recommended Site 14, site of the museum and apartment tower.

1Nods and Becks. 1944, quoted in The Cynic's Lexicon by
Jonathan Green, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1984, p. 2.
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At this point in the new deal the two heads of the
Mutagon, Koch and Cuomo, were working in tandem:
seemed good for both of their images,
City, the State, and the Commission.

the deal

as well as for the

Frucher, representing

Cuomo and BPCA, suggested that the museum move to Site 13
(immediately to the north)

and be free-standing, with the

capability of selling the Site 14 air rights to NOGA.

Klein

said the market for selling air rights for an apartment tower
was "very soft", and recommended this as a good deal.

There

would also be savings in building the museum, because without
the apartment tower, the foundation could be shallower.
Mr. Gaon was to enter into a letter of intent with BPCA
for the purpose of building a hotel or apartment house.
would

then

give

a

letter

to

the

Holocaust

BPCA

Commission,

changing the site and giving a lease at $1 per year for 86
years.

The Commission would then enter an agreement with

NOGA for transfer of the 400,000 square feet of air rights.
NOGA would pay $30 million for the transfer and a separate $2
million donation.

BPCA would also make the same offer to

other developers.

A State Environmental Impact Study (EIS)

was

necessary,

with

a

ULURP

(Uniform

Land

Use

Review

Procedure) for the hotel but not the museum, according to the
BPCA attorney.

Both projects would need to be approved by
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the

State

Public

Control

Authority,

which

oversees

the

issuing of bonds for Battery Park City.2
Based on this new deal, in September 1988 the Commission
was proceeding with plans for a November 10 ground breaking
at Site 13, rather than Site 14.
September

Newspapers reported on

25 that the Koch administration had reached a

preliminary agreement with NOGA, in which the Swiss company
could build a hotel at Battery Park City in exchange for a
$50 million payment to BPCA, most of which would be passed on
to the City to build low- and middle-income housing, and an
additional $3 0 million payment for the Holocaust museum.
At this point,

however,

Cuomo,

one of the Mutagon's

political allies, decided to withhold his support from this
particular

deal

(although not

project).

Cuomo's press officer announced the governor had

not endorsed the deal.

from the Holocaust museum

This reflected a conflict between

Cuomo and the other Founding Co-chairman of the Mutagon,
Koch.

The governor felt City Hall had intervened on his

turf, by unilaterally releasing information on the deal to
the press.

Possibly there was also friction between Cuomo

and Frucher, although no one will admit this.

At about the

same time, Frucher, who had gotten the governor involved in
the

Mutagon

for

the

Holocaust

museum

project,

and

had

encouraged the NOGA deal for BPCA, announced he was leaving
2Memo to Senator Ohrenstein from Rochelle Saidel.
"Report on Executive Committee Meeting of New York Holocaust
Memorial Commission", June 28, 1988, New York.
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BPCA to take a job with Olympia and York (developers of the
World Financial Center in Battery Park City).3
Ultimately the ground breaking scheduled for November
10,

1988

did not take place,

leaders of the Mutagon,
Founding

Co-chairman)

because

Cuomo,

one of the

at odds both with Koch (the other
and

with

the

Co-chairmen

of

the

Commission, took control as the central decision-maker and
blocked

it.

The

governor

prevented

actors

under

his

authority from acting (e.g., the Department of Environmental
Conservation did not act to approve an EIS). This prevention
of

requisite

action,

in

turn,

stopped

the

Holocaust

Commission from carrying out the action of breaking ground.
The governor had said the announcement of the ground breaking
was

"surprising

and

premature",

and

that

substantive

questions needed answers before the project proceeded.4

By

blocking the NOGA deal, one head of the polygon of political
forces creating the Holocaust museum project was at least
delaying the project, if not ultimately killing it.

However

the

Mutagon

governor

coalition.

did

not

sever

himself

from

the

Iron triangle and issue network theories do not

account for such a situation in a political coalition.

3Thomas J. Lueck, "City and State at Odds on Battery
Park Hotel Plan", The New York Times. September 25, 1988, New
York, p. 38, and Neil Barsky, "Holocaust museum and hotel
linked", Daily News. September 25, 1988, New York, p. 16.
4Ibid.
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As Banfield said, in any given situation, there may be
an actor who is autonomous and cannot be controlled.5 In the
case of the museum, the mayor, the governor, and Commission
co-chairmen developer Klein,
Morgenthau,

and

State

District Attorney Robert M.

Senate

Minority

Leader

Manfred

Ohrenstein, all had structures of control which were linked
with each other in varying ways outside of the project.

For

the Holocaust museum, they were all supposed to be leading
the

effort

and

working

together.

However,

because

he

controlled the site, Cuomo was able to act autonomously and
create an impasse.

Banfield said:

"Control over an actor

may be secured only by an exercise of power.

Or, to say the

same thing in another way, power is the ability to establish
control."6

Clearly, by intervening in the NOGA deal,

the

governor established that he (and not the mayor or Klein or
anyone else) could act autonomously and take control of the
Holocaust project.

He was supposed to be an integral part of

a political coalition created to carry out the project, but
at this point he became the obstacle.
Frucher recalled the NOGA deal as follows:
"I got a phone call from City Hall that said there
was someone in New York who was looking to do a five
star hotel, that was interested in doing it possibly at

5Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press
of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p. 310.
6Ibid., p. 312.

the

tip

of

Battery

gentleman.

Park

[City].

I met

His name is Nessim Gaon.

with

this

He came in and

said he wanted to build a five star hotel.

Initially we

talked about doing it and having within it the Holocaust
museum.

Then one thing led to another and the architect

Jim [James Stewart] Polshek came up with the idea of
moving it to a second site.
second

site

as part

Gaon would purchase the

of the deal

Holocaust museum $30 million.

and would pay the

In exchange for that, he

would get additional FAR [Floor/Area Ratio] on his site
which would
dollars.

allow

We

for him to

renegotiated

the

recoup

some

deal.

The

of

those

deal

was

probably one of the most lucrative deals that we had at
Battery Park City. Unfortunately during my transition
the deal was undone.

That's the story."

Frucher said his leaving BPCA "killed" the Holocaust museum
project.7

It at least weakened it, because he had been the

project's broker with the governor, wearing the hats of both
a government official and a Commission executive committee
member.
Museum director David Altshuler agreed that Frucher's
departure was detrimental.
of

Cuomo's

staff

He said other high level members

considered

the

NOGA-BPCA-Holocaust

Commission deal Frucher's "self aggrandizement".

He said

interview with Meyer S. (Sandy) Frucher, New York City,
February 4, 1991.
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others on the governor's staff were not
Frucher's NOGA deal,

and that after he

"so happy" with
resigned

someone

(unnamed) went to the governor and said NOGA was dirty.

This

was compounded because "Sandy went over to the developers"
and took a job with Olympia and York.8
Asked whether BPCA, i.e. the governor, reneged on the
deal with the commission, Frucher remained loyal to his old
friend, Cuomo.

He said:

"Yes, BPCA and the State did renege

on the deal with the Commission.
governor.

I don't know who drove that."

were many rumors,
NOGA's

I don't know if it was the

integrity.

Frucher said there

and "people on the outside" questioning
He

said

he

raised

that

issue

with

Morgenthau, "who checked [NOGA] out, and they checked out."
Frucher said there was a rumor about other real estate people
(e.g. Peter Kalikow or Jerry Speyer) in the area wanting to
stop the hotel, but he could not confirm this.

Whether the

governor "drove" the reneging or it was one of his high level
advisors (e.g., Fabian Palomino, then Chairman of the Board
of BPCA and a very close personal friend of Cuomo's) is not
important, because the governor must have approved the move.
By November 1988, after the governor's stonewall, the
situation had deteriorated rapidly and the implementation
phase was not moving forward.

On November 2 Altshuler sent

a memorandum to executive committee members, telling them a

8Interview with David Altshuler, New York City, December
20, 1990.
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decision had been made the night before to postpone the
ground breaking for the museum.

(The letter does not say who

made the decision; it was most likely Klein, with co-chairman
Robert Morgenthau's , Koch operative Herbert Rickman's and
Altshuler's agreement.

Ohrenstein was not consulted.)

A

"Dear Friends" letter, which accompanied the memorandum, was
sent to a wider mailing list.
"We

are

groundbreaking,
postponed.

It said:

writing

to

scheduled

inform

you

for November

10,

that

our

has been

As you may know from having read the papers

a few weeks ago, we are awaiting approval by the Battery
Park City Authority and the Governor's office of a plan
that will result in a site change for the Museum to a
plot immediately adjacent to the one it was originally
to occupy.

To date, the review of the plan has not been

completed, and it would be imprudent for us to break
ground without those approvals.
chosen

November

10

as

our

As you know, we had

groundbreaking

date

to

coincide with the 50th anniversary of Kristallnacht,
although actual construction was and still is scheduled
to begin in the spring.
"We are very excited about the pending plan, for
its successful conclusion will provide us not only with
a freestanding Museum adjacent to our original site but
also with a major addition of $30 million to our capital
campaign,

permitting

us

to

build

and

maintain

the
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institution

we

have

so

long

anticipated.

We

are

confident that in the very near future, when we do break
ground and begin construction, we will have reason to
rejoice,

for we will at long last be on our way to

realizing our dream of honoring the six million who died
by erecting a permanent structure of public education
that will
lived.

memorialize

them

by

remembering

how they

We know we can count on your continued good

support in this important endeavor."
The letter was signed by co-chairmen Klein and Morgenthau.9
Reading between the lines, the letter said the governor
had intervened and prevented the ground breaking from taking
place.

This type of action cannot be analyzed as part of an

iron triangle

or issue network of support.

Instead,

an

integral part of the Mutagon of political forces had used his
autonomous

authority

to

cause

project he was supporting.

detrimental

delays

for

a

The leaders of the Commission

were fearful this intervention could not only delay but could
possibly terminate their project, by disrupting momentum and
drying up fund raising.

They were therefore trying to assure

their contributors and potential contributors that they, too,
had

power

to

control

the

situation,

and

that

the

implementation of the project was still a reality.

9Letter from George Klein and Robert Morgenthau to "Dear
Friends", undated but fax paper dated November 2, 1988, New
York.
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As Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky said in their
analysis of the failure of the implementation phase of the
Federal

Economic

Development

project

in Oakland,

Administration's

employment

"what seemed to be a simple program

turned out to be a very complex one,

involving numerous

participants, a host of differing perspectives, and a long
and tortuous path of decision points that had to be cleared.
Given these characteristics, the chances of completing the
program with the haste its designers had hoped for— and even
the

chances

reduced."10

of

completing

it

at

all— were

sharply

The Mutagon polygon, unlike the iron triangle

or issue network, is so complex that it has the capability of
one of its leaders doing damage, while remaining part of the
polygon.
The delay in the ground breaking was orchestrated by the
Cuomo administration.

Besides proving the governor and not

the mayor was the lead player for BPCA affairs, his advisors
needed to carefully determine whether his close affiliation
with the Holocaust museum project was, in fact, good for his
political

future.

The

delay

was

very

serious

Commission, because its credibility was at stake.

for

the

It was not

a delay the other members of the coalition had anticipated or
wanted,

but

was

deliberately

planned

by

the

Cuomo

administration (which was part of the pro-museum coalition).
10Jeffrey
L.
Pressman
Implementation. Second Edition,
Press, 1979, p. 94.

and
Aaron
Wildavsky,
University of California
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As Pressman and Wildavsky said:
unplanned,

accidental

"Not all the delays were

occurrences;

some

were

caused

intentionally by participants who wanted to stop an undesired
action or to step back and reassess the development of the
program."11 At this point, after Frucher's departure, Cuomo
(with his advisors such as Palomino)

was reassessing his

affiliation with

deciding whether he

the

Commission

and

should be so closely connected with it.
At the end of September 1988 a new player entered the
scene,

which undoubtedly was

a factor

in the governor's

stonewalling on the NOGA deal and delaying the Holocaust
museum.

After Frucher resigned, Cuomo appointed as president

of BPCA David Emil, a 37 year old deputy commissioner in the
State Social Services Department and the son of a prominent
real estate developer.

Although he is Jewish, he is not an

actively committed Jew like Frucher.

Emil acted as though

this was just another real estate deal.
and

Cuomo were

Frucher

doing

campaigns.

close
major

friends
behind

Moreover, Frucher

and political

the

scenes

work

allies,
for

Cuomo's

Emil lacked these personal ties with Cuomo.

The New York Times said of Emil's appointment:

with

As

"To political

mavens, the main question is not what sort of leadership Mr.
Emil will give Battery Park City, a complex of offices and

11Ibid., 122.
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apartments

in

lower

Manhattan,

but

rather

what

sort

of

relationship he will have with the Governor."12
A

November

21

story

in a weekly

that

serves

lower

Manhattan said Emil had told the newspaper that a new plan
for use of Sites 13, 14, and 1 would be announced in early
December.

(Sites 14 and 1 are the southernmost sites, with

Site 1 east of Site 14; Site 13 is adjacent to and north of
Site 14.)
point.

"We are still working with the principals at this

There is no final resolution of the treatment of

sites 1, 13 and 14 yet," Emil said.

He said board chairman

(and Cuomo's special counsel and long-time friend) Palomino
and other board members did vote to accept the NOGA proposal
in August.

However, they later shelved it because they had

believed they were originally approving only a letter of
intent, and not the transaction itself.

Emil said:

discussing conceptual ideas and some specifics.
any other real estate deal."

"We're

It's like

He added that he expected to

seek a zoning change for commercial use of one of the sites
to allow for construction of a hotel, but he declined to say
which

site.

He

also

pointed

out

that

the

museum

had

controlled Site 14 since 1985, and had been unable to develop
it.13

12Elizabeth Kolbert, "Albany Notes:
Naming of Battery
Park City Head Expected", The New York Times. September 18,
1988.
13Joanna Molloy,
"Holocaust Museum Deal Expected",
Battery News. November 21, 1988, New York, p. 14.

The transaction with NOGA and the Commission seems to
have been a victim of the changing of the guard, with Emil
replacing Frucher, who had made the NOGA deal and was close
to Cuomo,

Klein and the Commission.

Frucher had been a

member of the executive committee and an active participant
at

its

meetings,

governor.

as

well

as

representing

BPCA

and

the

He thus was part of three angles of the polygon.

In fact, housing the Holocaust museum in Battery Park City
had been his idea.
project,

While he had a "paternal" interest in the

Emil was an outsider and representing only BPCA.

Although it cannot be proven, Emil was also probably acting
as a "fall guy" for Cuomo, whose interest in the project
seems to have waned over time.
Frucher

as

the

governor's

Palomino took over

personal

negotiate with the Commission.

representative

from
to

What Frucher had been willing

to push through and implement as quickly and cooperatively as
possible, Emil and Palomino wanted to stonewall.

They did

not want to be responsible for possible precedents engineered
by

Frucher that

would

make

them,

the

governor

and

BPCA

vulnerable to criticism.
In comparison with Frucher's deep personal involvement
with the Holocaust project, Emil's apparent interest was only
routine and his lack of knowledge was remarkable.

When asked

in an interview about the complicated and changing structure
of the political coalition behind the project, he said:
are

you

asking

me?

I'm not

involved

in

the

"Why

Holocaust
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Memorial Commission."

He said he did not know the governor

was a Founding Co-chairman, nor anything about the details of
the Commission.

He also did not know that appointments to

the Commission had been made by the mayor and the governor.
Emil said:

"My experience of [the Commission] is that

it is a creature of a small group of people who are not
politicians, and it happens to have politicians involved in
it.

It's

really

run

by

George

Klein."

Emil

said

he

considered the Commission "indistinguishable from any notfor-profit entity in New York State.

It has no greater or

lesser governmental role— kind of like the Museum of Modern
Art, in the sense that there are government officials who are
interested in its successful activities for various different
reasons

because— in

the

case

of

the

Holocaust

memorial

because of the commemoration of the event and so forth, in
the case of the Museum of Modern Art for other reasons— but
it essentially functions as a not-for-profit organization
that has sort of ex officio political
levels who have different interests."

figures at various

Emil said he had never

heard of Herbert Rickman, Koch's political entrepreneur who
had initiated the project and been heavily involved until
Koch's departure at the end of 1989 (more than a year after
Emil's arrival on the scene).14

14Interview with David Emil, CEO of Battery Park City
Authority, August 5, 1991, New York City.
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Besides Frucher's departure and his replacement by Emil,
another possible reason for Cuomo's decreasing enthusiasm for
the Holocaust museum project may have been his interest in
running for President.

Although promoting a particularistic

Jewish museum in New York City was politically good for being
reelected governor, it could appear somewhat parochial in a
race for President.

Palomino and another Cuomo counsel, Evan

Davis, repeatedly told the Holocaust Commission co-chairmen
and

executive

amendment

committee

issues.

they were

They were

concerned

concerned

about

first

Cuomo would

be

accused of supporting a project that could be questioned with
regard to separation of Church and State (see Chapter 14).
While The New York Post is not always an accurate news
source, on December 8, 1988 it broke a story on the NOGACommission-BPCA situation that was to prove true in many
respects.

Primarily, the article revealed that BPCA had said

for the first time that the Holocaust museum would have to
pay for its lease.

Instead of the previously agreed upon $1

per year (in the lease for Site 14), the museum would have to
pay "market rent for cultural institutions",
Emil.

Emil

told the

Post

the

according to

amount would be

"in the

millions" over the period of the lease, running (as do all
Battery Park City leases) until 2069.

The rent for private

non-profit arts groups that signed leases in the two previous
years in buildings not owned by the city had averaged $10 to
$12 per square foot annually, according to the article.

For
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the museum's 150,000 square feet on Site 13, this would make
the annual rent between $1.5 million and $1.8 million per
year.
Regarding NOGA, the Post said that, under Frucher, BPCA
had passed a resolution on August 25 to take "all steps
necessary
parcels

and

appropriate

related

to

the

13 and 14 in accordance with"

between the parties.

development

of

letters of intent

But Emil, who had not been present at

the August meeting and succeeded Frucher in October, said the
vote "merely authorized me to investigate the NOGA deal".
Palomino, Cuomo's special counsel and chairman of BPCA, told
the Post; "We just authorized a letter of intent, talking
about what we thought we intended to do....We had certain
reservations."

He added that the legislation that created

BPCA required that it be paid rent on all parcels, which the
museum would not have done under the NOGA agreement.15

(The

original lease also did not require payment of rent, except
for the symbolic $1 per year.

This symbolic payment seems to

have

of

fulfilled

leadership,

the

letter

but not Emil's.

the

Again,

law

under

Frucher's

this may have been a

reflection of Cuomo's shrinking interest in the project and
grander ambitions to run for national office.)
In 1991, Emil explained the reneging on the NOGA deal
and the change from the $1 per year rent as follows:
15Edward A. Adams, "Museum Jinxed Again:
Holocaust
memorial faces new delays at Battery Park City", The New York
Post. New York, December 8, 1988, p. 73.
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"There was

a lease entered

into

in

1986 which

allowed the Holocaust Memorial Commission and the Museum
of Jewish Heritage to build a building on one of our
sites— 14, which would have contained the museum in the
base and a residential building on top.

And the actual

rent that was paid under that lease was much more than
$1 a year— [it was] $45 per square foot valuation of the
property [for the residential portion of the complex].
But the thing you have to realize in order to understand
the transaction from the economic point of view and from
the Authority's point of view is that the Authority did
not recognize the square footage of the museum for the
purposes of our zoning calculations.

In a nutshell we

were allowing a bigger building to be built than might
have otherwise been built.
that

portion

of

the

And we were getting paid for

building

allowed on the site anyway.

that

would

have

been

So we said to the Holocaust

Memorial Commission, you can build a bigger building
than the site currently allows and we won't charge you
in excess of the what's presently allowed.

Now, what

then happened is the Holocaust Memorial Commission was
unable to find a builder that was interested in building
a residential tower on top of the museum."
Emil

said

the

Holocaust

Commission

then

looked

for

another transaction, in which they tried to sell the entire
lease to NOGA.

He said one critical problem for BPCA was
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that there was no public bid process for the site.

"Land

here is for public bid, not through private deals," he said.
"As regards the question of how rent came to be charged on
Site 13, the position of the Authority and the position of
the governor in this particular regard was,
you a lease on Site 14.

You chose to sell the site and

you're going to make a $30 million profit.
got for the sale.

'Look, we gave

That's what they

Now you made a $3 0 million profit and you

want us to give you another one.'"
When it was pointed out to Emil that the Commission
didn't sell
scenario:

the lease to NOGA,

he offered the

"It didn't go through,

but

if they did

it...we weren't going to give them another one.
go on forever.

following
sell

This could

We could give them every piece and soon they

would have hundreds

of millions

of dollars."

Emil

then

admitted this "seriously would ever happen", and said:

"If

that transaction had gone forward it was restructured through
a

negotiated

understanding

with

the

Holocaust

Memorial

through which essentially the Authority agreed to act as
agent to sell the property for $32 million.

And the Memorial

Commission agreed to rent the new site."16
At a December 14,
development

committees

1988 meeting of the executive and
of

the

Holocaust

Commission,

information in the Post was confirmed and amplified.
Klein

was

out

of

the

16Emil interview.

country,

Morgenthau

the

Because

conducted

the

meeting and Klein "attended" by speaker phone.

Morgenthau

reported as follows on a meeting he and Klein had held with
Emil and Palomino a week earlier:

BPCA had informed the

Commission the NOGA deal was definitely off, and would be
given no further consideration.

BPCA intended to find more

than one developer to bid on a deal that would place a
residential apartment building on Site 14, with the museum
moving to Site 13

(as in the NOGA deal) .

The apartment

developer would pay the museum $32 million for lease rights.
BPCA had figured the rent for the museum at Site 13 should be
$10 million or more over the life of the ground lease, with
the museum paying $5 million (or half of the rent) up front.
Another $5 million would be paid later, including a share of
the proceeds from museum admissions.

BPCA had told Klein and

Morgenthau it would be illegal to give anyone any site rentfree due to provisions in the 1972 bonding agreement.

BPCA

had also said they would know within two weeks whether they
had developer interest or not for Site 14.

If so, they would

put out a challenge bid by mid-January 1989.
The loss of free ($1 per year) rent was a major blow to
the Commission.
meeting:

Other problems were also discussed at the

The letter of agreement for the new lease was to

expire at the end of December, 1988, with a requirement for
the museum to submit schematics by then.

Although they had

not been developed because the NOGA deal had not been firm,
it was expected that something could be worked up to meet the
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legal requirements.

If the lease was renewed,

BPCA would

want the museum to begin paying rent of $100,000 per year.
Frucher arrived toward the end of the meeting and said the
governor was the Commission's friend and that "someone else"
was causing the problems.

He said the governor called him

almost daily out of genuine concern about the museum.
seems highly unlikely for several reasons:

This

1. Frucher was no

longer with BPCA and not in a position to know the exact
status of the project; 2. This was not ever a project which
the governor made a personal day-to-day priority; 3. Whoever
the "someone else" was would have to be subordinate to the
governor;

4.

discuss with

The

governor

Frucher

had

more

important

on the telephone,

issues Frucher worked on for him.

issues

such as

to

campaign

Perhaps in this context

the museum was occasionally a topic of conversation.
Although the governor had distanced himself and Frucher
had left BPCA, Cuomo remained "Founding Co-Chairman" and the
Mutagon remained in place.

There was still agreement there

should be a Holocaust museum, but there were now negotiations
within the polygon regarding the logistics of making it a
reality.

The

executive

committee

authorized

Klein

and

Morgenthau to go back to BPCA to obtain an extension of the
lease and assurances that BPCA would put on the table by
January 15 any names of potential developers for Site 14.
They also wanted BPCA to agree to return to the NOGA deal, if
no other developer emerged.

As he had at earlier impasses,
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Altshuler expressed fears about the project's losing momentum
(and thus
said,

funding).17

there was the

Again,
emergence

as

Pressman

in the

and Wildavsky

"decision path

of

numerous diversions not intended by the program sponsors.1118
On February 15,
decided

to

approve

1989 the executive committee met and
BPCA's

acceptance

of

an

offer

by

a

developer to build an apartment building on Site 14, the
original site of the museum (with the museum free standing on
adjacent Site 13) .

Although BPCA said they would have in

hand three offers for development of an apartment building by
January 15, one month after that date there was only one such
offer.
meeting:

The name of the developer was not revealed at the
Klein said he did not know the name and did not

want to know.
Klein said he and Morgenthau had been meeting with Emil
and Palomino.

They had been told the idea of a hotel had

been turned down by BPCA because it would have been subject
to a change of zoning, an EIS, and approval of the Public
Authorities Control Board.

The new deal, which still needed

approvals from the City and BPCA, would, like the NOGA deal,
give $32 million to the museum.
BPCA for about $4 million.

Land would be rented from

On March 1, BPCA would send a RFP

for any deal that matched the one in hand.

There would be a

17Memo from Meg Reed to Senator Ohrenstein, "Holocaust
Commission Meeting - Executive and Development Committees December 14, 1988", New York, December 15, 1988.
18Pressman and Wildavsky, p. 112.
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sixty day waiting period, with a thirty day extension.

BPCA

would accept only bids materially higher than the one in
hand.

There would then be thirty days for analysis, and then

two weeks for sealed and final bids between any parties that
remained.

Lease terms would be attached to the RFP (i.e.,

terms by which $32 million would go to the Holocaust museum) .
For an apartment building, no EIS or rezoning was required.
Upon receipt of the $32 million, the Holocaust museum
would

give

payment.

to

BPCA

This would

$5

million

leave

$27

for

its

required

million

rental

for the museum.

Payment should be the next Fall, when the apartment house
developer would sign the lease with BPCA.

The museum had to

pay an additional $5.2 million to BPCA, for an 80 year lease
(with no rental increases within the 80 years).

This would

be paid at a rate of 10% of any admissions contributions to
the museum and interest from tax free bonds.

BPCA had agreed

that this portion of the rent would not commence until the
museum opened.
BPCA,

The museum was in default of its lease with

and BPCA supposedly would not renew it unless the

Commission accepted the deal described above.

Thus BPCA had

made

refuse";

the

Commission

"an

offer

one

cannot

the

Commission had boxed itself into a corner, dependent on the
wishes of the State government.

The governor was still part

of the Mutagon, but on his terms.

Approval of the deal by

the board of BPCA was anticipated within ten days, possibly
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followed by a major press conference with the governor and
the mayor.19
On February 23, 1989, there was no press conference, but
there were press releases
Commission.

from BPCA,

the Mayor,

and the

BPCA said it had authorized that day "a series

of steps that will provide for construction of a 38-floor
residential

tower,

development

of

a

luxury

hotel

and

construction of a memorial to the Holocaust and Museum of
Jewish Heritage and will provide $50 million of BPCA funding
for New York City's housing program over the next three
years."

The press release said BPCA would issue a RFP for a

589,000 square foot residential tower of 360 feet in height
for Site 14, with a minimum bid of rental payments of $121
per square foot of developable area, which included a $3 2
million payment to the Holocaust Commission.

The RFP also

required annual rent payments to BPCA of about $3.8 million,
to be adjusted for inflation and increased land value over
the 80-year term of the lease.

Prospective developers had 90

days to respond.
The press release also said BPCA was issuing an RFP for
a luxury hotel or "mixed use hotel/residential use" on Site
1, which was "consistent with previous plans for Battery Park
City".

BPCA would seek the necessary zoning use changes.

addition,

BPCA was

entering

into

an

agreement

with

In
the

19Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein,
"Holocaust Museum Update", New York, February 16, 1989.

356

Holocaust Commission,

in which the museum would relinquish

its rights to Site 14 upon receipt of $32 million from the
Site 14 developer and enter into a new lease with BPCA for
Site 13.

The Commission had agreed to pay rent of $10.2

million, of which $5 million was to be paid immediately.
Cuomo is quoted that "Under these agreements everyone is
a winner."

The press release did not refer to the fact that

one of Cuomo's "winners", the Holocaust Commission, was now
losing $10.2 million, which it did not have to pay in the
original agreement in 1986.

Palomino is quoted about the

"outstanding sites" and the "significant economic benefits
from a first class hotel and tourist attraction in Lower
Manhattan". He seemed to consider the memorial museum a mere
"tourist attraction".20
Koch, who had taken a back seat to Cuomo with regard to
the project after the site changed to Battery Park City,
issued a statement with a lead that said he had for many
years "supported proposals for the creation in New York City
of a museum and memorial to the victims of the Holocaust."
The statement then praised the economic benefits from a new
residential

development,

a

first-class

hotel

and

a

new

tourist attraction in lower Manhattan, plus the generation of
$50 million for affordable housing in New York City.21

A

20Battery Park City Authority, News Release, New York,
February 23, 1989.
21Office of the Mayor, Statement by Mayor Edward I. Koch,
New York, February 23, 1989.
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very brief statement by Klein and Morgenthau said the museum
would benefit greatly from being freestanding, and also from
an infusion of $27 million in cash.

They thanked Cuomo,

Koch, Emil and Palomino— their partners in the Mutagon.22
The
the

New York Times reported, as Klein had announced at

February

15

executive

committee

meeting,

that

one

proposal meeting the condition of contributing $32 million to
the Holocaust museum had already been received.

The Times

article

(PRC),

named

Property

Resources

Corporation

a

developer that had already built a condominium project in
Battery Park City, as the prospective developer.

The article

also stated that BPCA had said the letter of intent with NOGA
had been terminated, and NOGA's good-faith deposit check was
being

returned.

NOGA

was

quoted

about

considering

the

possibility of suing BPCA.23
On April 4, 1989, Emil for BPCA and Klein and Morgenthau
for

the

Commission

and

museum

signed

a Letter

of

Understanding that set forth the terms ( as described above)
by which a free-standing museum could be built,

with the

project receiving $27 million ($32 million from the developer
of

Site 14,

Implementation

with

$5

million

could

begin

anew,

given
after

back to
PRC

or

BPCA).
another

22New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, "Statement by
George Klein and Robert Morgenthau", New York, February 24,
1989.
23Thomas J. Lueck, "Agency Revises A Museum Plan At
Battery Park: To Require Donation by Condominium Builder",
The New York Times. New York, February 24, 1989, p. B3.
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developer was accepted by BPCA and signed a different Letter
of

Understanding

with

the

Commission

and

the

museum

(obtaining Site 14 in return for a payment to the Commission
of $32 million).
Meanwhile, on May 9, 1989, Stephen Robert, Co-chairman
of the Development Committee announced that $17.2 million had
been raised.
cash.

Of this amount, only some $7 million was in

A financial statement on May 31, 1989 revealed there

was a contribution income of $7,260,000, with $10,335,000 in
pledges receivable.

With $27 million anticipated from BPCA,

funds to be raised were projected at $66,600,650.
pay for the projected costs of the museum,
repayment

of

a

$2

million

bank

loan;

and

This would

$103,019,650;
$300,000

in

architectural fees owed.24
The Commission decided at a June 8, 1989 meeting to go
ahead with a massive fund raising campaign to reach their
goal of $103 million.
an endowment fund.)

(This did not include $30 million for
Altshuler said that after 40 years of

prehistory, before the mayor convened his Task Force, plus
seven years on this project, "we are now poised to succeed."
He said the Commission had to finish their work now,
distortions

and

trivializations

survivors were disappearing.

were

because

multiplying

and

David Edell, the fund raising

24Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements, June 15,
1983 to May 31, 1989, A Living Memorial to the HolocaustMuseum of Jewish Heritage, New York.
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consultant said it was possible to raise $100 million from
the Jews of New York City.
Frucher (who was no longer working for the governor or
BPCA)

said the governor was committed to make the project

work:

"Make it a fait accompli, and then you'll get the $27

million."

He said the governor and the BPCA chairman and

president had made a commitment that the Commission would
receive the $27 million, and it would be too embarrassing for
them not to follow through.

He said the $5 million was to be

paid back to BPCA (from the

$32 million to be received from

the

developer)

"to

satisfy
in

a

quasi-legal

return

the

psychological

situation,"

and that

Commission

commitment.

Klein said hehoped to have $38 million in hand

by November, including the $27 million from BPCA.

had

a

He then

would hope to break ground in January 1990, and complete the
museum by Yom HaShoah (April) 1992.

Those present voted to

approve moving forward with the project as planned, without
any reduction in content.25
The June 8 meeting was like a pep rally for a losing
team.

Everyone patted the other one on the back and said he

had confidence the project would move forward.

In reality,

there were serious problems with finances, with fund raising,
and with a deal being closed with PRC or another developer.
The

Commission was proceeding

on the good

25Memo from Rochelle Saidel to
"Holocaust Commission", June 8, 1989.

faith

Senator

of the

Ohrenstein,
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governor and BPCA that the deal with PRC would go forward,
with no guarantees.

A Commission leader later said off the

record that Palomino had decided the NOGA deal was no good,
but he did not want the governor to look bad by completely
reneging on the Holocaust museum project.

Palomino had

therefore stopped the NOGA deal and found PRC as a developer
for the site.

(This has not been proved.

Palomino did not

appear for a confirmed interview at his office, and then made
an appointment for a telephone interview that he did not
keep.

He also did not answer questions that were given to

him in writing.)
Meanwhile, fund raising methods had become diversified
and intensified, and some were of questionable taste, e.g.:
1. Proposals were prepared for foundations, that included the
Grace

Foundation.

In

June

1981

Yeshiva

University

had

cancelled a major fund raising dinner honoring J.Peter Grace,
after the Jewish Telegraphic Agency revealed Grace had aided
a convicted Nazi war criminal.26

2 . There was a direct

mail campaign, using a personal appeal by popular television
sexologist Dr. Ruth Westheimer.

Although Westheimer is a

refugee (also described as a survivor in the mailing, which
she is not), using her for fund raising creates a disturbing
mix of sex and the Holocaust.

3. An "Associates Division",

26Rochelle Saidel, "Yeshiva U. Says it Cancelled Dinner
Honoring U.S. Businessman Who aided Convicted War Criminal",
Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin. June 2, 1981,
p. 3.

361

created to attract younger donors, held events that also were
questionably inappropriate for fund raising for a Holocaust
memorial.

For example, on October 23, 1988, an invitation

was issued that said:

"The Associates Division of The New

York Holocaust Memorial Commission invites you to Rock and
Roll The Night Away" at The Hot Rod, for a donation of $125
to the Commission.
After June 1989 progress on the project barely crept
forward for more than a year.

In November PRC was chosen as

the developer of the apartment building at Site 14, as a
result of a RFP.

The owners of PRC, Jerome Shatzky and Frank

Lindy, then began searching for funding for their project.
(BPCA, i.e., Palomino and Emil, had found PRC to develop the
site before the RFP was issued.)

PRC was supposed to put up

the money for their project by April 5, 1990, and this was
the second extension BPCA had given them.

Because of the

soft real estate market for luxury apartments, especially in
the Wall Street area, Citibank had pulled out of financing.
The museum

therefore

could

not

sign

a lease with

BPCA,

because BPCA did not have the $27 million from the developer.
Meanwhile, in March 1990 the Holocaust Commission was trying
to obtain money from such sources as Leonard Stern and was
basically

being

told,

"Don't

call

us,

we'll

call

you".

Altshuler said in March that if there was "no hole in the
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ground by the end of June, we can all go home".

He also said

a $27 million letter of credit from BPCA would help.27
On April 19, 1990 an emergency meeting of the executive
committee was held in the office of George Klein.
lack of it) was the main agenda item.

Money (or

The committee decided

to appoint a five member study group to explore how to scale
back the day-to-day operations of the museum project.

At

that time there was a staff of 30, with a $3 million annual
budget.

Almost $11 million had already been spent.

Another

subcommittee was to be appointed to scale back the museum to
$50 million

(from $100 million).

report back in a month or less.
made:

that

a

State

agency

The committees were to

Other suggestions were also
such

as

Urban

Development

Corporation or the Education Department float tax free bonds
to cover the cost so a lease could be signed; and that Cuomo
be asked to tell BPCA the Commission wants its $1 a year
lease

back.

The

possibility

of

Howard

Rubenstein,

Morgenthau, Klein, and maybe Frucher and co-chairman Senator
Manfred Ohrenstein meeting with Cuomo was discussed.

(Koch,

who had lost his reelection bid to David Dinkins in November
1989 was no longer actively
remained Founding Co-chairman.

in the picture,

although he

Nor was the new Mayor Dinkins

showing signs of interest at this point.)

27Telephone interview with Charles Dworkis,
Senator Ohrenstein, New York, March 23, 1990.
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The status of PRC's apartment project was also discussed
at the meeting.

After PRC had been selected, its source of

financing, Citibank, had pulled out.

Now Citibank was back

in, but with unrealistic restrictions.
a letter saying

Citibank had written

it would guarantee $150 million,

if the

developer came up with $52 million (which would include a $12
million letter of credit and $40 million in cash).

Citibank

also wanted to be able to lay off $75 million to a third
party co-lender.

Since virtually no one was doing this kind

of residential financing at that time, it was an impossible
condition for PRC to meet.
George

Klein

admitted

that

accepting

the governor's

original Battery Park City deal was a mistake.

He said it

was a decision made by very intelligent savvy people, but was
based on emotion— on the desire to be the best and have the
best museum in the best location.
they

should

have

stuck

to

the

In retrospect, he said
Custom

House.

It

was

anticipated that PRC would default and lose its $250,000
deposit.

Site 13 would still be for the museum, with the

Commission selling the lease (with air rights) to Site 14.
However, nothing would be built, as of then. The site, with
air

rights,

was

worth

about

$3 0 million, but

it

seemed

nothing was about to happen.28
By August
Albright

1990,

nothing

hadmoved

forward.

Harry

replaced Palomino as president of BPCA that month.

28Dworkis interview, April 19, 1990, New York.
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Albright, CEO of Dime Savings Bank, is said to be close to
the governor's son, Andrew Cuomo.

(Andrew is also reportedly

the governor's contact with Morgenthau.)
Altshuler

said that

Albright,

starting with a clean slate, was more likely to

"undo the mess".

Palomino had

Museum director

"screwed up",

and that

Altshuler said Albright had told Morgenthau

that his first assignment from the governor is to fix our
problem.

(This means getting money for the development of

Site 14, for which the museum owns the lease and air rights.)
Altshuler said there were a number of possibilities for doing
this:

1.

Get a new developer.

the State's part of the deal.

2.
3.

Give concessions from
Find a way

for the

Commission to get money in some other way than development of
Site 14.

4.

Give concessions to the Commission,

less rent, or forgetting the $5 million.
be

careful

to

Altshuler said.

stay

out

of

how

this

such as

"We are trying to
is

accomplished,"

"But they [the governor and BPCA] got us

into this and should get us out.
then threw him out.

They signed up NOGA and

They got us out of the Custom House and

into Battery Park City."29
By the end of 1990, nothing had moved.

Albright, the

new BPCA chairman, had promised progress by Labor Day, but
then he became seriously ill.

He then pledged to resolve the

situation by the end of the year, but got sick again.

PRC

29Interview of David Altshuler, New York City, August 9,
1990.

365

had been released from its pending deal.

The Commission

hoped to get some money from a deal including the sale of its
lease and air rights, when the market improved at a later
date.30

In February 1991, the Commission was anticipating

a new memo, just between the museum and BPCA.

Altshuler said

the Commission could then begin construction.
the memo in weeks, and the lease in months.

He expected
He said there

would be a ground breaking before the end of 1991, but there
was no rush,

as the museum needed to

be redesigned.

The

museum was to go back to Site 14, and use only half of

the

site— that closest to the water.

BPCA would get Site 13 back

and could build one or more apartment buildings both on it
and

on the

other

half

of Site

14

(when the market

got

better) .31
The expected memo from BPCA finally materialized on July
26, 1991.

As

museum lease

Altshuler had anticipated, it called for a new
on half of Site 14 and

terminated the1986

leases for a museum and a residential building on Site 14.
According to this new deal, the Commission will build a $50
million museum on half of Site

14.

BPCA will give the

Commission $10 million as a construction draw, probably by
floating commercial paper.

Later, when the other half of the

site is leased to a developer for residential construction,

30Interview of David Altshuler, New York City, December
20, 1990.
31Interview of David Altshuler, February 22, 1991.
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BPCA will give the museum a minimum of $10 million (depending
on the deal), and will recoup this money from the developer.
The museum has the half of the site that faces the Hudson
River and Statue of Liberty.
Altshuler said of the newest memorandum of understanding
that new external and internal designs for the museum would
be necessary,
Chapter 14).
had

raised,

but the concept would remain the same

(see

He said that of the $23 million the Commission
about

$10 million was

left.

With this

$10

million and the $10 million from BPCA, the Commission would
need to raise $30 million more to build the museum.

The

second $10 million from BPCA (from the sale of the second
half of the site) would be used to begin the endowment fund.
The new target date to begin construction would be 1992, with
the museum expected to open in 1994.32
Thus the Mutagon entered a new phase.
coincidence or not)
President,
with

the

then seemed

Cuomo, who (by

inclined not to run for

and BPCA, which he controlled, made a new deal
Commission

which

even

involved

a

$10

million

investment.

(An article the day before the memorandum was

signed said:

"Of 13 current and former Cuomo aides surveyed

in the last week,

none said they believed that Mr.

would run for President."33)

Cuomo

Meanwhile, ten years had gone

32Interview of David Altshuler, August 5, 1991, New York
City.
33Kevin Sack, "Cuomo Seeking the Presidency?
Yes, He
Isn't, Maybe He Is", New York Times. July 25, 1991, p. B5.
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by since Koch's initiation of the project, and time, itself,
was an enemy.

The first meeting of Koch's Task Force, the

initial stage of the Mutagon, was on July 22, 1981— almost
ten

years

earlier

to

the

day.

Costs

had

escalated,

unforeseen problems had developed (such as the drop in real
estate values), protagonists such as Koch had left the scene,
and new players (e.g., Cuomo, Palomino and Emil) had caused
further complications and delays in implementation.

Cuomo

and BPCA had then come up with a plan to "save the day".
Pressman and Wildavsky said:
are exactly that:
time."34

In

the

"The advantages of being new

being new.
case

of

As

They dissipate quickly over

creating

a Holocaust

memorial

museum in New York City, there had been ten years of such
dissipation.

SUMMARY
Between the Fall of 1988 and the Spring of 1991 there
was virtually no progress on actually building the Holocaust
museum.

The Mutagon was at an

impasse.

First

Frucher

arranged a deal with NOGA, through which the museum would be
free-standing on the next site and sell its lease rights for
a luxury hotel on its original site.

Soon afterward Frucher

resigned as BPCA president and other high level political
brokers in Cuomo's office decided the NOGA deal should not go
forward.

BPCA also reneged on the agreement whereby the

34Pressman and Wildavsky, p. 13 0.

Holocaust museum was to pay only symbolic rent of $1 per
year,

and the rental fee became some $10 million.

remained

part

of

the Mutagon

building

Cuomo

the museum,

retained his title as Founding Co-chairman.

At the

and
same

time, his office and BPCA stonewalled and seemed likely to
kill the project with which he was associated.

The probable

reason for this was that his political advisors thought the
original deal had Church-State problems that could hurt him
in a Presidential race.

Since severing himself completely

could also hurt the governor, especially in New York State,
his staff found another developer, PRC, for a deal with the
Holocaust Commission.
not obtain financing.

This deal fell apart when PRC could
The latest plan then was

for the

Commission to scale down and build a museum on half of the
original

site.

The Commission

understanding from
it was

not

expected

a

memo

of

BPCAfor the new deal by March 1991, but

delivered

until

July

26.

This

latest

plan

included a $10 million contribution from BPCA and the total
cost of the museum was expected to be $50 million.
exterior and

interior

designs

recommencing again,

With
museum

director Altshuler anticipated a 1992 ground breaking and a
1994 opening.

With Koch still officially the Founding Co-

Chairman but in reality out of the picture, the Mutagon now
was an alliance with one head, as in the beginning.
now that head was the governor and not the mayor.

However,
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CHAPTER 13:
THE Mutagon

INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLES AND CONFLICTS WITHIN

"Dogs in a kennel snarl at each other; but when a wolf
comes along they become allies." Talmud: Sanhedrin, 105a.

This chapter examines the internal conflicts between
various

players

in

the

New

York

of political

Holocaust

Commission's

Mutagon

forces.

theories most

often used to analyze how

Memorial

In

the

interest

two

groups

create political alliances— iron triangle and issue network
theories— there is a sense of harmony among the players for
the greater good of a common goal.
York

Holocaust

Commission's

In the case of the New

alliance

with

Mayor

Koch,

Governor Cuomo, and others over the years, the relationship
within

the

conflicts.

alliance

was

more

complex

and

subject

to

There were also conflicts among members within

the Commission.

Furthermore, the fact that the governor,

mayor, and Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) head were all
part of the Commission itself— as well as the government
officials with whom the Commission was dealing— causes the
relationship

between

the various

angles

of

the

changing

polygon of political allies, the Mutagon, to have built-in
conflicts of interest.
For nearly one third of the Mutagon's ten year life the
heads of the City and State governments shared the spotlight
as "Founding Co-Chairmen".

They had a say both as Commission

officers and as elected officials with whom the Commission
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was dealing.

In addition, two of the four Co-chairmen

elected officials,

were

and the third was a major real estate

developer that had megabuck deals going with the City and the
State.

Because of the complicated structure and overlapping

of roles, internal conflict is integral to this Mutagon.
While

iron

triangle

distinction between the
group,

theory
angles

executive branch,

generally makes

a clear

of the triangle— -interest

and congressional branch— Harold

Seidman provided a good example of the conflicts of interest
that can occur when elected officials are also part of the
interest group.
private

He

duties

position.

said:

places

"Intermingling of public and

public

officials

in

an

ambiguous

There are many unanswered questions.

Do the

secretaries of housing and urban development and agriculture
serve as directors of the National Home Ownership Foundation
in their official capacity, or as private citizens?
are

federal

directors

officials

if

the

accountable

foundation

for

is

not

instrumentality of the United States,
responsibilities
ultimately,

to

the

through them,

president,

their
an

To whom

actions
agency

what then are
the

to the people?"1

Congress,
Likewise,

as
and
its
and
as

Founding Co-Chairmen and members of the Commission members,
as well as elected officials, to whom are the governor and

1Harold Seidman, Politics. Position, and Power. Oxford
University Press, New York, 1970, 1980, p. 299.
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mayor responsible,

regarding their actions concerning the

Holocaust museum project?
While all of the players remained loyal to the basic
idea of a Holocaust memorial museum, there have been varying
intensities of loyalty and criteria for implementation, and
changes

in

individuals'

involvement

over

time.

These

differences have sometimes caused one player in the Mutagon
to be at odds with one or more other political forces in the
coalition.

(Governor

Cuomo's

midstream

cooling

down,

analyzed in the last chapter, is the most obvious example.)
In addition, the complex structure of a Mutagon, with its
large cast of city-state-private interest group players (and
some people in more than one category at the same time), is
subject to a number of conflicts between some of the players.
While some of these conflicts evolved from circumstances that
have

nothing

to

do

with

the

project

at

hand,

they

nevertheless affect the Mutagon coalition's unity.
The major players in the Mutagon have been:

Mayor Koch,

Koch political entrepreneur Herbert Rickman, developer George
Klein,

Manhattan

Governor

Cuomo,

District Attorney Robert M.
Cuomo

political

Morgenthau,

entrepreneurs

and

BPCA

officials Sandy Frucher and Fabian Palomino, New York State
Senate Minority

Leader Manfred Ohrenstein,

and,

briefly,

Peter A. Cohen (who lost his job at Shearson Lehman). By the
time

of

the

Mutagon's

latest

phase

in

1991,

new

BPCA

officials David Emil and Harry Albright had also become part

372

of the Mutagon.

After David Dinkins became mayor in 1990, at

a stage of impasse and stagnation, he hardly became involved.
If the newest deal, signed between BPCA and the Commission in
July 1991, goes forward smoothly, he will no doubt jump on
the band wagon.

(This may cause new friction with Cuomo, who

now has no competition from a mayor, as he did from Koch.)
Koch and Klein were closely connected, and there were no
known conflicts between them regarding the Holocaust project.
However, they had other business, including the multimillion
dollar Times Square redevelopment project (see Chapter 8) ,
which caused friction from time to time.

Koch recalled in

his autobiography, Mayor, how Klein came to see him in 1982
to complain about the administration's

limitation of tax

abatements for some of his other real estate developments,
the building of skyscrapers on the East Side.

Koch quotes

Klein that this zoning change "is going to cost me millions
of

dollars.

We

acquired property.

million dollars in this property.
make it impossible to build on it.
Koch continued:

I have

forty-eight

And now you are going to
We are going to sue!"

"I said, 'Of course you should sue, George.

I am not suggesting that you not protect yourself.
I have to do and you do what you have to do.
friends.

Don't be angry.'

[Klein] said,

I do what

We can still be
'I am angry.'

I
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said, 'Well, I understand.
this.'

But we are not going to change on

So he left."2

Klein

was

also

involved

administration's scandals.

in

one

of

the

Koch

Alex Liberman, who had been put

in control of the City's leasing bureaus soon after Koch took
office in 1978, was getting kickbacks from landlords to whom
he issued leases for use of their property by the City.

In

order to receive this money, Liberman, a Holocaust survivor,
used as a front (among others) his synagogue.

During the

investigation

that

of

Liberman,

it was

discovered

Klein

donated $5,000 to the synagogue, after Liberman had leased
three floors from him in an old Brooklyn building that had
not had a tenant for ten years.

Klein insisted the money was

unconnected to the lease and was never named as a bribe payer
in Liberman's indictment.3

Thus Klein's and Koch's other

interconnections, which all involved both of their obtaining
money, would be likely to affect their relationship in the
Mutagon.
While Koch and Klein were political friends with "one
hand washing the other", Koch and Cuomo had been political
enemies more than once.

They ran against each other in

bitter Democratic primaries, for mayor of New York City in

2Edward I. Koch, Mayor. Warner Books, New York, 1985, p.
297 .
3Jack Newfield and Wayne Barrett, City for Sale:
Ed
Koch and the Betrayal of New York. Harper & Row, New York,
1988, pp. 211-228.

1981 (which Koch won) and governor of New York State in 1982
(which Cuomo won).
sides.

As early as 1973, they were on opposing

Cuomo defended the development of a scaled down

public housing project in Forest Hills
blacks

into

opponents

the

neighborhood) , and

(which would bring

Koch

(white, and mostly Jewish).4

sided

with

the

There was "no love

lost" between them, and Koch must have let Cuomo become his
equal "Founding Co-chairman" of the Holocaust project only
because he had no other choice.

From Cuomo's perspective, he

may have wanted to be Koch's equal on the project as a way of
stealing some of Koch's thunder with the organized Jewish
community of New York City and State.

Since there is no

written record of the steps leading to the addition of Cuomo,
and

since

Rickman,

Cuomo's

broker,

Frucher,

and

Koch's

broker,

would say only what has been detailed here

(see

Chapter 10), there is no way of further documenting how and
why the merger took place.

It is common knowledge, however,

that these two Founding Co-chairmen of the Mutagon were not
political
Democrats,

of

personal

Koch

friends.

Although

is considered conservative,

they

are

even

both

"quasi-

Republican", and Cuomo, a liberal.
Koch supporter Klein is very much a Republican, and was
a high level backer of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George
Bush.

Klein's partisan feelings temporarily prevented the

4Michael Harrington, "When Ed Koch Was Still a Liberal",
Dissent Magazine ("A Special Issue: In Search of New York"),
Fall 1987, pp. 595-602.
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Congressman in whose district the Holocaust museum is to be
built from becoming a member of the Commission.

Although

East Side Manhattan Congressman S. William Green (Republican)
was

a

member,

Congressman

Ted

Weiss

(Democrat), whose

district includes both the Custom House and Battery Park
City, was not originally invited to serve.
refugee from Nazi Hungary.)
Commission
Congress to

because

Weiss

Klein kept him off of the

had

impeach Reagan.

(Weiss is also a

introduced

a resolution

Ironically,

in

then Commission

director David Blumenfeld asked Weiss for his support in the
quest for the Custom House in February,
understand why Weiss was "neutral".

1984, and did not

Weiss was not appointed

an Associate Chairperson until June 1986, much later than
other elected officials.5
Another Associate Chairperson and minor player in the
Mutagon, then Manhattan Borough President David Dinkins, also
had a disagreement with one of the Founding Co-chairmen,
Koch, regarding the activities of the Commission.

In 1986

Dinkins went against a request of the Holocaust Commission as
a way of opposing Koch,

whom he considered his political

rival for a future mayoral race.

Dinkins favored a local

community group, The West Side Jewish Community Council (now
defunct), which was engaged in an activity to which Koch's
special

assistant,

Rickman was

vehemently

5Memos from Rochelle Saidel to
February 13, 1984 and June 17,1986.

opposed.

Senator

The

Ohrenstein,
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episode was trivial, but it was publicized in newspapers and
is an example of how two members of the Mutagon were at odds
about memorializing the Holocaust. The West Side group, then
an umbrella for more than 65 Jewish organizations, decided to
have

a public ceremony on May

14,

1986

at the original

Holocaust memorial site in Riverside Park at 83rd Street.
School children would enhance the site by planting flowers.
Rickman, representing Koch, said this simple ceremony would
hurt the Holocaust Commission's fundraising efforts and he
begged

the

ceremony.

group

not

to

follow

through

with

a

public

When Borough President Dinkins was approached by

the group and learned about Rickman's opposition,

he was

eager to support the children's planting project (and thus
make Koch look foolish) .6

One reason that Dinkins did not

enthusiastically take a lead in the Mutagon after he was
elected mayor was probably the project's close association
with his old rival, Koch.

He may yet get heavily involved if

the newest effort begins to succeed and his advisors on the
Jewish community deem it politically expedient.

This will

create a new conflict between him and Cuomo.
At some time in 1987 Peter A. Cohen, then chairman and
chief

executive

officer

of

Shearson

Lehman

Hutton,

was

appointed a co-chairman, to serve with Klein, Morgenthau, and

6Ricki Fulman, "Park to recall Holocaust", New York
Daily News. May 15, 1986, p. 2 reports on the event.
The
politics behind it were discussed in author's presence, in
meetings with both Dinkins and Rickman in May 1986.
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Ohrenstein.
Klein's,

was

especially
Campaign

The idea behind this move, which was probably
to

have

in the

Cohen

head

financial

Co-Chairperson.

fund

sector.
From

raising

He was

the

efforts,

also named

beginning

he

was

ineffective and his association with the Commission gradually
faded into oblivion (although he is still officially a Cochairman) . Meanwhile, he was fired from his high level job,
and

in June,

severance

1990

pay.7

had
One

hired
titular

a

lawyer

head

of

to

negotiate

his

the

Mutagon

thus

accomplished little for the cause and then lost the job that
was the reason for his appointment.
The exception to the internal conflict between players
within the Mutagon is the relationship between Klein and
Morgenthau, who seem like "strange bedfellows".

Morgenthau,

a Democrat, is an "Our Crowd" rather assimilated Jew.

His

family lived in the United States for many generations, with
roots in Germany.
cabinet

and

his

His father was in Franklin D. Roosevelt's
grandfather

served

Ambassador to Turkey during World War I.

as

United

States

Following in their

footsteps on a much lower level, he is a public servant as
the

elected

District

Attorney

of

Manhattan.

Republican, fled Nazi Europe as a child.

Klein,

a

He is an Orthodox

Jew who inherited a fortune and has enhanced this wealth as
a developer.

Despite their different backgrounds,

their

7"Chronicle:
Negotiating severance
for Shearson
Lehman's ousted chairman", The New York Times. June 11, 1990,
p. B12.
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relationship as Commission Co-chairmen since 1982 seems to
have been smooth and cordial.

For the most part, Morgenthau

has let Klein take the lead and then signed what needed to be
signed. Klein seems to like being in charge, and Morgenthau
seems to like taking a back seat to him.

The

result has

been a harmonious partnership with no overt conflicts.

Both

Klein and Morgenthau were appointed by Koch.
The third co-chairman,
Cuomo.

Circumstances

Ohrenstein,

made

his

was

appointed by

relationship

conflictive and problematic in the Mutagon.

the

most

He, too, came

to the United States from Nazi Europe as a young refugee.

He

was elected to the Senate as a reform Democrat from the West
Side of Manhattan in 1960 and became Minority Leader in 1975.
Koch did not want Ohrenstein to be a co-chairman,
stated for the record.8

and so

Frucher said Cuomo appointed him

because Ohrenstein "insisted".9 These sentiments by the two
Founding

Co-chairmen

of the Mutagon

(and the

government

officials with whom the Commission was dealing)
themselves

indicate

expediency

could

there

overcome

were

conflicts,

personal

but

differences

Ohrenstein and the mayor or the governor.

would in
political
between

However, another

conflict arose that was unresolvable and surprisingly did not

interview with Edward I. Koch, New York, May 18, 1990.
interview with Meyer S. Frucher, New York, February 4,
1991.
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do

significant

damage

to

the

Commission's

image

or

implementation of its project.
On September 16, 1987, Ohrenstein was accused of payroll
abuses and indicted by his Holocaust Commission co-chairman,
District Attorney Morgenthau.

By coincidence,

he learned

about the probability of the indictment on March 23, 1987.
This was the very day of a high level fund raising dinner for
the Commission held at Gracie Mansion, with Henry Kissinger
as guest speaker.
on the program,
Manhattan
event.

Both Ohrenstein and Morgenthau were also
and the Senator was

supposed to

from Albany by helicopter,

especially

fly

to

for this

At the last moment he cancelled his appearance and

remained in Albany.
The

564

count

indictmentincluded

grand

larceny,

conspiracy and filing false documents.

The New York Post

headline

was

on

the

day

Ohrenstein".

The

next day

Morgenthau,
expose

of

Indicted".10

the

the
The

It

juxtaposed

day before,
nextweek

the

"Morgy

Bags

Post featured a photographof

saying he thanked that paper

Ohrenstein.

headline

of the indictment

a

for helping to

photograph

which
Daily

said

of

the

"Ohrenstein

News specifically

focused on the fact that the two were Commission co-chairmen.
With the catchy headline,

"The Morgy and Manny Show", the

article said the indictment "could cause some awkward moments

10"Morgy Thanks the Post for Baring Scam", The New York
Post. September 17, 1987.
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at the New York Holocaust Commission."11

This was the only

article

and Morgenthau's

that

zeroed

in

on

Ohrenstein's

relationship as Commission Co-chairmen.

This aspect of the

case, which could have made "good ink" for the press, was
never again picked up.
Although
situation,

it

was

indeed,

not

reported

caused some

in

the

press,

"awkward moments".

the
Since

Morgenthau was "the man in the white hat" and Ohrenstein, in
"the

black

hat",

the

Commission meetings

Senator

chose

to

stay

and avoid embarrassment.

away

from

He made

a

conscious effort to keep the Commission's project out of his
legal battle with Morgenthau, to protect both
and himself.

the project

Klein, who remained publicly neutral, suggested

to Ohrenstein that he call and check to see if Morgenthau was
attending each meeting,

before deciding whether to come.

Ohrenstein was not pleased with this suggestion, and decided
it was better not to come at all.

He remained a Co-chairman,

but the Commission started having communications signed only
by Klein and Morgenthau.
In November 1990, 445 of the 564 counts in the original
indictment were dismissed by the Court of Appeals,

and in

February 1991 Ohrenstein's trial was postponed indefinitely,
but still pending.

A Morgenthau spokesman said the delay was

to await the outcome of efforts to first try another State
11"The Morgy & Manny Show:
DA and senator may meet as
panel members", The New York Daily News. September 24, 1987,
p. 11.
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Senator, Howard Babbush.12

In September 1991, Morgenthau

dropped all remaining charges against Ohrenstein,

and the

Senator was exonerated.
Meanwhile,

by

1990

Ohrenstein

had

gradually

participating in some Commission activities.

begun

However, by

then his two Co-chairmen and others on the Commission were
not happy with him for two other reasons:

1) He was the

governor's appointee as chairman, and the governor at that
stage of the Mutagon had become a persona non grata

for

reneging on the Battery Park City NOGA deal and $1 per year
rent.

2)

legislative
Commission

Ohrenstein
grant
from

of
his

had

from the

beginning

$25,000-$50,000
supplemental

allowance in the State budget.

per

budget

obtained

year

for

"member

a

the
item"

The Commission asked him in

1990 to allocate $100,000 from the 1991 State budget, but he
allocated nothing.

Ohrenstein blamed it on Majority Leader

Ralph

cut

Marino,

Commission

who

the

budget

of

leaders blamed Ohrenstein.13

the

Minority,

but

(Both Morgenthau

and Ohrenstein refused to be interviewed about the indictment
and its effect on the Commission and their co-chairmanships.)
The governor's reputation within the Mutagon had gone
from bad to worse after Frucher left BPCA and the NOGA deal

12Ronald
Sullivan,
"Senator's
Trial
Is
Postponed
Indefinitely: Delay May Hurt Case Against Ohrenstein", The
New York Times. February 23, 1991, p. 27.
13Interview of David Altshuler, New York, February 22,
1991.
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fell apart (see Chapter 12).

By October 1987 the name of the

museum had been officially changed to please the governor's
office.

It had been "The Museum of Jewish Heritage - A

Living Memorial to the Holocaust".

This had been deemed "too

Jewish" by Cuomo's separation of Church and State experts
such as counsels Evan Davis and Palomino.

The name therefore

became "A Living Memorial to the Holocaust - The Museum of
Jewish Heritage".

Then,

in the summer of 1989 there was

another attempt by the governor to try to make the museum
appear more secular and less Jewish.
On June 28, 1989 there was a meeting of the Commission
with Palomino, who represented BPCA and Governor Cuomo.

The

purpose of this meeting at Klein's office was that Palomino
(i.e., the governor) was pressuring the Commission to have
the museum open on Saturdays and Jewish holidays.

Klein said

before the meeting that he had absolutely refused to agree to
this,

but Palomino would put pressure on the Commission.

Palomino presented his case very poorly.

As two precedents

for the museum being open on Saturdays and Jewish holidays,
he

named

the

Washington.

Holocaust

museums

at

Auschwitz

and

in

The Washington museum was not yet open at all,

because it had not been built.

As for Auschwitz, it seems

unnecessary to comment on his comparing a Jewish Holocaust
museum in New York City and the Judenrein state museum at
Auschwitz
Poland!

in

traditionally

anti-Semitic

(and

Judenrein)
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The Commission had the legal right, incorporated in its
by-laws,

to observe the Jewish sabbath and holidays.

On

February 15, 1985 George Klein, Robert M. Morgenthau,

Dr.

Irving Greenberg, Judah Gribetz,
Michel,

as

officers

of

the

Benjamin Meed,

Corporation,

had

Ernest W.
signed

the

following statement of Organizational Action of Trustees in
Lieu of Organization Meeting, adopted as part of the By-Laws
of the Corporation:
"RESOLVED, that the following 'Statement of Policy'
be,

and the same hereby is, adopted to apply to all

aspects of the Corporation:
'The

mandate

of

the

New

York

City

Holocaust

Memorial Museum is to establish in New York City of a
perpetual
victims
solemn

living

memorial

of the Holocaust
responsibility,

the

to

the

[sic].

6,000,000

Jewish

In upholding

Corporation

this

recognizes

a

sacred obligation on its part to respect the religious
sensibilities of the Jewish community.

Accordingly, all

activities relating to the Corporation will conform with
the religious laws, customs and traditions of the Jewish
people.'"
The Commission listened politely to Palomino, but held
firm.

Whether BPCA could later force them to comply and open

on Saturdays and Jewish holidays would remain to be seen.
With the subsequently defunct PRC deal then up in the air,
and the Commission dependent on BPCA bringing it to fruition,
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the governor and Palomino were in a good position to make
demands.

There were evidently two reasons Palomino had urged

that the museum remain open:

1. As already stated, Cuomo's

legal experts (of which Palomino was one) were concerned with
the issue of separation of Church and State.

The Commission

was closely linked with the governor and BPCA, and therefore
Palomino and others were worried about an appearance of a
State-linked entity being a religious institution.

This was

especially true after Cuomo began having aspirations to run
for President.
land

to build

2. The Catholic Diocese requested of BPCA
a church,

with

strong pressure

from John

Cardinal O'Connor.14 The Temple of Understanding, which was
housed at Cathedral of St. John the Divine and had as its
president Reverend James Park Morton,
space

from BPCA.15

The

governor's

also requested free

pressure

to

have

the

museum open on Saturdays and holidays may have been to prove
the museum was not a religious institution.
would not have to give "equal time"

Therefore, Cuomo

(in this case,

equal

space) to the Jews, the Protestants and the Catholics.16
Palomino,

the

governor's

old

friend,

confidant

and

counselor, did not like David Emil, Frucher's replacement in

14Letter from Chancery Office, Archdiocese of New York
to David Emil, February 24, 1989.
15Letter from Linda M. Kirk to David Emil, New York City,
April 21, 1989.
16Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein,
"Subject Holocaust Commission", New York, June 2, 1989.
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1988

as

chairman

BPCA president.

Palomino,

who

of BPCA's board

of directors,

at the time was
in

1990 publicly

called for an investigation of Emil's role in awarding a
construction contract to a company that was not the lowest
bidder.

Soon afterward, Palomino resigned and his office was

assumed by Albright.

Emil was subsequently cleared of the

charges by the State Inspector General's office.
In addition to the above conflicts between the leading
members of the Mutagon, some of the less important players
also had various problems, possible conflicts of interest,
and unrelated but potentially harmful other affiliations that
caused controversy in the Commission.

For example, survivor

and executive committee member Ben Meed wore too many hats.
As

the

president

Organization

of

(WAGRO)

the Warsaw

which

runs

the

Ghetto

Resistance

largest Yom

HaShoah

memorial commemoration in the City, he always wanted the new
memorial

museum

to

have

a spacefor

his

ceremony.

Furthermore, he was active on the U.S. Holocaust Memorial
Council and head of its content committee.

Since the two

museums were often both seeking the same artifacts, this put
him in a position of having a possible conflict of interest.
By

the

Spring

of

1991,

when the

New

York

project

was

floundering and the Washington museum was rising on the Mall,
his title for the national museum in Washington was Chairman
of the National Survivors Campaign.

Since the U.S. Holocaust

Memorial Council had in March 1991 opened a fund raising
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office in New York City, competing for funds urgently needed
by the New York Commission, Meed's role in fund raising for
the

Washington

interest

with

project
his

was

also

membership

on

a possible
the

New

conflict

York

of

executive

committee.
Commission member, Holocaust scholar and survivor Yaffa
Eliach also wore more than one hat.

Not only was she a

member of the Commission's Academic Advisory Committee, but
she also headed the Brooklyn Center for Holocaust Studies.
For years the Commission tried to incorporate the Brooklyn
institution

(which has

Eliach resisted.
to

the

excellent

archival

material), but

Finally, in August 1990 A Living Memorial

Holocaust-Museum

of Jewish

Heritage

Brooklyn Center for Holocaust Studies.

absorbed

the

The reason for the

merger was the Brooklyn institution's own serious financial
problems.
Attorney and Commission member Menachem Rosensaft was
president of the Second Generation organization of children
of

survivors.

His

family

organized survivor activities.

was

very

well

connected

to

For example, his mother was

active on the Washington project, and his father-in-law, Sam
Bloch, on the New York project and the National Gathering of
Holocaust Survivors.

Rosensaft, himself, became president of

the

Zionist

national

Labor

organization.

However,

in

December 1988, Rosensaft engaged in an activity that made him
a pariah among many of the Commission members, especially the
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survivors:

he met with Palestine Liberation Organization

head Yasir Arafat to discuss a possible peace settlement with
Israel.

There

was

a

general

fear

among

most

active

Commission members that this would somehow rub off on the
Commission's efforts and harm them.
Rosensaft said "some of the survivors who see things in
stark terms weren't happy about it".
some people

in the

leadership

However, he believes

of the survivor community

"mellowed" after reading articles he wrote.

"I've always

refused to consider remembering the Holocaust or Children of
Holocaust Survivor activities to be an all-consuming focus,"
he said.

"Other things are equally important.

I've been in

the peace movement since the late '70s and have done what I
believed had to be done."17
members

Since most other Commission

did not believe the things Rosensaft

did

(i.e.,

meeting with Arafat) "had to be done", there was a temporary
but sharp conflict between him and some Commission members.
Howard Rubenstein, who refused to be interviewed, was
himself a complex package of conflicting and overlapping
interests.
clients

His highly political public relations firm had as

both

Koch

and

Klein's

Park

Tower

Realty.

He,

himself, was a Commission member and his firm did some pro
bono public relations work for the Commission.

Thus one

17Telephone interview of Menachem Rosensaft, August 8,
1991, New York City.
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Mutagon

Founding

Co-chairman,

one

Co-chairman,

and the

Commission as an entity were his clients.
Another internal conflict emerged because of Academic
Advisory Committee member and Israeli Holocaust historian
Yehuda Bauer.

Asked by museum director David Altshuler to

evaluate a Preliminary Concept Study of the museum on June
24, 1987, he sent back a letter that was nothing less than
threatening.

It said:

"I must say I am absolutely appalled at the program
and its basic concepts.

Let me explain why, but please

be advised that unless this is immediately and radically
changed

I wish to have my name taken

off

any

list

associated with your Museum forthwith, and I must also
warn you that I shall take every opportunity— starting
with my forthcoming visits to New York and Los Angeles
this fall— to attack this outrageous design from every
public platform I have, not least of which will be a
major public international conference on the Holocaust
in Britain

in

1988

at which

most

of the

Holocaust

scholars, some 250 of them, will participate."18
Basically, Bauer objected to the use of the term "Holocaust"
for the murder of non-Jewish, as well as Jewish, victims.

He

indicated in his letter that he had sent copies to eight

18Letter from Yehuda Bauer to David Altshuler, July 29,
1987.
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other Holocaust

scholars,

survivors,

and academics,

both

members and non-members of the Commission.
Altshuler responded with a placating letter, but added
the following P.S.:

"I am sorry that as a member of the

Museum's Academic Advisory Committee, you did not see fit to
communicate with us directly before making a cause celebre by
circulating your letter to others."19

Thus this particular

Mutagon was not without its politics of academia, as well as
governmental politics.

Just as prominent elected officials,

such as Cuomo, tried to control the activities of the Mutagon
at certain stages (see Chapter 12), there were also internal
disputes among Holocaust scholars for power and control of
the museum's message.
Finally, there was the "business as usual" maneuvering
by heads of major Jewish organization on the Commission to
protect their turf and influence the Commission to follow
their

particular

Tannenbaum,
Women's

a

past

Zionist

philosophy.
national

Organization)

For

example,

president
wanted

of

Bernice

Hadassah

the message

of

(the
the

museum to be more Zionist.

SUMMARY
The Mutagon endeavoring to create a Holocaust memorial
museum in New York City is a long-term and changing political

19Letter from David Altshuler to Yehuda Bauer, August 5,
1987.

alliance.

Because

of

the

long

time

the

project

has

languished, and because of changes in the cast of players and
their roles over time, the members of the Mutagon do not
always work in harmony.

While, for the most part, they have

supported the greater common goal of creating the museum,
they have had differences among themselves.
and

internal

conflicts.
were:

circumstances

have

Both external

contributed

to

these

Among the most significant causes for conflict

Mayor

Koch

and

Governor

Cuomo

sharing

power

as

Founding Co-chairmen of the Commission, and also serving as
the

elected

officials

with

whom

the

Commission

must

negotiate; the indictment of Co-chairman Ohrenstein by Cochairman Morgenthau; the departure of Frucher from BPCA and
his replacement by a much less involved Emil.

All of these

interpersonal and operational conflicts have affected the
efficiency

of

the

Mutagon

in

achieving

its

goals.

Interpersonal relations, political differences and agendas,
conflicts between Commission members that were unrelated to
the activities of the Commission, Commission members "wearing
two

hats",

protection

of

individuals'

turf.

and

the

complexity and changeability of the polygon of political
forces working to create a Holocaust museum in New York City
have all been causes for friction.
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CHAPTER 14: WHY IS THIS HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL DIFFERENT FROM
ALL OTHER HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS?
"The mere choice of facts presented in an exhibition
offers a definite point of view. When selecting historical
data, one must consider what to exclude, what to emphasize
and why... .A statement made by a museum carries great weight.
It implies final authority and eternal remembrance."
Martin Weyl, Director, Israel Museum1
The framework for commemorating any historical event is
affected by political

considerations,

and the Mutagon of

political allies behind the effort to create a Holocaust
memorial museum in New York City has significantly influenced
the plans for implementing this project.

The basic concept

has remained the same since its inception, but the changing
structure of the Mutagon over time has caused some changes in
plans for the museum.
The

conceptual

plan

for

A

Living

Memorial

to

the

Holocaust-Museum of Jewish Heritage, as the proposed museum
is called, has four central themes:

1. "The World Before",

the European and North African Jewish civilization which
thrived for two thousand years before it was destroyed by the
Nazis; 2. "The Holocaust", particularly as it was experienced
by the Jews, both those who perished and those who survived;
3.

"The Aftermath"

of

survival,

including the plight

of

refugees, the establishment of the State of Israel, and the
pursuit of Nazi war criminals; and 4. "Renewal in America",

1Martin Weyl, "How Do Museums Speak the Unspeakable?",
The New York Times. June 11, 1989, p. 38.
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Jewish immigration to the United States from 1654 to the
present.2
The first two of these themes began with the report of
the "Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust:

Ideas for a NYC

Holocaust Memorial Center", dated December 1981.

Apparently

a report of the original content committee headed by Rabbi
Irving Greenberg, this document recommended that a Holocaust
memorial center should address:

the culture of European

Jewry that was destroyed, a detailed factual account of the
destruction or European Jewry (including resistance) , and how
this

could

have

happened

twentieth century".
center,

in

"the

supposedly

The report called

a scholarly archive,

civilized

for an exhibition

and a survivors'

space, with

personal taped memoirs and memorabilia.3
The New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission's June
1983 Certificate of Incorporation also included the first two
of the four current themes:
the

six

million

Jews

who

"(a) To perpetuate the memory of
died

in

the

Holocaust;

to

commemorate the victims of the Holocaust not only as they
died, but as they lived; to communicate the uniqueness of the
Jewish experience in the Holocaust; to teach the history and

2"A Living Memorial to the Holocaust— Museum of Jewish
Heritage", brochure of the New York Holocaust Memorial
Commission, 1990, New York City.
3"Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust: Ideas for a NYC
Holocaust Memorial Center", no author cited, December 1981,
(Record Group Mayor Koch, Acc'n 82-87, Subgroup Special
Assistant Herb Rickman), Municipal Archives, New York City.

lessons of the Holocaust to all people for generations to
come."

When

the

Holocaust

Commission

sent

the

General

Services Administration (GSA) Regional Office a memorandum
asking to lease space in the Custom House on December 6,
1983, the stated purposes were somewhat different than those
listed in the Certificate of Incorporation, including:

a. To

perpetuate the memory of the 6,000,000 Jews who were murdered
by Nazi Germany in the Holocaust.

b. To commemorate the

lives of the victims of the Holocaust by creating a record of
Jewish life, society and culture in Europe.

c. To portray

the arrival of Jewish immigrants to New York City and to
restore to memory the vigorous traditions and lifestyles
which formed a trans-Atlantic bond between European Jewry and
the Jewry of New York City.

The idea of Jewish immigration

to New York City was not mentioned in the earlier documents,
and may have been an attempt to "Americanize" the image of
the museum for the GSA and the Federal government.

This

theme evolved into "Renewal in America", Jewish immigration
to America, in the present concept plan.

The fourth current

theme, "The Aftermath" emerged over time and, like the other
three themes, gives the museum a Jewish slant.
The literature on memorial ization,s found mostly in the
(

fields

of

sociology

and

anthropology,

analyzes

how

the

particular locale of a memorial or a museum affects how that
entity portrays history.

For example, Peter L. Berger and

Thomas Luckmann's theory of "social construction of reality"
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analyzes how the historical reality created in a museum is a
reflection of where the museum is located.
hypothesis

is that

"knowledge"

Their central

is different in different

societies, and that a sociological study must deal with what
is considered knowledge in a particular society.4
words,

"reality" is not the same everywhere.

state that

In other

The authors

"reality is socially constructed and that the

sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes in which
this

occurs."

("Reality"

is

defined

as

"a

quality

appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being
independent of our own volition", and "knowledge" is defined
as

"the certainty that phenomena are real

possess specific characteristics".5)

and that they

When the segment of

reality under discussion is highly charged with emotion and
affected by an interest group's conscious effort to deliver
a

political

striking.
societies,

message,
Not

only

the

differences

become

is knowledge different

even

more

in different

but it is purposely made different to prove a

point of view.
A dramatic example of how

memorializing the Holocaust

serves different purposes in different places is a comparison
between Yad Vashem, the official Israel Government Holocaust

4Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social
Construction of Reality. Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co. ,
Garden City, N.Y., 1966, p.l.
5Ibid., p. 1.
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memorial and museum, and the Buchenwald Concentration Camp
Museum,

when

Republic.

it was

part

of the then

German

Democratic

At Yad Vashem in Israel, Holocaust memorialization

is a Zionist message:

the culmination of the depiction of

the Holocaust is the creation of the Zionist State of Israel.
The exiles are ingathered from Holocaust to redemption.
message

at

the

Buchenwald

Concentration

The

Camp Museum was

remarkably similar, except that it was a Communist message:
the

culmination

of

the

exhibits

on

the

atrocities

at

Buchenwald was the creation of the Communist State of the
German Democratic Republic.

Ben Gurion is the hero of Yad

Vashem, and Ernst Thalmann was the hero of Buchenwald.

Nazi

Germany was Nazi Germany, but the realities to be remembered-and use of this memorialization for political purposes— were
very different at these two memorial sites.
Berger and Luckmann did not delve into the political
or public policy reasons for "reality" being different in
different societies.

They came close, when they said:

"When

a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a
concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology... .The
distinctiveness of ideology is rather that the same overall
universe is interpreted in different ways, depending upon
concrete vested interests within the society in question."6

6Ibid., pp. 122-123.
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In The Nerves of Government. Karl Deutsch's "feedback
model of consciousness" theory7 has the same basic concept,
but he

addresses

the political

rather than the locale.

forces behind

Deutsch's central

a project,

idea

is that

political systems are dependent on communications processes,
and

these

systems

communications

are

equipment.

interests

of

the

knowledge

is

a point

elements

similar

meet.

person

He

at

He
who

some

speaks

of

knows.

which

presents

to

a

aspects

of

the

selective

Deutsch

concludes

subjective

and

theory

help

to

patterns of political actions and values,

objective
identify

and speaks of a

system of symbols by which selected data are recorded and
used for later application.

Deutsch defines a symbol as, "an

order to recall from memory a particular set of things or
events.

Any physical work or event that functions repeatedly

as such a command can thus function as a symbol."8
Deutsch does not use the term "social construction of
reality", but his "feedback model of consciousness" theory is
similar
politics,

to

Berger

will

preferences

is

and

and
a

Luckmann's:

pattern

inhibitions.

experiences of a social group,

of

"In

government

relatively

derived

from

and

consolidated
the

past

consciously labeled for a

7Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. The Free
Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1963.

8Ibid, p. 10.
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relevant portion of its members, and applied to guide the
actions, to restrict the subsequent experiences of that group
and its members." (emphases in original)9 Thus groups (such
as

creators

of

memorials)

select

certain

aspects

of

experience and attach symbols to them, which may distort the
message being conveyed,

to suit the preference of these

groups.
To analyze the specific conception and evolution of the
Mutagon's Holocaust museum project in New York City, Berger
and Luckmann's (locale) and Deutsch's (selective interests)
theories must be combined.

In New York City the museum's

viewpoint, or way of remembering, is influenced by the large,
organized population

of nearly two million Jews.

(With

1,844,000 Jews, New York State has the highest number of Jews
in America, and the highest percentage of Jews in any state's
total population, 10.3 percent.

The largest concentration is

in New York City and its environs.10)
In addition to the size of the community, many members
have high profiles in such fields as government, real estate
development, finance, the arts, public relations, and higher
education.

The Holocaust project Mutagon's initiator, Mayor

Koch, was himself an outspokenly Jewish mayor.

His strong

affiliation with the organized Jewish community, Israel, and
9Ibid., p. 107.
10Allison Kaplan, "Jewish Population in U.S. Steady, but
Traditional Areas See Decline", Jewish Telegraphic Agency
Daily News Bulletin, August 30, 1990, New York, p. 4.
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Jewish ethnicity were part of New York City's uniquely Jewish
ambience in the United States.
Both the locale and the initial political alliance have
given the New York City project a Jewish slant and a JewishAmerican slant.

In comparison, the museum under construction

in Washington,
Jewish.

D.C. is

As Michael

American, and more universal than

Berenbaum,

Washington museum, wrote:

project

director

for the

"The [Washington] Museum will take

what could have been the painful and parochial memories of a
bereaved ethnic community [i.e., the Jews] and apply them to
the most basic of American values.

Located adjacent to the

National Mall— surrounded by the Smithsonian Institution and
the monuments to Lincoln,
building

and

its

Jefferson,

contents

are

being

and Washington— the
designed

with

the

neighbors in mind so that the Holocaust Museum will emerge as
an

American

institution

and

will

speak

to

the

national

saga. "11
Mayor Koch himself described the New York project as
follows:

"This

is the Jewish Holocaust.

Washington is not."

The Museum in

He said there were no pressures from

other groups to be included, and that the project was all
privately funded.12

While there were some pressures,

such

as requests from gay, Polish, and Ukrainian groups, the New

11Michael Berenbaum, After Tragedy and Triumph. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 163.
12Interview with Edward I. Koch, New York, May 18, 1990.
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York Mutagon responded with minimal recognition, keeping the
slant essentially Jewish.

The Washington project, however,

has as part of its political alliance representatives of such
groups as Armenians and Ukrainians.

From its inception, the

interest group that President Carter named to create a museum
was deliberately not composed entirely of Jews.

Its more

universal and more American way of remembering reflects the
locale in the nation's capital (as opposed to New York City,
acknowledged as the nation's Jewish capital), and the Federal
government's involvement.

(See Chapter 7 for details on the

background of the Washington project.)
In addition to including other victims of the Nazis and
other genocides, the Washington museum is portrayed from an
American,

not a Jewish,

perspective.

The U.S.

Holocaust

Memorial Museum includes the following description in a 1991
fund raising letter:

"Your visit begins in the elevator

where you will be transported back to April 11, 1945— the
date American troops entered the Buchenwald concentration
camp.

(emphasis in original)

An American liberator will

appear on a video monitor and tell how what he saw that April
afternoon changed the rest of his life."

The letter begins:

"Eisenhower knew that what he and his men saw in 1945 would
be the only testimony many Americans would believe."

The

letter says the museum will be "A museum of American values",
"a museum of American experiences",

"a museum of American

history", and "a museum of American people".
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It also says of the museum:
"It is a story of how 6,000,000 Jews and millions
of

other

people

were

systematically

and

ruthlessly

exterminated...a story of the evil that 400,000 American
soldiers died fighting against 45 years ago.
"Though primarily a story about the extermination
of the Jewish people, it is also about the persecution
of

all

people

regarded

as

different

or

vulnerable

(emphasis in original)— of priests and patriots, Polish
intellectuals and Soviet prisoners of war, homosexuals
and the handicapped, and even innocent children."13
The

most

simple

but

dramatic

way

to

explain

the

differences in the "social construction of reality" and the
"feedback model of consciousness" of the two museums is:

for

the New York project, the first part of the sentence above
would be emphasized,
paraphrase,

rather than the second phrase.

To

the New York museum is planned as primarily a

story about the extermination of the Jewish people and the
richness of their life before and afterward, but it is also,
to a much lesser degree, about the persecution of all people
regarded as different or vulnerable.
Beginning with the name itself, "A Living Memorial to
the

Holocaust-Museum

of

Jewish

Heritage",

project's way of remembering is more Jewish.

the

New

York

Rather than

13Letter of invitation to become charter supporter,
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C.,
Spring 1991 (undated).
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emphasizing American liberators of concentrations camps, its
September

1991

news

brochure,

for

example,

focuses

on:

mementos of six Jewish-American families who migrated to
America and "maintained their [Jewish] heritage and a sense
of

[Jewish]

change";

a

continuity
traveling

in

the

exhibit

midst

of

of

transition

Holocaust

and

memorials;

a

gathering of hidden Jewish children during World War II; and
rare film footage of pre-war Jewish life in Poland.
Berenbaum,

who

rationalizes

the

universalism of the Washington museum,

pluralism

said:

and

"A national

council funded at taxpayers7 expense to design a national
memorial does not have the liberty to create an exclusively
Jewish one in the restricted sense of the term,
specifically with regard to audience.

and most

A purely Jewish museum

is the task of the American Jewish community operating with
private funding and without government subvention, as is the
case with the New York Holocaust Memorial

(appropriately

titled 'The Museum of Jewish Heritage')."14
However, the New York museum (for which he omitted the
first half of its name, "A Living Memorial to the Holocaust")
is not being created by the "American Jewish community", as
Berenbaum states.
political

alliance

It

is being created by a Mutagon,

that

includes

a

a

government-created

interest group, or Commission, of New York City and New York
State Jews.

This alliance also includes the City and State

u Berenbaum, p. 22.
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governments, and always had as its site government-owned land
(like

the

Washington

project).

Despite

government

involvement, the New York museum has a Jewish slant.

This is

because both the location and the original political alliance
are more Jewish than the Washington project.
demonstrated,

the

Jewish

mayor,

initiator,

As will be
and

Founding

Chairman of the Commission first shared power with, and then
lost power to, a non-Jewish governor with national political
aspirations.

When the governor first became a retroactive

Founding Co-chairman, the purpose of his involvement, as seen
by his political liaisons to the Jewish community such as
Sandy Frucher,
Therefore,
Koch's,

was- to ingratiate him with the community.

Cuomo's

were

from

appointments
the

Jewish

to

the

Commission,

like

Later

this

community.

in

process, however, the governor's office made an effort to
minimize the Jewishness of the project.
While the "social construction of reality" and "feedback
model

of consciousness"

theories are important tools

for

partially understanding the planned content of the New York
Holocaust

museum,

possibility

of

they

the

do

not

imposition

take
of

a

into
new

account
"reality"

the
or

"consciousness" as a result of a changing political coalition
over time.

When Mayor Koch initiated the Holocaust memorial

museum project

in

1981,

the Jewish

leaders

he

chose

to

implement it expected to be able to make the content uniquely
Jewish.

Operating in ethnically Jewish New York City, with
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Koch's encouragement, they thought other elected officials
would approve of a particularistic Jewish memorialization of
the Holocaust.
When
Mutagon

the

proposed museum became

changed,

"reality"

politics

City-State

interfered

or "consciousness".

and

and

changed

the
the

Berger and Luckmann's and

Deutsch's theories do not account for such a situation, with
a long-term project's political allies changing over time.
After Governor Cuomo's political entrepreneur, Sandy Frucher,
offered Battery Park City as a site,

the governor became

retroactive Founding Co-chairman of the Commission, equal to
Koch.

Frucher wore three hats:

the Commission,

the governor's liaison to

president of Battery Park City Authority

(BPCA), and member of the Commission's executive committee.
Because of his deep personal commitment to such a project,
his idea that it was politically good for the governor, and
his close personal friendship with the governor, Frucher was
able to smooth over any differences the Commission and the
governor's

office had

about the museum's particularistic

Jewish way of remembering.
The museum lease,
Commission

Co-chairmen

signed by BPCA,
on

September

24,

the governor,
1986,

proves the museum was to be decidedly Jewish.

in

and

itself

It said:

"'Business Days' shall mean any day which is not a Saturday,
Sunday or a day observed as a holiday by either the State of
New York or the federal government and, as long as New York
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Holocaust

Memorial

Commission,

following Jewish holidays:
Kippur,

Succoth

(first

Inc.

is

the

Tenant,

the

Rosh Hashanah (both days), Yom

two

(2)

days), Shmini

Atzereth,

Simchas Torah, Passover (first two (2) days and last two (2)
days) and Shavuoth (both days).")15
Although such a definition of business days in the lease
should have warned them, the governor and other members of
his staff seemed to become aware only later that the scope of
the planned museum was parochially Jewish.

As was detailed

in Chapter 13, the "Jewish" definition of "business days" in
the 1986 lease later caused friction between the governor and
the Commission.

He sent another trusted old friend and

confidant, his counselor Fabian Palomino, to try to "undo the
damage"
Palomino,

almost

three

years

later.

On

June

28,

1989,

who was chairman of the board of BPCA and also

represented Governor Cuomo, met with the Commission.

His

purpose (i.e., his and the governor's) was to pressure the
Commission to have the museum open on Saturdays and Jewish
holidays.

Co-chairman George Klein and others were polite

but noncommittal to Palomino;

after he left they made it

clear among themselves that their by-laws gave them the right
to close on Saturdays and Jewish holidays,
planning to do so.
days".

15Ibid., p. 1.

and they were

For them, these days were not "business
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In October, 1986, the name of the museum (according to
its provisional charter)

officially became "The Museum of

Jewish Heritage-A Living Memorial to the Holocaust".

At the

end of November, however, the governor's office conveyed his
displeasure (or that of his attorneys) with the name of the
museum.

The reasons

for the complaint were not given

detail,

but they were related to the emphasis on "Jewish

Heritage" in the name.

in

The governor's office was worried

about the appearance of a possible Church and State conflict.
Eventually, pressure from the governor's office forced the
Commission to change the name of the museum to "A Living
Memorial to the Holocaust— Museum of Jewish Heritage".

(The

name was changed by the Commission in November 1987, and made
official in the provisional charter by the Regents of the
University of the State of New York on April 22, 1988.)
Cuomo

feared

not

only

criticism

from

separation

of

Church and State advocates, but also requests for parcels of
land from other religious groups (such as he received from
the Catholic Diocese and St. John the Divine). He therefore
tried to change the image of the museum and make it appear
less Jewish, by changing the emphasis in the name.

Being

linked with a narrowly Jewish institution would be helpful
with his Jewish voters in New York City and State (where Jews
account for twenty percent of the Democratic primary), but
Cuomo was then seriously considering running for President.
He decided to please both his local and potential national
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electorates, by keeping the name but reversing it to minimize
the Jewish component.

The Commission, which knew it was now

subject to the governor's wishes

(because it had opted to

build the museum in Battery Park City), accepted the change.
The new Memorandum of Understanding signed on July 26,
1991 between BPCA, the museum and the Commission, brought
other changes, with language that was quite different than
that of the original 1986 lease.

This, too, reflected the

wishes of the governor's office and new BPCA president David
Emil that the museum should not appear to be a religious,
i.e., a Jewish,

institution.

At this point, the original

Founding Co-chairman, Koch, was completely out of the picture
(although he retained his title).
changed,

and the new mayor,

The Mutagon's shape had

David Dinkins,

nothing to do with the project.

had little or

The new "social construction

of reality" and "feedback of consciousness" had changed with
the change in the political polygon;

the governor and BPCA

were now in command of the situation.
According to the

1991 Memorandum,

the museum to be

established will be "an important cultural institution in the
south

residential

neighborhood

of

Battery

Park

City,

comprising a civic and cultural facility in furtherance of
the

public

accomplish.1,16

purposes
In

the

case

the

Authority
term

was

"civic

created
and

to

cultural

16Memorandum
of Understanding,
Battery
Park City
Authority, New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, Inc., and
A Living Memorial to the Holocaust:
Museum of Jewish
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facility” is not sufficient to clarify that the museum is not
a religious, i.e., a Jewish, institution, the Memorandum then
spells it out in no uncertain terms:

"The Building shall be

operated at all times during the term of the New Museum Lease
in accordance with the then current requirements of the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."17

The

museum no longer has "no business days" defined as Jewish
holidays and Saturdays, as in the 1986 lease.

Instead, "The

Museum shall be open to the general public for at least 240
days per year."18

If the Commission chooses to close the

museum on Saturdays and Jewish holidays, they may still do
so.

However, this religious aspect of the museum is not now

documented in the new Memorandum, as it was in the old lease.
The

following

three

new

restrictions

are

even more

telling, regarding the governor's concern about separation of
Church and State:
"The

Building

shall

not be

used

for

sectarian

instruction or as a place of religious worship, or in
connection with any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity for any religious denomination.
"The Museum shall not organize, sponsor, coordinate
or supervise public or private,

Heritage, July 26, 1991,
New York City, p. 2.
17Ibid., p. 7 .
18Ibid., p. 8

group or individual
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prayer in the Building, and no portion of the Building
shall be designated as a place for any such prayer.
"The Museum shall not require any person to observe
or conform to the laws or customs of any religion or
denomination as a condition to the use and enjoyment of
the

Building

or

any

facilities

located

at

the

Building. "19
These three paragraphs are almost paranoid in their
display

of

the

fear

religious institution.

that

the

museum

will

be

a

Jewish

From the inception of the current

project in 1981, it had always been planned as a memorial
project.

A special space for remembering Hitler's victims

was always included in the plan.
a

special

place

for

If the museum provides such

remembering

those

murdered

in

the

Holocaust, is this considered a place for prayer?
In Jewish tradition remembering the dead is associated with
prayer,

and

impossible.

defining

or

separating

the

two

is

almost

Only when the new architectural design for the

scaled-down museum on half of Site 14 is ready and approved
by BPCA will there be an answer to the question of whether a
space for remembering is considered

(according to BPCA)

a

space for praying.
Related to this is another question.

The tradition of

holding an annual Holocaust memorial ceremony in New York
City began in 1944, even before World War II ended.
19Ibid. , p. 8.

On April

19,

1944,

the

first

anniversary

of the

Warsaw

Ghetto

Uprising, more than 30,000 Jews gathered on the steps of City
Hall to hear Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia and prominent Jewish
leaders

honor

uprising.20

the

memory

of

After the war,

those
this

who

had

evolved

died

into an

in the
annual

ceremony on Yom HaShoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day (the 27th
day of the Hebrew month of Nissan ), sponsored by the Warsaw
Ghetto Resistance Organization (WAGRO). Benjamin Meed, head
of

WAGRO

and

committee,

a

member

of

theCommission's

executive

stressed for years that New York City needed an

appropriate site for such a ceremony (which has been held in
various locations such as Temple Emanu-El, The Felt Forum of
Madison Square Garden and the Javits Convention Center).
From the inception of the New York City
Holocaust

Memorial

Commission,

members

(later New York)
of

its

executive

committee assumed and informally discussed the idea that the
annual

ceremony

would

be

Holocaust Memorial Museum.
include prayers,

held

in

or at the

anticipated

Yom HaShoah commemorations always

such' as Kaddish for the dead and the El

Moleh Rahamim, the Jewish memorial prayer said at funerals.
According to "the letter of the law" of the new Memorandum,
it

appears

that

Yom

HaShoah

commemorations

will

be

prohibited.

20James E. Young, "Holocaust Memorials in America: The
Politics of Identity" in Survey of Jewish Affairs. Vol. 10,
ed. by William Frankel, Basil Blackwell, London, 1991, p. 3
of page proofs.
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The last paragraph quoted above is almost absurd.

For

example, there was always the provision for a restaurant or
snack bar in all earlier museum floor plans,

and it was

always understood by the Commission's executive committee
that only kosher food would be served.

If the food is kosher

in the new museum, does this mean the museum is requiring
people to "observe or conform to the laws or customs of any
religion

or denomination

as

a condition

to

the use

and

enjoyment of the Building or any facilities located at the
Building."?

According to a strict interpretation, the answer

would be affirmative,

and perhaps the museum will thus be

prevented from serving kosher food.

Since eating kosher food

for one snack or light meal should not be a problem for
anyone,

and

observant

eating

Jews

non-kosher

(including

food
some

is

not

possible

Holocaust

for

survivors,

Commission officers and members) who will visit the museum,
this

paragraph

(at

least

in

this

interpretation)

seems

restrictive to a fault.
At this point it is impossible to further analyze the
way of remembering in the forthcoming museum and how this
will be affected by the Mutagon.

New interior and exterior

designs are yet to be developed.

However, museum director

David Altshuler said the original concept will stay the same,
with

these

four main

themes:

"The World

Before",

Holocaust", "The Aftermath", and "Renewal in America".

"The
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SUMMARY
The particular way that a museum presents history is a
reflection both of who is doing the remembering and where the
remembrance is taking place.

While the basic concept of the

projected Holocaust memorial museum in New York City has
remained the same for more than ten years, the Mutagon, the
changing alliance of political forces behind creation of the
museum, has had an effect on the museum's message and image.
Since the inception of a Mayor's Task Force in 1981, this
message and image have always had a particularistic Jewish
slant.

With the exception of elected officials designated

because of their offices, all of the members of the original
New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission were Jewish.
Berger and Luckmann's theory of "social construction of
reality" analyzes how the historical reality created in a
museum is a reflection of the museum's locale, and Deutsch's
"feedback model of consciousness" theory addresses the effect
of the political forces behind such a project.

A combination

of these two theories, which considers both where a museum is
being created and who is doing that creating,

is necessary

for analyzing how the Mutagon has affected plans for the
Holocaust museum in New York City.
joined

the

overtly Jewish

After Governor Cuomo
a Founding

Co-

Chairman of

the Commission in 1986,the Mutagon changed.

The

governor's

legal

the

experts

Mayor Koch

then began

as

questioning

possibility of a separationof Church and State conflict for

this project (to be located on land granted by the State).
This led to a name change for the museum, and ultimately to
a new Memorandum of Understanding in July 1991, in which the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was
invoked by BPCA.
concept

in

the

There may be more significant changes in
forthcoming

completed some time in 1992.

new

interior

design,

to

be
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PART THREE:

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AMD CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 15: THE MUTAGON AS A CONCEPT FOR ANALYZING POLITICAL
ALLIANCES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
"Once the Holocaust expanded beyond the private realm of
Jewish memory and entered the public domain, it became
subject to all of those forces that shape and reshape images
in the public's consciousness and, by so doing, shape public
memory itself."
Alvin H. Rosenfeld1

This study has developed and utilized the so-called
Mutagon

concept

to

analyze

the

complicated

and

changing

political coalition that has endeavored from 1981 through
1991 to create a major Holocaust memorial museum in New York
City.

The Mutagon concept augments existing interest group

theory, which does not adequately account for:

1. changes in

political coalitions over time during long-term projects; 2.
the possibility of an interest group having to deal with both
a governor and a mayor;

3. the conflicts of interest when

elected officials are part of the interest group that deals
with government.
The new concept for analyzing political coalitions on a
state and local level, the Mutagon, was defined as follows:
Government policy for a long-term city-state public-private
project emerges from a changing polygon consisting of the
interest group, the mayor, the governor, and other elected
1Alvin H. Rosenfeld, "The Holocaust in Jewish Memory and
Public Memory", Dimensions: A Journal of Holocaust Studies.
Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 1986, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith, New York.
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Although the Mutagon is working for

and appointed officials.

closure, it may instead create an impasse because of:

1. the

changes within this polygon that occur over time {especially
when

a

new major

player

enters

or

an

old major

player

leaves); 2. the top-heavy structure of a political alliance
that

at

some

stages

has

two

heads;

and

3.

the

complex

relationship among the polygon's web of players.
Using this Mutagon, this study analyzed the political
processes during the 45 year impasse in efforts to complete
a major Holocaust memorial in New York City.

The study first

analyzed the pre-history of the current effort, i.e., earlier
failed projects beginning in 1946.

More specifically it

analyzed

circumstances

the genesis

and changing

of the

current project, which began in 1981 and continued into 1992.
During its first ten years, the stages of the New York City
project were:
1981-1982;

1. the Mayor's Holocaust Memorial Task Force—
New

York

Commission— 1982 through

1985;

Memorial

2.

the

Commission— from early

City
3.

Holocaust

Memorial

the New York Holocaust

1986

on;

4.

an ultimate

Memorandum of Understanding in July 1991, which gives the
Commission one year to begin implementing the project or lose
the opportunity to build in Battery Park City.
Mutagon

concept

takes

into

account:

l) . the

political alliances that occur over time; and

The new
shifts

in

2). the top-

heavy structure of a public-private project that involves
both city and state governments.
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The study demonstrated that the ways in which the New
York

City

and

State

governments

intervened— from

the

conception of the idea for the latest memorial museum project
in 1981 and throughout the attempted implementation stage—
are extremely complex, with an intricate interplay of City
and State government.
is private,
complex.

State-

The guestion of whether the Commission
and City-connected,

or both,

is also

This study analyzed how government intervention has

changed over ten years, and how the changing structure of the
combined interest group and government influences affected
implementation of the project.
The Mutagon concept is necessary because literature on
the

structure

limited,
theories.

of

interest

group-government

alliances

is

and dominated by iron triangle and issue network
As was

detailed,

both

of

these

theories

are

generally applied to interest groups dealing on a Federal,
rather than a state-city level.
issue

network

theories,

These iron triangle and

therefore,

are

not

adequate

for

analyzing the structure of the political forces behind the
New York Holocaust memorial museum or any long-term publicprivate project involving both city and state governments.
Not only do they deal with political coalitions on a Federal
level,

but they

analyze

a less

complex

and more

stable

polygon.
Hugh Heclo and Anthony King critiqued

iron triangle

theory, and instead developed an issue network theory.

Heclo
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said that "the iron triangle concept is not so much wrong as
it is disastrously incomplete.1,2
theory

is

not

wrong

but

Likewise,

"disastrously

issue network

incomplete"

for

analyzing a project such as the New York City Holocaust
museum.

Heclo

defined

an

issue

network

as

"a

shared-

knowledge group having to do with some aspect (or, as defined
by the network, some problem) of public policy."

According

to Heclo, participants in issue networks are shifting, fluid
and anonymous, unlike the iron triangle concept of a defined
small circle which forms to promote specific narrow issues.
An iron triangle is generally defined as a solid trilateral
bond formed by the interest group, its advocates in Congress,
and in the executive branch agency, with government policies
emerging from this closed triangle.
pass

favorable

legislation,

implement these mandates,

(Members of Congress

executive

agency

personnel

and interest groups support the

helpful elected officials.)
As was shown, both the issue network and iron triangle
theories

are

"disastrously

incomplete"

for analyzing the

political alliance of the New York City project:
more complex,

it is much

has changed over ten years of impasse,

consists of two levels of government— city and state.
Mutagon

polygon

project

consists

for the

New

or consisted

York

City

of the

Holocaust

former

and
The

museum

and present

2Hugh Heclo in The New American Political System edited
by Anthony King, American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. 87-124.
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mayor,

the governor,

past

and present

Battery

Park City

Authority (BPCA) officials, and an interest group (which the
government created).

In addition to the interest group (the

officially appointed New York City and then the New York
Holocaust Memorial Commission) , other interested parties have
included

survivor

organizations,

organizations,

developers,

heads

administrative

of
staff

Jewish
of

the

Commission and museum, architects and exhibit designers, and
consultants.
Estimate,

At some phases, the City Council, the Board of

the

State

Legislature,

and

the

City

Commission were also involved to an extent.

Planning

Furthermore,

many of the players wore two hats, especially those who were
both Commission members and government officials with whom
the Commission was dealing.

The Mutagon accounts for changes

in a complex coalition over time, while the issue network and
iron triangle theories do not.
As was demonstrated,

during the ten years since the

initiation of the Holocaust project Mutagon,

the power of

various members and components of the polygon has increased
or

diminished.

In

addition,

new

coalition and others drifted away.

partners

joined

the

The by-laws of the New

York Holocaust Memorial Commission are flawed, because there
is no provision for removing anyone.

While no one was ever

officially removed from office or membership, a few people
have resigned (e.g., Ivan Boesky) and others have merely lost
interest.

So much time has gone by since the inception of
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the project that many government officials who were staunch
advocates,

the prime examples being Mayor Koch and Sandy

Frucher of BPCA, are no longer in office.
At one phase beginning in 1986, the Mutagon polygon had
two heads with power of appointment to the Commission— the
mayor and the governor.

The "Founding Co-chairmen", however,

are not just the mayor and governor— they are a specific
mayor— Koch,
Koch,

and a specific governor— Cuomo.

the original

founder,

lost the

1989

After Mayor
elections,

he

continued to retain his title, but the power shifted to the
governor.

Not knowing what title to give Koch's replacement,

Mayor David Dinkins
Commission

decided

stationery as

(who has shown little interest), the
to

"Mayor

list

his

name

on

literature

of the City of New York"

consider him an officer.

and

and thus

Museum Director David Altshuler

said that the governor who will replace Cuomo will be listed
as "Governor of the State of New York", with Cuomo retaining
his "Founding Co-chairman" title after he leaves office.
Using the Mutagon concept, it was possible to analyze
the complex interrelationships within the political alliance
creating the New York museum project.

As was shown, this

polygon includes: two executive branches (the mayor and the
governor)

BPCA, the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission

(officially appointed by Koch and Cuomo), and others.

The

Commission has four Co-chairmen, one of whom, Peter Cohen, is
only serving on paper.

There were conflicts among the three
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active

Co-chairmen,

Manhattan

District

especially
Attorney

after

Robert

one

Co-Chairman,

Morgenthau,

indicted

another Co-chairman, New York State Senate Democratic Leader
Manfred

Ohrenstein.

(Morgenthau

charges in September 1991.)

dropped

all

remaining

The Co-chairman who has taken

the lead and been most prominent is powerful real estate
developer George Klein.

Koch appointed Klein and Morgenthau

in 1983; when Cuomo became Koch's "Founding Co-chairman in
1986, he appointed Ohrenstein (and later appointed Cohen, who
then lost his job at Shearson Lehman, and "disappeared" from
the Commission).
The Mutagon was employed to analyze why there is still
no major Holocaust memorial in New York City— which has been
home

for

the

largest

Jewish

and

the

largest

survivor populations in the United States.
years

after

initiation

of

the

current

Holocaust

More than ten

project,

at

the

beginning of 1992, there was still not even a hole in the
ground.

In order to understand why the current project has

been at such an impasse, the following issues were analyzed:
the politics behind earlier and current attempts,
issue
States

of

Holocaust memorialization

and

project's

New

York

changing

City

was

governmental

structure

of

placed

on United

agendas,

players,

how the

and

allies,

the
and

processes.
Related
Holocaust

events

Commission

that
were

preceded
reviewed

Koch's

creation

to place

the

of

a

current
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project in historical perspective:

the emergence of the

Jewish community as an interest group in the United States;
the increased importance of memorialization of the Holocaust
for

the

Jewish

community;

the

many

earlier

attempts,

beginning in 1946, to create a Holocaust memorial in New York
City; and President Jimmy Carter's national initiative.
As

was

shown,

earlier

failed

attempts

to

create

a

Holocaust memorial in New York City were begun by powerless
individuals

and

small,

disorganized

interest

groups,

and

failed partially because none of the mayors before Koch made
the idea his own and aggressively led the effort.

They all

remained private endeavors, with different parcels of City
land made available for various failed projects over the
years.

The

pre-history

summarized as follows:

of

the

current

project

can

be

1. The first attempt to create a

major Holocaust memorial in New York City began in 194 6, but
a memorial was never a priority for the organized Jewish
community until

President

Carter made

the

idea

official

government policy (after interest in the Holocaust emerged).
2.

Israel

has been the

community's

first priority,

with

rescue of Jews ranking second and related to the first, and
this has made fund raising for a memorial difficult. 3. Fear
of anti-Semitism and McCarthyism inhibited the community's
support of early efforts.

4. Although the 1967 and 1973 wars

in Israel raised Holocaust consciousness in the organized
American Jewish community, this was directed toward giving
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money

to

help

Holocaust

Israel,

survivors

not

were

to

not

community until about 1980.

building

a memorial.

influential

in

the

5.

Jewish

6. A psychological healing time

was necessary before the issue of the Holocaust could be
dealt with, and this may have affected earlier efforts to
create a memorial.

7. No single individual (or group) with

both money and influence took the lead for earlier projects.
8. Because the issue of Holocaust memorialization was not
major for the organized Jewish community until the mid-1970s,
elected officials had no reason to give it priority before
then.

9.

Before 1978, neither the Federal nor the New York

City government intervened and coopted the idea of creating
a Holocaust memorial.
As was detailed, the situation changed, and around the
mid-197 0s memorialization of the Holocaust gained increasing
acceptance in the organized Jewish community.
culminated with Carter's
memorial,

there

was

After this

1978 announcement of a national

greater

political

advantage

from

a

mayor's initiating a Holocaust memorial in New York City.
Koch,

encouraged

by

his

political

entrepreneur

Herbert

Rickman, then coopted the issue of Holocaust memorialization
to gain more political favor in the Jewish community in New
York City.

In 1981 the mayor created his own narrow interest

group, a Task Force and then a Memorial Commission, both to
build

a

memorial

and

to

strengthen

his

ties

organized Jewish community in New York City.

with

the

He chose to
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head this interest group his friend George Klein, a powerful
real estate developer who was vice president of the Jewish
Community Relations Council of New York.
The study examined the reasons why the project has been
at

an

impasse,

stemming

from

the

unwieldy

and

changing

structure of the Mutagon responsible for implementation, and
the length of time the project has dragged on.
were:

Included

changes in political alliances over time (e.g., new

elected and appointed officials); having at the helm (for
much of the time)

both the mayor and the governor; other

priorities (especially fundraising crises) in the organized
Jewish community; conflicts among the Commission members; the
politics of site selection; and the personalization of the
project by one major player (Klein).

Although the idea of

Holocaust memorialization increased in importance in the mid1970s in the American Jewish community and remains central in
the

early

1990s,

the

Mutagon

still

was

not

able

to

successfully complete a project by the beginning of 1992.
(An unrelated external reason for the delay in implementation
was "Black Monday" on Wall Street, October 19, 1987, and the
subsequent worsening economic conditions in New York City.
The economic climate both dropped property values in Battery
Park

City

resulting
museum.)

and

wiped

out

in new decisions

potential

and

actual

on the best way to

donors,
fund the
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As was shown,

the shape of the Mutagon changed most

drastically when Koch's Commission became City-State in 1986,
and Governor Cuomo joined him as a "Founding Co-chairman".
The

dissertation

analyzed

Mutagon in its new form:

the

negative

effects

of

this

the State government's trying to

influence the final outcome of the project, the governor's
policies

producing

bureaucratic

problems

and

delayed

implementation, friction between the City and the State over
the project, and the election and appointment of new State
and City government officials disrupting the continuity of
the project's implementation.
Besides these negative aspects, the study evaluated the
positive effects of the mayor's, and later the governor's,
intervention on the project in New York City.

These included

the gift of government resources such as land and money, and
the indirect positive impact of the mayor's (and later the
governor's)

connection at some stages helping to overcome

bureaucratic problems within the government.
In addition to going beyond iron triangle and issue
network theories to add to the literature on the structure of
interest group-government alliances, this Mutagon concept has
also built on the established body of work on agenda setting
and public policy,

which are related to the structure of

interest group politics.
in the

The study demonstrated how changes

complex Mutagon coalition have

affected both the
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agenda setting for and implementation of the museum project,
and led to more than ten years of stagnation.
As was shown, on the surface the project seems as though
it was destined for smooth sailing.

Unlike earlier attempts

in New York, the current project was placed on the agenda by
the mayor, who then created the interest group,
developers

and

other

supporters

of

Koch.

including

Furthermore,

President Carter's creation of the President's Commission on
the Holocaust three years earlier had set a precedent and
memorialization of the Holocaust had become a hot item for
the major Jewish American organizations before 1981.
various

unconnected

factors

had

come

together

By 1977
to

make

commemorating the Holocaust a suitable issue for the agendas
of American politicians:

e.g., the 1967 Six Day War and the

197 3 Yom Kippur War had brought forth visions of another
Holocaust; Menachem Begin,

who was skillful

at using the

Holocaust for his own political ends, became Prime Minister
of Israel in June, 1977; leaders of survivor organizations,
feeling their mortality,

began urging other survivors to

share their memories; the television program Holocaust was
the

first major

(fictionalized)

network airing about the

Holocaust in 1978; children of survivors became adults and
began wondering about their parents' secretiveness about the
past; secular American Jews who were politically disappointed
with Israel were seeking a substitute secular tie to Judaism;
in 1977 the United States Justice Department established a
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Special Litigation Unit to investigate and bring to trial
Nazi war criminals living in the United States.
For these reasons, in John Kingdon's words, when Carter
needed to court the Jewish community in 1978, the issue of
the Holocaust "arose in the primeval soup".

Kingdon's model

for determining what gets on a government's agenda was used
to

analyze

agenda,

how

a Holocaust

project

emerged

on

Carter's

leading to Koch's creation of the New York City

Commission.

According to Kingdon, it is important to know

what made the soil fertile,
seed.

rather than the origin of the

His model has three streams— problem recognition,

policy formulation and refinement, and politics— which must
come together at a critical time, in order for an issue to
suddenly "get hot".
As was detailed,

Koch initiated the New York project

when Rickman approached developer George Klein in the Spring
of 1981

(an election year).

Klein became chairman of a

Mayor's Task Force, and that July twenty-eight other leaders
of the Jewish community were named as members.

In 1982 this

Task Force recommended a permanent commission, and in 1983
the mayor appointed the New York City Holocaust Memorial
Commission.

In

1986

Governor Cuomo became

Founding

Co-

chairman, along with Koch, and the Mutagon changed its form.
Cuomo

appointed

additional

Commission

members

and

Co-

chairmen, and the name was changed to the New York Holocaust
Memorial Commission.

Cuomo had offered to house the museum
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in Battery Park City, which he controlled through BPCA, and
he therefore became a powerful member of the Mutagon.

When

Koch left office at the end of December 1989, the structure
of the Mutagon changed again, giving the governor more power.
Koch retained his title, but became inactive.

His absence

after so prominently linking himself with the project, and
Cuomo's shifting interest as he looked toward a possible
national election for President, were analyzed as factors
that impeded implementation.
The

study

analyzed

how

the

original

New

York

City

Holocaust Memorial Commission gave Rickman, Koch, Klein and
others

the

opportunity

to

use

the

issue

of

Holocaust

memorialization to increase their potential influence in the
organized Jewish community.

They were able to both promote

the idea and increase their power by being linked with the
project and recommending or appointing members.

After Koch

gave the chairmanship to Klein, his rich long-time friend,
Klein could then encourage other wealthy developers to be
generous both to the Holocaust project and to Koch's mayoral
campaign.
Robert

Dahl's

and

Edward

C.

Banfield's

theories

of

citizen participation were discussed as partial analyses of
the "player" aspect of the Mutagon concept of governmentinterest group structure.

While they— unlike iron triangle

and issue network theories— analyze political alliances on a
local

level,

they

still

do

not

account

for

changes

in
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political alliances when projects are long-term; nor do they
account

for a mayor and governor sharing power.

Unlike

Dahl's and Banfield's analyses, the Mutagon is a changing
construct.

For the Holocaust project the polygon was two-

headed during crucial years, with Governor Cuomo and Mayor
Koch jointly in control.
In addition to interest group theory, this study also
analyzed how Koch's and then Cuomo's intervention in efforts
to create a Holocaust memorial museum, and the location of
the

project

in

New

York

City,

give

conceptualization a particular slant.

the

museum's

It was demonstrated

that, like interest group and citizen participation theories,
theories of social

construction of reality and political

symbolism are useful but limited for analyzing the New York
City Holocaust memorial project.

Peter L. Berger and Thomas

Luckmann's theory of "social construction of reality" was
discussed

as

a relevant

analysis

of

how

the

historical

reality created in a museum is a reflection of where the
museum is located.
consciousness"

Karl Deutsch's related "feedback model of

theory was

also cited as

relevant

for an

understanding of why history is remembered the way it is, or
why a museum has a particular slant.

Berger and Luckmann's

and Deutsch's concepts are virtually the same:
as

creators

of

memorials)

select

certain

groups (such
aspects

of

experience and attach symbols to them, which may distort the
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message being conveyed,

to suit the preference

of these

groups.
Berger

and

Luckmann's

and

Deutsch's

theories

were

combined to demonstrate that both the locale in New York City
and the changing shape of the Mutagon polygon of political
forces affected the conceptualization and evolution of the
Holocaust museum project.
way of remembering,

The museum creators' viewpoint, or

is influenced by the large organized

Jewish population of nearly two million Jews, many of whom
are prominent

in

"worlds"

that make

New

York

"move

and

shake".
However, it was shown that, unlike the Mutagon concept,
"social

construction

consciousness"
possibility

of

"consciousness"
coalition.

of

theories
the
as

reality"

and

do

take

not

imposition
a

result

of
of

"feedback model
into

a
a

new

account
"reality"

changing

of
the
or

political

In the case of the New York City project, first

Mayor Koch opened the door by providing an opportunity to
create a Holocaust memorial.

Both he and the leaders he

chose to carry out the task wanted the museum to have a
decidedly Jewish slant.

Later,

once the proposed museum

became City-State and the Mutagon changed
politics

interfered

"consciousness".

and

Berger

changed
and

the

Luckmann's

theories do not analyze such a situation.

its structure,
"reality"
and

or

Deutsch's

As was shown, after Governor Cuomo offered Battery Park
City as a site and became a Founding Co-chairman, he learned
too late that the planned museum and exhibits were recounting
history

with

a

Jewish

viewpoint.

Because

of

possible

criticism from separation of Church and State advocates (and
requests for land from other religious groups), he tried to
change the message of the "reality" of the museum.

First he

insisted that the name of the museum be changed, and "The
Museum of Jewish Heritage-A Living Memorial to the Holocaust"
thus became "A Living Memorial to the Holocaust-Museum of
Jewish Heritage".

His association with the project could

help him please Jewish voters in New York City and State, but
could be detrimental

if he decided to run for President.

Therefore he compromised, by keeping the name but reversing
it to minimize the Jewish component.

The governor's concerns

about the Jewish message of the projected museum ultimately
resulted

in

BPCA's

invoking

the

separation of Church and State)

First

Amendment

(i.e.,

in the 1991 Memorandum of

Agreement between BPCA and the Holocaust Commission.
This

study

alliance— which

concluded
changes,

that
is

the

Mutagon

long-term,

has

political
a

complex

interconnection of players, and includes both state and city
governments— was largely responsible for the ten year impasse
in creating a Holocaust museum in New York City.
at

this

conclusion,

the

following methodology

To arrive
was

used:

Interviews were conducted with members, staff and officers of
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the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, BPCA officials,
leaders

of

memorials
project

earlier

in New

efforts

York

in Washington,

to

City,

create

major

initiators

of

Holocaust

the

national

museum directors at Yad VaShem in

Jerusalem, and the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles,
and experts on Holocaust history and the American Jewish
community.
chairmen

(Unfortunately,
ever

interviews.)

none of the three active Co-

responded

to

countless

requests

for

These broad-ranging interviews were aimed at

understanding the pre-history of the current project and why
it has not yet been implemented.
In addition to some 30 interviews, research was carried
out in archives that included the Jewish Labor Bund, YIVO,
the

American Jewish

Committee

archives

and

library,

the

President Jimmy Carter Library, the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance
Organization (WAGRO), the Jewish Community Relations Council
(JCRC) , and

the

New

York

City

Municipal

Archives.

An

unpublished and richly detailed review of the first effort to
erect a major Holocaust memorial in New York City (initiated
in

1946-1947)

was

discovered

incorporated into this study.

in

the

YIVO

archives

and

Likewise, original documents

pinpointing the genesis of the Federal project in 1977, also
unpublished,

were

found

in the

Atlanta and used in the study.

Jimmy

Carter

Library

in

The Bund archive provided

unpublished source material on one of the memorials planned
for Riverside Park,

and the WAGRO archives provided many
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important bits and pieces of original source material on the
46 year history of failed efforts.

Unfortunately, the old

files of the JCRC were warehoused and inaccessible, and there
were no data there on early history of the current project.
This, however, was found in the Municipal Archives.

Besides

developing the Mutagon concept and building on interest group
and related literature in political science, this study thus
for the first time pulled together from various people and
archives the entire history of attempts to create a major
Holocaust memorial in New York City.

It was necessary to put

this history on the record in order to understand exactly how
the current project emerged and began taking shape.

As for

information on the current project as it progressed, files,
documents and other information were made available by the
New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, BPCA, and the office
of Senator Ohrenstein.
This

study

is

an

effort

to

move

toward

a

broader

understanding of government-interest group alliances.

The

Mutagon contributes to the body of literature on interest
groups, citizen participation and political symbolism.

As

was demonstrated, this new concept is necessary to account
for changing political coalitions during the course of long
term projects that involve city and state governments and
interest groups.

It builds on earlier works on interest

groups and citizen participation, but provides a broader and
changing analytical framework.

One of the most important
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conclusions to be stressed about political alliances is that
for long-term projects, the shape of such alliances changes
over time.

The area of studies of long-term public-private

city-state projects is very limited, and other case studies
and empirical research should be carried out.
Regarding political symbolism, this study deals with how
an interest group's project is affected by the political
environment. The changes in the government's participation in
the

Mutagon

at various

stages,

and the

location

of the

project in New York City were analyzed as factors that affect
the way the museum project was conceptualized and evolved.
The plans for the museum's way of remembering history were
shown

to

be

influenced

by

both

the

changing

alliance and the locale of the project.

political

Most studies of

interest groups have focused on how the group influences the
political climate in which it is operating, rather than the
opposite.

More studies are needed on how interest groups are

affected by the political, social and cultural environment in
which they are functioning,

and this dissertation makes a

contribution in this area.
This study developed and used a Mutagon to analyze the
long-term and changing coalition of state, city and private
political forces responsible for the latest effort to build
a major Holocaust memorial museum in New York City.
though

the

industry

Holocaust

in the United

has

become

States,

a

multimillion

Even
dollar

with a national memorial
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museum rising on the Mall in Washington,
association
children

of Holocaust

of survivors,

centers,

national

D.C., a national

a national

gatherings

network

of

of survivors,

national academic conferences, courses in many universities,
public school curriculums in some states and cities, hundreds
of fiction and

non-fiction books,

movies, and television

programs, thereis still no major Holocaust memorial

in New

York City, the center of the organized Jewish community in
the United States.
The first attempt to create a Holocaust memorial in New
York City was remarkably early,
engraved stone remains

in 1946-1947.

Today an

in Riverside Park at 83rd Street.

Placed there in October 1947 and intended as a cornerstone,
it says:

"This

is the site for the American memorialto the

heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto battle April-May

194 3 and to the

6 million Jews of Europe martyred in the cause of human
liberty."

More than 45 years later this early effort and

many later ones still have not produced a major Holocaust
memorial in New York City.
After ten years of impasse,

the Mutagon has in 1992

another opportunity to finally break this impasse and create
a museum in Battery Park City.

BPCA and the governor, at

this stage the most powerful players in the Mutagon,

have

imposed a July 1992 deadline for implementation to begin.
The

Commission's

ability

to

raise

the

necessary

funding by this deadline will be the key factor.

private

Otherwise,

they will have to request an extension of the deadline from
their partners in the Mutagon, BPCA and the Governor.

At

this stage, the prospects for sufficient private funding by
the deadline are doubtful, and the State's reaction cannot be
predicted.

Although the Mutagon's complicated and long-term

characteristics led to an impasse, it might still be possible
to

successfully

implement

concomitant problems.

this

project— despite

the
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